Sub-atomic Stir-Fry and the Indivisibility of Spinoza's God

Warning: This is some wacky stuff.

Spinoza's Spin on Modes

Primer

     The chair I'm sitting on is a mode of God, the one and only substance.  Yup it is.  So I guess in a way I'm sitting on God.  "King of the castle! King of the castle!".  But wait, I'm also a mode of God, so I guess in a way God is sitting on himself.  That sounds strange.  Before we gaily launch ourselves into Spinoza's theory of modes lets do a quick review of terminology...

Substance:  The most fundamental level of existence/being.  All things are made from substance.  For Descartes everything was made of 1 or 2 distinct substances (Mind and Body) while Spinoza argued that everything is made of just one substance (God/Nature).

Attribute:  The fundamental property of a substance.  For Descartes thoughts are the principle attributes of Mind and extension is the principle attribute of Body.  For Spinoza thought and extension are both conceptually distinct attributes of one substance (God/Nature).  For both Spinoza and Descartes a substance can be known through its principle attribute(s); that is by reflecting on an attribute we can know to which substance it pertains.

Mode (Descartes):  For Descartes modes are properties that depend for their existence on primary attributes.  For example, a chair's weight, shape, and texture all depend on the chair being extended; and imagining a chair depends on the attribute of thought.  Another way to phrase it is that "a mode presupposes a particular attribute".

     Just like files are in a computer, modes are in a substance; this means that modes don't exist apart from substance, rather they are states of a substance.  Don't make the mistake Hansel makes in the early 2000's comedy classic "Zoolander" and think that by opening up the computer he can find the files in the computer; that is by pulling apart a substance you will find its modes...no, just as the files are states of electromagnetic configurations of the computer's insides; modes are just different ways a substance can be arranged/presented to us.  This is called the inherence relation; modes inhere in substances.  Inherence relations are dependence relations; modes depend for their existence on the substance being in a certain state.

     Modes also have a conceptual relation to substance.  The idea is that it is impossible to conceive of a mode without also conceiving of the substance in which it inheres.  For example, you can't conceive of a rectangular black (modes) computer without also conceiving of a body (substance); you just can't.  If you manage to do this, let me know and I will write a letter about it, and bring it to Descartes.  To summarize conceptual relations we can say that modes (eg. shape, texture, weight) are incomprehensible without presupposing the concept of a substance (body).

Spinoza's Account of Modes

     Every particular thing that exists is either a mode or a substance thus all finite things (minds and bodies) are modes of the one and only substance...God/Nature.  Since you are not God, you are a mode of the substance that is God (I'm going to go out on limb and assume that if there is a god he doesn't read my blog).  Though out the entry do not confuse Spinoza's notion of mode (any particular body or mind as a state of God/Nature) with Descartes' (properties of attributes).  How does it feel to be a mode?  Does it feel any different from being a finite substance as Descartes argues?  All feelings aside, lets see who has the more compelling argument...

Intuitive Unease With Monadic Monism (Say that 5 times fast...)

     It seems a little odd to say that particular things aren't independent entities but different states of one thing.  So, the table my computer is on isn't an independent substance with independent existence,  rather it is a state of God/Nature.  Things get even more loco when we interpret 'modes' in the Cartesian sense, that is, as properties.  Within the tradition (say in a BBC voice) properties can be regarded as universals or particulars.  The properties-as-universals view says the roundness of a wheel is an instance of a universal roundness.  All round objects partake in this one magical universal roundness.  Anyone who took a Phil 101 course will recognize this view from Plato's theory of perfect forms.  The properties-as-particulars view says, no, the roundness of the wheel is particular to only that wheel, all you other wheels out there, get your own damn roundness!

      It seems that no matter how we interpret Spinoza's view on modes, be it as universals or particulars, it arouses (heh heh...he said arouse) in us a sense of intuitive unease.  Suppose we interpret Spinoza as subscribing to the universal meaning of modes; then regarding a giraffe, for example, we are in a position of saying that God/Nature contains within it the universal property of "giraffeness" and our particular giraffe is simply an instance of God/Nature's "giraffeness".  On the other view, properties as particulars, we say this giraffe is a particular state of God/Nature; a giraffe is God/Nature is a particular state that we will call a "giraffe state"--but this giraffe state is not something inherent in God/Nature; it is the property we ascribe to God/Nature when it is in a giraffe configuration.  So, in the universal view, the property inheres in God/Nature and in the particular view things are properties that are brought about through different configurations God substance.  

     Because interpreting Spinoza's modes as Cartesian modes (properties) just seems wack, other less wack interpretations are sometimes used.  But despite wackiness it is still possible to make sense of the idea that particular things (minds and bodies) are properties/features of God.  The argument goes something like dis:

1.  Spinoza sees individual bodies (extended modes) as states of a substance.

2.  He also sees individual thoughts (modes of thought) as states of a substance.

3.  Spinoza's naturalism requires we interpret modes as states.

Individual Bodies as States of Substance

         You own a subatomic Chinese restaurant and need to make a stir-fry for some quarks.  You start chopping up a carrot into 1000 pieces, then chopped each piece into a 1000 more pieces, and for good measure, you repeat the process one more time.  You take one of the those pieces, and being the Zen master you are, ask yourself, if the carrot still exists. 

     In traditional theology God wasn't conceived as being extended for the reason that if he were, he could be divided infinitely out of existence, and then sweet baby Jesus would have no one to take care of him in heaven.  But Spinoza was no traditional theologian; he made the bold move of ascribing extension to God but did so in a way that defended God from being able to be chopped and divided into oblivion.  The way he did this way to say that individual bodies are not God being individuated, rather these are just God is affected--i.e., comes to exist in certain states.

     He uses the following example to explain his position:

Matter is everywhere the same and...parts are distinguished in it only so far as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are only distinguished modally, but not really.  For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another--in so far as it is water, but not in so far as it is corporeal substance.  For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided.  Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but in so far as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.

So what does he mean?  Essentially he is drawing a distinction between water as "water" (the liquid, with chemical properties x, y, z) and water as a corporeal substance.  We can divide the water into its constituent molecules and send each one into a different corner (fact: the universe has corners) of the universe and we can say the water is divided but we cannot say that the water ceases to be corporeal; or in modern parlance--matter. 

    So, how does this support the interpretation that individual modes inhere in God, rather than the interpretation that modes are simply caused by God (by waving his magic wand)?  Actually, before we look at that, consider what's at issue.  If we say that God causes bodies to exist then we have something closer to a traditional notion of God, that God creates everything and God is separate from his creation(s).  Recall Spinoza's conception of God is that God simply is everything that exists; there is no separation between "God" and "Nature", they are one and the same.

     With that in mind, lets see what happens if we interpret this water example in the "God causes existence" view.  First of all we notice that the example Spinoza uses is of a finite mode--a certain quantity of water--to demonstrate divisibility.  Keep in mind the purpose of this example is to show that attributing extension to God doesn't leave him vulnerable to the divisibility problem.  If, as this first interpretation suggests, God causes/creates modes/individual bodies (as opposed to modes being states of God) then the divisibility of water shouldn't be a threat to God anyway, because God isn't the water, he just created the water.  The fact that Spinoza uses a finite body (water) to show that divisibility isn't a problem for a God who is extended is evidence that Spinoza thinks individual bodies are modes of God, and individual bodies aren't simply created by God.  Again, Spinoza wants to show that an extended God isn't susceptible to the divisibility problem; to show this he argues that even though a finite body can be infinitely, it never ceases to be a corporeal substance--that is, its existence is unaffected even as part of a sub-atomic stir-fry.

Individual Thoughts as Modes of Substance

     Here's an interesting thought:  your mind is nothing more than your idea of your body.  It is a complex idea that contains various other ideas about particular states of your body and parts of your body.  I'm not sure I really understand what he means, but that's what he says...Also my mind is a collection of ideas in God's mind.  I think this means that, since God has infinite thought and my mind is finite, my mind is some of God's ideas; my mind can't have all of them (Spinoza's wrong!) because I am not perfect or finite.  Some of the ideas I partake in are God's ideas of my body.  Lets see if I can make that clearer.  God's got all the ideas in his mind.  Humans get (to share/have access to) some of them, and that is what a mind is--the sliver of God's ideas/thoughts that comprise your mind.  Some? All? of those ideas are ideas about states of your body and parts of your body.  Something like that...

     So, again, how do we relate this all back to the idea that we are all modes of God?  I think it goes a li'l something like this: Because God has all the ideas (ever!) in his mind, individual ideas must be states of his mind, so, our minds, in turn, (i.e., the collection of ideas that comprise them) are simply states of God's mind.  Yay! I'm Jesus!  All the ideas we have exist in God--they are features of God--so when they are expressed (in a particular mind) they must be expressed as modes of God--not separate independent entities that God has created. 

Modes and Spinoza's Naturalism

     Ok, if you've made it this far either you are a rabid Spinoza fan or you enjoy seeing me stumble through explanations of things I have difficulty understanding myself.  Let briefly return to something we talked about in the very beginning: relations of inherence dependence and relations of conceptual dependence.  Recall an inherence relation is the notion that something's existence depends on it inhering in something more fundamental.  For Spinoza particular bodies and individual minds are the products of inherence relations to God as substance; they are particular expressions of properties that inhere in God.  That God is infinitely extended allows him to express that extension in particular bodies; that God has infinite (non-contradicting) thoughts allows finite collections of those thoughts to be expressed as minds.  The finite expressions of the infinite qualities that inhere in God are modes, be they bodies or minds.  So, we can say that there is an inherence relation between God and modes because all qualities inhere in God.
     Also there is a way in which God causes modes to come about through the natural laws.  Modes (individual minds and bodies) are caused to come into existence as the result of never-ending causal chains that follow the laws of nature.  There is no "act of creation" outside of the products of causal chains that follow laws of nature.  In this sense there is a causal relation between God and modes.

     Both causal and inherence relations are types of conceptual relations. Consider causal relations: if something is the effect of something else, we can know something about it by knowing its cause.  This applies to modes and God because in order for use to know the qualities of a particular mode (the effect of God) we need to know something about its cause (God); we can say the concept of a mode can be known through its cause, for this reason we say causal relations are a species of conceptual relation.  

     A similar parallel can be observed between inherence relations and conceptual relations.  If we want to know the properties of some particular thing we would want to know the properties of the more general thing in which it inheres.  For example if we want to know the properties of a wooden table we would do well to know the properties of wood.  The same applies in Spinoza's model: if we want to know the properties of a particular mode we need to know about the substance in which the particular thing inheres, i.e., God.  Notice that if we want to better understand the concept of an particular mode (a table/a mind) we can better understand it if we refer to the concept of the thing in which its properties inhere.  For this reason inherence, like causation, is also a species of conceptual relation.

     Now for Spinoza, any time we want to make a distinction between two things we have to apply the principle of sufficient reason (PSR); that is, we have to provide a sufficient reason for which we should consider the 2 things distinct.  Spinoza doesn't see any sufficient reason for which we should distinguish between causal and inherence relations; after all they are both conceptual dependence relations--one thing (a mode) depends on the concept of something (causally/ontologically) prior  to it.  Basically, if there is no real difference in explaining something through causal relations rather than inherence relations then the 2 notions should be collapsed into on: a conceptual relation.  Restated, unless we can come up with an situation where an inherence relation explains something that a causal relation doesn't or vice verse we should consider them one and the same.

     So, why should we care about collapsing these two terms?  Because Spinoza's naturalism doesn't allow for different rules to apply to different things.  That is what naturalism is: there is one fundamental set of laws for everything including God, including humans.  Hand-waving appeals to special connections or properties is illegal.  To repeat: there is only one set of fundamental rules and they apply to everything.  So, if we adopt the typical theological views we see that there are different rules to explain how God exists and functions than there are for how finite individuals exist and function.  God can break physical laws that humans, for example can't.  

     More specifically Spinoza was concerned with the inconsistencies of the Cartesian view which required 2 kinds of dependence relations.  Recall for Descartes' 2 substance system of Mind and Body, these 2 substances do not inhere in God but still depend on him for their existence--that's one type of dependence relation--one without inherence but still of causation.  Then there are the attributes and modes of Mind and Body (substances) that do inherence relations.  Recall that, for example, the properties of an  body--e.g., a chair--inhere in its attributes; that is, the properties of hardness and weight depend on hardness and weight inhering in extension, which in turn inheres the substance of body.  So in the Cartesian system we have 2 types of conceptual dependence relations--one that includes inherence and one that doesn't.  With naturalism, you have to have the same rules for everything, so Spinoza rejects Cartesian dualism, mostly because it smacks of Dualism... depend for their existence on

     How do we apply this to the argument that Spinoza's modes should be seen a inhering in God?  Well, if God just caused modes (particular mind or bodies) to exist without their properties inhering in him then we'd have two different kinds of conceptual relations; that is, an inconsistent set of rules.  Why? Because if modes don't inhere in God then we have a non-inherence conceptual relation between God and modes but and inherence conceptual relation between modes and their properties.  Lets use the table as an example, I can  know of its properties by knowing it is extended.  The properties of hardness, shape, and weight all inhere in extension; I can conceive of them through the concept of extension because of the inherence relation; that is, I can know about the properties of the table because I know it is extended.  So as we can see we have one type of conceptual relation--between God/subtance and modes--that doesn't involve inherence and we have another type of conceptual relation--between modes and their properties--that does involve inherence.  Having 2 sets of rules without sufficient reason is barred by Spinoza's naturalism, thus, in interpreting Spinoza's notion of modes we must interpret him as saying that modes inhere in God, not that God creates modes.

If you read this whole thing, you are Jesus.  That took me over 3 hours.  I'm gonna proof read this tomorrow, sorry if it's full of mistakes...
     




  

Dueling with Dualism Part 3: The Leibniz Challenge and The Nature of God

Due to overwhelming reader demand here is part 3 of "Dueling with Dualism"...

Quick Review

     I know most of you have memorized most of Spinoza's philosophy but for the few of you who haven't and would like to be brought up to speed, here's what we've covered so far:  The grand argument that Spinoza is making is for Monism--the idea that there exists only one substance.  The argument proceeds in 4 intermediary steps...

1.  No two substances can share an attribute.

2.  It pertains to the nature of substance to exist, i.e., substance necessarily exists.

3.  God--defined as a substance that contains all attributes--exists.

/C.  Since (1) no two substances can share an attribute, God is the only substance that exists.

    In the previous post we looked at arguments for (1).  To prove (1) Spinoza demonstrated that if we supposed the opposite of his position, that is we supposed that two distinct substances 'A' and 'B' did somehow share an attribute 'X' we would have nothing through which we could appeal to pick the one out from the other.  The attempt would sound like this, "which one is 'A'?" Answer: "the one with attribute 'X'.  Since the attribute 'X' is common to both substances this information is of no help in confirming identity.

     The next attempt was to try to distinguish substances that share an attribute through modes.  For this we supposed two extended substances 'A' with mode 'm' and substance  'B' with mode 'n'.  The problem with this method of differentiation is that modes depend causally and conceptually on attributes for their existence; so mode 'm' only exists because it inheres in the attribute of extension and the same goes for mode 'n'.  Identifying a distinction between two things via the modes only tells us that the modes are different, it can't tell us that they are different substances.  So we know that the mode of substance A and the mode of substance B both inhere in the attribute of extension.  And since substances are known through their attributes, given the same attributes, the substances A and B must be the same.  By appealing to modes we end up back in the attribute problem.

Leibniz's Challenge

     Leibniz says ok, so we can't distinguish two substances that share a single attribute via appeal to the attribute or to the modes; but suppose instead there are 2 substances 'A' and 'B' that share one attribute in common but possess more than one attribute each.  Substance A possesses attributes 'x' and 'y' and substance B possesses attributes 'y' and 'z'.  Even though they both share attribute 'y' why couldn't we appeal to attributes 'x' and 'z' to distinguish them from each other? 

     To see how Spinoza can answer this challenge we need to review his definition of the relationship between a substance and its attribute(s); for Spinoza it is a matter of definition that a substance can be picked out and its essence (its nature) known simply by reference to its attribute.  For example, in Cartesian model, in the case of the substance 'Body' I can identify it as such solely by appealing to the fact that it is extended.  I don't need to appeal to any other concepts except the attribute which it possesses.  Similarly if something is the substance 'Mind' then if I am aware of its attribute of thought I can identify the substance as being 'Mind'. 

     It's very important that I don't need to appeal to anything outside of a substances attribute to identify what kind of substance it is.  Another way to view this principle is that identity of substances is possible through appeal to self-contained concepts.  E.g., The concept of "extension" is part of the concept of Body.  I don't need to appeal to any concepts beyond those included in 'Body' to identify it as such. 

     OK, so now that we are armed with relevant information, lets return to Leibniz's challenge of two substances 1 cup...Oops, I mean two substances, multiple attributes--with one of them shared.  So, how are we going to distinguish between substance A (with attributes 'y' and 'z') and substance B (with attributes 'x' and 'z')?  Obviously we can't appeal to substance 'z' because that's the one they hold in common and it wouldn't help us pick out either A or B.  This leaves appeal to 'y' and 'x' but there's a problem; according to our definition of attribute, every substance can be known through each of its attributes.  According to our definition I should have been able to know the nature of substance A and B through any of their attributes; but this clearly doesn't apply if I appeal to attribute 'z' because both share 'z' and knowing that A has 'z' and B has 'z' doesn't help me distinguish them as distinct substances.       

    So, to summarize the response to Leibniz's challenge that two substances could share an attribute if  each substance had multiple attributes, Spinoza can reply that the scenario that Leibniz presents violates the definition of attribute; namely that every attribute a substance possesses must in itself must conceptually imply the nature/essence of that substance.  Another way to put it would be that I should be able to appeal to any of a substance's attributes and, without appeal to anything else, know what type of substance it is; just as we can with extension and body, and thought and mind.

Multiple Attributes...Say Wuuut?

    That's right ninjas, contrary to the Cartesian idea that each substance has only one attribute Spinoza contends that a substance can have multiple attributes; and if that doesn't boggle the mind, he says a substance can have infinitely many!  I'd explain it to you right now but according to the book whose format I'm following we have to first further discuss Spinoza's substance monism.

Step 2: The Necessary Existence of Substance

     "It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist".  Here we are entering the realm of ontological arguments (more or less "arguments for why something exists").  I'm not a big fan of ontological arguments because they always seem to be defining things into existence; on the other hand how else can you explain the existence of fundamental things.  You could say that the same thing happens in theoretical physics in regards to fundamental forces and particles; take energy for example, that it cannot be created or destroyed is one of its defined properties.  In a cosmological context we might also say that energy has always existed (it's a difficult statement to disprove empirically); it is in the nature of energy to exist; and the same goes for the fundamental particles of matter.  So, I think I we view Spinoza's ontological arguments in this context they don't seem so anachronistic and irrelevant. 

      Getting back to Spinoza's view of the nature of substance vis a vis existence, it is a matter of logical necessity that existence is part of the intrinsic nature of substance.   To understand why he makes this claim lets consider nature of finite things first.  In regards to finite things, such as your computer, you, the chair you're sitting on, your fridge, the tree outside, the other tree beside it, the grass in your lawn, the blade of grass on the property line between your property and your neighbour's property, the blade of grass beside that...I could go on...there is nothing about the nature of finite things that makes their existence logically necessary.  If you didn't exist, or if your computer didn't exist, or if the tree didn't exist..and so on, there'd be no logical contradiction.  We'd still live in an intelligible world.

     Beyond logical necessity there is also the fact that finite things are the products of their causes--and that could be unknowably many causes.  Take a table for example, for it to exist a carpenter had to make it (a cause), and he had to get the wood from a tree (a cause) and something had to make the tree grow (causes) and the parents of the carpenter had to copulate for him to exist (causes) and so on.  

     This idea of chains of causation don't apply to substances.  Substances are self-caused.  So long as the concept of a substance is coherent it is in its nature to exist; and if its nature is to exist, then it does exist.  Alright, before you have a wack attack like I did when I first heard this let me 'splain what my professor said about this.  At first this idea of something existing simply because it is coherent and its essence seems like the kind of stuff that give philosophy a bad name.  But if we approach Spinoza's idea within the framework of his naturalism a different picture emerges.  In this context he is simply searching for fundamental entities and principles upon which our universe is built.  He's doing theoretical physics.  He's asking what sorts of entities must necessarily exist in order for our known world to be intelligible and what physical laws need to exist.  View in this context we can see Spinoza as a proto-Naturalist theoretical physicist.  This is usually how he is interpreted.  The talk of "substance" and "god" are all just artifacts of the time in which he wrote.

     So, to summarize his position on substance: (a) it is self-caused; (b) it is conceptually and causally independent from other substances; (c)  if it is conceivable and it is coherent--i.e., doesn't lead to logical contradictions--it exists.  For the most part (a) is self-explanatory and it logically follows from it that no substance can be caused by anything else.  Regarding (b) for Spinoza causal and conceptual relations are equivalent; for example a finite thing such as yourself is both causally and conceptually dependent on the same things for your existence, thus we can equate the two concepts.  Applied to substances, no substance can be causally or conceptually related to any other substance (because they are by definition causally and conceptually independent).   So, given that a substance cannot be causally or conceptually related to any other substances and all things inhere in substances, it must follow that substances are self-caused and self-conceived (which in the end is the same thing).  Besides this argument that naturally follows from his premises Spinoza also applies, in tandem, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR): because a substance cannot be produced by anything else, it must be produced by itself, i.e., it is self-caused.

     A possible objection to self-causation is that since causes must exist prior to their effects then for a thing to cause itself it must exist prior to itself, which doesn't make any sense.  Spinoza gets out of this because of his "wide" notion of causation.  Essentially he holds there is an equivalence between causation and explanation; to give an explanation of something is to talk about its causes and vice versa.  On this wider notion of causation, saying something is self-caused is the same as saying it is self-explanatory.  Like I said before, if we give Spinoza in a modern naturalist interpretation, this idea doesn't seem so outrageous; as I mentioned before, we see the same ideas being applied in modern theoretical physics.  And now that we have proven premise (2), that substances necessarily exist, we can move to (3).

Step (3) and (4): God Is The Substance That Contains All The Attributes And God Is The Only Substance In The Woooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooorld!!!!!!

     As with most Spinozan arguments we begin with a definition: 

By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

So what's it all mean?  Well, we know that God is a substance.  We know he has infinitely many attributes.  From premise/fact (2)--that all substances necessarily exist it--follows that God necessarily exists.  And from the premise/fact (1)--no two substances can share attributes--and (3) God's got all of 'em, (4) there can be no other substances but God, hence substance Monism.  Q.E.D.

     There is one important caveat that arises out of Spinoza's rationalism, which is that the notion of God has to be logically coherent and all of its features must be intelligible.  These demands were a significant break from tradition, not so much it what they required but the degree to which Spinoza insisted that the PSR be applied to God.  Spinoza's God can't do or be logically unintelligible; he can't escape the fundamental laws of nature because God just is the fundamental laws and substance of nature.  There is no separate being that shows favoritism or has some master plan for humanity.  There is just the lawful order of the cosmos...the God/Nature.  Obviously this doctrine would not have been viewed favourably in a time (sadly, even now) when orthodoxy was that the notion of God wasn't subject to intelligibility.

     So, apart from a fairly standard ontological argument for God Spinoza did make one unique contribution via the PSR.  He said that given his definition of God there is no good reason by which we could explain the fact that God doesn't exist.  Again, if we interpret Spinoza as a modern naturalist this is in a way equivalent to trying to explain why the cosmos is the way it is and and trying to come up with reasons for why it could have been otherwise.  I think, formulated this way, these are legitimate ways to say, "well the world just wouldn't make any sense if we didn't postulate (a Spinozan) God".  

     At first I wasn't too keen on this application of the PSR to invoke the existence of God; it just seemed too much like a really bad layman's argument from ignorance for the existence of God.  But like I said, given the naturalist interpretation of Spinoza's God and substance, I can live with it.  But if Spinoza tries to attach supernatural powers to his "God"(but he di'in't), I'm outta here!

Everything is One! Dueling with Dualism Part 2

     Welcome back all you crazy Spinoza fans!  In the introduction entry I made on Spinoza I laid out the definitions of the key terms--substance, primary attribute, and mode--I will be using to discuss Spinoza's arguments.  Before I go any further, I'm just going to be really honest and say that sometimes with metaphysics I have no idea what the crap is going on or even why I should care, but mostly the latter--especially in the case of 17th Century metaphysics.  Now, if that doesn't motivate you to read the rest of this entry, I don't know what will!

Argument For Substance Monism

     Recall that for Descartes all of reality is either the substance "Body" or the substance "Mind".  Spinoza, using the same rational principles by which Descartes reached his conclusion reaches a different conclusion: that everything that exists is really just a manifestation of one substance; all particular bodies and minds are just modes of this one substance.  In other words, everything that exists (particulars) are just instantiations of this one maaaaaagical substance.  According to my secondary source book, Spinoza's argument is comprised of four sub-arguments (the references in parentheses refer to Spinoza's text):

1.  No two substances can share an attribute (1p5).

2.  It pertains to the nature of substance to exist (1p7).

3.  God--which Spinoza previously defined as the substance with all the attributes--exist.  This follows from (1p7).

C.  Since God exists, and by (1p5) no two substances can share an attribute, no other substance besides God can exist.

     Before we happily launch ourselves into the individual arguments I just want to point out what Spinoza meant by "God".  Spinoza's God: Spinoza didn't mean some capricious anthropomorphic God of the Bible who isn't subject to the same laws that apply to all particular things; by "God" Spinoza meant "Nature".  There is some debate about exactly what he meant but for our purposes we can merrily go about substituting the word "Nature" every time Spinoza uses "God".  

     The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): This rejection of God as free from the constraints of the laws of the universe was all part of his idea that "everything has to play by the same rules"; that is to say, if we want to hypothesize an entity or class of things that is subject to a different set of rules from everything else, there has to be a rational argument to give a reason for which this should be true.  If a sufficient reason cannot be provided, then we have no reason to assume that there is any difference between the two classes of things being discussed.  The PSR is central to Spinoza's method so keep an eye out for it!  Once again, the PSR in plain language is: If'n you can't provide a good reason for a distinction then we should not apply the distinction.

     

Step 1: We Can Have Lots of Fun!

     The first step of the argument is to demonstrate that "in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature of attribute"; in other words two or more substances can't share an attribute.  Given Spinoza's rationalist method, to prove his claim he gives a rational argument for how two substances could be individuated (if it's possible).  In logical terms, Spinoza uses a reductio argument: that is; he begins with trying to prove the opposite of his desired conclusion and shows that it leads to a logical contradiction; since the opposite hypothesis leads to a contradiction, its opposite (Spinoza's) must be true. Lets take a look-see: 

     Spinoza gets out his ax and axes, what would it take to prove that two substances are indeed different substances?  I.e. What is required to explain a substances identity and non-identity? Obviously, the only way to distinguish between substance A and substance B is through some difference in their properties.  We know that substances in the Cartesian Dualist model have both primary attributes and modes that allow us to identify the type of substance they are.  E.g., If a substance has extension (attribute) or texture and smell (modes) we can infer that the substance is Body.  So if we were to distinguish between two substances (in the metaphysical sense) we would have to refer to either the attributes or modes of the substances.

Vs Attributes 

     Lets try distinguishing 2 substances via attributes.  Recall that the end goal for Spinoza is to show that 2 substances cannot share the same attribute.  But suppose that two substances did share the same attribute; if this is the case and we are relying on attributes to distinguish the two substances Spinoza's argument will fail.  E.g., substance A has the attribute X and so does substance B.  To identify substance A I say "it's the one with attribute X" but to identify substance B I also say "it's the one with attribute X".  How can they be the same but different?  (In Thai: same, same but different) This is a contradiction.  So via reductio, where 2 things share the same attribute we shouldn't say that the two things are of different substance rather they are of the same substance.  Of course this still leaves open the possibility that 2 substances have different attributes to which we will return; nevertheless it seems quite clear that Spinoza is correct in that two substances cannot share an attribute and still be identified as distinct substances.

Vs Modes

     Well, maybe appealing to attributes doesn't work to show that two substances can share attributes...what about appealing to modes?  Certainly modes vary from thing to thing maybe they can help...Spinoza's argument against using modes to distinguish between 2 substances that share an attribute hinges on the notion of ontological priority.  (Ontological refers to "being".)  As I'm sure you recall from the previous Spinoza entry last month both Spinoza and Descartes propose that some things are conceptually and causally prior to others.  Relevant to our discussion is that substance is conceptually prior to attributes--i.e., the concept of extension presupposes the concept of substance; and primary attributes are conceptually prior to modes--i.e., you can't have modes of texture, smell, colour without having the prior concept of extension.

     Now that we have the notion of conceptual priority clear as mud we can apply it to Spinoza's attempt to prove that two substances cannot share an attribute, through appeal to modes.  Suppose substance C and substance D both share the primary attribute of extension.  We know that we can't appeal to extension to individuate the two as separate substances...we tried that a few paragraphs back to no avail; lets instead try pointing to the differences in C and D's modes.  Are you pointing?  Point harder!  Remember that the principle of priority implies that all modes are explainable via the primary attribute through which they arise.  We can ask, in virtue of what does C's colour, shape, and texture arise?  From it's primary attribute--extension.  And in the case of D, which also shares extension, we can ax the same, "where do D's modes come from?" Why from its extension of course...C has its modes because it has extension and D has its modes because its extended.  

     Doh! Now we are back to referring to both C and D via their primary attribute (extension); and as we saw a few paragraphs up, there is no way for us to assert that two substances are distinct if they have the same primary attribute.  So, again since assuming two different substances that share the same attribute leads to a logical contradiction, we must assume the opposite to be true; that when 2 things share an primary attribute, they are the same substance.  In rationalist language: there is no sufficient reason for which we should assume two things sharing the same attribute are two different substances.

Leibniz' Objection

     So, if you understood any of that (it took me reading my book at least 3 times very very very sloooooooowly) the possible objection should be obvious.  Like I said, only if you understand what's going on.  If you do, then you are either a philosophy genius or I am a genius teacher...I'll make that an inclusive or.  Ok, back to Leibniz' objection:  Spinoza says a substance can have more than one attribute; indeed God has "absolutely infinitely many" of which extension and thought are only two.  So why not suppose that there are 2 substances that share one attribute but not another.  Eg., substance E is a rock, it only has extension.  Substance F is a human, it has extension and thought.  Why can't we just say "we can identify substance E and F as being distinct because E is the one that doesn't have thought and F is the one that has thought."

    Because his works were published post-modem obviously he didn't address this objection directly but we can apply some of his principles and construct a good reply that Spinoza could have given.  The principle required for this reply are that each attribute should, by itself, be able to pick out the substance which is conceptually prior to it.  I'm going to let you ponder this cuz I needs me some sleep.  If anyone actually read this entry all the way to the end, you win one internet!

I'm gonna proof read this tomorrow, my brain is dead now...
  

Dueling with Dualism Part 1

Is The Fundamental Level of Reality Divided into Mind and Body?  Or Are Mind and Body Two Aspects of an Even More Fundamental Reality?

     The answer to this question is the key distinction between Descartes and Spinoza.  Lets unpack the two positions:  In the Dualist view (Descartes) anything that exists is either an extended substance (Body) or a thinking substance (Mind).  There is nothing more fundamental than these two types of substance; that is to say Mind and Body are not properties of some more fundamental substance.  All properties either inhere in the substances of Mind or Body.

Descartes' Position

     So how do we know there isn't a more fundamental level of existence?  The reason is that these two categories are conceptually distinct:  if something is a body then we can identify it as such without appeal to anything beyond the properties of Body, the same is true of Mind.  For example,  consider the table in front of you:  every single property you can attribute to the table (shape, extension, texture, weight, etc...) is a property of Body.  We do not (and indeed cannot) invoke any properties of Mind to identify the table as being a body.  In another case consider how you would identify your own mind:  any property that you would use to identify your mind as your own mind (thought, imagination, feelings, etc...) is a property of Mind and not of Body (body's don't think).  Because of this feature of "self-conception", substances are conceptually distinct from each other--they are conceptually walled off from each other.  To repeat:  to identify a substance as a substance I should not need to refer to properties other than those properties which pertain to that particular substance.

     So why does Descartes think that all existing things are made up of either Mind or Body?  Because these notions are conceptually distinct/walled off from each other.  But there is an important assumption here that Descartes makes: that a substance can have only one attribute (for Mind it is thought and for Body it is extension).  Lets ignore for a moment that humans--by Descartes own admission--seem to possess both and ask if this is a good assumption.  This is the angle from which Spinoza attacks Descartes.

Spinoza vs Descartes

      Spinoza is an uber-rationalist which means that for every fact in the world, there must be an explanation, otherwise we cannot claim to know if a fact is true.  This principle of Spinoza's rationalism is called "the Principle of Sufficient Reason" (PSR).  But the demand for explanations doesn't end there; Spinoza also applies the PSR to facts about non-existence.  For instance, if something doesn't exist, we need to provide a sufficient reason to explain why it can't exist.

     So lets get back to Descartes assertion that a substance can only have one attribute.  Spinoza rejects Descartes assumption because he hasn't given sufficient reason for which we should believe this.  Spinoza argues that we have no reason to suppose that a substance couldn't possess 2 or more attributes.  Just because thought and extension are conceptually distinct notions doesn't mean that a thing could not possess both.  Another way to look at is, just because two things are conceptually different doesn't necessarily imply that they constitute two different substances.

     This argument is partly how Spinoza advances his own position of Monism.  So, what's Monism?  In Spinoza's case it is the idea that Mind and Body are just two of many possible aspects of the one and only substance.  Since there is no sufficient reason to show that a substance can't have more than one attribute, Monism the logical conclusion.  

      Well, that's half the argument.  The other half concerns why Monism must be the case, because simply showing that something is a possibility isn't grounds for its truth.  But I will leave that argument for next time.  For now, I'll end with a few random comments on what Monism is for Spinoza:  

    The one substance in which all things inhere is God.  But this is not some mystical and/or anthropomorphized god who (magically) lives outside of time and space and is not subject to the laws of the natural world.  God, for Spinoza, is nature.  God is not some entity that partakes in Nature either.  The two are one and the same.  Nature is the substance of which all things are properties, or modes.   Nature has an absolute infinite number of attributes of which Mind and Body are but two.  Because Spinoza's views were basically philosophical naturalism, Spinoza didn't publish his work during his lifetime because he knew he'd probably end up dying the death for his views.  Instead he had his friends publish his works after his death.