Introduction
Can you write something about guns in the US of A without pissing off a large portion of your audience? Not likely. But let me try to propose a policy that has elements that both sides might endorse (excluding the most extreme ends of the spectrum).
A little auto-biography
As a Canadian born to pacifist parents, the American fascination with guns has always been mysterious to me. Most of the world probably shares this sentiment regarding Americans and their gun fetish. Why would you want to own something that can--with the simple tug of your finger-- kill another human being? Clearly there is something psychologically wrong with such a person.
Anyhow, after living in the US of A since 2007, I've come to see that it's not just crazy True Patriots that like guns, it's a lot of "normal" Americans too. In fact, many of the people I've become friends with (and with whom I share political values in every other domain) loved them some guns. This softened my "judgy-ness". Some people just like to shoot things for fun or go hunting. "Piew! Piew!" It's not for me but I no longer see much harm in it. The demographic my friends represent certainly don't own guns with the delusion that they'll someday get to be a vigilante super-hero.
Let's get to my policy suggestions...
Deez Nuts
The Liberal Media (controlled by Jews who, according to esteemed historian Ben Carson, didn't fight back) loves nothing more than to run stories involving True Patriots accidentally shooting themselves or their friends. While the specific numbers vary between studies, the trend is the same: for every time a gun is legitimately (and successfully) used in self-defense, proportionately more people are killed accidentally (between 100-400% more, depending on the study you look at and the inclusion criteria). If you include accidental non-fatal shootings, the numbers are much higher.
A significant portion of the anti gun-control lobby sincerely believes that if they were in a public-shooter-type situation they would be able to save the day or at least have a positive impact. This is pure fantasy. While I don't doubt that a combat marine or special forces operative could "take down" a shooter with minimal "collateral damage", it is only because they have years of combat training.
I don't care how good a shot you are in a shooting range (or on your Xbox). There is a massive difference between trying to shoot a stationary target vs a moving (suicidal) target that is trying to kill you. Without training you have no idea how you're going to respond. You may simply freeze up. You may panic and shoot everywhere. You will likely be trembling from either fear or adrenaline undermining your capacity to aim. In a crowded area, failure to have perfect aim may result in further deaths--the exact thing you're trying to prevent.
Trained professionals (military, police, various security agencies) go through thousands of hours of training to condition themselves to deal with high stress situations. I don't care how badass you are in your fantasies: if you aren't trained for using your weapon when someone is trying to kill you, you will not perform the way you think you will. You are either going to have no effect on the situation or you will end up shooting innocent people in your panic. Merely owning a gun does not a brave or competent person make.
Solution
The typical argument you hear from True Patriots is that if everyone is armed in a public place, suicidal shooters won't be able to do the damage they do. This is only possibly true if the people carrying weapons are trained to use them in high stakes situations. It is not true if they have never been in any situation remotely resembling a live fire fight.
So here's the proposal: Anyone who wants to carry a gun in a school or similar public place can do so provided they have the relevant training. This would include at minimum (a) a one time course that provides training equivalent to what a SWAT team, marine, or comparable operative receives for live fire-fight situations; (b) mandatory annual training refresher course.
Regarding (a) the big political issue will be who decides how much training is enough? Easy. Ask the marines or some other respected military/police institution to outline what they consider to be the minimal training required to send someone into a live fire fight. After all, these institutions know better than anyone else what's required. That is to say, we let the experts rather than politics decide. (Crazy. I know.)
Regarding (b) the answer is the same. Knowing how to react effectively in a live fire situation is a perishable skill and so there must be retraining if we want gun-carriers to be more likely to help then harm a situation. After all, that's the goal, right?
Bb..bbut...it's my right. First of all, rights are not unrestricted. They are commensurate with capacities to exercise them. Second, no one is saying you can't go to shooting ranges, keep a gun in your house, or go hunting. This is about carrying a gun in a crowded public place.
Although there may exist other arguments, the primary argument given for why fire arms should be permitted (or even encouraged) in public spaces is that True Patriots with guns will be able to diminish the casualty and fatality rates. This argument rests on a false assumption that mere possession of a gun is sufficient to, on average, accomplish this outcome. For the argument to have any chance at soundness a premise needs to be qualified. It isn't merely armed True Patriots that can reduce casualty and mortality rates in mass shootings but True Patriots with sufficient training. Otherwise, True Patriots will, on average, probably be a net liability or have no effect at all.
Loose Ends
1. Gun control is not the same thing as the government coming to take your guns. Why do we always hear this straw man?
2. As far back as the mid 90s, the NRA sponsored a law in congress (which was passed and repassed) that prevents the CDC from collecting and using any data on gun violence. The law reads that "[any data collected by the CDC] may not be used to advocate or promote gun control.” WTF? If unrestricted gun ownership and lax gun control laws (and enforcement) really weren't related to higher gun death rates, as the NRA claims, then why does the NRA lobby against collecting the data? What are they so afraid of? If they're right, why not use the data to show it? And more importantly how can we have good policy without good data? To me the reasons are fairly obvious but I'll let you draw your own conclusions.
3. Gun control vs gun rights arguments usually go like this:
(a) War of empirical evidence. Continued disagreement for a variety of reasons having to do with biased interpretations and different quality of evidence being given equal credence, methodological disputes.
(b) Normative: "Fine, I don't accept your studies and you don't accept mine. It doesn't matter anyway. Gun ownership is a right." So, here's the thing I've always wondered...and if you are anti gun control proponent maybe you can let me know in the comments what you think. Suppose the empirical data indicated fairly strongly that lax gun control laws (and enforcement) actually do lead to significantly higher rates of homicides and accidental deaths, ceterus parabus. Would you be willing to oppose gun control legislation despite the fact that more people will die and get injured? At how many preventable deaths per year might you change your mind? 100? 200? 1 000? Is there any number? Or is an unrestricted right to own a gun more important than any number of preventable deaths?
Showing posts with label debate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debate. Show all posts
Saturday, October 10, 2015
Monday, October 21, 2013
Overview of Freewill Vs Determinism
Introduction and Context
The debate over the degree to which we have control (if any at all) over our actions is one of the longest debated topics in philosophy and there isn't much reason to think it will end any time soon. The debate is known as the freewill-determinism debate.
Before proceeding lets quickly define some of the main positions (this in itself is a big issue in the debate):
1. Libertarian (not political Libertarianism) freewill: In all circumstances, we are able to act otherwise (unless it entails a logical contradiction). In other words, if I went to Roberto's and ordered the bean and cheese burrito with guacamole, I could have order something else. Or if I was starving and stole a loaf of bread, I could have acted otherwise. This is the strongest freewill position (not in terms of defensibility but in terms of the size of the scope of freewill).
2. Hard determinism: The universe is physical. The laws of physics tell us that every state is an effect of a prior state. Freewill implies the suspension of the laws of physics because it requires that (a) an agent do something that isn't the result of prior causes and (b) the physical chain of cause and effect be broken. (a) and (b) can't be true, therefore, all actions are determined.
Even if someone wants to counter with "but the universe has mental properties too!" the hard determinist can rely "ok, but surely mental behaviors are also governed by causal laws. You acted because you had a desire. Cause and effect. And what's more, you didn't choose to have that desire. Did you choose to like chocolate? Or ice cream? Or philosophy 101? No. You just do.
3. Freewill Skepticism is closely related to hard determinism except it adds a dilemma for the freewill supporter. At the quantum level of physics, events aren't determined but random. So, either events are causally determined (by the environment and the physical make-up of the agent) or they are random. If it is the former, they are not free. If it is the latter, they are not free because randomness isn't freewill either. Therefore, since all events are either determined or random, there is no freewill.
Positions 1-3 subscribe to incompatibilism which is the idea that freewill and causal determinism are incompatible. You can only have one or the other, but not both.
In contrast to incompatibilism there is also compatibilism, the idea that freewill and causal determinism are not mutually exclusive. The classical defense of this position redefines freedom as a decision being free from compulsion or coercion. So, suppose someone puts a gun to your head and says "write an essay about freewill and determinism," the classical compatibilist would say your decision to write the paper isn't free. So, now "free actions" applies to those actions where there was no coercion or compulsion even though they are causally determined.
The more modern compatibilist position is that there is a distinction between acting freely and having freedom of will. I might be suggested that freedom of will is a matter of acting on our desires. But Frankfurt replies that this isn't enough. Freedom of will requires that we have some control over what we desire and that those desires motivate us to action. This is as opposed to us being some entity that is pre-programmed with desires but has no say in what those desires are. Note that this position still agrees that causal determinism is true.
Why the Crap Does the Freewill Determinism Debate Matter?
The main reason people think it matters is because the notion of moral responsibility implies that people have some control over whether or not they do something. Do we hold our computers morally responsible for their actions? Except for that one time I had a paper due in 15 minutes and the printer decided at that moment not to work, the answer is usually no. Most of us think that justice, in part, requires that a punishment have some sort of proportional relationship to moral responsibility, but if my actions were all causally determined, it seems to follow that I'm not morally responsible for them.
Related to the question of proportionality, we also think people deserve praise, reward, or condemnation based on their actions. Again, if there is no freewill, it doesn't seem to make sense to praise them. But maybe we're causally determined to praise/punish them anyway! And maybe we are causally determined to puzzle over this problem...This can get very confusing very fast.
The debate over the degree to which we have control (if any at all) over our actions is one of the longest debated topics in philosophy and there isn't much reason to think it will end any time soon. The debate is known as the freewill-determinism debate.
Before proceeding lets quickly define some of the main positions (this in itself is a big issue in the debate):
1. Libertarian (not political Libertarianism) freewill: In all circumstances, we are able to act otherwise (unless it entails a logical contradiction). In other words, if I went to Roberto's and ordered the bean and cheese burrito with guacamole, I could have order something else. Or if I was starving and stole a loaf of bread, I could have acted otherwise. This is the strongest freewill position (not in terms of defensibility but in terms of the size of the scope of freewill).
2. Hard determinism: The universe is physical. The laws of physics tell us that every state is an effect of a prior state. Freewill implies the suspension of the laws of physics because it requires that (a) an agent do something that isn't the result of prior causes and (b) the physical chain of cause and effect be broken. (a) and (b) can't be true, therefore, all actions are determined.
Even if someone wants to counter with "but the universe has mental properties too!" the hard determinist can rely "ok, but surely mental behaviors are also governed by causal laws. You acted because you had a desire. Cause and effect. And what's more, you didn't choose to have that desire. Did you choose to like chocolate? Or ice cream? Or philosophy 101? No. You just do.
3. Freewill Skepticism is closely related to hard determinism except it adds a dilemma for the freewill supporter. At the quantum level of physics, events aren't determined but random. So, either events are causally determined (by the environment and the physical make-up of the agent) or they are random. If it is the former, they are not free. If it is the latter, they are not free because randomness isn't freewill either. Therefore, since all events are either determined or random, there is no freewill.
Positions 1-3 subscribe to incompatibilism which is the idea that freewill and causal determinism are incompatible. You can only have one or the other, but not both.
In contrast to incompatibilism there is also compatibilism, the idea that freewill and causal determinism are not mutually exclusive. The classical defense of this position redefines freedom as a decision being free from compulsion or coercion. So, suppose someone puts a gun to your head and says "write an essay about freewill and determinism," the classical compatibilist would say your decision to write the paper isn't free. So, now "free actions" applies to those actions where there was no coercion or compulsion even though they are causally determined.
The more modern compatibilist position is that there is a distinction between acting freely and having freedom of will. I might be suggested that freedom of will is a matter of acting on our desires. But Frankfurt replies that this isn't enough. Freedom of will requires that we have some control over what we desire and that those desires motivate us to action. This is as opposed to us being some entity that is pre-programmed with desires but has no say in what those desires are. Note that this position still agrees that causal determinism is true.
Why the Crap Does the Freewill Determinism Debate Matter?
The main reason people think it matters is because the notion of moral responsibility implies that people have some control over whether or not they do something. Do we hold our computers morally responsible for their actions? Except for that one time I had a paper due in 15 minutes and the printer decided at that moment not to work, the answer is usually no. Most of us think that justice, in part, requires that a punishment have some sort of proportional relationship to moral responsibility, but if my actions were all causally determined, it seems to follow that I'm not morally responsible for them.
Related to the question of proportionality, we also think people deserve praise, reward, or condemnation based on their actions. Again, if there is no freewill, it doesn't seem to make sense to praise them. But maybe we're causally determined to praise/punish them anyway! And maybe we are causally determined to puzzle over this problem...This can get very confusing very fast.
Friday, May 4, 2012
Realism vs. Anti-Realism 2: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism by Bas Van Fraassen
Notes and Thoughts on Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Summarizing quote: "The rigour of science requires that we distinguish well the undraped figure of nature itself from the gay-coloured (heh!heh!he said "gay") vesture with which we clothe it at our pleasure."
--Heinrich Hertz quoted by Ludwig Boltzmann, in turn quoted by Van Fraassen, in turn quoted by me.
Preamble
In the previous post, I introduced the realist-antirealist debate in philosophy of science. Again, although there are many species of each, we can loosely say that the debate is over whether unobservable theoretical entities, like subatomic particles, refer to something real or are purely theoretical and we should not think of them as corresponding to some real "thing".
Historically, logical positivism was the first contemporary position in philosophy of science (the only statements that have meaning are verifiable and refer to objects we can directly perceive). Scientific realism mainly grew out of criticism of this anti-realist position. In this article, van Fraassen agrees with realists that we ought to reject the positivist philosophy, but disagrees that this should entail realism. Instead, he proposes an anti-realism that he calls "constructive empiricism". The idea is that we can accept scientific theories but remain agnostic about their truth; we require only that they be "empirically adequate" (i.e., true about observables).
Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism
Scientific Realism: Vas ist das? An unsophisticated definition is that the picture of the world that science gives us is a true one, "faithful in its details, and the entities postulated in science really exist: the advances in science are discoveries, not inventions." There are a couple of caveats. Scientific realists aren't necessarily committed to the view that all current scientific theories are True or that the scientific enterprise is going to finish any time soon. But this is the gist of it. A philosophical theory about science must answer two questions: what is a scientific theory, and what does a scientific theory do. Realists say scientific theories are about what there really is, and science is an activity of discovery not invention.
Summarizing statement of scientific realism: "I understand scientific realism to be the view that the theoretical statements of science are, or purport to be, true generalized descriptions of reality." (Ellis)
The advantage of this statement is that it avoids any commitment to a particular current theory being true, only that they "purport" to be.
Another formulation: A realist (with respect to a given theory or discourse) holds that (1) the sentences of that theory are true of false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external--that is to say, it is not (in general) our sense date, actual or potential, or the structure of our minds, or our language, etc...(Dummett and Putnam)
Yet another formulation: That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer, that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories--these statements are viewed by the scientific realist. . . as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its relations to its objects. (Boyd)
Final formulation: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. (van Fraassen's summary of all the views)
8 Quick Arguments against Realism, How it Can't Explain the Success of Science, and NKTB
In these arguments I will primarily be referring to scientific theories about (directly) unobservable theoretical entities like atoms and subatomic particles.
Step 1. We can have lots of fun! Just because a theory's central terms (e.g. subatomic particles) refer to something doesn't entail that the reference will be successful. For example, if you see the shadow of a bunny rabbit on the wall you might infer there's a bunny. But the shadow might have been made by someone's fingers you can't see. So, your belief that "there's a bunny" doesn't refer to the entity to which you think it does.
Also, just because a theory is successful, doesn't mean that all or most of its central terms (entities) refer to something. For example, in early chemistry heat was thought to be some sort of invisible fluid "phlogiston". But it turns out that term doesn't refer to anything real. Same goes for "ether" that was postulated to explain how light travels. Given historical precedent, there's no reason to suppose our theories are any better off.
Step 2. I can 'splain it to you! The notion of "approximate truth" is too vague to permit us to judge whether a theory comprised of laws that are all approximately true would be empirically successful; that is, would it adequately describe the observed phenomena. It seems that a theory can be empirically successful even if it is not approximately true. Take for example Newtonian physics. It gets the predictions right (at low relative speeds) but its theoretical explanations of time and space are not approximately true.
Step 3. Read it with me! Related to the previous point is that realists don't have an explanation of how some past theories had theoretical terms that turned out not to refer to anything (eg. phlogiston, ether) yet were successful predictors of empirical phenomena. That is, the theory worked (for the known phenomena and testing methods) yet it was totally wrong. There was no phlogiston or ether. Who's to say the same won't happen with today's theories?
Step 4. Tell me some more! Realists who give a convergentist (science converges on the truth by building on previous theories) account of scientific progress can't give a good explanation of how this works. The realist model is that the new better theory preserves some of the laws that were in its predecessor because they were approximately true. But, obviously they weren't approximately true enough to get it right, otherwise why would the theory have been revised and replaced? So, what does "approximately true" mean if something that we say is approximately true has to be modified? Where's the line between a modification, a change, and a new law? "Approximate truth" is too vague to mean anything. How did the preceding theory's law refer to something approximately true about the world if it was getting it wrong?
Step 5. Bees in a hive! Realism presupposes its truth (Problem of circularity). Realism assumes that just because a referring theory or an approximately true theory are explanatorily successful that they are true. But this presupposes that explanatory success and truth are one and the same, but they aren't. History is full of examples of theories that were explanatorily successful, yet false.
Step 6. Reeeee mix! (wika wika). Just cuz a theory does a better explanatory job than its predecessor, this doesn't imply that the new theory can explain why the others succeeded or failed. For example, Einsteinian physics doesn't explain why Newtonian physics was approximately true. So, this idea of convergence on truth is weakened. In other words, if E physics can't explain why N physics got it approximately true, how can we say that N physics did get it approximately true or the E physics was built on N physics? It might have gotten its predictions right for all the wrong reasons. Nukin' pu nub fo all the wong weasons...
Step 7. I know a guy named Devon. He built his own convenience store. He calls it "Devon-eleven". Again, against the convergent view of science: If a new theory's predecessor has been falsified then it is not possible for the new theory to contain either all of the predecessor's content or all of its confirmed consequences or all of its theoretical mechanisms. The realist might reply that this is not a necessary condition on a new theory. But the anti-realist counter is that if the realist believes scientific theories aim at referring to real things and are approximately true then he has to admit that the previous theory didn't do this if some of the postulated entities or laws have to be rejected. And again, why assume that the new one gets it right?
Step 8. Isn't this great? Realists haven't given any argument for why anti-realists won't be able to explain the the success of science. The only "argument" the realists make against antirealists is that otherwise it would be a gosh-darned miracle that our theories--which have allowed so much prediction, explanation, and beneficial application--didn't refer to real things in the world. But that's not an argument, that's the fallacy of personal incredulity.
Conclusion
The conclusion is that realism has not shown how it explains scientific success beyond presupposing that explanation=truth. Throughout the history of science there have been many scientific laws that approximately explained all or most phenomena at the time, but were later shewn to be false. Realism cannot explain their success. On their model, those theories and the entities which they postulated were approximately true of the world. But as we've seen they weren't. Realism is the wrong model for interpreting what science does and what theoretical entities are (they are not approximate references to real things in the world).
On the other hand, we shouldn't go too far in the other direction. We shouldn't say that a theories predictive and explanatory power are meaningless. The difference might be between wanting to believe something is true and having good reasons for believing it. That sounds right. But I'm not clear on what other possible reasons beyond predictive and explanatory power there might be.
Summarizing quote: "The rigour of science requires that we distinguish well the undraped figure of nature itself from the gay-coloured (heh!heh!he said "gay") vesture with which we clothe it at our pleasure."
--Heinrich Hertz quoted by Ludwig Boltzmann, in turn quoted by Van Fraassen, in turn quoted by me.
Preamble
In the previous post, I introduced the realist-antirealist debate in philosophy of science. Again, although there are many species of each, we can loosely say that the debate is over whether unobservable theoretical entities, like subatomic particles, refer to something real or are purely theoretical and we should not think of them as corresponding to some real "thing".
Historically, logical positivism was the first contemporary position in philosophy of science (the only statements that have meaning are verifiable and refer to objects we can directly perceive). Scientific realism mainly grew out of criticism of this anti-realist position. In this article, van Fraassen agrees with realists that we ought to reject the positivist philosophy, but disagrees that this should entail realism. Instead, he proposes an anti-realism that he calls "constructive empiricism". The idea is that we can accept scientific theories but remain agnostic about their truth; we require only that they be "empirically adequate" (i.e., true about observables).
Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism
Scientific Realism: Vas ist das? An unsophisticated definition is that the picture of the world that science gives us is a true one, "faithful in its details, and the entities postulated in science really exist: the advances in science are discoveries, not inventions." There are a couple of caveats. Scientific realists aren't necessarily committed to the view that all current scientific theories are True or that the scientific enterprise is going to finish any time soon. But this is the gist of it. A philosophical theory about science must answer two questions: what is a scientific theory, and what does a scientific theory do. Realists say scientific theories are about what there really is, and science is an activity of discovery not invention.
Summarizing statement of scientific realism: "I understand scientific realism to be the view that the theoretical statements of science are, or purport to be, true generalized descriptions of reality." (Ellis)
The advantage of this statement is that it avoids any commitment to a particular current theory being true, only that they "purport" to be.
Another formulation: A realist (with respect to a given theory or discourse) holds that (1) the sentences of that theory are true of false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external--that is to say, it is not (in general) our sense date, actual or potential, or the structure of our minds, or our language, etc...(Dummett and Putnam)
Yet another formulation: That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer, that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories--these statements are viewed by the scientific realist. . . as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its relations to its objects. (Boyd)
Final formulation: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. (van Fraassen's summary of all the views)
8 Quick Arguments against Realism, How it Can't Explain the Success of Science, and NKTB
In these arguments I will primarily be referring to scientific theories about (directly) unobservable theoretical entities like atoms and subatomic particles.
Step 1. We can have lots of fun! Just because a theory's central terms (e.g. subatomic particles) refer to something doesn't entail that the reference will be successful. For example, if you see the shadow of a bunny rabbit on the wall you might infer there's a bunny. But the shadow might have been made by someone's fingers you can't see. So, your belief that "there's a bunny" doesn't refer to the entity to which you think it does.
Also, just because a theory is successful, doesn't mean that all or most of its central terms (entities) refer to something. For example, in early chemistry heat was thought to be some sort of invisible fluid "phlogiston". But it turns out that term doesn't refer to anything real. Same goes for "ether" that was postulated to explain how light travels. Given historical precedent, there's no reason to suppose our theories are any better off.
Step 2. I can 'splain it to you! The notion of "approximate truth" is too vague to permit us to judge whether a theory comprised of laws that are all approximately true would be empirically successful; that is, would it adequately describe the observed phenomena. It seems that a theory can be empirically successful even if it is not approximately true. Take for example Newtonian physics. It gets the predictions right (at low relative speeds) but its theoretical explanations of time and space are not approximately true.
Step 3. Read it with me! Related to the previous point is that realists don't have an explanation of how some past theories had theoretical terms that turned out not to refer to anything (eg. phlogiston, ether) yet were successful predictors of empirical phenomena. That is, the theory worked (for the known phenomena and testing methods) yet it was totally wrong. There was no phlogiston or ether. Who's to say the same won't happen with today's theories?
Step 4. Tell me some more! Realists who give a convergentist (science converges on the truth by building on previous theories) account of scientific progress can't give a good explanation of how this works. The realist model is that the new better theory preserves some of the laws that were in its predecessor because they were approximately true. But, obviously they weren't approximately true enough to get it right, otherwise why would the theory have been revised and replaced? So, what does "approximately true" mean if something that we say is approximately true has to be modified? Where's the line between a modification, a change, and a new law? "Approximate truth" is too vague to mean anything. How did the preceding theory's law refer to something approximately true about the world if it was getting it wrong?
Step 5. Bees in a hive! Realism presupposes its truth (Problem of circularity). Realism assumes that just because a referring theory or an approximately true theory are explanatorily successful that they are true. But this presupposes that explanatory success and truth are one and the same, but they aren't. History is full of examples of theories that were explanatorily successful, yet false.
Step 6. Reeeee mix! (wika wika). Just cuz a theory does a better explanatory job than its predecessor, this doesn't imply that the new theory can explain why the others succeeded or failed. For example, Einsteinian physics doesn't explain why Newtonian physics was approximately true. So, this idea of convergence on truth is weakened. In other words, if E physics can't explain why N physics got it approximately true, how can we say that N physics did get it approximately true or the E physics was built on N physics? It might have gotten its predictions right for all the wrong reasons. Nukin' pu nub fo all the wong weasons...
Step 7. I know a guy named Devon. He built his own convenience store. He calls it "Devon-eleven". Again, against the convergent view of science: If a new theory's predecessor has been falsified then it is not possible for the new theory to contain either all of the predecessor's content or all of its confirmed consequences or all of its theoretical mechanisms. The realist might reply that this is not a necessary condition on a new theory. But the anti-realist counter is that if the realist believes scientific theories aim at referring to real things and are approximately true then he has to admit that the previous theory didn't do this if some of the postulated entities or laws have to be rejected. And again, why assume that the new one gets it right?
Step 8. Isn't this great? Realists haven't given any argument for why anti-realists won't be able to explain the the success of science. The only "argument" the realists make against antirealists is that otherwise it would be a gosh-darned miracle that our theories--which have allowed so much prediction, explanation, and beneficial application--didn't refer to real things in the world. But that's not an argument, that's the fallacy of personal incredulity.
Conclusion
The conclusion is that realism has not shown how it explains scientific success beyond presupposing that explanation=truth. Throughout the history of science there have been many scientific laws that approximately explained all or most phenomena at the time, but were later shewn to be false. Realism cannot explain their success. On their model, those theories and the entities which they postulated were approximately true of the world. But as we've seen they weren't. Realism is the wrong model for interpreting what science does and what theoretical entities are (they are not approximate references to real things in the world).
On the other hand, we shouldn't go too far in the other direction. We shouldn't say that a theories predictive and explanatory power are meaningless. The difference might be between wanting to believe something is true and having good reasons for believing it. That sounds right. But I'm not clear on what other possible reasons beyond predictive and explanatory power there might be.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
The Vaccine Debate Part 2: With Whom is the Debate and Should We Listen?
The Vaccine Debates Part 2: With Whom Is the Debate?
Intro
As I've been looking more into the vaccination “debate” (I'm using quotes because amongst scientists and physicians there is no debate) I've discovered a wealth of literature. Because I am far from an expert in biochemistry I will not discuss the individual studies that compile the mountains of positive evidence for vaccines but will instead look at general plausibility of anti-vaccination claims.
Who are the Anit-Vaxers and Should we Listen?
It might be instructive to take a quick look at who the anti-vaccination people are. Just like any group, there are many subgroups but there are some common traits. Some are suckers for the naturalist fallacy, some are anti-government activists, and some have an affinity for conspiracy theories. Most members of this group have a mistrust of what they call the “medical industrial complex”. I will grant that in the context of the profit based US medical system, there is warrant for healthy skepticism when considering the claims of large for profit drug companies and insurance companies. Where I feel the justification for this skepticism breaks down is when we consider the attitudes toward particular health policies of systems that are not profit driven. Consider that every single country that has some form of nationalized/socialized medicine has a national vaccination program. Coincidence? Not only that, but the WHO (World Health Organization) also recommends vaccines and has mountains of research demonstrating their safety (vs. the risk of not vaccinating).
Lets pause for a second and think. I understand that conspiracy theories are exciting but is it really plausible that every scientist that works for every national healthcare plan and every WHO scientist has been bought out by big pharma to act as their shill? Really? I know what you're thinking...how else can you explain the fact that all these scientists churn out year after year of long term studies demonstrating vaccine efficacy? Um....may I humbly suggest that it might be because the research and its conclusions are valid? Is it really possible that big pharma is paying all these scientists to fudge their research? Lets suppose it's true. Where's the smoking gun? By now at least one disgruntled scientist or spouse of a scientist would have spilled the beans. Ah! I forgot. The media's in on in it too and are covering up the story. Right.
So, lets say you're still not convinced. You poke your finger in my chest and your logical fallacy detector screeches “Argument from authority! Aruga! Aruga!” You are right to point out that an argument from authority is not a good argument but sometime appeal to authority is valid. The argument from authority as a logical fallacy usually only applies when you only appeal to an individual or a small group of “experts” like, say...appealing to an Andrew Wakefield study.
When there is broad consensus amongst a field of experts, this is not an argument from authority; it is prevailing wisdom. A quick example: if your car has a problem and you take it to a hundred mechanics and 99 of them say there's a problem with the regulator but 1 says the problem is with the alternator, which are you going to get fixed? Add to that example that the other 99 mechanics say the lone mechanic is a hack. Who would you listen to? Please don't say that “well what if the 99 mechanics are being paid by the regulator industrial complex and the 1 mechanic is fighting the good fight”. I might have to hurt you.
Lets apply the example to something less controversial (than vaccines, not regulators/alternators) like climate change or evolution. 100% of biologists support evolution and all but one or 2 climate science experts support the idea of anthropogenic climate change. Should we listen to theologists when it comes to evolution? Should we give equal weight to the views of the 1 or 2 dissenting climate scientists? Hopefully not.
To be sure there is disagreement among the experts about interpretation of the data and the details, just as there are matters that are still unsettled. That's why research is ongoing. But none of these experts in their respective fields would deny the main tenants of the overarching theories: That evolution happened/is happening, that there is anthropogenic climate change and that the benefits of vaccines far outweigh the risks of not being vaccinated.
Ok, so I know what you're thinking. “Science” has been wrong before, and those in the minority view were eventually vindicated. True. Sometimes it happens. But it takes extraordinary evidence to overturn mountains of confirmatory evidence for an overarching theory. And so far that evidence hasn't materialized. As the skeptics say “extraordinary claims demands extraordinary evidence.”
Next post I'll (finally) write about the basic science surrounding the vaccination question)
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