Holy Crap! It's 4:10am and I'm going to start this now? Am I insane? Yup. Actually, I have to do a presentation on this articles in 2 days so I'm forcing myself to get through the entire article tonight so tomorrow I can pick and choose the parts I'll use for my presentation.
I should add, as I've mentioned before, I am extremely grateful to those of you who take the time to read my blog. I know that some of this stuff may not be the most exciting content. But how can I be expected to compete with cute lol catz? But seriously, knowing there is a small, yet, loyal audience inspires me to learn and write more and betterly...and be further indoctrinated by those "snobish professors with a liberal agenda". So, thank you.
Notes and Thoughts on "How to Be a Moral Realist" by Richard Boyd
Recap
Read Parts 1 and 2.
Two Epistemological Challenges to Moral Realism
Both of these challenges fall out of the claim that moral realism is conflating our construction of moral value with its discovery. Lets flesh this out a bit. Recall back in part 1 when we were talking about realist epistemology, there was this idea that there is a positive feedback loop between our moral intuitions and our moral reasoning...
This idea comes from the close analogy Boyd proposes between how we acquire scientific knowledge and how we acquire moral knowledge. The basic idea is that improvements in theory will improve our methods of inference, and those improved methods of inference will improve our theories. Note that methods of inference can include both explicit (like deduction and statistical methods) and implicit methods (like the the types of intuitions a good scientist develops with experience and deep theoretical knowledge).
Two important issues arise when we apply this model to moral thinking. First of all, the positive dialectic between method and theory only works if we've started with an approximately good (i.e., true) theory and method, although with some failings. The second issue is to give a plausible account of what the moral analogue to scientific observation will be. Scientists have lab coats, test tubes, and bunsen burners; that shit's 'fficial and objective. What does moral observation gots?
Observation
Lets deal with observation first. Boyd's answer to moral realism's analogue to scientific observation is: "observation". Wut you talkin' 'bout Boyiiiiiiiiiiiiiiid? You try'na get crazy with us ese?
Ok, lets give him a chance. He reasons that since goodness is a natural property then, just like any other natural property, observation is how we'z gonna come to know 'bout it. Consider the properties studied by psychologists, historians, sociologists and such. The properties these fields study are non-physical yet are all studied empirically. Some of these types of observations will involve introspection, some will involve observation of oneself. And some will require trained observation by experts (read: snobbish liberal indoctrinators). Ahh, I really can't let that Santorum remark go. I should. But it's difficult. Sooo difficult.
Of course our moral observations will be influenced by the moral framework within which we see the world, but this is no objection since all sciences--hard or soft--operate the same way. Baaaaat there is a difference! Our scientific theories are constrained by the hard facts of reality to make them approximately true. I can believe that mind can overcome matter all I want but reality will constrain this theory when I try to walk through a wall. Which brings us to the next challenge moral realism has to overcome--that reality will constrain its theories sufficiently to make them approximately true.
Approximate Truth of the Starting Point
The quextion we need to answer is whether we are correct to suppose that "we have had background moral beliefs sufficiently near the truth that they could form the basis for subsequent improvement of moral knowledge in the light of further experience and further historical development". Otherwise stated: Is what we know about human goods and the mechanisms by which we realize them sufficient to act as a guide to gradual progress and expansion of these goods?
Boyd thinks that the answer is yes. We do know enough about human goods, mechanisms of their fulfillment, and observation for there to be gradual progressive development of moral theory through reflective equilibrium.
My non-skeptic, non-philosopher self agrees with him if we limit the claim to certain cultures. But that tom-foolery aside, I don't think this argument does anything to temper my intuition that moral progress is not so much a matter of discovering natural properties but of our after-the-fact ascription of moral notions to things that agree with us and/or become cultural norms.
But enough about me, lets talk about Boyd. For Boyd, once we grant that indeed we do know enough about human goods and mechanisms for their augmentation that there can be a positive feedback loop, then "we may now treat moral intuitions exactly on par with scientific intuitions". He acknowledges that moral intuitions needn't have a foundational role in moral understanding nor be a substitute for observation. However, just as good scientists develop legitimate intuitions that are embedded in fruitful theories, we can say the same of moral intuitions: if they are embedded in "approximately true" moral theories, they are a legitimate means of acquiring knowledge.
Ok, even though I put that above quote in italics, it's still a bold statement. I think it's a bit of stretch to say the two kinds of intuition are on par. Given the constraints on scientific inferences are much greater than those on moral inferences and I don't think the methodologies come close in level or objective rigour. Also, the mechanisms by which moral observations can be distorted are much more difficult to control for than for scientific observation (hard sciences, anyway).
Boyd will probably counter that that isn't the point. All he needs to get moral realism going is that we accept that our moral theory is approximately true enough for there to be reflective equilibrium. I don't have a clear argument for why I disagree, probably cuz it's 530 in the morning, but something's gone awry with his reasoning. For now I'm just going to say that I refudiate his conclusion. I don't think moral intuitions are on par with scientific intuitions because they are respectively constrained to different degrees.
The God Objection
Another possible argument against the naturalist moral realist is that for most of human history people have believed that some sort of supernatural entity grounded moral law. If moral values are natural properties, then, most people been (and continue to be) wrong about the source of morality. This is contradicts what the realist just said, that our moral theory is currently at a place where it is approximately true.
Boyd replies that, while they were wrong about the source of morality, this did not prevent them from making correct moral judgments about fundamental human goods. The judgments about fundamental human goods were correct enough for their moral theory to be approximately true, and allow for progressive reflective development.
He draws an analogy to biology. Pre-darwinian biologists (and unfortunately, many present-day Americans) attributed all order and organization of life to sweet baby jesus. But the fact that they mis-attributed the source of the order did not prevent them from developing important knowledge in biology. What's important is they got enough of it right to allow for progressive reflective development to get started.
Note: I never managed to finish this last night, so, picking up from last night....
Moral Knowledge Is Easier to Explain than Scientific Knowledge
I'm just gonna warn you right now, shit's about to get loco up in herr. So, check it aus. In the 17th Century, modern chemistry was born but it was based on the incorrect idea that all matter was made of corpuscules. It a lot of ways it was kind of a lucky guess but the idea that all matter had micro-structure, despite getting the details wrong, was sufficient to get modern chemistry off the ground. But how did they arrive at this idea? In many ways it a lucky guess. It was more or less accidental. It was not a belief that was produced by particularly reliable mechanisms of belief production.
Now, this here's going to blow your mind. The mechanisms by which we have come to our homeostatic-cluster-o'-human-goods idea are much more reliable than the ones that produced the ideas of corpuscular theory. Recall that our beliefs about what constitute the homeostatic cluster o' human goods is arrived at through our understanding of human needs. Who better to understand human needs (our own and of others) than humans? It is entirely plausible that the evolutionary and psychological mechanisms for understanding these needs is reliable where as the we know that the belief producing mechanism for early chemistry were not. Boyd summarizes that it is "easier, not harder, to explain how moral knowledge is possible than it is to explain how scientific knowledge [is possible]".
Wrap your big head around that! Again, I think there's something to his idea that the belief producing mechanisms for beliefs about human goods is more reliable than they are for science. However, there is a prollem. Suppose he's right. It's going to be hard to account for the fact that in just under 400 years of modern science and only a teeny tiny fraction of the population working as scientists, scientific knowledge has exploded and progressed; whereas, after 2300 years (if we use Ancient Greek philosophy as a starting point) and the entire population thinking about morality, we haven't made close to the amount of progress we see in science. If I could make that sentence shorter I would. Sorry.
How do we explain non-western cultures that have been around for 1000s of years that still mutilate women's genitals and treat them as barely better than livestock? Where is the progress we should see if we are starting on even better footing than science did?
Semantics
What are the big bugaboos for moral realism? (1) How to explain the wide variation in moral concepts between cultures, individuals, and groups which is purportedly best explained by a constructivist framework; (2) how to explain the wacky idea that moral terms refer to properties that can be explained in the language of natural science.
How can the moral realist meet these 2 challenges? the general approach will be to shew that moral terms are naturalistic but not reducible to specific natural definitions. This is the whole concept of homeostatic definitions. For this line of response to work the moral realist needs to further shew that (A) there are good reasons to see moral definitions as grounded in natural phenomena rather than being stipulative; (B) there are good reasons to think that our every day use of moral terms reference real moral properties; that is, our use of moral terms like 'good' are constrained by reality.
Ok, Mr. moral realist, convince me of (A). I don't fancy Boyd's reason for (A) to be too convincing. He offers a couple of arguments. The first sounds a little like fancy footwork. He says that it is the homeostatic cluster-o'-properties nature of moral terms that explains why there is variation.
That is, some people's conception of the good might have a little more concern for a particular set of human needs, while others might give a little more preference to another set. Think of the 'cozy' example. One house might be have a nice warm fire place and the other some quaint wood furniture covered in large fluffy pillows. That the two houses aren't identical is no reason not to call them both cozy. The same applies to 'good', that's why we can have different conceptions of it.
As I've said elsewhere, a constructivist story also explains varying uses of the same moral terms. So far, Boyd hasn't given me a compelling reason to pick the realist story, unless that's the position I already started with. Lets check out his next argument.
His second argument is that the progressively changing nature of our conception of the good, in light of new evidence about human needs and potential, is best explained by moral realism. The idea is as we discover more about human needs we are discovering more about the property of 'goodness'.
But, again, I don't see why we should prefer this to a constructivist account. It seems equally likely that after discovering new human needs we later come to describe their fulfillment as good. But this happens after the fact. We aren't discovering an aspect of something that was heretofore hidden from us. Think of the expansion of suffrage to women. After observing that it is a human need to have equal gender participation in the political process were we discovering an already existant aspect of goodness? Or did we merely expand our notion of good to include women's suffrage because we observed it fulfilled a human need?
Ok, I'm just going to admit right here that I've kind of lost my line of thought and may have gone off track in terms of structuring this entry, so bare with me as I try to get it back on track...
I think I'm supposed to talk about bugaboo #(2), that moral terms refer to properties that can be explained in the language of natural science. To support this Boyd has to appeal to (B) and shew that our use of moral terms is constrained by objective reality. In other words, I can't just use the word 'good' to refer to anything (if I want its use to be intelligible).
I'm going to agree that it would be unintelligible for me to use the term 'good' to describe murder of innocents but does it necessarily follow that this is because the word's usage is constrained by reference to natural properties? Maybe. But might it not also be just as likely that we can explain away this constraint by appeal to convention? Isn't it just the convention of a language community that constrains how I use words? I don't see why we should accept one explanation over the other.
Hard Cases and Divergent Views
Supposing that moral realism is true, there are two other objections they have to handle: hard cases and divergent view. 'Hard cases' refers to hollow reinforced objects used to transport other objects. Another definition is that hard cases are moral dilemmas for which there is no obvious solution, even between people who share a moral culture. The difficulty is magnified when we consider how people of different moral cultures would approach a hard case.
The non-realist can avoid this difficulty because they are making no claims about objective moral values. But of course, this is not true of the realist.
What's a realist to do? Well, clever Boyd has already laid the groundwork for an esplanation. Recall his homeostatic property-cluster definitions. Recall also that due to their homeostatic nature they are not always bivalent (that is, they are not always, necessarily either true or false).
It's kind of like the notion of species. At what point do we say a particular group of a species has evolved to the point that we should call them a new species? There's no clear line. Of instances on the extreme ends of the spectrum between two species that share the same genus we can say of a specimen whether it is or isn't a member of one of the species. But a specimen somewhere in the midway point of evolving from into another species, there's no true of false answer to the question.
Ok, I can dig that the whole homeostatic property-cluster non-bivalence thing. Most social sciences have such terms and biology does too. The next confounding factor for why there can be diverging moral views--even though there are real moral values--is that class interests and other cultural factors can distort analysis.
Now things are starting to sound just a little too convient for the moral realist. His problem is to account for how there can be such divergent views on moral good. He's so far given us one account, which is that 'good' isn't always true of false of something. Now he's saying that also, analysis of these differences can be clouded by social distortion and bias. Next he says that another confounding factor is that moral issue are incredibly complex and controversial.
All of what he is saying is true but here's my problem with it: how can we distinguish between a legitimate case where, on a moral judgment, one group "gets it right" (and the other wrong), and a case where the disagreement is only apparent because of all the confounding factors? Especially if both groups have moral frameworks that are approximately true enough were recursive progress occurs.
I don't see how this can be done (unless we presuppose a prior objective standard). Not so say this proves realism is false, but I think it tilts plausibility in favour of constructionists.
An interesting tangential suggestion Boyd makes is that most moral disagreements could be resolved if there were total agreement on non-moral facts. For instance, if there were unanimous agreement on exactly what human needs ought to be satisfied to what respective degrees, moral realism predicts most moral disagreements would dissipate. That koo. But, assuming rational actors that are concerned about morality, I don't see why this doesn't preclude a constructivist interpretation.
Well, tangents aside, does Boyd succeed in giving a realist account of moral disagreement and hard cases? I think he give a decent defense but I'm not convinced he's made a convincing positive case.
Morality, Motivation, and Rationality
The final objection typically aimed at moral realism is that it does not give a good account of (what people think should be) a logical connection between moral judgments and reason for action. Otherwise stated, if we come to judge/know that something is morally good then this should necessarily provide a reason to act in accordance with that judgment. Facts on their own, especially natural facts, don't provide this logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action. The argument concludes that since natural facts can't motivate action, they must not exist. So, moral realism is false.
In all honesty I think this is a crap argument against realism but lets look at it for fun...yay! The moral realist can simply deny that knowledge of moral facts necessitates it motivating action. People can come to know what is morally right, yet not have that knowledge motivate them to act. I think people like this exist. I don't think there has to be a necessary link between moral knowledge and motive for action. Some people be wack.
That's possible. Know what else it possible? I'll tell you....that psychologically normal humans will act in accordance with what they believe to be morally good. It's not the facts that do the motivating, it's just part of our psychology because the homeostatic definition of 'good' is tied to human needs. Because we, as fellow humans, can understand and thus sympathize with the needs of others, we will tend to act in such a way that will anticipate correctly the probable effect of our actions on others. I can dig that.
Conversely, if we say that it is moral facts that must motivate, then in cases where people don't act in a way we'd expect, we have to say that they just didn't perceive the right moral facts. That doesn't sound right. We do have clear examples of people do who know intellectually what the correct moral facts are, yet don't act in accordance with them. So, I'm with the realists on this one.
It is the psychological capacity for sympathy and compassion that motivate action, not moral facts. People who don't have these psychological capacities are not motivated by moral facts. This is actually in line with modern psychology and neuroscience. It is not logic that motives us to moral action but our psychology.
Got damn! That was a long article. Of course the article I'm doing my presentation on just happens to be the longest we've done in class so far...Anyway, you win 10 internets if you read all 3 and made it to the end.
Showing posts with label Richard Boyd. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Richard Boyd. Show all posts
Thursday, March 1, 2012
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 2 "How to Be a Moral Realist" by R. Boyd
Overview
In part 1 we looked at how Boyd draws an analogy between scientific realism and moral realism. The first parallel is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and experience. The second is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and method. Check out part 1 if you'd like further elaboration...I've got work to do!
The Problem of Natural Properties
One of the bugaboos moral realism has is to account for the claim that moral judgments refer to real properties out there in the world. This is somewhat incompatible with some versions of empirical science that say if a term doesn't refer to something that is understandable in the language of physics then it's not real in the sense that moral realist want it to be. For example, if I say something is 'baaaaaaad', the moral realist wants to say I'm referring to some property that actually exists beyond mental concepts.
Non-Reductionist Naturalism
So how does the moral realist deal with this problem? First, they're going to reject the idea that things (in a general sense), such as states, properties, need be reducible to language of physical substances in order to be considered real. They're also going to reject the idea that things can be only considered "real" if they're directly observable. We don't directly observe sub-atomic particles and their properties but we still say they're real, so why not extend that leniency to moral properties.
Connected with that they're going to reject what is called the "constructivist Humean" idea of causation. Hume's idea was that we don't directly observe causation but our mind "constructs" a causal story to explain a relationship between two things. The inference is that causal forces aren't real, they are constructed by our minds, only the physical objects that interact are real. The moral realist refudiates this constructivism and say it's perfectly fine to speak of non-physical relations as being real (hello friend zone!).
Natural Definitions
Here Boyd leans on Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences. Consider gold and pyrite. A few thousand years ago before they knew anything of their respective chemical properties the two were considered indistinguishable, they were both called 'gold'.
Gold and pyrite have different micro-structures but the naming convention is determined by the observed properties (nominal) which are not necessarily (and often not at all) the same as the micro properties (real). It is the particular micro structure of gold and pyrite that produce in us the impression of the colour gold and the mistaken perception that they are one and the same substance. If we had a super-duper micro scope and looked at the atoms that make up gold and pyrite, they wouldn't be gold coloured--it's their structure that produces in us the perception of the colour gold.
So, the goal of science should be to uncover the real essences of substances, not the nominal essences. As we come to know the real essences of substances we will not confuse natural kinds, like we did with gold and pyrite...since it was the discovery of their real essences (micro-structure) that allowed us to correctly identify the kind of thing they are.
Boyd fancies extending Locke's idea of a distinction between nominal and real essences regarding (physical) substances to properties, relations, and magnitudes. We can see where he's going with this. He's going to leverage this difference to account for moral disagreements.
The strategy will be to say that moral disagreements arise because of something analogous to what's happening with the gold and pyrite example. People are making judgments based on nominal essences of 'good' rather than the real essences. A science of morals will commit itself to discovering the real essences of moral properties.
Now, this all sounds fine and dandy but I anticipate some problems. First of all, Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences applies to substances--physical things. On Locke's model, properties are ideas caused in our minds by the powers of a substance's micro-structure. The properties themselves are non-maleable and are not subject to revision--they are basic. It is through the properties that we identify nominal and real essence of substances.
For instance, the colour gold helps us identify gold (nominally) or the micro-structure of gold--i.e., the property of "number of protons and electrons"--helps to identify gold's real essence. So, all properties are somehow tied to something physical; they inhere in something physical. But I don't see how it is a property can have a micro-structure, and supposing it did, how a property's micro-structure would be different from how we perceive it.
How could 'yellow' have a micro-structure? I'm not even sure this is intelligible. The only thing that would make sense is to say that the perception 'yellow' is a function of the light wavelengths that strike our visual apparatus. But that wavelength is a function of an objects surface properties. Again, the properties is tied to something physical, exactly what the realist hopes to avoid. In this analysis we end up talking about a physical object's microstructure, we haven't talked about the real essence of 'yellow'. It seems yellow is yellow is yellow regardless of whether we are referring to nominal or real essence.
Homeostatic Property-Cluster Definitions (WTF?)
Whoa! Hold on a second. I know what you're thinking. It's probably not politically correct for me to use the term 'homeostatic'. I understand your concern but I contend that since some of my friends are homeostatic, it's ok. Sometimes I'll even say it to their face and we have a good chuckle.
Lets forget about the big words for a second and go back to a major problem that moral realism has: if moral values are real and exist in the natural world, how do realists account divergent moral judgments? In order to preempt this criticism Boyd's going to suggest that some natural kinds are defined by property clusters. But not just any kind of property cluster--homeostatic property clusters!
What the crap does this mean? Consider what we might mean when we refer to something as 'cozy'. Are we referring to just one property, like when I say 'large'? No, I'm referring to a cluster of properties, such as warmth, softness, comfort, etc...
Now, is there only one rigid combination of these properties by which we might call something 'cozy'? Nope. One cozy house might have a different set of these properties than another cozy house. Also something completely different like a blanket can also be 'cozy'. None of these considerations mean that there's no such thing as a cozy house or blanket.
He goes on to argue that this type of reference is used in natural science. Consider the term 'healthy'. This is a relatively scientific notion that involves a cluster of properties that needn't be in the same quantities for every case that falls under the kind 'healthy'.
Other examples used in the (harder) science of biology are the notions of species, class, phylum, etc...Biology relies on the "imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological, and behavioural features which characterize its members. Just because we can't nail down those biological terms to something specific and immutable, doesn't prevent people in lab coats from using them.
What Boyd is getting at with this idea of homeostatic property clusters is that there's flexibility in how we define certain traits, or kinds. Obviously, he's going to apply this idea to moral kinds, like 'good' and 'baaaaaaaaaad'. For something to be good it can have varying degrees of a cluster of properties, it needn't be rigidly defined by definite amounts of each member of a set of properties.
I think there is something to this idea but it's hard to see why his approach isn't evidence for a constructivist picture of how we define 'good' rather than a realist approach. For example, he gives a list of possible elements that, in varying combinations and amounts, could constitute what we reference by 'good'. They are things that satisfy different human needs, such as physical and medical needs, social and psychological needs like the need for love and friendship, the need to engage in cooperative effort, the need to exercise control over one's life, the need for intellectual and artistic appreciation and expression, the need for physical recreation, etc...
So, why do I say this sounds constructivist? Well, he begins by looking at facts about humans, then reasons from there to what properties might encompass moral goodness. If moral values exist in the natural world, then I'm not sure why we need to reason from human needs to figure them out.
Why shouldn't we be able to detect them, independent of prior knowledge about what's good for humans? If 'good' is an objective value, it shouldn't matter how it relates to humans, that just might be a happy coincidence. And besides, what if actual natural absolute moral values in fact better accord with the needs of spider monkeys?
Furthermore, I think Boyd has to walk a fine line with his homeostatic cluster model because if he allows too much flexibility the kind he's defining gets too vague and becomes useless.
Homeostatic Consequentialism
Ok, so a few paragraphs back I laid out some of the human needs whose satisfaction relate to our notion of moral 'good'. The next point is that there are many possible different social arrangements that could satisfy these needs. That is, there is a wide variety of psychological and social mechanisms such as political democracy, mutual respect, rules of courtesy, etc...that can contribute to the homeostasis of the different human goods. I can get jiggy with that.
From there, Boyd says that we can define moral goodness in terms of the cluster of goods that satisfy human needs combined with the homeostatic mechanisms which unify them. So, action, policies, character traits, etc...are good to the extent that they bring about the goods and reinforce the mechanisms that bring them about. I can get jiggy with that too, although I'm concerned that this is starting to sound like the liberal brainwashing by professors that Santorum warned me about.
This next part is a little harder to get jiggy with because it sounds a little too much like wishful thinking. The hypothesis is that "in actual practice, a concern for moral goodness can be a guide to action for the morally concerned" because the fact the that the different moral goods are "mutually reinforcing". Aaand that they are mutually reinforcing will help mitigate conflict between them.
Ok, anyone who follows US--or any country for that matter--politics will note that "in actual practice" there is plenty of conflict when it comes to choosing between moral goods. Although I absolutely loath Rick Santorum, if I presented to him the list of human goods (satisfaction of medical, psychological, social needs, etc...) I doubt he'd deny any of the members of the list. He'll probably also agree to the list of mechanisms: attitude of mutual respect, political democracy, egalitarian social relations, customs, etc...Whether he actually practices them is another matter, but I don't think he'd deny any of them as having value.
So, the problem for the realists is that we have a fairly clear counter example to the idea that the concern for moral goodness, in actual practice, would mitigate conflicts between members of these lists. I see very little mitigation going on where the extreme right is concerned. Of course, the moral realist could simply refudiate this example by arguing that Santorum isn't committed to this particular set of goods and mechanisms, but a different set. And they may be correct. But then we're back to the problem of explaining divergent conceptions of a good that is supposedly objective.
There is another reply suggested by Boyd, and that relates back to the reciprocal relationship between advances in theory and method. As our theory of moral goodness approaches truth, our psychological and social mechanism for balancing demands for the cluster of goods will allow us to make better decisions. This, I think is entirely plausible.
We can explain away the Santorum counter-example as evidence that in our journey to discovering the moral truth, we are still at a point where our choice-making mechanisms are still imperfect. We aren't close enough to the truth to accurately know how to reconcile tensions between satisfying different human needs in such a way that there can be a net gain. I guess I can dig that.
One more issue that moral realism is going to have comes back to is the problem of proving morality is real and a natural property rather than a construction we impose after the fact. To try to solve this Boyd will rely on the similarity of how we acquire moral knowledge and how we acquire scientific knowledge. In both cases knowledge will arise out of empirical investigation.
This is a clever line to account for barbaric moral codes throughout history. Ostensibly if moral facts exist in nature how is it that we had slavery for so long? The answer is that certain empirical facts only become accessible to us under the correct conditions. In the case of slavery, its injustice didn't become apparent until limited democracies developed. In wasn't until we had the structure of democracy that we could see the psychological and social human good in equal social and political relations. Once those facts about the good were observed it was a matter of time before they were logically extended to include everyone.
This seems plausible enough, but I don't see why we can't explain the same phenomena using a constructivist story. Were we discovering moral properties of actions and policies or were we constructing them? How do we know that once we discovered the empirical facts of the conditions under which humans thrive, we didn't ex post facto ascribe to them the notion of 'goodness'? (using Latin makes me feel smrt) Are we human or are we dancer?
In part 1 we looked at how Boyd draws an analogy between scientific realism and moral realism. The first parallel is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and experience. The second is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and method. Check out part 1 if you'd like further elaboration...I've got work to do!
The Problem of Natural Properties
One of the bugaboos moral realism has is to account for the claim that moral judgments refer to real properties out there in the world. This is somewhat incompatible with some versions of empirical science that say if a term doesn't refer to something that is understandable in the language of physics then it's not real in the sense that moral realist want it to be. For example, if I say something is 'baaaaaaad', the moral realist wants to say I'm referring to some property that actually exists beyond mental concepts.
Non-Reductionist Naturalism
So how does the moral realist deal with this problem? First, they're going to reject the idea that things (in a general sense), such as states, properties, need be reducible to language of physical substances in order to be considered real. They're also going to reject the idea that things can be only considered "real" if they're directly observable. We don't directly observe sub-atomic particles and their properties but we still say they're real, so why not extend that leniency to moral properties.
Connected with that they're going to reject what is called the "constructivist Humean" idea of causation. Hume's idea was that we don't directly observe causation but our mind "constructs" a causal story to explain a relationship between two things. The inference is that causal forces aren't real, they are constructed by our minds, only the physical objects that interact are real. The moral realist refudiates this constructivism and say it's perfectly fine to speak of non-physical relations as being real (hello friend zone!).
Natural Definitions
Here Boyd leans on Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences. Consider gold and pyrite. A few thousand years ago before they knew anything of their respective chemical properties the two were considered indistinguishable, they were both called 'gold'.
Gold and pyrite have different micro-structures but the naming convention is determined by the observed properties (nominal) which are not necessarily (and often not at all) the same as the micro properties (real). It is the particular micro structure of gold and pyrite that produce in us the impression of the colour gold and the mistaken perception that they are one and the same substance. If we had a super-duper micro scope and looked at the atoms that make up gold and pyrite, they wouldn't be gold coloured--it's their structure that produces in us the perception of the colour gold.
So, the goal of science should be to uncover the real essences of substances, not the nominal essences. As we come to know the real essences of substances we will not confuse natural kinds, like we did with gold and pyrite...since it was the discovery of their real essences (micro-structure) that allowed us to correctly identify the kind of thing they are.
Boyd fancies extending Locke's idea of a distinction between nominal and real essences regarding (physical) substances to properties, relations, and magnitudes. We can see where he's going with this. He's going to leverage this difference to account for moral disagreements.
The strategy will be to say that moral disagreements arise because of something analogous to what's happening with the gold and pyrite example. People are making judgments based on nominal essences of 'good' rather than the real essences. A science of morals will commit itself to discovering the real essences of moral properties.
Now, this all sounds fine and dandy but I anticipate some problems. First of all, Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences applies to substances--physical things. On Locke's model, properties are ideas caused in our minds by the powers of a substance's micro-structure. The properties themselves are non-maleable and are not subject to revision--they are basic. It is through the properties that we identify nominal and real essence of substances.
For instance, the colour gold helps us identify gold (nominally) or the micro-structure of gold--i.e., the property of "number of protons and electrons"--helps to identify gold's real essence. So, all properties are somehow tied to something physical; they inhere in something physical. But I don't see how it is a property can have a micro-structure, and supposing it did, how a property's micro-structure would be different from how we perceive it.
How could 'yellow' have a micro-structure? I'm not even sure this is intelligible. The only thing that would make sense is to say that the perception 'yellow' is a function of the light wavelengths that strike our visual apparatus. But that wavelength is a function of an objects surface properties. Again, the properties is tied to something physical, exactly what the realist hopes to avoid. In this analysis we end up talking about a physical object's microstructure, we haven't talked about the real essence of 'yellow'. It seems yellow is yellow is yellow regardless of whether we are referring to nominal or real essence.
Homeostatic Property-Cluster Definitions (WTF?)
Whoa! Hold on a second. I know what you're thinking. It's probably not politically correct for me to use the term 'homeostatic'. I understand your concern but I contend that since some of my friends are homeostatic, it's ok. Sometimes I'll even say it to their face and we have a good chuckle.
Lets forget about the big words for a second and go back to a major problem that moral realism has: if moral values are real and exist in the natural world, how do realists account divergent moral judgments? In order to preempt this criticism Boyd's going to suggest that some natural kinds are defined by property clusters. But not just any kind of property cluster--homeostatic property clusters!
What the crap does this mean? Consider what we might mean when we refer to something as 'cozy'. Are we referring to just one property, like when I say 'large'? No, I'm referring to a cluster of properties, such as warmth, softness, comfort, etc...
Now, is there only one rigid combination of these properties by which we might call something 'cozy'? Nope. One cozy house might have a different set of these properties than another cozy house. Also something completely different like a blanket can also be 'cozy'. None of these considerations mean that there's no such thing as a cozy house or blanket.
He goes on to argue that this type of reference is used in natural science. Consider the term 'healthy'. This is a relatively scientific notion that involves a cluster of properties that needn't be in the same quantities for every case that falls under the kind 'healthy'.
Other examples used in the (harder) science of biology are the notions of species, class, phylum, etc...Biology relies on the "imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological, and behavioural features which characterize its members. Just because we can't nail down those biological terms to something specific and immutable, doesn't prevent people in lab coats from using them.
What Boyd is getting at with this idea of homeostatic property clusters is that there's flexibility in how we define certain traits, or kinds. Obviously, he's going to apply this idea to moral kinds, like 'good' and 'baaaaaaaaaad'. For something to be good it can have varying degrees of a cluster of properties, it needn't be rigidly defined by definite amounts of each member of a set of properties.
I think there is something to this idea but it's hard to see why his approach isn't evidence for a constructivist picture of how we define 'good' rather than a realist approach. For example, he gives a list of possible elements that, in varying combinations and amounts, could constitute what we reference by 'good'. They are things that satisfy different human needs, such as physical and medical needs, social and psychological needs like the need for love and friendship, the need to engage in cooperative effort, the need to exercise control over one's life, the need for intellectual and artistic appreciation and expression, the need for physical recreation, etc...
So, why do I say this sounds constructivist? Well, he begins by looking at facts about humans, then reasons from there to what properties might encompass moral goodness. If moral values exist in the natural world, then I'm not sure why we need to reason from human needs to figure them out.
Why shouldn't we be able to detect them, independent of prior knowledge about what's good for humans? If 'good' is an objective value, it shouldn't matter how it relates to humans, that just might be a happy coincidence. And besides, what if actual natural absolute moral values in fact better accord with the needs of spider monkeys?
Furthermore, I think Boyd has to walk a fine line with his homeostatic cluster model because if he allows too much flexibility the kind he's defining gets too vague and becomes useless.
Homeostatic Consequentialism
Ok, so a few paragraphs back I laid out some of the human needs whose satisfaction relate to our notion of moral 'good'. The next point is that there are many possible different social arrangements that could satisfy these needs. That is, there is a wide variety of psychological and social mechanisms such as political democracy, mutual respect, rules of courtesy, etc...that can contribute to the homeostasis of the different human goods. I can get jiggy with that.
From there, Boyd says that we can define moral goodness in terms of the cluster of goods that satisfy human needs combined with the homeostatic mechanisms which unify them. So, action, policies, character traits, etc...are good to the extent that they bring about the goods and reinforce the mechanisms that bring them about. I can get jiggy with that too, although I'm concerned that this is starting to sound like the liberal brainwashing by professors that Santorum warned me about.
This next part is a little harder to get jiggy with because it sounds a little too much like wishful thinking. The hypothesis is that "in actual practice, a concern for moral goodness can be a guide to action for the morally concerned" because the fact the that the different moral goods are "mutually reinforcing". Aaand that they are mutually reinforcing will help mitigate conflict between them.
Ok, anyone who follows US--or any country for that matter--politics will note that "in actual practice" there is plenty of conflict when it comes to choosing between moral goods. Although I absolutely loath Rick Santorum, if I presented to him the list of human goods (satisfaction of medical, psychological, social needs, etc...) I doubt he'd deny any of the members of the list. He'll probably also agree to the list of mechanisms: attitude of mutual respect, political democracy, egalitarian social relations, customs, etc...Whether he actually practices them is another matter, but I don't think he'd deny any of them as having value.
So, the problem for the realists is that we have a fairly clear counter example to the idea that the concern for moral goodness, in actual practice, would mitigate conflicts between members of these lists. I see very little mitigation going on where the extreme right is concerned. Of course, the moral realist could simply refudiate this example by arguing that Santorum isn't committed to this particular set of goods and mechanisms, but a different set. And they may be correct. But then we're back to the problem of explaining divergent conceptions of a good that is supposedly objective.
There is another reply suggested by Boyd, and that relates back to the reciprocal relationship between advances in theory and method. As our theory of moral goodness approaches truth, our psychological and social mechanism for balancing demands for the cluster of goods will allow us to make better decisions. This, I think is entirely plausible.
We can explain away the Santorum counter-example as evidence that in our journey to discovering the moral truth, we are still at a point where our choice-making mechanisms are still imperfect. We aren't close enough to the truth to accurately know how to reconcile tensions between satisfying different human needs in such a way that there can be a net gain. I guess I can dig that.
One more issue that moral realism is going to have comes back to is the problem of proving morality is real and a natural property rather than a construction we impose after the fact. To try to solve this Boyd will rely on the similarity of how we acquire moral knowledge and how we acquire scientific knowledge. In both cases knowledge will arise out of empirical investigation.
This is a clever line to account for barbaric moral codes throughout history. Ostensibly if moral facts exist in nature how is it that we had slavery for so long? The answer is that certain empirical facts only become accessible to us under the correct conditions. In the case of slavery, its injustice didn't become apparent until limited democracies developed. In wasn't until we had the structure of democracy that we could see the psychological and social human good in equal social and political relations. Once those facts about the good were observed it was a matter of time before they were logically extended to include everyone.
This seems plausible enough, but I don't see why we can't explain the same phenomena using a constructivist story. Were we discovering moral properties of actions and policies or were we constructing them? How do we know that once we discovered the empirical facts of the conditions under which humans thrive, we didn't ex post facto ascribe to them the notion of 'goodness'? (using Latin makes me feel smrt) Are we human or are we dancer?
Monday, February 27, 2012
Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 1 "How to Be a Moral Realist" by R. Boyd
Before I start I want to give a shout out to fauxphilnews.wordpress.com a blog which I fancy is one of the cleverest blogs I've seen in a while. For those of you who didn't see (or click on) the link I posted on my fb page, I highly recommend you check it out. Oh, I should warn you, unless you have some familiarity with philosophy you won't get a lot of the jokes, but even if you only took a couple of courses you should get most of them.
Notes and Thoughts on "How to Be a Moral Realist" by Richard Boyd
Overview
I've noted before that facebook is a double-edged sword when it comes to getting to know long past acquaintances (in the general sense). Inevitably, some of the people we went to high school with or met in some prior stage in our lives will end up having views wildly divergent from our own. Sometimes this is good because it forces us to be exposed to ideas and points of view we might not encounter in our current circle of friends. And sometimes, it can be annoying or flat out enraging. But I digress...
So, why bring this up in a post on meta-ethics? Because, out there in the meta-ethical world there are philosophers (and a lot of regular people) that fancy that there are absolute moral truths and we can come to know them. This position is called "moral realism". But if moral realism is correct, how can I account for the fact that my friends on facebook sometimes post things contrary to what I know is the Truth. How is it that sooooo many people get it wrong? And why don't they just ask me what's right? I'd be happy to tell them.
Anyhow, Richard Boyd fancys that moral realism is correct. Lets look at some of his arguments for why, then, since (unlike the rest of you) I haven't erred in perceiving these objective truths, I will explain what moral views you should have (if I have time).
Intro to Moral Realism
Moral realims makes three assertions:
(1). We can have lots of fun...and by fun I mean "moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false)". For example if I say "you ought to help old ladies across the street," we can say of this statement that it is either true of false. We can contrast this with, for example, some other views that say moral statements aren't true or false but merely express someone's emotional attitude.
(2). "The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.." In other words, moral truth bears no relation to our subjective opinion; much in the way our thoughts about the physical world have relation to how the physical world actually is.
(3). "Ordinary canons of moral reasoning--together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning--constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge." I fancy this means that common moral notions in conjunction with our methods of reasoning in both ethics and science are sufficient for figuring out and improving moral knowledge.
A consequence of the view that there really is such a thing as objective morality is that moral terms like 'good', 'fair', 'just', 'obligatory' will correspond to real properties or relations. Furthermore, we can reason our way toward figuring out what kinds of events, policies, and social arrangements these properties and relations correspond to. Importantly, the claim is not that we presently have reasoned our way to the perfect moral theory but that, just as the methodes of science are self-correcting and progressive, so to are the methods of moral reasoning.
The general objection to suggesting that there are similarities between scientific knowledge and moral knowledge is that scientific theories are value-neutral, objective, and empirically testable. In order to counter this claim Boyd's argument will hinge on trying to shew that moral beliefs and the methods used to obtain them are similar to our scientific beliefs and methods of reasoning.
The Realist View of Science
So, obviously it's a pretty contentious claim to say there are objective moral facts and we can come to know them through moral and scientific reasoning. Lets check aus how the moral realist backs this up...
Without making a huge digression into debates within philosophy of science Boyd first wants to assume scientific realism, the idea that reality is prior to thought--i.e., our perceptions conform to reality rather than the other way around. The opposing position would be that our perception of reality is constructed out of our social structures, theories, and psychology--in other words, we (science included) don't/can't perceive the physical world objectively.
The main argument for supporting the realist position is that it gives a better account than anti-realism of how scientific knowledge (theories) and method have progressively improved. If anti-realism is correct how do we explain the fact that scientific theories have had progressively better predictive power, that we been able to apply our theories to build iphones, that the scientific method has progressively been refined, and that the method has been reliable? Moving on...
The 2 Important Features of Science for Boyd
Here comes the sneaky part because so long as we accept that science aims at objective reality and that the scientific method allows us to progressively approach objective reality, Boyd argues that there are two important parallels between how science is done and how moral thinking is done.
First of all science is cumulative and approaches the truth through "successive approximations". In other words, science builds on itself and is constantly revising itself based on the latest theoretical modifications. So, working within a theoretical framework, new information is discovered that brings about a modification of the theory.
Now, within the modified theory, the same thing happens....over and over again, each time (hopefully) getting closer and closer to truth. The new theoretical framework lets us better interpret phenomena which in turn leads to improvement in our theory. If the original theory had been wrong this type of progress would eventually stop. The revisions occur within a theoretical framework which is modified to fit new information. What's important is that the new information isn't "theory-free"; it's always embedded in a theory.
There's a constant back and forth between theory and new information that is observed from within a theory. As theories are modified to better fit "reality" we say that the general direction of science is progressive and it obtains closer and closer approximations of truth.
The second, which is related to the first, concerns the relationship between advances in scientific theory and advances in scientific method. There is a "dialectical relationship between current theory and the methodology for its improvement". What mean this does? Basically, that as our theories improve with their approximations of truth, so do our scientific methods.
But the fun doesn't stop there. Improved scientific methods of experimentation allow for better science and hence an improvement in theory...and improved theory leads to better methods of experimentation...which in turn lead to better information and better theories...I think you get the point...
"'Cumulativity' and Theory-Method Dialectic as Applied to Ethics
Now think of how this might apply to moral thinking. When we make moral judgements we are operating within an moral framework which influences how we perceive events. Occasionally, we can have an experience that suggests that we should modify our theory so we modify our moral theory (unless, of course, you are a fundamentalist of some sort). This is a cumulative process.
The problem that Boyd is going to have is to shew that this is necessarily progressive when applied to morality. I don't think it would take too long for a many thinking people to point to moral frameworks that could be considered morally regressive (by the thinking persons standards, anyway...). But how do we explain the fact that the people in those "regressive" frameworks don't think they're regressive at all. They think our framework is regressive. What can we reference to make any kind of evaluation without presupposing our conclusion?
Regarding the second point, that theory and method are in a reciprocal relationship, is also very plausible. The difficulty, again, will be to shew that the direction has been/is progressive.
The big problem I see for Boyd is, given the wide array of moral systems in the world, who do we point to as the analogue to science and who are the analogue to pseudoscience? Some moral systems say the way to Truth is by looking at this book, others say you can just feel if something's right, other's will reference minimizing harm, others will reference maximizing liberty, and others maximizing equality. Some will reference all of them. Within science we have some fairly objective criteria to make this general distinction but how do we make this judgment in ethics without presupposing our own methods and results as being the correct ones?
Anyhow, the main thing Boyd wants to say is that the fact that moral judgments are embedded in pre-supposed moral theories and methods is not point against moral realism. Science operates the same way.
How Should We Justify ourLove Moral Beliefs?
Again, to shew the plausibility of real moral facts and how we might justify them, Boyd makes an analogy with the scientific method. Although scientists haven't figured out how magnets work they know a lot of cool stuffs. But how do they justify their beliefs?
The old assumption was that our knowledge was built upon fixed truths and fixed methods of truth acquisition. This model is called foundationalism. Think Descartes. He strips away all beliefs that can be doubted and is left with only"wax is cool" "I think therefore I am". Then because he perceives this solitary truth as something "clear and distinct" he claims, as a method, that anything that he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true. So, from his one foundational belief and his method of acquiring new beliefs, he rebuilds his entire epistemology. With variations in what constitutes the foundational beliefs and methods, for several centuries this was the general model for justifying beliefs.
Boyd refudiates this model and opts for a "naturalized coherentist epistemology". Very briefly here's what this means: The coherentist part means that we don't reason from permanent foundational beliefs but our system of beliefs is fluid. We are constantly adjusting them with experience and deliberation. Sure, some beliefs are more strongly held than others, but given sufficiently strong evidence, they are all open to revision--either directly or indirectly. As we adjust certain beliefs to better conform to our experiences, other beliefs that are connected might also be revised.
Another important notion that comes out of the coherentist picture is that there is a reciprocal relationship between our set of beliefs and how we interpret experience. An experience that causes a revision in our set beliefs will in turn cause us to perceive subsequent experiences differently, which will cause further revisions. There is a constant back and forth between how we interpret experience and our particular set of beliefs.
The naturalized part refers to our methods of justifying beliefs. In the foundationalist model we have a set of static methods with which we can produce true beliefs. Naturalized epistemology says that we should also investigate our methods of belief production and use that information to refine them. For example, visual psychology studies how we go from visual stimulus to belief about what we saw. Understanding how this mechanism works and the circumstances under which it fails helps us further refine our methods of belief acquisition which in turn helps refine our beliefs.
The idea is that the more we can refine the ways in which we acquire beliefs, the more our beliefs will approximate "truth". And the more our beliefs approximate truth, the better we will be able to refine our methods of belief acquisition....over and over until people ultimately come to know the absolute truth that the flying spagetti monster is the one True god.
Naturalized Coherentist Epistemology Applied to Moral Thinking
The analogy to moral thinking should be apparent (or is it? ...whoa!). Consider the coherentist part: we have a web of moral beliefs and as we progress through our lives some of those beliefs will start to change to conform with experience. And of course, some of the moral beliefs will be more amenable to change than others. The important point being that changes in one belief will impact other interconnected beliefs to varying degrees. There is continuous dialectic between our moral beliefs and how we perceive the world.
The interesting part comes when we apply this epistemology to methods of inference. To naturalize our methods of moral inferences, the idea is that we should learn how it is we make moral decisions and that learning about conditions under which this process is fallible or accurate will help us produce more accurate moral judgements. These more accurate moral judgments will further allow us to detect conditions under which our methods of moral thinking fail/are successful. Once again, the idea is that there is a positive feedback loop in the direction of truth.
This is going to be a similar problem as we saw in the previous section. With science we have a quasi objective standard by which we can judge the direction of progress. If a method of inference consistently produces theories that accurately describe observed phenomena, and substantial predictions can be made with those theories, we can say the method of inference is a good one.
By what standard can we measure the successfulnicity of a method of moral inference? One person can say, "look, my method is reliable because it shows that abortion is morally permissible". The other says, "look, my method is reliable because it shows abortion isn't morally permissible". In science, we can compair two outcomes: my method predicts 'x' vs my method predicts 'y'. To resolve this we can (often) appeal to what happened, if not immediately, then at some point in the future.
I'm kind of oversimplifying and running roughshod over a few issues but my point is just that often (but not always) scientific disputes can be eventually resolved by appeals something quasi objective--how well actual results fit with the predicted results and how fruitful our new theory turns out to be. In moral thinking, this is only possible when we presuppose we are measuring something objective, but supposing there is, it's not clear how we arbitrate between conflicting views.
This weakness withstanding I think we can pick out a few good things from Boyd's treatment of ethical thinking as analogous to scientific thinking. For instances, there in merit in understanding how we make moral judgments; that is, what's going on neurologically, sociologically, and psychologically, and any-other-ly.
A simple common sense example is that we make poor ethical judgments when we are in a heightened emotional state like anger or love (yeah, I went there). Psychology also tells us we can be "primed" to influence judgments in a predetermined direction. So, I think there is something to his idea of approaching moral thinking with a naturalized epistemology but I'm not sure it follows that naturalizing methods of moral thought will help us determine whether there are objective moral truths or discover what they might be.
Notes and Thoughts on "How to Be a Moral Realist" by Richard Boyd
Overview
I've noted before that facebook is a double-edged sword when it comes to getting to know long past acquaintances (in the general sense). Inevitably, some of the people we went to high school with or met in some prior stage in our lives will end up having views wildly divergent from our own. Sometimes this is good because it forces us to be exposed to ideas and points of view we might not encounter in our current circle of friends. And sometimes, it can be annoying or flat out enraging. But I digress...
So, why bring this up in a post on meta-ethics? Because, out there in the meta-ethical world there are philosophers (and a lot of regular people) that fancy that there are absolute moral truths and we can come to know them. This position is called "moral realism". But if moral realism is correct, how can I account for the fact that my friends on facebook sometimes post things contrary to what I know is the Truth. How is it that sooooo many people get it wrong? And why don't they just ask me what's right? I'd be happy to tell them.
Anyhow, Richard Boyd fancys that moral realism is correct. Lets look at some of his arguments for why, then, since (unlike the rest of you) I haven't erred in perceiving these objective truths, I will explain what moral views you should have (if I have time).
Intro to Moral Realism
Moral realims makes three assertions:
(1). We can have lots of fun...and by fun I mean "moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false)". For example if I say "you ought to help old ladies across the street," we can say of this statement that it is either true of false. We can contrast this with, for example, some other views that say moral statements aren't true or false but merely express someone's emotional attitude.
(2). "The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.." In other words, moral truth bears no relation to our subjective opinion; much in the way our thoughts about the physical world have relation to how the physical world actually is.
(3). "Ordinary canons of moral reasoning--together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning--constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge." I fancy this means that common moral notions in conjunction with our methods of reasoning in both ethics and science are sufficient for figuring out and improving moral knowledge.
A consequence of the view that there really is such a thing as objective morality is that moral terms like 'good', 'fair', 'just', 'obligatory' will correspond to real properties or relations. Furthermore, we can reason our way toward figuring out what kinds of events, policies, and social arrangements these properties and relations correspond to. Importantly, the claim is not that we presently have reasoned our way to the perfect moral theory but that, just as the methodes of science are self-correcting and progressive, so to are the methods of moral reasoning.
The general objection to suggesting that there are similarities between scientific knowledge and moral knowledge is that scientific theories are value-neutral, objective, and empirically testable. In order to counter this claim Boyd's argument will hinge on trying to shew that moral beliefs and the methods used to obtain them are similar to our scientific beliefs and methods of reasoning.
The Realist View of Science
So, obviously it's a pretty contentious claim to say there are objective moral facts and we can come to know them through moral and scientific reasoning. Lets check aus how the moral realist backs this up...
Without making a huge digression into debates within philosophy of science Boyd first wants to assume scientific realism, the idea that reality is prior to thought--i.e., our perceptions conform to reality rather than the other way around. The opposing position would be that our perception of reality is constructed out of our social structures, theories, and psychology--in other words, we (science included) don't/can't perceive the physical world objectively.
The main argument for supporting the realist position is that it gives a better account than anti-realism of how scientific knowledge (theories) and method have progressively improved. If anti-realism is correct how do we explain the fact that scientific theories have had progressively better predictive power, that we been able to apply our theories to build iphones, that the scientific method has progressively been refined, and that the method has been reliable? Moving on...
The 2 Important Features of Science for Boyd
Here comes the sneaky part because so long as we accept that science aims at objective reality and that the scientific method allows us to progressively approach objective reality, Boyd argues that there are two important parallels between how science is done and how moral thinking is done.
First of all science is cumulative and approaches the truth through "successive approximations". In other words, science builds on itself and is constantly revising itself based on the latest theoretical modifications. So, working within a theoretical framework, new information is discovered that brings about a modification of the theory.
Now, within the modified theory, the same thing happens....over and over again, each time (hopefully) getting closer and closer to truth. The new theoretical framework lets us better interpret phenomena which in turn leads to improvement in our theory. If the original theory had been wrong this type of progress would eventually stop. The revisions occur within a theoretical framework which is modified to fit new information. What's important is that the new information isn't "theory-free"; it's always embedded in a theory.
There's a constant back and forth between theory and new information that is observed from within a theory. As theories are modified to better fit "reality" we say that the general direction of science is progressive and it obtains closer and closer approximations of truth.
The second, which is related to the first, concerns the relationship between advances in scientific theory and advances in scientific method. There is a "dialectical relationship between current theory and the methodology for its improvement". What mean this does? Basically, that as our theories improve with their approximations of truth, so do our scientific methods.
But the fun doesn't stop there. Improved scientific methods of experimentation allow for better science and hence an improvement in theory...and improved theory leads to better methods of experimentation...which in turn lead to better information and better theories...I think you get the point...
"'Cumulativity' and Theory-Method Dialectic as Applied to Ethics
Now think of how this might apply to moral thinking. When we make moral judgements we are operating within an moral framework which influences how we perceive events. Occasionally, we can have an experience that suggests that we should modify our theory so we modify our moral theory (unless, of course, you are a fundamentalist of some sort). This is a cumulative process.
The problem that Boyd is going to have is to shew that this is necessarily progressive when applied to morality. I don't think it would take too long for a many thinking people to point to moral frameworks that could be considered morally regressive (by the thinking persons standards, anyway...). But how do we explain the fact that the people in those "regressive" frameworks don't think they're regressive at all. They think our framework is regressive. What can we reference to make any kind of evaluation without presupposing our conclusion?
Regarding the second point, that theory and method are in a reciprocal relationship, is also very plausible. The difficulty, again, will be to shew that the direction has been/is progressive.
The big problem I see for Boyd is, given the wide array of moral systems in the world, who do we point to as the analogue to science and who are the analogue to pseudoscience? Some moral systems say the way to Truth is by looking at this book, others say you can just feel if something's right, other's will reference minimizing harm, others will reference maximizing liberty, and others maximizing equality. Some will reference all of them. Within science we have some fairly objective criteria to make this general distinction but how do we make this judgment in ethics without presupposing our own methods and results as being the correct ones?
Anyhow, the main thing Boyd wants to say is that the fact that moral judgments are embedded in pre-supposed moral theories and methods is not point against moral realism. Science operates the same way.
How Should We Justify our
Again, to shew the plausibility of real moral facts and how we might justify them, Boyd makes an analogy with the scientific method. Although scientists haven't figured out how magnets work they know a lot of cool stuffs. But how do they justify their beliefs?
The old assumption was that our knowledge was built upon fixed truths and fixed methods of truth acquisition. This model is called foundationalism. Think Descartes. He strips away all beliefs that can be doubted and is left with only
Boyd refudiates this model and opts for a "naturalized coherentist epistemology". Very briefly here's what this means: The coherentist part means that we don't reason from permanent foundational beliefs but our system of beliefs is fluid. We are constantly adjusting them with experience and deliberation. Sure, some beliefs are more strongly held than others, but given sufficiently strong evidence, they are all open to revision--either directly or indirectly. As we adjust certain beliefs to better conform to our experiences, other beliefs that are connected might also be revised.
Another important notion that comes out of the coherentist picture is that there is a reciprocal relationship between our set of beliefs and how we interpret experience. An experience that causes a revision in our set beliefs will in turn cause us to perceive subsequent experiences differently, which will cause further revisions. There is a constant back and forth between how we interpret experience and our particular set of beliefs.
The naturalized part refers to our methods of justifying beliefs. In the foundationalist model we have a set of static methods with which we can produce true beliefs. Naturalized epistemology says that we should also investigate our methods of belief production and use that information to refine them. For example, visual psychology studies how we go from visual stimulus to belief about what we saw. Understanding how this mechanism works and the circumstances under which it fails helps us further refine our methods of belief acquisition which in turn helps refine our beliefs.
The idea is that the more we can refine the ways in which we acquire beliefs, the more our beliefs will approximate "truth". And the more our beliefs approximate truth, the better we will be able to refine our methods of belief acquisition....over and over until people ultimately come to know the absolute truth that the flying spagetti monster is the one True god.
Naturalized Coherentist Epistemology Applied to Moral Thinking
The analogy to moral thinking should be apparent (or is it? ...whoa!). Consider the coherentist part: we have a web of moral beliefs and as we progress through our lives some of those beliefs will start to change to conform with experience. And of course, some of the moral beliefs will be more amenable to change than others. The important point being that changes in one belief will impact other interconnected beliefs to varying degrees. There is continuous dialectic between our moral beliefs and how we perceive the world.
The interesting part comes when we apply this epistemology to methods of inference. To naturalize our methods of moral inferences, the idea is that we should learn how it is we make moral decisions and that learning about conditions under which this process is fallible or accurate will help us produce more accurate moral judgements. These more accurate moral judgments will further allow us to detect conditions under which our methods of moral thinking fail/are successful. Once again, the idea is that there is a positive feedback loop in the direction of truth.
This is going to be a similar problem as we saw in the previous section. With science we have a quasi objective standard by which we can judge the direction of progress. If a method of inference consistently produces theories that accurately describe observed phenomena, and substantial predictions can be made with those theories, we can say the method of inference is a good one.
By what standard can we measure the successfulnicity of a method of moral inference? One person can say, "look, my method is reliable because it shows that abortion is morally permissible". The other says, "look, my method is reliable because it shows abortion isn't morally permissible". In science, we can compair two outcomes: my method predicts 'x' vs my method predicts 'y'. To resolve this we can (often) appeal to what happened, if not immediately, then at some point in the future.
I'm kind of oversimplifying and running roughshod over a few issues but my point is just that often (but not always) scientific disputes can be eventually resolved by appeals something quasi objective--how well actual results fit with the predicted results and how fruitful our new theory turns out to be. In moral thinking, this is only possible when we presuppose we are measuring something objective, but supposing there is, it's not clear how we arbitrate between conflicting views.
This weakness withstanding I think we can pick out a few good things from Boyd's treatment of ethical thinking as analogous to scientific thinking. For instances, there in merit in understanding how we make moral judgments; that is, what's going on neurologically, sociologically, and psychologically, and any-other-ly.
A simple common sense example is that we make poor ethical judgments when we are in a heightened emotional state like anger or love (yeah, I went there). Psychology also tells us we can be "primed" to influence judgments in a predetermined direction. So, I think there is something to his idea of approaching moral thinking with a naturalized epistemology but I'm not sure it follows that naturalizing methods of moral thought will help us determine whether there are objective moral truths or discover what they might be.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)