(apology--I haven't proof read this yet)
Yo, check it. I think I might actually have my paper topic for metaFX. Stop. That would be the best DJ name for a philosopher ever, DJ metaFX. Anyway, I is going to talk about whever der is such ting as normativity in reasons--that is, whether there's such a ting as a good, bad, right, or wrong reason for axion.
Parfit's Preamble on Disagreements
This is an intensely personal section where Parit shares his personal reasons for his quest to determine what matters in life. The main point, however, is that if we find ourselves in disagreement with someone over a moral issue, the standard assumption is that there is some sort of asymmetry. Maybe the person with whom we disagree doesn't have sufficient cognitive capacity to see the correct answer, or maybe they just don't have all the right facts. But, those types of disagreements can be explained away.
The difficult disagreements are with those that we consider our epistemic peers. The people who are also on a whole. nuva. level. wif us. Aaaand they have all same facts as us. In cases of epistemic symmetry there is no rational reason to suppose our belief is any more correct than our friend's. What do? The only thing we can do is to assume that there is an asymmetry in knowledge or capacity somewhere. But how do we know it's not us that is in the weaker position? Answer: we don't. Oh! Snap!
An example of one of these beliefs is retributive justice. Parfit doesn't think anyone deserves to suffer ever. To support his view he has to find the asymmetry responsible for his epistemic peers' views to the contrary. To support his position Parfit suggests that belief in retributive justice may be a case "in which an evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains".
His argument goes that evolution explains why people have reactive attitudes and the desire to inflict harm. But the fact that these emotions and reaction arise out of the evolutionary process demonstrates that such attitudes are not responses to reasons. They are simply reactions. In other words, just because we have an impulse, doesn't mean the action for which we have the impulse is a right action, or that an emotional reaction isn't justification for an action's being right. Something akin the naturalistic fallacy is going on up in hur.
The upshot of the section is that he has deep disagreements with some of his epistemic peers so in order to determine whether his view is correct, rather than his peers, he needs to discover the asymmetries between them.
Parfit on Williams
Parfit has great reverence for Williams and it disturbs him that their moral views are so divergent. A central issue between them is whether there is such a thing as an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good is something that isn't good because of any consequences derived from its acquisition rather it is good in itself. A standard example would be happiness. We don't pursue happiness for any other reason than happiness itself is good. Contrast that with money. We don't pursue money just to have it, but because it allows us to obtain other things we might value like Ed Hardy shirts--which are intrinsically ugly.
So, why is Parfit so pre-occupied by Williams' rejection of the notion of intrinsic good? Because, without this notion Parit doesn't think we can answer the first question of philosophy: Are we human or are we dancer? Not only that, but we also can't answer the "other" first question of philosophy, "how ought we to live our lives/which kind of life do I have the most reason to live?"
You see, if we have nothing with absolute value to pursue, then not only can we not know at what we should aim our own actions but there will be no grounds by which we might judge the actions/life choices of others. If all values are relative, then the person who pursues a life of causing suffering for others is on equal normative footing as someone who spends their life pursuing justice, happiness, knowledge, and love. For Parfit we need some objective normative truths in order to know what reasons should count in favour or against engaging in an action.
For Williams the notion of an intrinsic good is inexplicable. If something were to be intrinsically good-- that is, its essence was goodness--then its goodness should be explainable in advance of human valuation. This is close to my position. I don't understand how something is intrinsically good, devoid of any context. I understand the notion if we say something like "justice and happiness are intrinsically good for humans". Without humans would justice and happiness be good? Are justice and happiness also good for ants and bacteria? It seems that these values are only positive in relation to the benefits they bring to humans (in a community).
Someone like Parfit might reply that bacteria and ants don't have the capacity for happiness and goodness, so my counter-example is irrelevant. That's an objection I'll have to reply to.
But enough about me, lets go back to Williams' argument which is very similar to my own thought, but obviously more sophisticated! He says that if something has intrinsic goodness then we should not be able to explain its goodness by saying we value it. So, I can't say that love is good because I value it. It has to be the other way around; I must say of something that has intrinsic value that I value it because of its intrinsic goodness. In the case of love, I need to say that I value love because it is good. In essence we are saying that something (e.g. love) is good because it is good. This seems a little tautologous.
The suggestion might be that we should value things such as virtue, justice, and happiness because of the other properties that make them good. Plato says justice is good because it creates harmony. But just like Palin, Williams refudiates this view too.
Before we get into Williams' argument there, lets return to Parfit's view of reasons. He says:
When we call something intrinsically good in the reason-implying sense, we mean that this thing has intrinsic properties that would or might give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, or trying achieve this thing.
The basic idea is that certain facts about the world will give us reasons to act in a certain way. For example, it is a fact that helping an old lady across the street will make her happy and will be kind. Both of those things are intrinsically good--those are facts! Those facts give me reasons to act. If there were no facts about the intrinsic goodness of happiness and kindness, I'd have no reason to act one way or the other. A central idea is that facts create reasons for a determinate action.
Reasons Internalism Vs. Reason Externalism
Williams thinks this is all claptrap. He adopts the "Humean" model of action. The basic idea is that I have a predetermined set of desires, dispositions, character traits, etc called the motivational set...the only way we can explain action is by reference to my motivational set. If I say I want to study, but I procrastinate on facebook instead, then my dominant desire was to make witty comments on facebook. Every time I ask "why did I do x" the answer will be "to satisfy some desire in my motivational set". A consequence of this view is that, logically, we can't act in a way that isn't in accordance with something our pre-existing motivational set.
Parfit sees things differently. He says that facts about the world give us reasons to have new desires (if we are sufficiently rational and reflexive). For example, maybe I see an old lady trying to cross the street on my way to work. For whatever reason Zeus (the one TRUE god) gave me a motivational set that lacks the desire to help her across the street. My friend sees that I didn't help her then explains to me why it's good to help old ladies across the street. He states facts about kindness and compassion that give me reasons to include the desire to help many old ladies across many streets. And I dedicate the rest of my life to helping old ladies across streets. The end.
From Parfit's position Williams' view is tragic for humanity. If all that can motivate action are pre-existing desires, then it is pointless to ask what kind of life we ought to live. All we can do is internally reflect on our motivational set and decide which desires we weigh more than others. There is no point in asking what things are important or what we should care about. It is a sad state of affairs indeed.
I have to say that while my philosophical sympathies are with Williams, Parfit paints a much nicer picture. Those in the Williams camp can claim that they are simply doing psychology. It doesn't make sense to say that someone acted in a way that didn't accord with one of their desires. Note that Williams' view doesn't necessarily imply profligate behaviour. Most people have in their motivational set the desire to act in accordance with whatever they consider to be moral.
Moral Disagreement
But I want to set that debate aside and turn to another issue. This notion of normatively--of intrinsic value. It's all fine and dandy to say that this and that are intrinsically good or bad, but what do we do in cases of disagreement? Certainly there are cases where people disagree. Some people think allowing individuals to end their own lives is a good thing, others think it's baaaaaaad. Because Parfit believes in intrinsic values, in such cases someone must be wrong. It's not a matter of, "well, for person A's community it's ok and for person B's community it's not". Nope. Someone is wrong. And it ain't me!
Lets suppose Parfit is right and there are objective moral values. What do we do in cases of disagreement, especially when er'body has all the same facts? It seems that the only way to choose between the two positions, given equal epistemic positions, is to presuppose a meta-theory of value. In other words, suppose I give the reason "dignity is da best" for my position and you give yours "suicide is the da worst". Now we need a theory of value to determine which values to value more. But then someone comes along and gives a contrary theory of how we should weigh values. Now we need a meta-meta theory to adjudicate between those two theories.
The bottom line is this: once we say there is objective normative value, in a moral dispute given epistemic parity, there is no way to decide which reason for action we should prefer unless we further presuppose a meta-theory of values.
I didn't really explain that too well but I hope you get the point...
Wacky Mackie and Wile E. Coyote
Ok, one last thing. What's the solution to this? I think Mackie's error theory is the solution. Here's what he says. When I say this is good or this is bad, I mean what I say but my statements are false. There is no such thing as good and bad. Oh! Snap! The world is going to end! Er'body hide your wife, hide your kids, hide your husband cuz they b rapin' er'body up here!
Hold on. Ain't nobody gong b climbin' in ur windows. Here's Mackie's idea. Just because moral statements are all false doesn't mean that we need to throw away morality. Morality and moral concepts serve a very useful purpose. Just cuz there's no such thing as objective good or bad is no reason to go rapin' er'body in here. Think of it like this. (Some people might disgree with this example but I'll try to come up with others later). Numbers. What are they? Can you touch them? Do they exist? No. They are concepts. Very useful ones at that. We don't stop using them just because they don't exist in any real sense. We can do the same with moral concepts like "good", "right", "bad", and "wrong". Nothing is really intrinsically good or bad, but these are certainly useful concepts.
One interesting consequence of this view is that we are a little like Wile E. Coyote before he realized he's run off a cliff. We act as if these concepts are real and so long as we don't look down, we should be fine!
Any and all criticisms are welcome as it will give me content for my paper. Thank you for reading.
Showing posts with label error theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label error theory. Show all posts
Sunday, April 1, 2012
Saturday, March 3, 2012
The Arguments from Queerness and Relativity (Mackie Part 2)
Other Mackie Articles
Mackie on Subjectivity vs Objectivity
Mackie Intro and Second vs First Order Ethics
Overview
Do objective moral values or principles exist? Or are we dancer? When someone says, "it's wrong to do x" or "you ought not to do x" it seems as though they are referring to something objective about or in the act. That is, we are referring to some real quality or property in the act. Mackie says this is a quirk of language and that moral properties and values don't exist in any real sense (i.e., the way we use language makes it seem like we are referring to something but actually we aren't). He gives two arguments for his position: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness.
Argument from Relativity
This argument is fairly straight forward:
P1. It's an empirical fact (that's science!) that many cultures around the world both historically--and now--have very different moral concepts, many of them in genuine opposition to each other.
[P1* However, disagreement alone isn't enough to prove there are no objective moral values, so I'll offer a further argument.]
P2. (Argument from Arrow of causation and constructivist account of morality) One way to explain the difference in moral judgments is that a culture's moral values arise out of how they live their lives. The ways of living comes first, the moral judgments come after, not the other way around. For example, if a culture finds polygamy morally acceptable, it's because that's how they live. A community doesn't first decide what types of marriage are appropriate, then modify its behavior. If we accept this interpretation, then moral values aren't objective; instead they are a consequence of social structures.
P3. The moral realist has another way to explain moral differences which is to assume that there are objective moral facts. The difference between moral values in cultures/moments in history arises because some cultures are (somehow) more aware of the true moral values than others. Some cultures just have better perception of moral qualities than do others.
P4. (Abductive Argument) However, if moral values are objective, giving an account of how entire cultures can fail to perceive them is not going to be easy (or plausible). Instead we should adopt the constructivist explanation: i.e., we construct our values based on the normal behaviours and arrangements in our particular culture--rather than there being objective moral values that people somehow (mis)perceive.
Conclusion: Because the constructivist account is a more plausible explanation for the wide variety of often conflicting moral positions we observe, we should say that there are no objective moral values.
Possible Objection 1: Moral Reformers Exist
Moral judgments aren't merely a matter of conforming to a social standard. There are cases of moral change and reform throughout history. For example, the abolition of slavery, the civil rights act, advance of women's and, recently, gay etc...
Reply 1: Move Toward Consistency
There's aren't changes in the moral code, rather, they are moves toward consistency in the moral code. For example, the moral argument for the abolition of slavery was that slavery was inconsistent with the pre-existing ideals of all people being born free and equal before the law.
Possible Objection 2: Instances of Universal Principles
The specific rules vary across cultures however they are instances of a more general universal rules. E.g., do whatever will bring about the greatest amount of good. So, of course what brings about the greatest amount of good will vary across different living circumstances. But this doesn't undermine the fact that the general rule is universally true. And so, morality does have objectively true principles.
Mackie's Reply: It's Only a Partial Counter
Accepting the above line of argument means that the specific laws are only derivatively and contingently objectively true. That is, their objectivity relies on their being instances of universal laws. Since the specific laws are dependent on local circumstances that means that if the local circumstances change, the objective truth of the specific laws will change. But this doesn't reflect what people think about their local moral rules. They think that their specific rules are objectively true and not merely derivative of universal rules or contingent on circumstance.
For example, in some cultures they believe it's wrong to eat pork. They don't think this is wrong because it's an instance or derivation of a more general universal rule. They just think it's wrong to eat pork "period". Also, they don't think that if circumstances changed, it would be OK to eat pork. In other words, the specific rather than a general rule is considered to be objectively true. And it's objective truth isn't derivative of a more general rule, nor is it contingent on circumstance.
Argument from Queerness
This argument has two parts, one metaphysical (to do with the nature of something's existence) and one epistemological (how we come to know something).
Metaphysical Argument: Suppose there were objective moral values: real qualities that were part of the world--in short, they exist. What would they be made of? Do they inhere in matter? Can I taste them? Touch them? What colour are they? How is it that we can sense them but not explain their properties? It seems they would be queer entities or properties indeed! (Not that there's anything wrong with that--some of my best friends have queer properties).
Epistemological Argument: Setting the metaphysical issue aside and continuing with our supposition, by what faculty might we come to know these queer qualities? If I can't see, touch, taste, smell, or hear them, by what sense faculty do I come to know them?
It seems any theory that says moral values are objective must give us some sort of account of how it is we come to know them. And to reply that ethical thinking occurs simply by sitting down and having an 'intuition' turns ethical thought into a travesty of a mockery of a sham. What about application of reason? conceptual analysis? deliberation?
The only possible good defense to this argument a realist can offer is to somehow show that these supposed moral qualities/properties can be known empirically.
So, what might these real moral properties be like? According to Mackie, they'd have to be something like Plato's Forms. A quick and dirty explanation of Plato's forms is that they are the perfect abstract notion of all qualities and things. Well, not only are they abstract notions but they actually exist somewhere, in some sense. Consider the Form of the Good. This is the ideal goodness to which we all ought to strive; and although it is an ideal, it also somehow exists. In what way do ideals objectively exist?
The Problem of Motivating Force (Another metaphysical argument)
Anyhow, Mackie's argument isn't specific to Plato's forms. He argues that any moral realist position would be susceptible to the following argument: According to Mackie, for a moral realist the properties of the "goodness" or "badness" of an act must not only be sensible but must also motivate action.
For example, recognizing an act as "good" is not simply a matter of perceiving that property in something and thinking, "huh, that thing has 'goodness' in it--cool," it also necessarily provides the knower with a direction and motive for action. So, when we recognize something as good, it should also incite us to action. That is, knowing something is good should also motive us to pursue it. And the same will apply for all moral values (if we perceive the property of 'badness' in something, it must also motivate us to avoid it).This meta-ethical position is called "existence internalism" (not to be confused with and not related to internalism in epistemology).
But why should the realist accept this condition imposed by Mackie? Why can't the realist say that it is possible to recognize 'goodness' in something and not have it motivate action? I suppose the realist could do that, but then the realist has to give up the claim that moral values/properties of an situation or act do motivate action toward the good, which is a move they probably don't want to make. It relegates moral properties to the same status as 'red' and 'heavy'.
More Queerness...
In a particular action/situation, what would be the relationship between an objective moral quality and the act's/situation's natural features?
Take the example of an act of cruelty. Why do cruel acts also have the property of 'wrongness'? The typical answer is that the act's wrongness is a consequence of its cruelness: it is wrong because it's cruel. But the realist can't use this explanation because their argument is that moral values are in the act as natural properties, so appealing to a causal relation (x is wrong because it's cruel) is off limits. Cruelness and wrongness have to exist independently of one another.
Furthermore, how do we rule out that judging a particular cruel act as wrong isn't simply a consequence of our culture? There is a wide range of cultural opinions on what constitutes, for example, 'wrongness' in regards to treatment of animals. Isn't an account of differing cultural values a better explanation for the diversity of views (rather than some groups' moral faculty being more accurate than others')?
The realist might reply the wrongness supervenes on the cruelty of an action; that is, the property of wrongness is a property that comes about wherever there is the property of cruelty. But how do we explain the notion of properties having properties? It seems a little...mmmm...queer! Is it not a more likely account that our application of the term 'wrong' to cruel acts is a consequence of our subjective response to cruel acts--not that we are perceiving some additional natural property in the act.
The realist's position in regards to supervenience of properties is actually quite defensible. In contemporary philosophy (especially of mind) the notion of supervening properties is almost unanimously accepted. For example, the property of consciousness supervenes on the physical properties of the brain. This notion can plausibly be extended to acts.
So, there you have it, the arguments from relativity and from queerness, both against moral realism. Whaduyuthink? Are you ready to give up the chimera of objective moral qualities? I should add that giving up objective moral values doesn't mean giving up morality, just objective morality.
Mackie on Subjectivity vs Objectivity
Mackie Intro and Second vs First Order Ethics
Overview
Do objective moral values or principles exist? Or are we dancer? When someone says, "it's wrong to do x" or "you ought not to do x" it seems as though they are referring to something objective about or in the act. That is, we are referring to some real quality or property in the act. Mackie says this is a quirk of language and that moral properties and values don't exist in any real sense (i.e., the way we use language makes it seem like we are referring to something but actually we aren't). He gives two arguments for his position: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness.
Argument from Relativity
This argument is fairly straight forward:
P1. It's an empirical fact (that's science!) that many cultures around the world both historically--and now--have very different moral concepts, many of them in genuine opposition to each other.
[P1* However, disagreement alone isn't enough to prove there are no objective moral values, so I'll offer a further argument.]
P2. (Argument from Arrow of causation and constructivist account of morality) One way to explain the difference in moral judgments is that a culture's moral values arise out of how they live their lives. The ways of living comes first, the moral judgments come after, not the other way around. For example, if a culture finds polygamy morally acceptable, it's because that's how they live. A community doesn't first decide what types of marriage are appropriate, then modify its behavior. If we accept this interpretation, then moral values aren't objective; instead they are a consequence of social structures.
P3. The moral realist has another way to explain moral differences which is to assume that there are objective moral facts. The difference between moral values in cultures/moments in history arises because some cultures are (somehow) more aware of the true moral values than others. Some cultures just have better perception of moral qualities than do others.
P4. (Abductive Argument) However, if moral values are objective, giving an account of how entire cultures can fail to perceive them is not going to be easy (or plausible). Instead we should adopt the constructivist explanation: i.e., we construct our values based on the normal behaviours and arrangements in our particular culture--rather than there being objective moral values that people somehow (mis)perceive.
Conclusion: Because the constructivist account is a more plausible explanation for the wide variety of often conflicting moral positions we observe, we should say that there are no objective moral values.
Possible Objection 1: Moral Reformers Exist
Moral judgments aren't merely a matter of conforming to a social standard. There are cases of moral change and reform throughout history. For example, the abolition of slavery, the civil rights act, advance of women's and, recently, gay etc...
Reply 1: Move Toward Consistency
There's aren't changes in the moral code, rather, they are moves toward consistency in the moral code. For example, the moral argument for the abolition of slavery was that slavery was inconsistent with the pre-existing ideals of all people being born free and equal before the law.
Possible Objection 2: Instances of Universal Principles
The specific rules vary across cultures however they are instances of a more general universal rules. E.g., do whatever will bring about the greatest amount of good. So, of course what brings about the greatest amount of good will vary across different living circumstances. But this doesn't undermine the fact that the general rule is universally true. And so, morality does have objectively true principles.
Mackie's Reply: It's Only a Partial Counter
Accepting the above line of argument means that the specific laws are only derivatively and contingently objectively true. That is, their objectivity relies on their being instances of universal laws. Since the specific laws are dependent on local circumstances that means that if the local circumstances change, the objective truth of the specific laws will change. But this doesn't reflect what people think about their local moral rules. They think that their specific rules are objectively true and not merely derivative of universal rules or contingent on circumstance.
For example, in some cultures they believe it's wrong to eat pork. They don't think this is wrong because it's an instance or derivation of a more general universal rule. They just think it's wrong to eat pork "period". Also, they don't think that if circumstances changed, it would be OK to eat pork. In other words, the specific rather than a general rule is considered to be objectively true. And it's objective truth isn't derivative of a more general rule, nor is it contingent on circumstance.
Argument from Queerness
This argument has two parts, one metaphysical (to do with the nature of something's existence) and one epistemological (how we come to know something).
Metaphysical Argument: Suppose there were objective moral values: real qualities that were part of the world--in short, they exist. What would they be made of? Do they inhere in matter? Can I taste them? Touch them? What colour are they? How is it that we can sense them but not explain their properties? It seems they would be queer entities or properties indeed! (Not that there's anything wrong with that--some of my best friends have queer properties).
Epistemological Argument: Setting the metaphysical issue aside and continuing with our supposition, by what faculty might we come to know these queer qualities? If I can't see, touch, taste, smell, or hear them, by what sense faculty do I come to know them?
It seems any theory that says moral values are objective must give us some sort of account of how it is we come to know them. And to reply that ethical thinking occurs simply by sitting down and having an 'intuition' turns ethical thought into a travesty of a mockery of a sham. What about application of reason? conceptual analysis? deliberation?
The only possible good defense to this argument a realist can offer is to somehow show that these supposed moral qualities/properties can be known empirically.
So, what might these real moral properties be like? According to Mackie, they'd have to be something like Plato's Forms. A quick and dirty explanation of Plato's forms is that they are the perfect abstract notion of all qualities and things. Well, not only are they abstract notions but they actually exist somewhere, in some sense. Consider the Form of the Good. This is the ideal goodness to which we all ought to strive; and although it is an ideal, it also somehow exists. In what way do ideals objectively exist?
The Problem of Motivating Force (Another metaphysical argument)
Anyhow, Mackie's argument isn't specific to Plato's forms. He argues that any moral realist position would be susceptible to the following argument: According to Mackie, for a moral realist the properties of the "goodness" or "badness" of an act must not only be sensible but must also motivate action.
For example, recognizing an act as "good" is not simply a matter of perceiving that property in something and thinking, "huh, that thing has 'goodness' in it--cool," it also necessarily provides the knower with a direction and motive for action. So, when we recognize something as good, it should also incite us to action. That is, knowing something is good should also motive us to pursue it. And the same will apply for all moral values (if we perceive the property of 'badness' in something, it must also motivate us to avoid it).This meta-ethical position is called "existence internalism" (not to be confused with and not related to internalism in epistemology).
But why should the realist accept this condition imposed by Mackie? Why can't the realist say that it is possible to recognize 'goodness' in something and not have it motivate action? I suppose the realist could do that, but then the realist has to give up the claim that moral values/properties of an situation or act do motivate action toward the good, which is a move they probably don't want to make. It relegates moral properties to the same status as 'red' and 'heavy'.
More Queerness...
In a particular action/situation, what would be the relationship between an objective moral quality and the act's/situation's natural features?
Take the example of an act of cruelty. Why do cruel acts also have the property of 'wrongness'? The typical answer is that the act's wrongness is a consequence of its cruelness: it is wrong because it's cruel. But the realist can't use this explanation because their argument is that moral values are in the act as natural properties, so appealing to a causal relation (x is wrong because it's cruel) is off limits. Cruelness and wrongness have to exist independently of one another.
Furthermore, how do we rule out that judging a particular cruel act as wrong isn't simply a consequence of our culture? There is a wide range of cultural opinions on what constitutes, for example, 'wrongness' in regards to treatment of animals. Isn't an account of differing cultural values a better explanation for the diversity of views (rather than some groups' moral faculty being more accurate than others')?
The realist might reply the wrongness supervenes on the cruelty of an action; that is, the property of wrongness is a property that comes about wherever there is the property of cruelty. But how do we explain the notion of properties having properties? It seems a little...mmmm...queer! Is it not a more likely account that our application of the term 'wrong' to cruel acts is a consequence of our subjective response to cruel acts--not that we are perceiving some additional natural property in the act.
The realist's position in regards to supervenience of properties is actually quite defensible. In contemporary philosophy (especially of mind) the notion of supervening properties is almost unanimously accepted. For example, the property of consciousness supervenes on the physical properties of the brain. This notion can plausibly be extended to acts.
So, there you have it, the arguments from relativity and from queerness, both against moral realism. Whaduyuthink? Are you ready to give up the chimera of objective moral qualities? I should add that giving up objective moral values doesn't mean giving up morality, just objective morality.
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