Critical Thinking: Arguments from Ignorance, God, and GMOs

Introduction
The next argument scheme we will look at is what's known as the argument from ignorance.  An argument from ignorance (or argumentum ad ignorantium if you want to be fancy) is one that asserts that something is (most likely) true because there is no good evidence showing that it is false.  It can also be used the other way to argue that a claim is (most likely) false because there's not good evidence to show that it's true.

Lets look at a couple of (valid) examples:

There's no good evidence to show that the ancient Egyptians had digital computeres.  (This evaluation comes from professional archeologists), therefore, they likely didn't have digital computers.

Or

There's no good evidence to suppose the earth will get destroyed by an asteroid tomorrow.  (This evaluation comes from professional astronomers),  so we should assume it won't and plan a picnic for tomorrow.

Or

There's no good geological evidence that there was a world-wide flood event.  (This evaluation comes from professional geologists), therefore we should assume that one never happened.

Formalizing the Argument Scheme
As you may have guessed, we can formalize the structure of the argument from ignorance:
P1:  There's no (good) evidence to disprove (or prove*) the claim.
P2:  There has been a reasonable search for the relevant evidence by whomever is qualified to do so.
C:    Therefore, we should accept the claim as more probable than not/true.
C*:  Therefore, we should reject the claim as improbable/false.

Good and Bad Use of Argument from Ignorance
The argument from ignorance is philosophically interesting because sometimes the same structure can be used to support the opposing position.  The classic example is the debate over the existence of God.  Lets look at how both sides can employ the argument from ignorance to try to support their postion.

Pro-God Arg 
P1:  You can't find any evidence that proves that God or gods don't exist.
P2:  We've made a good attempt to find disconfirming evidence, but can't find any!
C:   Therefore, it's reasonable to suppose that God or gods do exist.

Vs God Arg 
P1:  You can't show any evidence that God or gods do exist.
P1*:  Any evidence you present can also be explained through the natural laws.
P2:  We've made a good attempt at looking for evidence of God's/gods' existence but can't find any! (I even looked under my bed!)
C:  Therefore, it's reasonable to suppose that God/gods don't exist.

This particular case brings out some important issues we studied earlier in the course such as bias and burden of proof.   Not surprisingly, theists will find the first argument convincing while atheists will be convinced by the latter.  This of course brings up questions of burden of proof.  When we make a claim for something's existence, is it up to the person making the claim to provide proof?  Or does the burden of proof fall on the critic to give disconfirming evidence?  In certain questions, your biases will pre-determine your answer.

While in the above issue, there is arguably reasonable disagreement on both sides, there are other domains where the argument from ignorance fails as a good argument.  As you might guess, this will have to do with the acceptability of P1 (i.e., there is/is no evidence) and P2 (i.e., a reasonable search has been made).  Most criticism of arguments from ignorance will focus on P2--that the search wasn't as extensive as the arguer thinks.  Generally, we let P1 stand because it is usually an authors opinion to the best of their own knowledge.  Recall from the chapter on determining what is reasonable, we typically let personal testimony stand.

We can illustrate a poor example of an argument from ignorance with an example.  Claim: There's no evidence to show Obama is American, therefore he isn't American.

Lets dress the argument to evaluate it:
P1:  I've encountered no good evidence to show that Obama is an American citizen.
P2:  Numerous agencies and individual trained in the search and identification of state documents have been unable to locate any relevant documents.
C:   Obama isn't American (and is a Communist Muslim).

Regarding P1, maybe the arguer hasn't encountered any evidence so we'll leave it alone.  P2 however has problems.  There have been reasonable searches for evidence, and that evidence was found.  Perhaps, the arguer was unaware or didn't truly exert him/herself enough.  The argument fails because P2 is not acceptable (i.e., false).

We can also typically find the argument from ignorance used in arguments against new (or relatively new) technologies in regards to safety or efficacy.  For example:

We should ban GMOs because we don't know what long-term health effects are.

Dressed:
P1:  I've found no evidence that shows that GMOs are safe for human consumption.
P2:  Those qualified to do studies and evaluate evidence have found no compelling evidence to show that GMOs are safe for human consumption.
C:  Therefore, we should assume GMOs are unsafe and ban them until we can determine they are safe.

If we were to criticize this argument we'd consider P2.  In fact, there have been quite a few long term studies done by those qualified to assess safety.  At this point we will have a debate over quality of evidence.  Some on the anti-GMO side dispute the quality of the evidence (i.e., it was funded by company x, and therefore it is questionable).  In a full analysis we'd consider this question in depth, but for our purposes here, we might legitimately challenge the claim that there is no available evidence purporting to demonstrate safety.

As an aside, notice that we can also use the argument from ignorance for the opposite conclusion:  There's no compelling evidence to show that GMOs are unsafe for human consumption in the long-term, therefore, we should continue to make them available/ should not regulate them.

The "team" that wins this battle of arguments from ignorance will have much to do with our evaluation of P2:  That there legitimately is or isn't quality evidence one way or the other.

Final Notes on Arguments from Ignorance
We can look at arguments from ignorance as probabilistic arguments.  That is, given that there is little or no evidence for something, what is the likelihood that it still might exist?  This is especially true for claims that something does exist based on an absence of evidence for its non-existence.   However, as Carl Sagan famously said, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."  In other words, just because we can't find evidence for something, doesn't mean that the thing or phenomena doesn't exist.

On the flip side, this line of argument can also be used to support improbable claims.  Consider such an argument for the existence of unicorns or small teapots that circle the Sun:  There's no evidence that unicorns don't exist or small tea pots don't circle the Sun, therefore we should assume they exist.

At this point we should return to the notion of probability:  Given no positive evidence for these claims, what is the probability that they are true (versus the probability that they aren't)?  It seems that, given an absence of evidence, the probability of there being unicorns is lower than the probability that they do not exist.  Same goes for the teapot.

Typically, in such cases we say that the burden of proof falls on the person making the existential claim.  That is, if you want to claim that something exists, the burden is upon you to provide evidence for it, otherwise, the reasonable position is the "null hypothesis."  The null hypothesis just means that we assume no entity or phenomena exists unless there is positive evidence for its existence.   In other words, if I want to assert that unicorns exist, using the argument from ignorance won't do.  It's not enough for me to make the claim based on an absence of evidence.  This is because, we'd expect some evidence to have turned up by now if there were unicorns (i.e., P2 of the implied argument would be weak).

This brings us to another Carl Sagan quote (paraphrasing Hume):  "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." Or as Hume originally said:  "A wise man proportions his beliefs to the evidence."   Claiming that unicorns exist is an extraordinary claim and so we should demand evidence in proportion to the "extraordinariness" of the claim.  This is why an ad ignorantium argument fails here;  it doesn't offer any positive evidence for an extraordinary claim, only absence of evidence.  We'll discuss this principle of proportionality more in the coming section.   For now, just keep it in mind when evaluating existential arguments from ignorance.

Critical Thinking: Case Study on How to Lay the Smack Down

So, this meme has been floating around the intertubes for a couple of years. It popped up again in my feed. It's such a great example of a poor argument. I've commented on it before, but not to the degree that you will soon experience. In the comments section, a friend and former roommate of mine from U of H gave a pretty good example of how to deconstruct a poor argument. So, sit back and enjoy, how to lay the smack down on facebook with Seth Robertson:


Note: I want to make clear that my intent (in this particular post) is not to post things that are deliberately anti-religious. The fact that this meme has to do with religion is incidental. The main point is that this meme is a poor argument for the existence of God and does not adequately address the professor's concerns. This does not necessarily imply there is no God, it only suggests that the particular argument in the meme is a poor one to use as an argument for God's existence. There are also poor atheist arguments, and as I see them in my news feed, I will post them too. And again, a poor argument against there being a god doesn't mean we ought to conclude that there is one. It only tells us that the particular argument being used is a poor one.


That said, we should not suppose that arguments are irrelevant to what we should or should not believe. In perennial issues, such as God's existence, while we should not attach our assent or dissent to just one argument, we should be sensitive to the relative strength of arguments on either side. That sensitivity should be reflected in the degree of certainty we hold in certain beliefs.

First read the argument (dialectic) then check out my friend's comments which I've posted below.

Professor : You are a Christian, aren’t you, son ?

Student : Yes, sir.

Professor: So, you believe in GOD ?

Student : Absolutely, sir.

Professor : Is GOD good ?

Student : Sure.

Professor: Is GOD all powerful ?

Student : Yes.

Professor: My brother died of cancer even though he prayed to GOD to heal him. Most of us would attempt to help others who are ill. But GOD didn’t. How is this GOD good then? Hmm?

(Student was silent.)

Professor: You can’t answer, can you ? Let’s start again, young fella. Is GOD good?

Student : Yes.

Professor: Is satan good ?

Student : No.

Professor: Where does satan come from ?

Student : From … GOD …

Professor: That’s right. Tell me son, is there evil in this world?

Student : Yes.

Professor: Evil is everywhere, isn’t it ? And GOD did make everything. Correct?

Student : Yes.

Professor: So who created evil ?

(Student did not answer.)

Professor: Is there sickness? Immorality? Hatred? Ugliness? All these terrible things exist in the world, don’t they?

Student : Yes, sir.

Professor: So, who created them ?

(Student had no answer.)

Professor: Science says you have 5 Senses you use to identify and observe the world around you. Tell me, son, have you ever seen GOD?

Student : No, sir.

Professor: Tell us if you have ever heard your GOD?

Student : No , sir.

Professor: Have you ever felt your GOD, tasted your GOD, smelt your GOD? Have you ever had any sensory perception of GOD for that matter?

Student : No, sir. I’m afraid I haven’t.

Professor: Yet you still believe in Him?

Student : Yes.

Professor : According to Empirical, Testable, Demonstrable Protocol, Science says your GOD doesn’t exist. What do you say to that, son?

Student : Nothing. I only have my faith.

Professor: Yes, faith. And that is the problem Science has.

Student : Professor, is there such a thing as heat?

Professor: Yes.

Student : And is there such a thing as cold?

Professor: Yes.

Student : No, sir. There isn’t.

(The lecture theater became very quiet with this turn of events.)

Student : Sir, you can have lots of heat, even more heat, superheat, mega heat, white heat, a little heat or no heat. But we don’t have anything called cold. We can hit 458 degrees below zero which is no heat, but we can’t go any further after that. There is no such thing as cold. Cold is only a word we use to describe the absence of heat. We cannot measure cold. Heat is energy. Cold is not the opposite of heat, sir, just the absence of it.

(There was pin-drop silence in the lecture theater.)

Student : What about darkness, Professor? Is there such a thing as darkness?

Professor: Yes. What is night if there isn’t darkness?

Student : You’re wrong again, sir. Darkness is the absence of something. You can have low light, normal light, bright light, flashing light. But if you have no light constantly, you have nothing and its called darkness, isn’t it? In reality, darkness isn’t. If it is, well you would be able to make darkness darker, wouldn’t you?

Professor: So what is the point you are making, young man ?

Student : Sir, my point is your philosophical premise is flawed.

Professor: Flawed ? Can you explain how?

Student : Sir, you are working on the premise of duality. You argue there is life and then there is death, a good GOD and a bad GOD. You are viewing the concept of GOD as something finite, something we can measure. Sir, Science can’t even explain a thought. It uses electricity and magnetism, but has never seen, much less fully understood either one. To view death as the opposite of life is to be ignorant of the fact that death cannot exist as a substantive thing.

Death is not the opposite of life: just the absence of it. Now tell me, Professor, do you teach your students that they evolved from a monkey?

Professor: If you are referring to the natural evolutionary process, yes, of course, I do.

Student : Have you ever observed evolution with your own eyes, sir?

(The Professor shook his head with a smile, beginning to realize where the argument was going.)

Student : Since no one has ever observed the process of evolution at work and cannot even prove that this process is an on-going endeavor. Are you not teaching your opinion, sir? Are you not a scientist but a preacher?

(The class was in uproar.)

Student : Is there anyone in the class who has ever seen the Professor’s brain?

(The class broke out into laughter. )

Student : Is there anyone here who has ever heard the Professor’s brain, felt it, touched or smelt it? No one appears to have done so. So, according to the established Rules of Empirical, Stable, Demonstrable Protocol, Science says that you have no brain, sir. With all due respect, sir, how do we then trust your lectures, sir?

(The room was silent. The Professor stared at the student, his face unfathomable.)

Professor: I guess you’ll have to take them on faith, son.

Student : That is it sir … Exactly ! The link between man & GOD is FAITH. That is all that keeps things alive and moving.

P.S.

I believe you have enjoyed the conversation. And if so, you’ll probably want your friends / colleagues to enjoy the same, won’t you?

Forward this to increase their knowledge … or FAITH.

By the way, that student was EINSTEIN.

Seth's Comments:
Problems with this letter:

1. Einstein never did this. It does not even match with Einstein's religious beliefs. Einstein was agnostic.

2. If this was a real professor, he should be reprimanded or fired for harassing a student.

3. If this was a real professor, he should be reprimanded or fired for being a total idiot.

3. If this was a philosophy professor, he'd be the worst philosopher ever. Excluding Heidegger.

4. The professor begins with a very poorly articulated version of the infamous"problem of evil." A better version of it goes like this. God is always good (all-good). If one has the power, it is good to intervene to stop an evil thing from happening. God has the power to do anything (all-powerful). But there is evil in the world, which means that God did not intervene (even though he could have, because he is all-powerful. That means that there is a good thing that God didn't do. So God is not simultaneously all-good and all-powerful.

5. This "problem of evil" is a big deal. It is such a big deal that not only does it have its own name, but attempted solutions to it have their own name (theodicies). It's not easy to solve.

6. Even if it was easy to solve, the student never even tries. At no point does he offer a counter-argument to the problem of evil. Personally, I think it is possible to solve the problem of evil. The student doesn't bother. That's no way to win an argument.

7. The professor then says " Science says you have 5 Senses you use to identify and observe the world around you." Actually, science doesn't say that. We clearly have more than five senses. In addition to the obvious five, there are also senses like balance and proprioception (you can close your eyes, move your hand to the left, and still tell roughly where your hand is). In fact, I think the commonly agreed upon number of senses for now is somewhere around 20 or 21.

8. Next, the professor gives a just terrible argument that no agnostic or atheist one in her right mind would make. It goes like this: We don't perceive God with sight, smell, taste, sound, or touch, so "science says" God does not exist. Evidently, by "science," the professor means some version of hyper-radical empiricism that no scientist ever actually believed in. If we could only believe in the existence of things that we personally perceived, I would not be justified in believing that my great-great grandfather existed, or that atoms existed, or that planets that were too far away to see with the naked eye existed.

9. The more philosophically robust version of the terrible argument that the professor ran goes like this: as science progresses, we create new scientific theories that explain phenomenon naturalistically that were previously thought of as only explainable supernaturallistically. Thus, there is less and less of a motivation to posit a theoretical supernatural entity as the cause of events in our world.

10. Let me re-emphasize that no scientist thinks that we are only justified in believing things that we can directly perceive.

11. The student then goes on to deploy some quasi-Augustinian argument about the nature of heat and light. He says that "heat is energy." More accurately it is molecular kinetic energy. But whatevs. The student then says that cold is the absence of heat, so there is no such thing as cold. This is a non-sequiter. There is such a thing as "cold." It is roughly any atmosphere below a certain threshold of molecular kinetic energy. It is subjective to humans, but that doesn't mean it does not exist.

12. The student does the same thing with light. I swear, the only point of this section is to rehash an ancient argument provided by Augustine that the author must have thought was neat because it is totally irrelevant to any point. The student says , "In reality, darkness isn’t. If it is, well you would be able to make darkness darker, wouldn’t you?" Again, this is a non-sequiter. Just because "darkness" occurs when there is lower than a certain threshold of light particles and reflective surfaces does not mean that "darkness" does not exist.

13. Same thing with death.

14. The student tries to get to the point. It seems to be that the problem of evil assumes duality. Well, Christianty cerainly assumes duality in many cases too (heaven & hell, right and wrong, for example).

15. The student says "Science can't even explain a thought." Wait what?

16. The student says "To view death as the opposite of life is to be ignorant of the fact that death cannot exist as a substantive thing" Aww, that is very touching and profound. But it has absolutely nothing to do with anything the professor said.

17. The student then tries to turn the tables on the professor, but arguing that unobserved entities and processes do exist. This is actually fair. The problem is that his individual arguments are so bad.

18. The student says " Since no one has ever observed the process of evolution at work and cannot even prove that this process is an on-going endeavor." What? We've observed evolution happening tons and tons and tons of time.

19. The student then says "Are you not teaching your opinion, sir? Are you not a scientist but a preacher?" This implies that evolutionary theory is just an opinion. If you're a creationist, fine, but evolutionary theory is not "just like your opinion, man." Further, at the collegiate level, it is very common for professors to give a lecture about their opinions on certain matters. That's why they are professors.

20. "(The class was in uproar.)" Yeah right. If this actually happened, everyone would be sitting there, abashed, waiting for this student to get down off her pulpit so class can continue. It would be awkwardly silent, not uproarious. Also, hopefully, students would transfer out of the class because the professor is a moron.

21. The student asks if anyone has seen the professor's brain. There is a dis-analogy between this argument and the "we-can't-observe-God-so-he-doesn't-exist" argument. We could, in principle, observe the professors brain. It'd be easy. It would not be so easy to observe God.

22. Then, it says "The link between man & GOD is FAITH. That is all that keeps things alive and moving." Is this really a Christian principle? That it is faith that keeps things alive and moving? Then who do unfaithful people live or move around? There are lots of them. And they're living. And they are moving. If there were no people, there could be no faith. But the planets would still move. And plants would still live. So this claim must be false.


In conclusion, this "article" is really problematic. If Christians want to be afforded any intellectual respect, we / they can't keep arguing against idiot strawmen like the "professor" from the article. Christians as a whole have to stop their anti-intellectualism - if they have any faith at all they should believe that the things they believe in would be proven by science, given enough time. Instead, they'd rather forward chain letters containing no real substance, but managing to make the Christian reader feel giddy that some down-home country boy sitting in that great cesspit of sin (the American college classroom) had proved the atheist college professor (who probably had pre-marital sex and voted for Obama) wrong.


Oh yeah. And that down-home country boy in the American college classroom / cesspit of sin was Einstein.

Why Do People Pray? (Just to Make It Today?)

Random Thoughts On Prayer


I don't know why it popped into my head, but while I was making a snack I had this thought that prayer makes even less sense than I previously thought.  Maybe someone out there can explain things to me.


Lets suppose for a moment that there is indeed a god, and (lucky you) you magically picked the One True god to pray to (more than likely it's a consequence of geography-but I digress).  In most monotheistic religions the god is omniscient.  So, why should a theist pray to their god if their god already knows what they need/want?  Wouldn't the god be like "Dude, shut up! I already know!  Stop nagging me!  Oh, my God, won't you people shut up!  I ALREADY KNOW!!!!"


Is it because their god has some sort of pray-o-meter which determines whether the prayer is granted?  If so what are the units that a prayer-o-meter measures?  How many prayer units do you need before a prayer is granted?  Is the pray-o-meter sensitive to intensity of prayer or volume?  Do prayers have to come from various sources to move the pray-o-meter or can the same person pray for the same thing over and over again?


If someone's god is benevolent, and they're asking for something "good", like saving their mother from cancer, why should they need to ask?  Supposedly the god already knows what's going on, and that having someone's mother die from cancer is not a particularly good thing, why does the god need to be prompted by prayer to do anything?  Does a person really have to demonstrate to the god how badly they want their mother to live?  That would be kind of wack.


Of course not all prayers are about asking for things.  Maybe some people pray to tell their god how great he/she/it is.  But doesn't it already know?  It's true that it's pretty hard to get too many compliments--I love it when people tell me I'm awesome all day long, every day--but don't you think after several millennia it would get old and you'd just want some peace and quiet? 


Not that I understood prayer in the first place, but now that I think about it, it makes even less sense than I thought.  If anyone has any explanations (and "God acts in mysterious ways" is not an explanation) or hypotheses, I'm curious.


Thanks. 

Sub-atomic Stir-Fry and the Indivisibility of Spinoza's God

Warning: This is some wacky stuff.

Spinoza's Spin on Modes

Primer

     The chair I'm sitting on is a mode of God, the one and only substance.  Yup it is.  So I guess in a way I'm sitting on God.  "King of the castle! King of the castle!".  But wait, I'm also a mode of God, so I guess in a way God is sitting on himself.  That sounds strange.  Before we gaily launch ourselves into Spinoza's theory of modes lets do a quick review of terminology...

Substance:  The most fundamental level of existence/being.  All things are made from substance.  For Descartes everything was made of 1 or 2 distinct substances (Mind and Body) while Spinoza argued that everything is made of just one substance (God/Nature).

Attribute:  The fundamental property of a substance.  For Descartes thoughts are the principle attributes of Mind and extension is the principle attribute of Body.  For Spinoza thought and extension are both conceptually distinct attributes of one substance (God/Nature).  For both Spinoza and Descartes a substance can be known through its principle attribute(s); that is by reflecting on an attribute we can know to which substance it pertains.

Mode (Descartes):  For Descartes modes are properties that depend for their existence on primary attributes.  For example, a chair's weight, shape, and texture all depend on the chair being extended; and imagining a chair depends on the attribute of thought.  Another way to phrase it is that "a mode presupposes a particular attribute".

     Just like files are in a computer, modes are in a substance; this means that modes don't exist apart from substance, rather they are states of a substance.  Don't make the mistake Hansel makes in the early 2000's comedy classic "Zoolander" and think that by opening up the computer he can find the files in the computer; that is by pulling apart a substance you will find its modes...no, just as the files are states of electromagnetic configurations of the computer's insides; modes are just different ways a substance can be arranged/presented to us.  This is called the inherence relation; modes inhere in substances.  Inherence relations are dependence relations; modes depend for their existence on the substance being in a certain state.

     Modes also have a conceptual relation to substance.  The idea is that it is impossible to conceive of a mode without also conceiving of the substance in which it inheres.  For example, you can't conceive of a rectangular black (modes) computer without also conceiving of a body (substance); you just can't.  If you manage to do this, let me know and I will write a letter about it, and bring it to Descartes.  To summarize conceptual relations we can say that modes (eg. shape, texture, weight) are incomprehensible without presupposing the concept of a substance (body).

Spinoza's Account of Modes

     Every particular thing that exists is either a mode or a substance thus all finite things (minds and bodies) are modes of the one and only substance...God/Nature.  Since you are not God, you are a mode of the substance that is God (I'm going to go out on limb and assume that if there is a god he doesn't read my blog).  Though out the entry do not confuse Spinoza's notion of mode (any particular body or mind as a state of God/Nature) with Descartes' (properties of attributes).  How does it feel to be a mode?  Does it feel any different from being a finite substance as Descartes argues?  All feelings aside, lets see who has the more compelling argument...

Intuitive Unease With Monadic Monism (Say that 5 times fast...)

     It seems a little odd to say that particular things aren't independent entities but different states of one thing.  So, the table my computer is on isn't an independent substance with independent existence,  rather it is a state of God/Nature.  Things get even more loco when we interpret 'modes' in the Cartesian sense, that is, as properties.  Within the tradition (say in a BBC voice) properties can be regarded as universals or particulars.  The properties-as-universals view says the roundness of a wheel is an instance of a universal roundness.  All round objects partake in this one magical universal roundness.  Anyone who took a Phil 101 course will recognize this view from Plato's theory of perfect forms.  The properties-as-particulars view says, no, the roundness of the wheel is particular to only that wheel, all you other wheels out there, get your own damn roundness!

      It seems that no matter how we interpret Spinoza's view on modes, be it as universals or particulars, it arouses (heh heh...he said arouse) in us a sense of intuitive unease.  Suppose we interpret Spinoza as subscribing to the universal meaning of modes; then regarding a giraffe, for example, we are in a position of saying that God/Nature contains within it the universal property of "giraffeness" and our particular giraffe is simply an instance of God/Nature's "giraffeness".  On the other view, properties as particulars, we say this giraffe is a particular state of God/Nature; a giraffe is God/Nature is a particular state that we will call a "giraffe state"--but this giraffe state is not something inherent in God/Nature; it is the property we ascribe to God/Nature when it is in a giraffe configuration.  So, in the universal view, the property inheres in God/Nature and in the particular view things are properties that are brought about through different configurations God substance.  

     Because interpreting Spinoza's modes as Cartesian modes (properties) just seems wack, other less wack interpretations are sometimes used.  But despite wackiness it is still possible to make sense of the idea that particular things (minds and bodies) are properties/features of God.  The argument goes something like dis:

1.  Spinoza sees individual bodies (extended modes) as states of a substance.

2.  He also sees individual thoughts (modes of thought) as states of a substance.

3.  Spinoza's naturalism requires we interpret modes as states.

Individual Bodies as States of Substance

         You own a subatomic Chinese restaurant and need to make a stir-fry for some quarks.  You start chopping up a carrot into 1000 pieces, then chopped each piece into a 1000 more pieces, and for good measure, you repeat the process one more time.  You take one of the those pieces, and being the Zen master you are, ask yourself, if the carrot still exists. 

     In traditional theology God wasn't conceived as being extended for the reason that if he were, he could be divided infinitely out of existence, and then sweet baby Jesus would have no one to take care of him in heaven.  But Spinoza was no traditional theologian; he made the bold move of ascribing extension to God but did so in a way that defended God from being able to be chopped and divided into oblivion.  The way he did this way to say that individual bodies are not God being individuated, rather these are just God is affected--i.e., comes to exist in certain states.

     He uses the following example to explain his position:

Matter is everywhere the same and...parts are distinguished in it only so far as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are only distinguished modally, but not really.  For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another--in so far as it is water, but not in so far as it is corporeal substance.  For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided.  Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but in so far as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.

So what does he mean?  Essentially he is drawing a distinction between water as "water" (the liquid, with chemical properties x, y, z) and water as a corporeal substance.  We can divide the water into its constituent molecules and send each one into a different corner (fact: the universe has corners) of the universe and we can say the water is divided but we cannot say that the water ceases to be corporeal; or in modern parlance--matter. 

    So, how does this support the interpretation that individual modes inhere in God, rather than the interpretation that modes are simply caused by God (by waving his magic wand)?  Actually, before we look at that, consider what's at issue.  If we say that God causes bodies to exist then we have something closer to a traditional notion of God, that God creates everything and God is separate from his creation(s).  Recall Spinoza's conception of God is that God simply is everything that exists; there is no separation between "God" and "Nature", they are one and the same.

     With that in mind, lets see what happens if we interpret this water example in the "God causes existence" view.  First of all we notice that the example Spinoza uses is of a finite mode--a certain quantity of water--to demonstrate divisibility.  Keep in mind the purpose of this example is to show that attributing extension to God doesn't leave him vulnerable to the divisibility problem.  If, as this first interpretation suggests, God causes/creates modes/individual bodies (as opposed to modes being states of God) then the divisibility of water shouldn't be a threat to God anyway, because God isn't the water, he just created the water.  The fact that Spinoza uses a finite body (water) to show that divisibility isn't a problem for a God who is extended is evidence that Spinoza thinks individual bodies are modes of God, and individual bodies aren't simply created by God.  Again, Spinoza wants to show that an extended God isn't susceptible to the divisibility problem; to show this he argues that even though a finite body can be infinitely, it never ceases to be a corporeal substance--that is, its existence is unaffected even as part of a sub-atomic stir-fry.

Individual Thoughts as Modes of Substance

     Here's an interesting thought:  your mind is nothing more than your idea of your body.  It is a complex idea that contains various other ideas about particular states of your body and parts of your body.  I'm not sure I really understand what he means, but that's what he says...Also my mind is a collection of ideas in God's mind.  I think this means that, since God has infinite thought and my mind is finite, my mind is some of God's ideas; my mind can't have all of them (Spinoza's wrong!) because I am not perfect or finite.  Some of the ideas I partake in are God's ideas of my body.  Lets see if I can make that clearer.  God's got all the ideas in his mind.  Humans get (to share/have access to) some of them, and that is what a mind is--the sliver of God's ideas/thoughts that comprise your mind.  Some? All? of those ideas are ideas about states of your body and parts of your body.  Something like that...

     So, again, how do we relate this all back to the idea that we are all modes of God?  I think it goes a li'l something like this: Because God has all the ideas (ever!) in his mind, individual ideas must be states of his mind, so, our minds, in turn, (i.e., the collection of ideas that comprise them) are simply states of God's mind.  Yay! I'm Jesus!  All the ideas we have exist in God--they are features of God--so when they are expressed (in a particular mind) they must be expressed as modes of God--not separate independent entities that God has created. 

Modes and Spinoza's Naturalism

     Ok, if you've made it this far either you are a rabid Spinoza fan or you enjoy seeing me stumble through explanations of things I have difficulty understanding myself.  Let briefly return to something we talked about in the very beginning: relations of inherence dependence and relations of conceptual dependence.  Recall an inherence relation is the notion that something's existence depends on it inhering in something more fundamental.  For Spinoza particular bodies and individual minds are the products of inherence relations to God as substance; they are particular expressions of properties that inhere in God.  That God is infinitely extended allows him to express that extension in particular bodies; that God has infinite (non-contradicting) thoughts allows finite collections of those thoughts to be expressed as minds.  The finite expressions of the infinite qualities that inhere in God are modes, be they bodies or minds.  So, we can say that there is an inherence relation between God and modes because all qualities inhere in God.
     Also there is a way in which God causes modes to come about through the natural laws.  Modes (individual minds and bodies) are caused to come into existence as the result of never-ending causal chains that follow the laws of nature.  There is no "act of creation" outside of the products of causal chains that follow laws of nature.  In this sense there is a causal relation between God and modes.

     Both causal and inherence relations are types of conceptual relations. Consider causal relations: if something is the effect of something else, we can know something about it by knowing its cause.  This applies to modes and God because in order for use to know the qualities of a particular mode (the effect of God) we need to know something about its cause (God); we can say the concept of a mode can be known through its cause, for this reason we say causal relations are a species of conceptual relation.  

     A similar parallel can be observed between inherence relations and conceptual relations.  If we want to know the properties of some particular thing we would want to know the properties of the more general thing in which it inheres.  For example if we want to know the properties of a wooden table we would do well to know the properties of wood.  The same applies in Spinoza's model: if we want to know the properties of a particular mode we need to know about the substance in which the particular thing inheres, i.e., God.  Notice that if we want to better understand the concept of an particular mode (a table/a mind) we can better understand it if we refer to the concept of the thing in which its properties inhere.  For this reason inherence, like causation, is also a species of conceptual relation.

     Now for Spinoza, any time we want to make a distinction between two things we have to apply the principle of sufficient reason (PSR); that is, we have to provide a sufficient reason for which we should consider the 2 things distinct.  Spinoza doesn't see any sufficient reason for which we should distinguish between causal and inherence relations; after all they are both conceptual dependence relations--one thing (a mode) depends on the concept of something (causally/ontologically) prior  to it.  Basically, if there is no real difference in explaining something through causal relations rather than inherence relations then the 2 notions should be collapsed into on: a conceptual relation.  Restated, unless we can come up with an situation where an inherence relation explains something that a causal relation doesn't or vice verse we should consider them one and the same.

     So, why should we care about collapsing these two terms?  Because Spinoza's naturalism doesn't allow for different rules to apply to different things.  That is what naturalism is: there is one fundamental set of laws for everything including God, including humans.  Hand-waving appeals to special connections or properties is illegal.  To repeat: there is only one set of fundamental rules and they apply to everything.  So, if we adopt the typical theological views we see that there are different rules to explain how God exists and functions than there are for how finite individuals exist and function.  God can break physical laws that humans, for example can't.  

     More specifically Spinoza was concerned with the inconsistencies of the Cartesian view which required 2 kinds of dependence relations.  Recall for Descartes' 2 substance system of Mind and Body, these 2 substances do not inhere in God but still depend on him for their existence--that's one type of dependence relation--one without inherence but still of causation.  Then there are the attributes and modes of Mind and Body (substances) that do inherence relations.  Recall that, for example, the properties of an  body--e.g., a chair--inhere in its attributes; that is, the properties of hardness and weight depend on hardness and weight inhering in extension, which in turn inheres the substance of body.  So in the Cartesian system we have 2 types of conceptual dependence relations--one that includes inherence and one that doesn't.  With naturalism, you have to have the same rules for everything, so Spinoza rejects Cartesian dualism, mostly because it smacks of Dualism... depend for their existence on

     How do we apply this to the argument that Spinoza's modes should be seen a inhering in God?  Well, if God just caused modes (particular mind or bodies) to exist without their properties inhering in him then we'd have two different kinds of conceptual relations; that is, an inconsistent set of rules.  Why? Because if modes don't inhere in God then we have a non-inherence conceptual relation between God and modes but and inherence conceptual relation between modes and their properties.  Lets use the table as an example, I can  know of its properties by knowing it is extended.  The properties of hardness, shape, and weight all inhere in extension; I can conceive of them through the concept of extension because of the inherence relation; that is, I can know about the properties of the table because I know it is extended.  So as we can see we have one type of conceptual relation--between God/subtance and modes--that doesn't involve inherence and we have another type of conceptual relation--between modes and their properties--that does involve inherence.  Having 2 sets of rules without sufficient reason is barred by Spinoza's naturalism, thus, in interpreting Spinoza's notion of modes we must interpret him as saying that modes inhere in God, not that God creates modes.

If you read this whole thing, you are Jesus.  That took me over 3 hours.  I'm gonna proof read this tomorrow, sorry if it's full of mistakes...
     




  

Everything is One! Dueling with Dualism Part 2

     Welcome back all you crazy Spinoza fans!  In the introduction entry I made on Spinoza I laid out the definitions of the key terms--substance, primary attribute, and mode--I will be using to discuss Spinoza's arguments.  Before I go any further, I'm just going to be really honest and say that sometimes with metaphysics I have no idea what the crap is going on or even why I should care, but mostly the latter--especially in the case of 17th Century metaphysics.  Now, if that doesn't motivate you to read the rest of this entry, I don't know what will!

Argument For Substance Monism

     Recall that for Descartes all of reality is either the substance "Body" or the substance "Mind".  Spinoza, using the same rational principles by which Descartes reached his conclusion reaches a different conclusion: that everything that exists is really just a manifestation of one substance; all particular bodies and minds are just modes of this one substance.  In other words, everything that exists (particulars) are just instantiations of this one maaaaaagical substance.  According to my secondary source book, Spinoza's argument is comprised of four sub-arguments (the references in parentheses refer to Spinoza's text):

1.  No two substances can share an attribute (1p5).

2.  It pertains to the nature of substance to exist (1p7).

3.  God--which Spinoza previously defined as the substance with all the attributes--exist.  This follows from (1p7).

C.  Since God exists, and by (1p5) no two substances can share an attribute, no other substance besides God can exist.

     Before we happily launch ourselves into the individual arguments I just want to point out what Spinoza meant by "God".  Spinoza's God: Spinoza didn't mean some capricious anthropomorphic God of the Bible who isn't subject to the same laws that apply to all particular things; by "God" Spinoza meant "Nature".  There is some debate about exactly what he meant but for our purposes we can merrily go about substituting the word "Nature" every time Spinoza uses "God".  

     The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): This rejection of God as free from the constraints of the laws of the universe was all part of his idea that "everything has to play by the same rules"; that is to say, if we want to hypothesize an entity or class of things that is subject to a different set of rules from everything else, there has to be a rational argument to give a reason for which this should be true.  If a sufficient reason cannot be provided, then we have no reason to assume that there is any difference between the two classes of things being discussed.  The PSR is central to Spinoza's method so keep an eye out for it!  Once again, the PSR in plain language is: If'n you can't provide a good reason for a distinction then we should not apply the distinction.

     

Step 1: We Can Have Lots of Fun!

     The first step of the argument is to demonstrate that "in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature of attribute"; in other words two or more substances can't share an attribute.  Given Spinoza's rationalist method, to prove his claim he gives a rational argument for how two substances could be individuated (if it's possible).  In logical terms, Spinoza uses a reductio argument: that is; he begins with trying to prove the opposite of his desired conclusion and shows that it leads to a logical contradiction; since the opposite hypothesis leads to a contradiction, its opposite (Spinoza's) must be true. Lets take a look-see: 

     Spinoza gets out his ax and axes, what would it take to prove that two substances are indeed different substances?  I.e. What is required to explain a substances identity and non-identity? Obviously, the only way to distinguish between substance A and substance B is through some difference in their properties.  We know that substances in the Cartesian Dualist model have both primary attributes and modes that allow us to identify the type of substance they are.  E.g., If a substance has extension (attribute) or texture and smell (modes) we can infer that the substance is Body.  So if we were to distinguish between two substances (in the metaphysical sense) we would have to refer to either the attributes or modes of the substances.

Vs Attributes 

     Lets try distinguishing 2 substances via attributes.  Recall that the end goal for Spinoza is to show that 2 substances cannot share the same attribute.  But suppose that two substances did share the same attribute; if this is the case and we are relying on attributes to distinguish the two substances Spinoza's argument will fail.  E.g., substance A has the attribute X and so does substance B.  To identify substance A I say "it's the one with attribute X" but to identify substance B I also say "it's the one with attribute X".  How can they be the same but different?  (In Thai: same, same but different) This is a contradiction.  So via reductio, where 2 things share the same attribute we shouldn't say that the two things are of different substance rather they are of the same substance.  Of course this still leaves open the possibility that 2 substances have different attributes to which we will return; nevertheless it seems quite clear that Spinoza is correct in that two substances cannot share an attribute and still be identified as distinct substances.

Vs Modes

     Well, maybe appealing to attributes doesn't work to show that two substances can share attributes...what about appealing to modes?  Certainly modes vary from thing to thing maybe they can help...Spinoza's argument against using modes to distinguish between 2 substances that share an attribute hinges on the notion of ontological priority.  (Ontological refers to "being".)  As I'm sure you recall from the previous Spinoza entry last month both Spinoza and Descartes propose that some things are conceptually and causally prior to others.  Relevant to our discussion is that substance is conceptually prior to attributes--i.e., the concept of extension presupposes the concept of substance; and primary attributes are conceptually prior to modes--i.e., you can't have modes of texture, smell, colour without having the prior concept of extension.

     Now that we have the notion of conceptual priority clear as mud we can apply it to Spinoza's attempt to prove that two substances cannot share an attribute, through appeal to modes.  Suppose substance C and substance D both share the primary attribute of extension.  We know that we can't appeal to extension to individuate the two as separate substances...we tried that a few paragraphs back to no avail; lets instead try pointing to the differences in C and D's modes.  Are you pointing?  Point harder!  Remember that the principle of priority implies that all modes are explainable via the primary attribute through which they arise.  We can ask, in virtue of what does C's colour, shape, and texture arise?  From it's primary attribute--extension.  And in the case of D, which also shares extension, we can ax the same, "where do D's modes come from?" Why from its extension of course...C has its modes because it has extension and D has its modes because its extended.  

     Doh! Now we are back to referring to both C and D via their primary attribute (extension); and as we saw a few paragraphs up, there is no way for us to assert that two substances are distinct if they have the same primary attribute.  So, again since assuming two different substances that share the same attribute leads to a logical contradiction, we must assume the opposite to be true; that when 2 things share an primary attribute, they are the same substance.  In rationalist language: there is no sufficient reason for which we should assume two things sharing the same attribute are two different substances.

Leibniz' Objection

     So, if you understood any of that (it took me reading my book at least 3 times very very very sloooooooowly) the possible objection should be obvious.  Like I said, only if you understand what's going on.  If you do, then you are either a philosophy genius or I am a genius teacher...I'll make that an inclusive or.  Ok, back to Leibniz' objection:  Spinoza says a substance can have more than one attribute; indeed God has "absolutely infinitely many" of which extension and thought are only two.  So why not suppose that there are 2 substances that share one attribute but not another.  Eg., substance E is a rock, it only has extension.  Substance F is a human, it has extension and thought.  Why can't we just say "we can identify substance E and F as being distinct because E is the one that doesn't have thought and F is the one that has thought."

    Because his works were published post-modem obviously he didn't address this objection directly but we can apply some of his principles and construct a good reply that Spinoza could have given.  The principle required for this reply are that each attribute should, by itself, be able to pick out the substance which is conceptually prior to it.  I'm going to let you ponder this cuz I needs me some sleep.  If anyone actually read this entry all the way to the end, you win one internet!

I'm gonna proof read this tomorrow, my brain is dead now...