Relativism, Nihilism, and Realism: You Think You're a Relativist but You're Not.

Introduction
If I had a nickel for every time I hear something like “Well, if it's right for him, who am I to judge?” I'd still be poor. Not because I don't hear it a lot but because I'd donate all those nickels to charity. Anyway, relativism--the position that values are relative to an individual or culture-is by far the most dominant view among the general population. In fact, back in my pre-philosophical days I too was a relativist. If you were born to a relatively secular or liberal religious household chances are you *think* you're a relativist too.


Before getting into the problems with this view, I'll quickly go over some of the (perceived?) virtues of relativism. (a) It promotes a culture of tolerance and avoids/tempers dogmatism and (b) by way of (a) it can reduce conflicts. However, there are two main problems with relativism: (a) no one really believes it when push-comes-to-shove and (b) it's logically incoherent: instead you must pick either realism (there are objective values) or nihilism (there are no objective values).

EDIT: Some commenters have correctly pointed out that realism and nihilism aren't the only positions available if you reject relativism. In the interest of simplicity for my non-professional audience I intentionally lumped non-cognitivist positions in with nihilism. So, for those of you familiar with the distinction, please read "nihilism" as including non-cognitivist positions for the purposes of this post. For non-philosophers, if you'd like to learn about the difference I've given a brief summary here.


Part 1: There Are No True Relativists
OK, let's grant the virtues of relativism for the moment. Unfortunately for relativists (i.e., most Westerns) you aren't really relativists. Take this guy for instance. Is he expressing a valid point of view relative to his culture or is he mistaken in an absolute sense?


Relativism leads to the absurd conclusion that there's no normative difference between a sadist's values and a humanitarian's values. Hey, if tormenting people for fun is perceived as good and right by the sadist, then it's good. Who are we to judge his values? The relativist might reply, “No, what I mean is you can do what you want so long as you don't harm other people.” That's a fine response but you've just given up relativism. You've just conceded that there is at least one objective moral truth.

Another response might be that people can do what they want so long as it makes them happy (however you define it). Once again you've conceded the argument because you've committed yourself to the objective value of happiness. I.e., when actions conflict with happiness, we ought to favor happiness; happiness is more important than all other things. You are actually a realist/objectivist.

Again, relativism leads to the unsavory position that the Gestapo and Medicins Sans Frontieres are organizations of equal moral worth. If the Gestapo thinks it's good and right to “throw the Jew down the well,” then, hey, who are we to judge? Punching someone in the face is no less praiseworthy as giving someone a helping hand. I doubt very much that anyone truly thinks that, beyond personal beliefs and preferences, there are no important differences between the values in the above examples. If you think there are important differences you're a realist because you just made a judgment about one set of values having more value than another. If you don't then you're probably a nihilist. But you aren't a relativist. More on that later.


Why the Virtues of Relativism Aren't Virtues
Tolerance, aversion of dogmatism, and reduction of conflicts are not genuine virtues in the face of obvious evil. If we discovered that our neighbors had child slaves most of us do not think it would be virtuous to tolerate the practice. In fact, we should dogmatically oppose it and we should confront those who practice it. In short, most of us think that confronting evil and injustice is virtuous while tolerating it is not. And so, the virtues of relativism are not virtues after all. They are contingent on the objective goodness of the practice in question.


If we think a practice is good or perhaps value neutral then tolerance for diversity appears good. But it's not relativism that grounds the virtue of tolerance, non-confrontation, etc... It's our recognition of a practice that brings about some good. And so, the virtuousness of our response is grounded in the fact that we are tolerant of things that are good (or value-neutral) and intolerant of things that are bad. In short, it is the goodness or badness of the act that grounds the virtue of our response to it.


Part 2: The Logical Invalidity of Relativism and Why You Must Be Either a Realist or a Nihilist
Argument 1: The Multiplicity of Things

Let's get the ball rolling with a little Plato...

Now if a man believes in the existence of beautiful things, but not of Beauty itself, and cannot follow a guide who would lead him to a knowledge of it, is he not living in a dream. Consider: does not dreaming, whether one is awake or asleep, consist in mistaking a semblance for the reality it resembles?
I should certainly call that dreaming.
Contrast with him the man who holds that there is such thing as Beauty itself and can discern that essence as well as the things that partake of its character without ever confusing the one with the other—is he a dreamer or living in a waking state?
He is very much awake.
So may we say that he knows, while the other has only a belief in appearances; and might we call their states of mind knowledge and belief? Republic V. 476

Ok, there's a bunch of stuff going on here that I'll possibly address in a later post but for now I just want to focus on one idea. How is it that someone can say of many particular things, actions, or events that they are good/bad/just/unjust/beautiful/ugly, etc... if he isn't referring to one objective standard? That is, by indicating that several particulars are good then they must share the property of goodness just as all red things must share the property of redness. 

For example, when someone says x was good, y was good and z was good, all these things (are perceived to) share the quality of goodness. And so goodness must be one objective thing, not many things. There is one concept of goodness and particular acts or events can partake, to varying degrees, in goodness. (Note: some philosophers contest this view suggesting that there are only particulars but let's roll with it for now. It's not the only argument against relativism.)

The simple response is to say, yes but people might disagree over what goodness/rightness/justice is. That is, they might have different beliefs about what those normative concepts contain.

First of all, the fact that people disagree over something isn't evidence that there's no objective truth about it. For example, just because people might disagree over whether Sweet Baby Jesus created the universe or whether it was Indra (those are the only possible choices) doesn't mean that there's no right answer to the question. (Indra did it)

Disagreement only is evidence for three possibilities: (a) one person is right while the other is wrong; (b) both people are wrong; (c) there is no right or wrong answer. You can't just jump to (c) from the fact that there is disagreement over something. You must also consider that (a) and (b) might be true.

Argument 1: “True”--You Keep Using That Word But I Don't Think It Means What You Think It Means

The fact is, relativists often express their position in the following mantra “If Bob thinks X is good then it's true that X is good for Bob.” In short, each individual (or culture) is the arbiter of value. Let's see why this argument doesn't work...

I covered the first reason to reject the relativist argument in the first section. Relativism means we can make no judgments between the most evil and the most benevolent actions. Let's assume for the moment that it's true that we can't make such objective judgments. There's no way to distinguish between what we perceive as benevolent and evil actions. Let's try a different argument.

Another reason to reject the relativist mantra is that just because someone believes something is good for them doesn't make it so. If you can't think of at least a few times you believed something was good for you but at a later date realized it was a mistake, either you are still an infant or you're lying. Scientifical fact from test tubes and beakers: People can be mistaken about what is or isn't good for them and so just because a person believes something is good doesn't make it so.

Here the relativist can reply, OK so maybe people can be wrong about what's good, bad, right, or wrong for them but it doesn't follow that there is some objective good, bad, right, wrong for everyone. The person that got it wrong just got it wrong relative to them.

Let's use logicalization to address this counter-reply:

Again, at the heart of relativism is the idea that believing something makes it so. Thus, believing that abortion is wrong makes it true that abortion is wrong (for that person or culture). But this is to misunderstand the notion of truth. When we say that something is true we mean that it's true regardless of your beliefs. For example, if someone believes that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq their belief has no bearing on the truth of the proposition. The proposition “there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq” is either true or false regardless of what anyone believes because the truth value of propositions depends on states of affairs in the world not on our beliefs about states of affairs. It can't be both true and false. It must be one or the other.

Consider:
Person A says “I believe abortion is wrong (in circumstance C), therefore it's wrong.” They say the proposition “abortion is wrong” is true.
Person B says “I believe abortion isn't wrong (in circumstance C), therefore it isn't wrong.” They say the proposition “abortion is wrong” is false.

The most basic rule of logic is the law of non-contradiction: that something cannot both be true and false at the same time. Relativism leads us to violate the most fundamental rule of logic. It makes it so a proposition can both true and false at the same time. Under relativism “abortion is wrong” is both true and false.

Accepting relativism means we have to reject the most basic rule of logic and this is not a good outcome. It means you can't even communicate because everything is both true and false. Squares both do and do not have 4 corners; Circles both are and are not squares; I both exist and don't exist at the same time; I both will and will not meet you for lunch. My car both is and is not a car. Those jeans both make your butt look fat and not fat. Nothing makes any sense. All meaning is drained from language. This is the logical cost of accepting relativism.

The relativist can reply. No! No! No! You don't understand! What I mean is “abortion is wrong" is true for me! (Me! Me! Me! Everything revolves around me! Even truth and falsity). But this is to completely abandon what we mean by true and false. Nobody takes seriously the person who says “the earth is flat is true for me!”. To such a person we simply say that they are confusing belief for factual knowledge. They believe that the earth is flat but this doesn't make it true. And they certainly don't know that the earth is flat. There is a fact about the universe that the earth either is flat or it isn't. It can't be both—regardless of how hard you believe and regardless of what you read in "The Secret"...

To summarize: An assertion cannot both be true and false (law of non-contradiction). Relativism violates the law of non-contradiction because some people will say of a moral statement that it is true while others will say it's false. There are two alternative: (a) both are wrong and there is no moral truth at all, just preferences (i.e., some form of nihilism is true); (b) one is right and the other is wrong (i.e., some form of realism is true).

Realism or Nihilism: Pick One but You Can't Be a Relativist

We want language to have meaning so we must abandon relativism. Our two choices are realism or nihilism. Realism (in its many flavors) is the position that we can make objective judgments about some values being better than others. Contrary to what simplistic caricatures would have us believe, realism doesn't necessarily commit you to hard and fast rules. 

Realism can be very coarse grained. It might say that for certain situations there is no one right answer there are several but there are also wrong answers. If you think that there are some situations where there is fact about what's good or right or that there can be wrong answers, you are a realist. Maybe you think it's wrong to kill a bunch of innocent civilians for drawing cartoons of a person who lived in the 7th century. If you think it's wrong, and not just a belief that it's wrong but are willing to say it's wrong for anyone to do, then you're a realist.

If you don't think there are any objective moral facts or values then you can never say one set of values is better than another. As a nihilist you can't say that making one decision over another matters (from an objective point of view) because there are no values and so there's no reason to prefer one outcome over another. People might have personal preferences but we can never objectively evaluate their preferences. The person who chooses to spend their life counting blades of grass has a life no less meaningful than the person who cures cancer.

What you can't be is a relativist. Either there are objective moral facts and/or values or there aren't. It's one or the other. It can't be both. People can have beliefs/preferences about what's good/right/bad/wrong but this doesn't tell us anything about the objective state of affairs. If you're a realist, people can have mistaken beliefs about what's good/right/bad/wrong. If you're a nihilist, people only have preferences and preferences can't be “true” or “false” any more than my preference for strawberry ice cream is true or false.

Realism vs. Antirealism on Theoretical Entities: Maxwell vs van Fraassen

Preamble
Here's a paper I maked for filosofy of sciences class. i maked it myself.
There's an inside joke with my professor Dr. J. Brown that needs some explaining to understand part of this paper.  Every time he uses hypotheticals he always says "I could have come to class in a bear suit".  Anyway, the grad students all pitched in an bought him a bear suit (he's well-liked)


The paper is about the realist vs antirealist debate in science.  That is, does science get at how the world really is or does it just produce coherent theories.  There are lots of strands of realism vs antirealism debates but my essay involves the one over the existence of theoretical entities.  Basically, unobservable things like atoms and electrons and subatomic particles have never been observed directly.  They've only been observed indirectly.  Furthermore, there are limitations on what we actually can observe so it is unlikely they will ever be directly observed.  For that reason they are theoretical entities: we infer their existence from detected properties.   It's kind of like guessing what's in a box by shaking it, feeling its weight, and evaluating how it moves in the box.  We'll never be able to look in the box.  


The realists argument can be boiled down to what's called the "miracle" argument which goes like this: Supposing science isn't right about theoretical entities--it's a miracle that it's wrong yet  we have the coherence of the theories, the explanatory power, the predictive power, and the ability to use the knowledge in applied technology.


The basic anti-realist argument is called "the pessimistic meta-induction".  This goes like this: science has gotten it wrong in the past about theoretical entities (eg. mass, gravity, ether, phlogiston, etc..) why should we think this time is special?  In this paper one of the main arguments is slightly different and it goes like this: epistemic principles don't give us ontological conclusions.  In normal language that means just because a theory has a certain desirable property (coherence, explanatory power, simplicity, predictive power) it doesn't make it True of the world, it only means it has that epistemic property.  And (related to the pessimistic meta-induction) there have been countless theories in the past with those properties, why should we think our current ones are special?

Anyway, that's the debate in a nutshell.  For me this in one of those philosophical issues that make you loco.  I changed my conclusion 5 times over the course of writing the paper.  I kept switching sides.  It's not an issue to which I think there will be any resolution soon.   


It's not necessary, but I suggest reading my 2 previous posts on realism and antirealism for background, but if you don't care to, you should be able to follow along anyway.

Thanks for stopping by....

Can Epistemic and Pragmatic Reasons Bear on Ontological Conclusions about Theoretical Entities?

An Investigation into the Debate between Maxwell's Realism and Van Fraassen's Antirealism about Theoretical Entities 

Introduction

In rejecting logical empiricism1, van Fraassen and Maxwell end up on different ends of the realist-antirealist divide. For Maxwell, the observable-unobservable distinction is arbitrary and so is a poor principle from which to infer antirealism about theoretical entities. Conversely, van Fraassen argues that ontological conclusions do not follow from a theory's epistemic merit; therefore, so long as a theory is empirically adequate (i.e., is consistent with what we see in the observable world) there are reasons in favour of using it, but we ought to remain agnostic about the ontology of theoretical entities. I will suggest that both positions fail to give adequate consideration to the implications of differences in epistemic and pragmatic merit between scientific theories2: both accounts imply an all-or-nothing ontological attitude toward theoretical entities as a whole. Instead, perhaps we ought to adjust our ontological attitude toward theoretical entities in relation to the aggregate of a particular theory's epistemic and pragmatic qualities in which an entity is embedded. While van Fraassen is probably right concerning theoretical entities that no particular epistemic quality confers upon them ontological certainty, this does not preclude us from assessing a theory's epistemic and pragmatic qualities and making reasonable inferences in favour of or against the ontological status of various theoretical entities which will ultimately inform our ontological attitude.

In laying the groundwork for my conclusion, my paper will follow a thread of possible replies and counter replies beginning with Maxwell's argument that the observable-unobservable distinction is arbitrary and so ontological claims against theoretical entities cannot rest on this distinction. Specifically, my paper will have the following structure: (1) Discussion of Maxwell's argument for the arbitrariness of the observable-unobservable distinction; (2) possible anti-realist replies; (3) discussion of possible realist counter-replies; (4) possible anti-realist replies; (5) conclusion.




Maxwell's Argument for the Arbitrariness of the Observable-Unobservable Distinction
Maxwell gives us several arguments against anti-realism toward theoretical entities from which he concludes we ought to be realists. The first argument Maxwell gives is in response to Bergman's anti-realist argument which I'll call the “distortion argument”.

Suppose we are looking at a microorganism through a compound microscope. What do we observe? Bergman says, “all I see is a patch of colour which creeps through the field like a shadow over a wall. And a shadow, though real, is certainly not a physical thing” (quoted in Maxwell, p. 1055).

The gist of this argument is that what I'm seeing is a distortion of the (theoretical) entity in the petri dish, so how can I be sure that the properties of the image I see through the microscope are the same as those of the entity in the dish?

Maxwell's replies that it is simply balderdash to deny that what we are looking at is real because the light travels through a lens. He uses an argument ad absurdum to demonstrate his point: The underlying logic of the skeptical argument is that if we are observing distorted light or a projected image of the entity, then we are not looking at the thing itself; so, we cannot make any ontological claims about it. But, if distorted light is grounds for denying something's ontological status this would imply that people who wear glasses cannot make ontological claims about what they see.

We can further demonstrate this absurdity when we apply it to looking through a wet window. Should the fact that the light is being slightly distorted impede us from believing the world on the other side is real? Similarly, when we look at the moon or other planets through a telescope, they certainly appear to be physical objects rather than “patches of colour”. Are we to deny their reality because the lens has distorted the light or projected an image of the object?

Because of the continuity between methods of observing the world on the micro and macro scale, where we draw the line is arbitrary—and the logical extension of the distortion argument is clearly silly. In sum, because the ontological status of entities clearly doesn't vary with our ability to perceive them and where the observable/unobservable line is drawn, we ought to reject the observable/unobservable distinction as a grounds for ascribing or denying ontological status.




Antirealist Reply: Arbitrary Line Doesn't Imply No Line
The antirealist can reply that this argument is a caricature and fails to meet the central objection. While it is certainly true that there is a continuum of observational enhancement techniques it does not follow that there are no important differences between extreme ends of the spectrum. Where we draw the line will to some extent be pragmatic, but there are important differences between extremes. Surely, we can say that there is a difference between looking at a room with glasses on, and observing bleeps and blips on an instrument panel at CERN to infer the existence of subatomic particles.

To illustrate, we can draw an analogy with the classical problem of distinguishing between what is constitutive of baldness and what isn't. While it seems correct to say that there are grey areas along the continuum, this does not preclude the possibility of canonical cases. A head with no hair is a bald head--that much is certain, and Charlie Brown with his one hair is also bald. Hair thick enough so that the scalp is not visible is not a bald head. Of course, there will be cases in between that are unclear but this does not preclude the existence of clear cases on either end of the continuum.

The same might be argued of observation. While Maxwell is correct to point out that there is a continuum and that there is some arbitrariness in where the line is drawn, this does not entail that there are no clear cases of each end of the spectrum. This fact is not diminished by the problems of where to draw the line.

In the case of the observable-unobservable distinction, in what might that difference inhere? I suggest that at least one important difference has to do with the length and epistemic certainty of the chain of inference from observation to conclusions about the properties of a theoretical entity. Consider the “direct observation” end of the spectrum: It does not seem unreasonable to say that my looking at the wall and concluding that “there are walls and they are solid” is a direct form of observation whose conclusions we should consider valid. If this isn't sufficient, to further establish certainty about the properties I'm observing, I can employ my other senses and ask my friends to verify my observations. So, why ought we to consider the conclusions from this type of observation valid? Because the inferential step is minimal and my knowledge comes from a epistemically reliable source: the direct experiences I have of macro objects justify my ontological conclusions about them3.

Now consider the other end of the continuum: how we get images of atoms from a scanning tunnelling microscope (STM):

The STM is based on the concept of quantum tunnelling. When a conducting tip is brought very near to the surface to be examined, a bias (voltage difference) applied between the two can allow electrons to tunnel through the vacuum between them. The resulting tunnelling current is a function of tip position, applied voltage, and the local density of states (LDOS) of the sample. Information is acquired by monitoring the current as the tip's position scans across the surface, and is usually displayed in image form. (Wikipedia4)




In this case, there are several inferential steps: the information from the tunnelling current-- which has been derived from other variables--is run through software that converts it into other electrical signals, which in turn are converted into an image on a monitor. So, are we observing an atom when we view it through an STM microscope? It doesn't seem that way. It seems that we are observing a reconstruction of an atom based on our instruments having detected voltage differences between tip position, applied voltage, and LDOS. In sum, there is a fairly long chain of inference from detection to “observation”. In such cases, perhaps there is warrant for some skepticism that our reconstruction of the differentials in voltage resembles how the world really is. The worry can elucidated through the classic Chinese thought experiment of the three blind students and the sage who teaches in a bear suit:

Having never seen their sage who wears a bear suit (unbeknownst to them) three blind students are curious to know what he is like. With the sage's consent each “observes” by touch a different part of him. The first touches his leg and exclaims “Lo! the sage is like a moss-covered young sapling”; the second holds the sage's tail and exclaims to the first, “you are mistaken, verily our sage is like a snake!”; meanwhile the third who has touched the sages paw can bear it no more, he exclaims “you are both fools! Our sage is like a furry ping pong paddle!”

Here, the anti-realist might concede that—as the blind students can about the sage--we can detect properties of the world; but how those properties are “assembled” into entities is unknowable. For this reason we should be antirealist about theoretical entities.


Realist Counter-Reply: Epistemic Qualities But it is not only the anti-realist that can appeal to the three blind students and the bear-suit- wearing sage analogy to support his position. He can propose that there's no reason to suppose that the blind students had to stop their observations of the sage when they did. They could have continued to each walk around the sage, communicated, and replicated each other's observations. There is a parallel in science. It's not as though the only line of evidence we have for atoms comes from one type of observation—e.g., an STM microscope. There are multiple lines of converging evidence that point to the existence of atoms. Just as if the three blind men had continued their observations they might eventually concluded that all three properties inhere in the same object, the same goes for observing the different properties of atoms. So, the realist can say that the atomic theory has the epistemic quality of (1) support from multiple independent lines of evidence.

The realist can further argue that theoretical entity “atoms” have several other important epistemic qualities: (2) They offer the best explanatory model for the properties and phenomena that are detected/observed. (3) Their postulation provides a reliable model from which we can predict phenomena. (4) We can apply the atomic model successfully in technology, even technology that is recursive—i.e., it helps to make further discoveries about atoms and even other theoretical entities such as subatomic particles.


Anti-Realist Counter-Counter Reply: Epistemic Qualities Don't Necessarily Entail Ontological Consequences  Van Fraassen's response to the the various arguments from epistemic qualities is that as far as theoretical entities go the epistemic qualities of the T of which they are part don't necessarily entail ontological conclusions one way or the other (p. 1066). The waste bin of history is filled with theories that had one of or some combination of (1), (2), (3), and (4) which were eventually rejected. Instead we should say that so long as T adequately explains all (directly) observable phenomena, we can say T is empirically adequate—but that is all (Ibid, pp. 1066 and 1131). Furthermore, if--as some realists suppose--scientific theories cumulatively aim at approximations of truth, realist can't explain how previous theories were “approximately true” about entities “whose central terms have evidently not referred” (Ibid, p. 1132). For example, phlogiston was proposed to explain heat and ether to explain how light travels, despite the epistemic qualities their supporting Ts at the time, they failed to refer.

We should work within the theory that, compared to its rivals, best meets the standard of empirical adequacy, but given the absence of any necessary relation from epistemic qualities to ontological consequences and historical precedent, we ought to remain agnostic about the ontology of theoretical entities.


Conclusion
For the most part I agree with van Fraassen that we ought to remain agnostic about theoretical entities (where ever the demarkation line happens to be drawn); however I disagree that we should be absolutists in our agnosticism. Just as there is a continuum between observable and unobservable entities, I suggest there's also a continuum of epistemic reasons in favour of a theory's postulated entity's likelihood of resembling the world. There will never be 100% certainty or Truth, but this doesn't preclude our talking in degrees. Also, just as it will be a combination of pragmatic considerations that we will consider when drawing the line on the observable-unobservable continuum, so too will there be pragmatic considerations regarding where we draw a the line between strength of epistemic reasons in favour of agnosticism or ontological belief. Finally, in the observable world we (sometime unconsciously) evaluate epistemic and pragmatic reasons in inferring ontological conclusions about the world, so, I suggest we carefully extend this allowance to some theoretical entities.

Consider how the sage in the bear suit might come to ontological conclusions about the observable world. It seems unlikely that he would/does not permit himself certain basic ontological beliefs about the observable world just because in his wisdom he knows there is no necessary entailment from epistemic reasons to ontological conclusions. Why might he make ontological conclusions? I hypothesize that, amongst other beliefs, he would have a belief in the general epistemic reliability of his senses; that is, they reliability produce true beliefs about the world. Also, perhaps partly because the coherence, simplicity, and predictive and explanatory power of his beliefs/theory about the observable world. Finally, there are pragmatic reasons for the sage to conclude from his epistemic reasons that the wall he is approaching is solid. It seems odd that he would hold separate his epistemic and pragmatic reasons from his ontological conclusions about the world. In short, he has strong epistemic and pragmatic reasons to infer ontological consequences.
If we can accept this much--that in the observable world most realists and antirealists alike draw ontological conclusions from epistemological and pragmatic reasons—then, with some qualifications, there doesn't seem to be any necessary prohibition against doing the same in the theoretical realm. It does not follow from this that all theoretical entities should be granted ontological status. Science is not a unified body of knowledge and this suggests that each theory should be assessed individually because, obviously, not all theories and their postulated entities are on equal epistemic footing and/or have equally strong practical reasons in their favour.

Again, just as the antirealist can point out to the realist that the difficulty with drawing a observable-unobservable distinction doesn't entail there isn't one; the realist can reply that just because there's a continuum of strength of epistemic and practical reasons in favour of believing in ontological conclusions doesn't entail there are no difference between the extreme ends. In the theoretical realm (just as in the observational realm), there are some cases where it seems the epistemological and pragmatic reasons in favour of accepting ontological implications overwhelm those against, it would seem odd not to acknowledge their cumulative weight. Perhaps, electrons are one such entity.

Finally, the antirealist might yet respond that our beliefs and desires simply do not an ontological Truth make. And they are correct. He might further point out that even in the observable world he has good epistemic and pragmatic reasons to act as though walls are solid, but he still withholds judgment as to their ultimate reality. I propose that a some point this ontological agnosticism exceeds its utility. What do we gain from this almost pedantic ontological tiptoeing? At some point the practical considerations seem to outweigh the philosophical and--just as we do in the observable world--we ought to move from acting as though wall are solid to simply believing they are.

As a philosopher it pains me to say it, but there is a point at which we have to be willing to admit that the philosopher doth protest too much. There's a parallel with the Cartesian skeptic. He'll never be satisfied, but there is a point at which skepticism overstays its philosophical welcome and exceeds its utility5. I do not , however, purport to know where on the continuum that demarkation line ought to be drawn. Nevertheless, so long as we accept that antirealists avoid walking through walls because they have good epistemic and practical reasons for not doing so, then we can accept that at some point on the continuum, epistemic and practical reasons can tip the balance in favour of ontological conclusions about some theoretical entities.


Footnotes


1Although there are many “brands” of logical empiricism it can be generally defined as the view that if theoretical language can't be cashed out in observational language then it has no ontological or metaphysical meaning.


2My point is not that they don't consider it, but my position is that there are possible implications that are overlooked.


3At this point I'm going to assume that conclusions from epistemically reliable observation methods are valid grounds for ontological conclusions. Later in the paper I will address anti-realist realist rejection of the inference from epistemic qualities of a theory to ontological assertions about the world.


4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scanning_tunneling_microscope


5My suggestion is not that utility on its own is the arbiter of Truth, but in the observable world, even the most skeptical of philosophers considers it, along with epistemic reasons, in how they live their daily lives. Why not, in some cases, extend this to the theoretical realm?

Realism vs. Anti-Realism 2: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism by Bas Van Fraassen

Notes and Thoughts on Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Summarizing quote: "The rigour of science requires that we distinguish well the undraped figure of nature itself from the gay-coloured (heh!heh!he said "gay") vesture with which we clothe it at our pleasure."
--Heinrich Hertz quoted by Ludwig Boltzmann, in turn quoted by Van Fraassen, in turn quoted by me.

Preamble
In the previous post, I introduced the realist-antirealist debate in philosophy of science.  Again, although there are many species of each, we can loosely say that the debate is over whether unobservable theoretical entities, like subatomic particles, refer to something real or are purely theoretical and we should not think of them as corresponding to some real "thing".

Historically, logical positivism was the first contemporary position in philosophy of science (the only statements that have meaning are verifiable and refer to objects we can directly perceive).  Scientific realism mainly grew out of criticism of this anti-realist position.  In this article, van Fraassen agrees with realists that we ought to reject the positivist philosophy, but disagrees that this should entail realism.  Instead, he proposes an anti-realism that he calls "constructive empiricism".  The idea is that we can accept scientific theories but remain agnostic about their truth; we require only that they be "empirically adequate" (i.e., true about observables). 

Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

Scientific Realism: Vas ist das?  An unsophisticated definition is that the picture of the world that science gives us is a true one, "faithful in its details, and the entities postulated in science really exist: the advances in science are discoveries, not inventions."  There are a couple of caveats.  Scientific realists aren't necessarily committed to the view that all current scientific theories are True or that the scientific enterprise is going to finish any time soon.  But this is the gist of it.  A philosophical theory about science must answer two questions: what is a scientific theory, and what does a scientific theory do.  Realists say scientific theories are about what there really is, and science is an activity of discovery not invention.

Summarizing statement of scientific realism:  "I understand scientific realism to be the view that the theoretical statements of science are, or purport to be, true generalized descriptions of reality." (Ellis)

The advantage of this statement is that it avoids any commitment to a particular current theory being true, only that they "purport" to be.

Another formulation:  A realist (with respect to a given theory  or discourse) holds that (1) the sentences of that theory are true of false; and (2) that what makes them true or false is something external--that is to say, it is not (in general) our sense date, actual or potential, or the structure of our minds, or our language, etc...(Dummett and Putnam)

Yet another formulation:  That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer, that the theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true, that the same term can refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theories--these statements are viewed by the scientific realist. . . as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its relations to its objects. (Boyd)

Final formulation:  Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. (van Fraassen's summary of all the views)

8 Quick Arguments against Realism, How it Can't Explain the Success of Science, and NKTB
In these arguments I will primarily be referring to scientific theories about  (directly) unobservable theoretical entities like atoms and subatomic particles.

Step 1.  We can have lots of fun!  Just because a theory's central terms (e.g. subatomic particles) refer to something doesn't entail that the reference will be successful.  For example, if you see the shadow of a bunny rabbit on the wall you might infer there's a bunny.  But the shadow might have been made by someone's fingers you can't see.  So, your belief that "there's a bunny" doesn't refer to the entity to which you think it does.   

Also, just because a theory is successful, doesn't mean that all or most of its central terms (entities) refer to something.  For example, in early chemistry heat was thought to be some sort of invisible fluid "phlogiston".  But it turns out that term doesn't refer to anything real.  Same goes for "ether" that was postulated to explain how light travels.  Given historical precedent, there's no reason to suppose our theories are any better off. 

Step 2.  I can 'splain it to you! The notion of "approximate truth" is too vague to permit us to judge whether a theory comprised of laws that are all approximately true would be empirically successful; that is, would it adequately describe the observed phenomena.  It seems that a theory can be empirically successful even if it is not approximately true.  Take for example Newtonian physics.  It gets the predictions right (at low relative speeds) but its theoretical explanations of time and space are not approximately true.

Step 3.  Read it with me! Related to the previous point is that realists don't have an explanation of how some past theories had theoretical terms that turned out not to refer to anything (eg. phlogiston, ether) yet were successful predictors of empirical phenomena.  That is, the theory worked (for the known phenomena and testing methods) yet it was totally wrong.  There was no phlogiston or ether.   Who's to say the same won't happen with today's theories? 

Step 4.  Tell me some more!  Realists who give a convergentist (science converges on the truth by building on previous theories) account of scientific progress can't give a good explanation of how this works.  The realist model is that the new better theory preserves some of the laws that were in its predecessor because they were approximately true.  But, obviously they weren't approximately true enough to get it right, otherwise why would the theory have been revised and replaced?  So, what does "approximately true" mean if something that we say is approximately true has to be modified?  Where's the line between a modification, a change, and a new law?  "Approximate truth" is too vague to mean anything.  How did the preceding theory's law refer to something approximately true about the world if it was getting it wrong?

Step 5.  Bees in a hive!  Realism presupposes its truth (Problem of circularity).  Realism assumes that just because a referring theory or an approximately true theory are explanatorily successful that they are true.  But this presupposes that explanatory success and truth are one and the same, but they aren't.  History is full of examples of theories that were explanatorily successful, yet false.

Step 6.  Reeeee mix! (wika wika).  Just cuz a theory does a better explanatory job than its predecessor, this doesn't imply that the new theory can explain why the others succeeded or failed.  For example, Einsteinian physics doesn't explain why Newtonian physics was approximately true.  So, this idea of convergence on truth is weakened.  In other words, if E physics can't explain why N physics got it approximately true, how can we say that N physics did get it approximately true or the E physics was built on N physics?  It might have gotten its predictions right for all the wrong reasons.  Nukin' pu nub fo all the wong weasons...

Step 7.  I know a guy named Devon.  He built his own convenience store.  He calls it "Devon-eleven".  Again, against the convergent view of science:  If a new theory's predecessor has been falsified then it is not possible for the new theory to contain either all of the predecessor's content or all of its confirmed consequences or all of its theoretical mechanisms.  The realist might reply that this is not a necessary condition on a new theory.  But the anti-realist counter is that if the realist believes scientific theories aim at referring to real things and are approximately true then he has to admit that the previous theory didn't do this if some of the postulated entities or laws have to be rejected.  And again, why assume that the new one gets it right?

Step 8.  Isn't this great?  Realists haven't given any argument for why anti-realists won't be able to explain the the success of science.  The only "argument" the realists make against antirealists is that otherwise it would be a gosh-darned miracle that our theories--which have allowed so much prediction, explanation, and beneficial application--didn't refer to real things in the world.  But that's not an argument, that's the fallacy of personal incredulity. 

Conclusion
The conclusion is that realism has not shown how it explains scientific success beyond presupposing that explanation=truth.  Throughout the history of science there have been many scientific laws that approximately explained all or most phenomena at the time, but were later shewn to be false.  Realism cannot explain their success.  On their model, those theories and the entities which they postulated were approximately true of the world.  But as we've seen they weren't.  Realism is the wrong model for interpreting what science does and what theoretical entities are (they are not approximate references to real things in the world).

On the other hand, we shouldn't go too far in the other direction.  We shouldn't say that a theories predictive and explanatory power are meaningless.  The difference might be between wanting to believe something is true and having good reasons for believing it.  That sounds right.  But I'm not clear on what other possible reasons beyond predictive and explanatory power there might be.

Realism vs Anti-Realism: Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities by Maxwell

Notes and Thoughts on "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities" by Grover Maxwell

Preamble
One of the big debates in philosophy of science is between realists and anti-realist.  Although there are many types of each, generally speaking we can say that realists think that our theories describe real entities while the anti-realist don't.   Here's an example to illustrate.  Consider "electrons".  When I use this word does it refer to an actual physical thing?  Or it it referring to a theoretical account of a set of observations? Or is it just a "useful fiction" to facilitate scientists' thinking but should not be thought of corresponding to any real physical entity?

A problem is that in modern science no one has ever directly observed any of atomic or subatomic particles, although we talk about them as though they're real physical things.  Consequently, our knowledge of them is only inferred from bleeps and blips on instrument panels.  "Electrons" and such are merely theoretical postulates to give a coherent account of the bleeps and blips that we count as observations.  So, the anti-realist argument goes, all these theoretical entities (atoms, subatomic particles, forces) are just that, they're theoretical, not real entities.

Maxwell's essay is a response to several anti-realist positions.  His basic argument is that the divide between observable and unobservable entities which anti-realists rely on is itself only a theoretical distinction. For example, before microscopes, germs were theoretical entities.  But with the invention of microscopes they became observable.  So, why should we suppose that just because some entities are unobservable now that they will continue to be.  Therefore, they can't depend on the unobservable/observable distinction to support their theoretical/real distinction.

Quick Definition:  "Ontological Status" is a fancy way of talking about the degree to which something exists.  For some people, the only things that have ontological status are physical things, for others ontology extends to concepts like numbers and (maybe) ideas and mental states.  There are a great many views on what sorts of things exist.  But (almost) all agree that physical things exist; that is, they have ontological status.

The Observable-Theoretical Dichotomy:  R U 4 Realz?

Vs What we see through a microscope isn't real: 
 I know this will sound kinda wack to the peeps out there who haven't studied philosophy.  But wackiness abounds in philosophy.  Lets carry on shall we?

Suppose, pre-microscopes, a scientist infers the existence of germs.  His theory appeals to unobservable "bugs" that cause infections.  Application of his theory yields great results when people start washing their hands and such, lending further support to the theory.  A few years later the microscope is invented and he's vindicated--these "bugs" are observed and given the name "microbes".

A philosopher of science, upon hearing this, denies that the microbes were ever observed under the microscope.  But why?  He argues that "when I look through a microscope, all I see is a patch of colour which creeps through the field like a shadow over a wall.  And a shadow, though real, is certainly not a physical thing."  Basically, when you look through a microscope you are not directly seeing the thing in the plate, rather you are seeing the light which bounces off the microbe which is then amplified (i.e., distorted), then you see the distorted light coming out of the lens.

What's the basic argument?  It's that the microscope distorts/amplifies the light which reflects off of the microbe, so we're not really seeing the microbe, but a distortion.  But there seems to be some arbitrariness going on.  If I look through a slightly convex window does that mean that I can't infer that what's on the other side isn't real (i.e. physical)?  What about people who wear glasses?  Are they not allowed to infer that what they're seeing is real just because the lens distorts the light?  That seems kinda wack.

Of course this is not to say that we can't draw any line.  Certainly there's a difference between inferring the physical reality of a room through a pair of glasses and inferring the Higgs-Bozon particle from the instrument panel and computers at CERN.  What are the implications to our ontology?  Do we ascribe different ontological status to things depending upon how they were observed?  Why should how they are observed affect whether they're 4 realz?

There is also the problem of people and organisms having different natural levels of resolution in their visual faculty.  Is the world less real to the coke-bottle-glasses-wearing person than it is for me with my 20/20 vision because I can see at a higher resolution?  That seems wack.  When someone gets lasik, does the world become more real for them?  There's certainly a silliness to this distinction which points to its arbitrariness. 

There's another problem about the continuum of existence.  Is an very small molecule, only visible under an electron microscope less real than a larger molecule visible under an optical microscope?  What about some salts and polymers that can have single molecules so large that they are visible to the naked eye?  Does each one have a different level of reality?

Vs Only Entities that Are in Principle Observable Are For Realz
So, this is the view that only entities that are in principle observable can be considered real.   Conversely, if an entity isn't in principle observable then it remains only a theoretical rather than real entity.  So on this view we will appeal to facts like the physiology of the eye and the properties of the postulated theoretical entities.  The "in principle" part also refers to the fact that some theories entail that the entities to which they refer are about are unobservable.

Here Maxwell makes what I think is a poor argument.  He suggests a thought experiment whereby some drug makes it possible for us to directly perceive electrons (which are theoretical entities). The mechanism is that the drug alters our perceptual apparatus such that we can perceive the electrons with some latent sense faculty--not necessarily visually.   I don't even understand what it would mean to perceive an electron with some sense beyond the ones I have.  Maybe my imagination isn't good enough.

Then he sort of dismisses this example, probably because er'body's gonna think the same thing that I did, and proposes another.  Suppose a mutant is born who is able to "observe" ultraviolet radiation, or even X-rays, in the same way we observe visible light.  But this counterexample (I don't think) does the work he needs of it.  I don't think anyone is saying that X-rays and ultraviolet radiation are in principle unobservable; in fact we know several animals and insects "perceive" ultra-violet light.  

I think there's a difference between trying to observe subatomic theoretical particles (i.e., entities) and parts of the spectrum.  I'm just not sure what it is...Maybe it's that there's a difference between the ontology of parts of the spectrum and the postulated ontology of particles.  What's the ontological status of light?  I'm totally confused by this.  When we say "that gives off red light" do we mean there's something floating through the air that causes the appearance of redness?  I don't think so.  We mean (scientifically) that the surface of the object in question absorbs all wavelength of light except the one we perceive--but there's still no red thing floating into my eye.  But when we talk about subatomic particles, we're implying reference to a physical-ish thing.  I don't know.  There's some kind of difference there.

Maybe that is it.  When we observe light, we don't give it ontological status of a physical thing, but with sub-atomic particles we do.  So, why does that matter?  I guess because his thought experiment is all about showing that the difference between things that are observable "in principle" and things that are mere theoretical entities is an illusion.  I'm gonna disagree for now.

Next, he says the matter at hand is not to speculate which theoretical entities are or aren't in principle observable.  It is the theory within which the theoretical entity is postulated that stipulates this.  So, in a  way saying "un/observable in principle" is superfluous because this fact is part of the theory.  This is the heart of the matter because it seems there is no pre-theoretical way to determine what is or isn't observable.  It's like this y'all:  peeps were rappin' 'bout 'lectrons 'til there was a theory that postulated them.  That theory wasn't someone's wacky dream, it was based on a crap-load of observations.  So, as far as theoretical entities go, it is the theory itself that defines whether the entity is observable or not.  And that's kinda cheating.  

I want to rejectify this a little.  It's true that theoretical entities like subatomic particles have their un/observability quality stipulated by that same theory.  But, that theory operates within a larger theoretical framework whose principles are that objects below a certain size are unobservable for reasons x, y, z.  Theories don't exist in isolation, and they don't emerge independent from meta and pre-theoretical contexts; these other considerations shape and constrain what types of new theories and hence new theoretical entities are possible.  So, it's not entirely circular.

Of course, Maxwell can reply that it still is circular because the parallel and meta-theoretical considerations are already defining what types of entities are in principle observable.  That maybe so, but any theory of observation, including that there are real macro physical objects instead me being plugged into the matrix, requires some pre-theoretical stipulations about what is un/observable.  That we have background theories doesn't make it a free-for-all that anything in principle observable.  At most, Maxwell can say that we should be agnostic about what types of theoretical entities are un/observable. 

He can also reemphasize the point that an entities observability has no necessary logical bearing on its existence.  That seems right.  But, (I repeating myself) it cuts both ways: an entities' unobservabilitization doesn't make it's existence any more likely either.  If anything it's a strike against it, albeit a small one.  Maybe unobservable.

Vs.  Observation Language
Background:  So, in philosophy one way we distinguish between different kinds of sentences is between observation sentences/language and theory sentences/language.  Observation language refers to statements about our observations.  Eg. "there is a red spot on the wall", or "the gauge moved from left to right", or "the cat weighs 8kg".  There are various limits on what can be included in an observation language, for the sake of argument Maxwell address a general one that allows physical object terms (chair, table) and observable predicates (big, brown, heavy, etc...).  

The main point is that all descriptive terms refer to the thing that has been observed or are reducible to something physical.  Any term in my observational language has to reference some real thing.  So, on a strict version of this, if I have never actually observed x, then the term is not observational language for me because it doesn't refer to anything I've observed.  For example, I've never seen a liger, so in an extremely restrictive observational language "liger" wouldn't be an observational term for me.  Of course this strict of a language is kind of silly.  Just because I haven't seen a liger myself shouldn't have any bearing on its ontological status.  

So, we might loosen our observational language and say that observational terms must be members of a kind, some of whose members have been observed or instances of a property some of whose instances have been observed.  In this case, I can use 'liger' because it's a kind of cat, and I've seen cats before!  Or maybe we can say that ligers have properties that I'm familiar with, so for that reason I can use 'liger' in my observational language because it refers to sets of properties that I've observed.  The main point is that our observational terms have to refer to something real.

But this formulation also runs afoul.  Sometimes an entity can be one of a kind.  Or sometimes our language is clearly observational, yet doesn't refer to anything; eg. ligers over 14' long.  There is no instance of property or kind of 'Ligers over 14'' long that could be the referent of the expression.  The way out is to make our properties more general.  We can say, well, we are familiar with cats, with the colour blue, and with things that are 14' long, so our language does reduce to properties and kinds.  

The problem is that once we loosen the restrictions this much on observational language, it's hard to see how we're going to distinguish between theoretical and observational entities.  For example, in this loose language I can say that unicorns are part of my observational language because unicorns have properties that I'm familiar with.  The same goes for sub-atomic particles--they're going to have general properties that we've experienced in real entities.  Eg. spin, velocity, mass.   So, once I've allowed properties and kinds to be very general in my observation language, on what grounds can I distinguish theoretical entities from observable ones?

What Do?
Clearly, it's important to have some kind of distinction betwixt observational and theoretical language.  We need observation sentences to either confirm theories or to refer to entities that are currently unobservable.  If there is no distinction then er'thing's just cirkalur.   So, what do?  Maxwell says that instead of basing our observations in terms that must be cashed out in physical kinds or properties, we ought to use as our base the "quickly decidable sentence".  K.  Just a little forewarning.  Shit's about to get a little loco.  Don't worry about it too much.  Keep going.  Dju cang do eet!

A quickly decidable sentence is "a singular, non-analytic sentence such that a reliable, reasonably sophisticated language user can very quickly decide whether to assert it or deny it when he is reporting on an occurrent situation."  Say wut?  Non-analytic means that the predicate isn't contained in the subject (i.e., as opposed to analytic like "a bachelor is an unmarried man").  As for the rest, I'm guessing he just means that the descriptive terms aren't too mumbo-jumboish and that so long as a person isn't a complete rube they'll be able to say of the observation that the descriptor applies or it doesn't.  

For example, if someone axes me "Do you wanna do karate in the garage?"  That's a quickly decidable sentence.  Or suppose I put on a lab coat on and do a titration in a beaker being warmed by the bunsen burner.  I have test tubes too, but they're just for effect.  Anyway, a quickly decidable sentence would be something like "the solution is a base because it turned purple and I'm wearing a lab coat".  I could quickly assent to that.  I'll be honest, I'm not too sure if this is exactly what he means.  I'll have to do a bit of research.  

Lets add one more thing to muddle our minds.  An observation term will be defined as "a descriptive term which may occur in a quickly decidable sentence".  Ok, so that kind of works with what I just said about the contents of the quickly decidable sentences not being full of mumbo-jumbo descriptors; just simple stuff like, it's purple, it's a base, etc...

We have two pieces that fit together--quickly decidable sentences and observation terms--to give us a new, non-reference based version of the observation sentence.   So, an observation sentence is a quickly decidable sentence whose only descriptive terms are observation terms.  Eg. Is that apple crunchy?  Yup.   Or "that Delorian requires 1.21 jigga watts"  Assent or dissent?  Assent in no time!

One more example.  Suppose you're driving down the freeway and you see someone mowing their lawn.  You could probably assent that they were mowing the lawn, but maybe not what colour his shirt was or the square footage of the lawn.  So, "he was mowing the lawn" would be a quickly decidable observation sentence while, "he was wearing a navy shirt with brown pants" wouldn't be.  Perhaps if you were walking by and could make more careful observations "he was wearing a navy shirt..." would become a quickly decidable sentence.  I'm not sure what Maxwell would say.

I have a problem with this.  He proposes this new theory of observational sentences but doesn't really tell us under what conditions they apply.  The closest he comes is acknowledging that determining how quickly we can evaluate the truth or falsity of an observation sentence is unknown so far.  Well, so how the crap do I know what qualifies as a legitimate observation that I can evaluate and what doesn't?  It's a totally useless criteria without this information.  It's like saying, "you're right when you're right".  Thanks, but how do I know when I'm right?

Conclusion
What was the whole point of this ruckus?  Maxwell is a realist arguing against the anti-realists who say that non-observable entities like sub-atomic particles are merely theoretical and don't exist in any real way.  The anti-realists say that atomic and subatomic particles are only theoretical entities constructed to explain indirect observations.  Maxwell's argument is that the anti-realist assumptions that the observable-unobservable line is objective and that it bears on the observable-theoretical line are false.  He showed that the line between observable and unobservable is contingent and a function of our physiology, current state of knowledge and the instruments we happen to have available.  Because where the line between observable and unobservable objects is drawn is arbitrary, it is of no relevance to an entities ontological status.  To summarize in a sentence: jus' cuz we can't see wiph our eyes don't mean it ain't fur realz.

Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 2 "How to Be a Moral Realist" by R. Boyd

Overview


In part 1 we looked at how Boyd draws an analogy between scientific realism and moral realism.  The first parallel is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and experience.  The second is that there is a progressively recursive relationship between theory and method.  Check out part 1 if you'd like further elaboration...I've got work to do!


The Problem of Natural Properties


One of the bugaboos moral realism has is to account for the claim that moral judgments refer to real properties out there in the world.  This is somewhat incompatible with some versions of empirical science that say if a term doesn't refer to something that is understandable in the language of physics then it's not real in the sense that moral realist want it to be.  For example, if I say something is 'baaaaaaad', the moral realist wants to say I'm referring to some property that actually exists beyond mental concepts.  


Non-Reductionist Naturalism


So how does the moral realist deal with this problem?  First, they're going to reject the idea that things (in a general sense), such as states, properties, need be reducible to language of physical substances in order to be considered real.   They're also going to reject the idea that things can be only considered "real" if they're directly observable.  We don't directly observe sub-atomic particles and their properties but we still say they're real, so why not extend that leniency to moral properties.  


Connected with that they're going to reject what is called the "constructivist Humean" idea of causation.  Hume's idea was that we don't directly observe causation but our mind "constructs" a causal story to explain a relationship between two things.  The inference is that causal forces aren't real, they are constructed by our minds, only the physical objects that interact are real.  The moral realist refudiates this constructivism and say it's perfectly fine to speak of non-physical relations as being real (hello friend zone!).


Natural Definitions


Here Boyd leans on Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences.   Consider gold and pyrite. A few thousand years ago before they knew anything of their respective chemical properties the two were considered indistinguishable, they were both called 'gold'.  


Gold and pyrite have different micro-structures but the naming convention is determined by the observed properties (nominal) which are not necessarily (and often not at all) the same as the micro properties (real).  It is the particular micro structure of gold and pyrite that produce in us the impression of the colour gold and the mistaken perception that they are one and the same substance.  If we had a super-duper micro scope and looked at the atoms that make up gold and pyrite, they wouldn't be gold coloured--it's their structure that produces in us the perception of the colour gold.  


So, the goal of science should be to uncover the real essences of substances, not the nominal essences.   As we come to know the real essences of substances we will not confuse natural kinds, like we did with gold and pyrite...since it was the discovery of their real essences (micro-structure) that allowed us to correctly identify the kind of thing they are. 


Boyd fancies extending Locke's idea of a distinction between nominal and real essences regarding (physical) substances to properties, relations, and magnitudes.   We can see where he's going with this.  He's going to leverage this difference to account for moral disagreements.  


The strategy will be to say that moral disagreements arise because of something analogous to what's happening with the gold and pyrite example.  People are making judgments based on nominal essences of 'good' rather than the real essences.  A science of morals will commit itself to discovering the real essences of moral properties.


Now, this all sounds fine and dandy but I anticipate some problems.  First of all, Locke's distinction between nominal and real essences applies to substances--physical things.  On Locke's model, properties are ideas caused in our minds by the powers of a substance's micro-structure.  The properties themselves are non-maleable and are not subject to revision--they are basic.  It is through the properties that we identify nominal and real essence of substances.  


For instance, the colour gold helps us identify gold (nominally) or the micro-structure of gold--i.e., the property of "number of protons and electrons"--helps to identify gold's real essence.  So, all properties are somehow tied to something physical; they inhere in something physical.  But I don't see how it is a property can have a micro-structure, and supposing it did, how a property's micro-structure would be different from how we perceive it.  


How could 'yellow' have a micro-structure?  I'm not even sure this is intelligible.  The only thing that would make sense is to say that the perception 'yellow' is a function of the light wavelengths that strike our visual apparatus.  But that wavelength is a function of an objects surface properties.  Again, the properties is tied to something physical, exactly what the realist hopes to avoid.  In this analysis we end up talking about a physical object's microstructure, we haven't talked about the real essence of 'yellow'. It seems yellow is yellow is yellow regardless of whether we are referring to nominal or real essence.


Homeostatic Property-Cluster Definitions (WTF?)


Whoa! Hold on a second.  I know what you're thinking.  It's probably not politically correct for me to use the term 'homeostatic'.  I understand your concern but I contend that since some of my friends are homeostatic, it's ok.  Sometimes I'll even say it to their face and we have a good chuckle.

Lets forget about the big words for a second and go back to a major problem that moral realism has: if moral values are real and exist in the natural world, how do realists account divergent moral judgments?  In order to preempt this criticism Boyd's going to suggest that some natural kinds are defined by property clusters.  But not just any kind of property cluster--homeostatic property clusters!  


What the crap does this mean?  Consider what we might mean when we refer to something as 'cozy'.  Are we referring to just one property, like when I say 'large'?  No, I'm referring to a cluster of properties, such as warmth, softness, comfort, etc...  


Now, is there only one rigid combination of these properties by which we might call something 'cozy'?   Nope.  One cozy house might have a different set of these properties than another cozy house.  Also something completely different like a blanket can also be 'cozy'.  None of these considerations mean that there's no such thing as a cozy house or blanket.  


He goes on to argue that this type of reference is used in natural science.  Consider the term 'healthy'.  This is a relatively scientific notion that involves a cluster of properties that needn't be in the same quantities for every case that falls under the kind 'healthy'.  


Other examples used in the (harder) science of biology are the notions of species, class, phylum, etc...Biology relies on the "imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological, and behavioural features which characterize its members.  Just because we can't nail down those biological terms to something specific and immutable, doesn't prevent people in lab coats from using them.


What Boyd is getting at with this idea of homeostatic property clusters is that there's flexibility in how we define certain traits, or kinds.  Obviously, he's going to apply this idea to moral kinds, like 'good' and 'baaaaaaaaaad'.   For something to be good it can have varying degrees of a cluster of properties, it needn't be rigidly defined by definite amounts of each member of a set of properties.  


I think there is something to this idea but it's hard to see why his approach isn't evidence for a constructivist picture of how we define 'good' rather than a realist approach.  For example, he gives a list of possible elements that, in varying combinations and amounts, could constitute what we reference by 'good'.  They are things that satisfy different human needs, such as physical and medical needs, social and psychological needs like the need for love and friendship, the need to engage in cooperative effort, the need to exercise control over one's life, the need for intellectual and artistic appreciation and expression, the need for physical recreation, etc...  


So, why do I say this sounds constructivist?  Well, he begins by looking at facts about humans, then reasons from there to what properties might encompass moral goodness.  If moral values exist in the natural world, then I'm not sure why we need to reason from human needs to figure them out.  


Why shouldn't we be able to detect them, independent of prior knowledge about what's good for humans? If 'good' is an objective value, it shouldn't matter how it relates to humans, that just might be a happy coincidence.  And besides, what if actual natural absolute moral values in fact better accord with the needs of spider monkeys?   


Furthermore, I think Boyd has to walk a fine line with his homeostatic cluster model because if he allows too much flexibility the kind he's defining gets too vague and becomes useless.


Homeostatic Consequentialism


Ok, so a few paragraphs back I laid out some of the human needs whose satisfaction relate to our notion of moral 'good'.  The next point is that there are many possible different social arrangements that could satisfy these needs.  That is, there is a wide variety of psychological and social mechanisms such as political democracy, mutual respect, rules of courtesy, etc...that can contribute to the homeostasis of the different human goods.  I can get jiggy with that.


From there, Boyd says that we can define moral goodness in terms of the cluster of goods that satisfy human needs combined with the homeostatic mechanisms which unify them.  So, action, policies, character traits, etc...are good to the extent that they bring about the goods and reinforce the mechanisms that bring them about.  I can get jiggy with that too, although I'm concerned that this is starting to sound like the liberal brainwashing by professors that Santorum warned me about. 


This next part is a little harder to get jiggy with because it sounds a little too much like wishful thinking.   The hypothesis is that "in actual practice, a concern for moral goodness can be a guide to action for the morally concerned" because the fact the that the different moral goods are "mutually reinforcing".  Aaand that they are mutually reinforcing will help mitigate conflict between them.


Ok, anyone who follows US--or any country for that matter--politics will note that "in actual practice" there is plenty of conflict when it comes to choosing between moral goods.  Although I absolutely loath Rick Santorum, if I presented to him the list of human goods (satisfaction of medical, psychological, social needs, etc...) I doubt he'd deny any of the members of the list.  He'll probably also agree to the list of mechanisms: attitude of mutual respect, political democracy, egalitarian social relations, customs, etc...Whether he actually practices them is another matter, but I don't think he'd deny any of them as having value.

So, the problem for the realists is that we have a fairly clear counter example to the idea that the concern for moral goodness, in actual practice, would mitigate conflicts between members of these lists.   I see very little mitigation going on where the extreme right is concerned.  Of course, the moral realist could simply refudiate this example by arguing that Santorum isn't committed to this particular set of goods and mechanisms, but a different set.  And they may be correct.  But then we're back to the problem of explaining divergent conceptions of a good that is supposedly objective. 


There is another reply suggested by Boyd, and that relates back to the reciprocal relationship between advances in theory and method.  As our theory of moral goodness approaches truth, our psychological and social mechanism for balancing demands for the cluster of goods will allow us to make better decisions.  This, I think is entirely plausible.

We can explain away the Santorum counter-example as evidence that in our journey to discovering the moral truth, we are still at a point where our choice-making mechanisms are still imperfect.  We aren't close enough to the truth to accurately know how to reconcile tensions between satisfying different human needs in such a way that there can be a net gain.  I guess I can dig that.  


One more issue that moral realism is going to have comes back to is the problem of proving morality is real and a natural property rather than a construction we impose after the fact.  To try to solve this Boyd will rely on the similarity of how we acquire moral knowledge and how we acquire scientific knowledge.  In both cases knowledge will arise out of empirical investigation.  


This is a clever line to account for barbaric moral codes throughout history.  Ostensibly if moral facts exist in nature how is it that we had slavery for so long?  The answer is that certain empirical facts only become accessible to us under the correct conditions.  In the case of slavery, its injustice didn't become apparent until limited democracies developed.  In wasn't until we had the structure of democracy that we could see the psychological and social human good in equal social and political relations.  Once those facts about the good were observed it was a matter of time before they were logically extended to include everyone.  


This seems plausible enough, but I don't see why we can't explain the same phenomena using a constructivist story.  Were we discovering moral properties of actions and policies or were we constructing them?  How do we know that once we discovered the empirical facts of the conditions under which humans thrive, we didn't ex post facto ascribe to them the notion of 'goodness'?  (using Latin makes me feel smrt) Are we human or are we dancer?