Parfit on Moral Disagreement: Part 2

Notes and Thoughts on Moral Disagreement as Discussed in Parfit's "On What Matters" Ch. 34

Parfit Vs Basic Argument from Disagreement

Suppose you and your counterpart are in ideal epistemic conditions.  You are aware of and agree on all the non-normative facts yet your opinions differ on what the true moral belief is.  In a way, we can see this in the abortion debate and in the vegetarianism debate, to name a few.  Since both parties in these debates often agree on the  non-normative facts, we should not rationally suppose that our intuitions about the issue are true.  The basic idea is that, given epistemic parity, there is no compelling reason, beyond ego, to suppose that our normative belief is the correct one or that our opponent wrong.

Parfit says that the Intuitionist response must be that in such situations where everyone knows all the relevant non-normative facts there wouldn't be disagreement over moral assessment.  In such ideal conditions, everyone would agree on the normative belief.   For example, if everyone on all sides of the abortion debate agreed on and knew all the relevant non-normative facts, the Intuitionist has to say that they'd all agree on what is the correct normative belief regarding abortion.

Hmmm...I'm not too sure what to think of that claim.  Anyhow,  the bottom line here is that Parfit is making an empirical claim.  He's saying that, given all the relevant epistemic information, we'd make the same moral judgments.

The cool thing about empirical claims is that they can be tested.  Remember way back in the Intro of Part 1 I axed you to answer the trolly questions? video of trolley problem   Well, here's the thing.  There's a branch of philosophy called xphi (as in "experimental philosophy") where one of the things  they do is psychology-like experiments to test testable philosophical claims.  (check out this link to see some cool xphi experiments)          
     
There are some xphi experiments that test people's intuitions on moral questions.  It's been a while since I read it but I remember reading something on an xphi experiment testing people's intuitions on the trolly thought experiments.  I don't remember the details but I do remember that there wasn't unanimity in moral judgments for what to do in the trolly problems. I'll have to look it up later for my paper but I think something like 3/4 said they'd pull the lever and 3/4 said they wouldn't push the fat man.  The odd thing about the thought experiment is despite the outcome being the same (1 person dies to save 5), most people aren't consistent with their answer.

So how does this apply to Parfit's claim about er'body having the same intuitions given perfect information?  It seems to falsify it because, in the thought experiment, everyone has the same relevant non-normative facts, yet a statistically significant portion of respondents disagree with the majority.

There's a possible reply for Parfit here.  In his senario he says that not only would agents have all the same non-normative facts but they'd also be using the same normative concepts (and understand the relevant arguments and not be affected by distorting influences).  So, his way out is that he can say, despite the fact that er'body agrees about the non-normative facts in the trolley experiment, they aren't all starting with the same normative concepts.  That explains the different outcomes.

Lets pause for a second and look at what Parit (might) mean here by "shared normative concepts".  Given what he has said in previous chapters we can assume that included in this category of concepts is the notion of external reasons in favour of/against an action.  

A quick review of Parfit's notion of "reasons":  For Parfit, a reason is a fact, awareness of which counts in favour of/against a particular action.  This is in contrast to Williams' notion of a reason which is a psychological account of motivation:  I.e., a reason for action is when an agent had a psychological desire to be satisfied.  If an agent has no psychological desire to be satisfied, then they have no reason for an action.  As I have discussed in several other posts, Williams' notion of reason is purely internal to the agent whereas, Partit's is external to the agent and objectively true to all rational creatures. 

Another thing we might include in Parit's cluster of normative concepts in the idea of intrinsic goods; I.e., things that are good in themselves, not because they lead to further things.  I'm going to hypothesize that he's including this too.

"I Am a Computer" (*in a robot voice)
Now here's where things get a little tricky.  I could be totally wrong with this but I'm going to present an analogy to Parfit's hypothesis.  Imagine a moral decision making computer in the future that has a cool robot voice.  It says, "I am a computer" a lot.   Not only does it talk in a cool robot voice but it solves moral dilemas for us.  How might it do this?  One thing it needs is the data.  On Parfit's model that will be the non-normative facts.  The next thing it needs is algorithms to interpret and weigh the data.  These will be the normative concepts.  The program will provide the logical structure, which for Parfit will be the arguments (maybe?).   So, Parfit is saying that if two properly functioning computers with cool robot voices had all these elements in common, they give the same output.

Problem 1:  Which normative concepts?
Hmmm...he's probably right but I'm not sure this is a very meaningful claim.  It seems tautologous to say that provided we shared the same normative concepts we'd come up with the same normative conclusions.  Duh!  In a way it seems like he's side-stepping the whole problem.  

One of the main reasons for which we have moral disagreement is because we don't share the same normative concepts. Furthermore, there doesn't seem to be any objective way to arbitrate between competing normative concepts without already presupposing some prior meta-normative concepts.

Parfit might reply that reasons allow us to arbitrate between competing normative.  But I think this assumes everyone is going to be equally responsive to the same reasons.  I'm not sure that will be the case.  

Problem 2:  Non-testability 
I don't think this claim is testable.  Lets grant that in making a moral decision, two or more people meet all the right epistemic conditions and are using the same normative concepts.  There's still another problem.  It is highly unlikely that 2 or more people will ever share every normative concept.  Maybe Bob has normative concepts {A, B, C, D, E} and Mary has normative concepts {A, B, C, D}.  In some cases, concept E won't play any determining role in the outcome; in others it might.  

Of course, Parfit can reply that just because it's not actually a testable claim doesn't make it false.  He'd be right, but it doesn't make it true either.  It makes it untestable, and so difficult to know how things would actually play out. 

Parfit can also reply that in the case where E is a relevant factor, the disputants don't share a relevant concepts, and so his hypothesis is right.  After all, his claim is that if disputants shared relevant normative concepts, they'd get roughly the same moral answer.  He has a strong response here, but how significant is the claim that if people share relevant normative concepts, they will get a similar answer?  

Problem 3:  Problem of relevant concepts and weight.
Suppose we run the trolley experiment on some people.  We also check to see if they use the same normative concepts. One possible problem is that while they agree on which concepts are relevant, they might not agree on how the concepts should be applied or weighed.   For example we ask:  "are you applying external reasons to your analysis" and they answer in the affirmative.  It's possible that 2 people might agree on using the normative concept of external reasons, but they might disagree on what those reasons are and how they should be weighed in a particular situation.

Parfit might respond that people can make mistakes in their application and weighing of normative concepts. Mathematicians can disagree on things but they are still able to recognize mathematical truths.  That there are occasional mistakes doesn't mean there is no objective truth, it only means that someone has made a mistake.  The method needn't be infallible to support an Intuitionist account of moral realism--we're human, we're bound to err.  We could be deficient is our appraisal of which non-normative facts are relevant, how and which normative concepts should be applied, and there may be distorting influences (like culture/upbringing).  These facts only show that we can get it wrong, not that there are no objective normative truths.

A problem with this reply is that it is non-falsifiable.  Anytime there's a moral disagreement, Parfit can say either that someone has just made a mistake or that the two parties have slightly different normative concepts and one of them has the wrong one.  There's always some sort of ex post facto explanation open to him.   

Distorting Influences
Parfit partly acknowledges this problem by saying we can't simply claim that someone has been subject to a distorting influence anytime they end up with a belief that differs from our own.  He needs to give a more careful description of what constitute distorting influences.  He gives self-interest as a legitimate distorting factor of which we should be wary in our moral reasoning.  True dat...unless you're an egoist, in which case it is an elucidating factor...different normative concepts...oh! snap!

Parfit concludes this section by setting the bar for what is required for the Intuitionist account of moral realism to be true.  "Intuitionists need not claim that, in ideal conditions these disagreements would all be completely resolved.  But they must defend the claim that, in ideal conditions, there would not be deep and widespread moral disagreement."  

I can dig that.  However, a problem I foresee is how Parfit will show that convergence over values is a product of there being objective moral truths instead it being a product of cultural convergence or evolutionary forces.  Both stories could account for moral agreement.  What would really be compelling for the moral realist's case is to give examples of widely divergent cultures that share significant moral values. That, in my estimation, would carry some weight.  

Note: I wrote this before reading the entire chapter.  Later in the chapter Parfit makes stronger defenses of his claims and addresses some of my worries.  Why does he have to be so reasonable?  How am I supposed to write a critical paper about someone I'm starting to agree with?  Curse you Parfit!

Moral Disagreement Part 1: Parfit

Notes and Thoughts on Parfit and Moral Disagreement (Ch. 34)


Introduction
Before getting into the philosophy, for those of you who aren't familiar with the trolley thought experiments, answer these questions before proceeding:


Trolly Q1:  You are driver of a runaway tram which you can only steer from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other.   You are currently on the track to kill the five.  Do you flip the switch to change tracks and cause the one man to die to save the 5?


Trolly Q2:  This time you aren't the driver of the runaway tram.  This time there's only one track, and there are 5 workers working on it.  If the train reaches them, they'll all die.  You are on an overpass.  You notice a fat man whose body weight is such that if you pushed him off he'll cause the tram to derail and the 5 workers will be saved.  Yay!  But only at the expense of the fat man's life.  Boo!  Do you push him off?


Was your answer different for the 2 questions?  The outcome was the same, so why might it be different?  What's the difference between the situations?  And most importantly, how do you justify your position?  Keep these questions in mind as we discuss this section.  In a way Parfit wants to argue that under ideal conditions we'd all give the same answer.  There's a fairly large body of empirical evidence to the contrary, but he'll probably reply that in some way the ideal conditions hadn't been met.


Overview
Yo, check it! (That means I'm about to drop some knowledge)  We is about to talk about D-Rock Parfit's replies to the argument from disagreement (and some variations).  The argument from disagreement is one of the classical arguments against moral realism (that there objectively true moral values).   I did a more detailed account of the argument from disagreement in my post on Mackie (Mackie calls it "the argument from diversity") but for the one or two of you not familiar with the argument it goes a lil' somethin' like this:
1.  There is somes peoples.
2.  The peoples is disagree very muchly about what is goodly and badly.
3.  If there were such a thing as objective moral values, we would expect to find agreement, not disagreement.
C.  Therefore, it is seeming there are no objectively true moral values, only relative values.  I.e., Moral truth is always relative to social/cultural/historical context; it is never objectively true.


Parfit says this argument is badly.  He does not like it.  Not one little bit!


Two last definitions, normative belief:  A belief about something's value.  For example, "telling the truth is good" or "causing unnecessary pain is baaaaaaaad."
Normative reason:  That's a reason in favour of doing 'x'.   Or, that's a reason against doing 'x'.  Or, that's a good/bad reason to do 'x'.


Ok, enough lol catz language.  Lets look at his criticisms.  (Can you imagine turning in a whole paper in lol catz language?  That'd be awesome. lol.)


I will add one more point.  Parfit is going to advance the thesis that ultimately it is our intuition that tells us that certain actions and reasons for actions are morally good.  This thesis is contrary to other realist positions that say we can know that something is good either by empirical means or by conceptual analysis.  


Parfit's Main Claims


Yo, check it!  Parfit is a moral realist:  He thinks that there are objective moral values.  More specifically he makes several claims:
(A).  There are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths, some of which are moral truths.
This means there are objective truths about moral values.  For example, there are certain things that are objectively good--in the moral sense--to do, and knowing what these things are gives us reasons for or against an action.  Morally good things aren't good because of their consequences, but they are good in themselves.  Maybe, helping people is one of these things.  "But helping who?"  "I don't know, people who need help!"
(B).   Since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception or on evidence provided by empirical facts.
This one's pretty self-explanatory.  Things aren't good because of some property they have, things are good because they are essentially good.  Morally good things are intrinsic goods.
(C).  Positive substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning.
Whether something is good is not discoverable by analyzing the meaning of the term.  E.g., That "justice" is good, isn't discoverable through its definition the way that we can discover what a bachelor is by understanding the meaning of "unmarried man".   Identifying something as good isn't a matter of analyzing the concept of the word.


Therefore
(D).  Our normative beliefs cannot be justified unless we are able to recognize in some other way that these beliefs are true.
Since we can't know what things are good based on empirical investigation, apprehension of properties, or conceptual analysis, we need another way to be able to identify what things are objectively good.


And, Parfit says, we do have this capacity.  Some of our normative beliefs give us reasons in favour/against certain actions and we are responsive to these reasons.  Some of our normative beliefs are "self-evident, and intrinsically credible".   


For example:  Poking children in the eyes with needles for fun is wrong.   According to Parfit, we just know that this normative belief is true.  We know this to be true just as we know that a something and its negation cannot both be true (at the same time and place).


Of course the big question is how do we know these assertions to be true without appeal to our sensory perception or definitions?  It's not like I need to see someone poke a child in the eyes to know it's wrong...Parfit proposes intuitionism:  The theory that we have intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and recognize some normative truths.


Parfit is well aware of the problems with intuitionism.  Where was people's moral intuition during slavery?  Back then people often argued it is intuitively true that Africans ought to be slaves.  And what about wars?  People do horrendous things because they take it to be intuitively true that the other side is evil or that they're on the side of good (see: US military culture, or any military culture for that matter...).


Nevertheless, in the less clear cases we ought not to rely only on intuition about the act.  This is where Parfit adds in a requirement that we assess the strengths and weaknesses of conflicting reasons, arguments, and principles.  The idea is that, as with particular acts, our intuition gives us "similar abilities to recognize truths about what is rational, and about what we have reasons to believe, and want, and do."


I'm not sure I agree with him here.  I think all one has to do is look at American politics to see that people clearly do not agree on what truths are rational "and what we have reasons to believe, and want, and do".  However, I do agree with him (and Scanlon) that appeal to reasons for/against committing a particular action "is the only defensible method".   I mean, for serious, if you can't give reasons for why you did something, beyond "I just felt it was the right thing to do", then you is wack.


The problem for Parfit is in trying to show that people's intuitions will magically aligne regarding what they think are good objectives, reasons and/or principles for action.  To deal with this objection Parfit argues that just because there might be disagreement over what 2 people find to be "self-evident", doesn't imply that we don't have the capacity to find out.  


Consider our other senses.  People can disagree over what they see or hear, yet we don't conclude from that that they are blind and deaf.  Well...sometimes, I do.  Nevertheless, despite their infrequent lapses, we don't conclude that vison and hearing aren't reliable ways of coming to know truths about the world.


One more reply to the anti-intuitionists is that people might find that the beliefs over which they disagree aren't of the self-evident variety; that's why they're disagreeing.   Well, that's sounds like a mighty convenient argument for Parfit.  "No, no, no! it's not that one of your intuitions is wrong, it's that regarding this particular matter, there is no self-evident truth--that's why you're disagreeing".  But this reply avoids one difficulty by creating another.


How is it that we are supposed to distinguish between intuitive beliefs that are self-evidently true and those that only appear to be self-evidently true?  If Parfit's answer is that we should resort to our intuition to sort it out, I'm gonna punch him right in the face!   Oh! I shouldn't say that.  Parfit's a nice guy.  Almost all accounts of him never fail to mention how nice he is.  But anyway, you know what I mean.  There's a vicious circle goin' on here, and it's making me dizzy!

Normative Truth: Good and Bad Reasons. (Parfit)

(apology--I haven't proof read this yet)


Yo, check it.  I think I might actually have my paper topic for metaFX.  Stop.  That would be the best DJ name for a philosopher ever, DJ metaFX.  Anyway, I is going to talk about whever der is such ting as normativity in reasons--that is, whether there's such a ting as a good, bad, right, or wrong reason for axion.  


Parfit's Preamble on Disagreements
This is an intensely personal section where Parit shares his personal reasons for his quest to determine what matters in life.  The main point, however, is that if we find ourselves in disagreement with someone over a moral issue, the standard assumption is that there is some sort of asymmetry.  Maybe the person with whom we disagree doesn't have sufficient cognitive capacity to see the correct answer, or maybe they just don't have all the right facts.  But, those types of disagreements can be explained away.  


The difficult disagreements are with those that we consider our epistemic peers.  The people who are also on a whole. nuva. level. wif us.  Aaaand they have all same facts as us.  In cases of epistemic symmetry there is no rational reason to suppose our belief is any more correct than our friend's.  What do?  The only thing we can do is to assume that there is an asymmetry in knowledge or capacity somewhere.  But how do we know it's not us that is in the weaker position? Answer: we don't.  Oh! Snap! 


An example of one of these beliefs is retributive justice.  Parfit doesn't think anyone deserves to suffer ever.  To support his view he has to find the asymmetry responsible for his epistemic peers' views to the contrary.  To support his position Parfit suggests that belief in retributive justice may be a case "in which an evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains".
His argument goes that evolution explains why people have reactive attitudes and the desire to inflict harm.  But the fact that these emotions and reaction arise out of the evolutionary process demonstrates that such attitudes are not responses to reasons.  They are simply reactions.  In other words, just because we have an impulse, doesn't mean the action for which we have the impulse is a right action, or that an emotional reaction isn't justification for an action's being right.  Something akin the naturalistic fallacy is going on up in hur. 


The upshot of the section is that he has deep disagreements with some of his epistemic peers so in order to determine whether his view is correct, rather than his peers, he needs to discover the asymmetries between them. 


Parfit on Williams


Parfit has great reverence for Williams and it disturbs him that their moral views are so divergent.  A central issue between them is whether there is such a thing as an intrinsic good.  An intrinsic good is something that isn't good because of any consequences derived from its acquisition rather it is good in itself.  A standard example would be happiness.  We don't pursue happiness for any other reason than happiness itself is good.  Contrast that with money.  We don't pursue money just to have it, but because it allows us to obtain other things we might value like Ed Hardy shirts--which are intrinsically ugly.


So, why is Parfit so pre-occupied by Williams' rejection of the notion of intrinsic good?  Because, without this notion Parit doesn't think we can answer the first question of philosophy: Are we human or are we dancer?  Not only that, but we also can't answer the "other" first question of philosophy, "how ought we to live our lives/which kind of life do I have the most reason to live?"  


You see, if we have nothing with absolute value to pursue, then not only can we not know at what we should aim our own actions but there will be no grounds by which we might judge the actions/life choices of others.  If all values are relative, then the person who pursues a life of causing suffering for others is on equal normative footing as someone who spends their life pursuing justice, happiness, knowledge, and love.   For Parfit we need some objective normative truths in order to know what reasons should count in favour or against engaging in an action.


For Williams the notion of an intrinsic good is inexplicable.  If something were to be intrinsically good-- that is, its essence was goodness--then its goodness should be explainable in advance of human valuation.  This is close to my position.  I don't understand how something is intrinsically good, devoid of any context.  I understand the notion if we say something like "justice and happiness are intrinsically good for humans".  Without humans would justice and happiness be good?  Are justice and happiness also good for ants and bacteria?  It seems that these values are only positive in relation to the benefits they bring to humans (in a community). 


Someone like Parfit might reply that bacteria and ants don't have the capacity for happiness and goodness, so my counter-example is irrelevant.  That's an objection I'll have to reply to.    


But enough about me, lets go back to Williams' argument which is very similar to my own thought, but obviously more sophisticated!  He says that if something has intrinsic goodness then we should not be able to explain its goodness by saying we value it.  So, I can't say that love is good because I value it.  It has to be the other way around;  I must say of something that has intrinsic value that I value it because of its intrinsic goodness.  In the case of love, I need to say that I value love because it is good.   In essence we are saying that something (e.g. love)  is good because it is good.  This seems a little tautologous. 


The suggestion might be that we should value things such as virtue, justice, and happiness because of the other properties that make them good.  Plato says justice is good because it creates harmony.  But just like Palin, Williams refudiates this view too.


Before we get into Williams' argument there, lets return to Parfit's view of reasons.  He says:


When we call something intrinsically good in the reason-implying sense, we mean that this thing has intrinsic properties that would or might give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, or trying achieve this thing. 


The basic idea is that certain facts about the world will give us reasons to act in a certain way.  For example, it is a fact that helping an old lady across the street will make her happy and will be kind.  Both of those things are intrinsically good--those are facts!  Those facts give me reasons to act.  If there were no facts about the intrinsic goodness of happiness and kindness, I'd have no reason to act one way or the other.  A central idea is that facts create reasons for a determinate action.


Reasons Internalism Vs. Reason Externalism
Williams thinks this is all claptrap.  He adopts the "Humean" model of action.  The basic idea is that I have a predetermined set of desires, dispositions, character traits, etc called the motivational set...the only way we can explain action is by reference to my motivational set.  If I say I want to study, but I procrastinate on facebook instead, then my dominant desire was to make witty comments on facebook. Every time I ask "why did I do x" the answer will be "to satisfy some desire in my motivational set".  A consequence of this view is that, logically, we can't act in a way that isn't in accordance with something our pre-existing motivational set. 


Parfit sees things differently.  He says that facts about the world give us reasons to have new desires (if we are sufficiently rational and reflexive).  For example, maybe I see an old lady trying to cross the street on my way to work.  For whatever reason Zeus (the one TRUE god) gave me a motivational set that lacks the desire to help her across the street.  My friend sees that I didn't help her then explains to me why it's good to help old ladies across the street.  He states facts about kindness and compassion that give me reasons to include the desire to help many old ladies across many streets.  And I dedicate the rest of my life to helping old ladies across streets.  The end.  


From Parfit's position Williams' view is tragic for humanity.  If all that can motivate action are pre-existing desires, then it is pointless to ask what kind of life we ought to live.  All we can do is internally reflect on our motivational set and decide which desires we weigh more than others.  There is no point in asking what things are important or what we should care about.  It is a sad state of affairs indeed. 


I have to say that while my philosophical sympathies are with Williams, Parfit paints a much nicer picture.  Those in the Williams camp can claim that they are simply doing psychology.  It doesn't make sense to say that someone acted in a way that didn't accord with one of their desires.   Note that Williams' view doesn't necessarily imply profligate behaviour.  Most people have in their motivational set the desire to act in accordance with whatever they consider to be moral.


Moral Disagreement
But I want to set that debate aside and turn to another issue.  This notion of normatively--of intrinsic value.  It's all fine and dandy to say that this and that are intrinsically good or bad, but what do we do in cases of disagreement?  Certainly there are cases where people disagree.  Some people think allowing individuals to end their own lives is a good thing, others think it's baaaaaaad.  Because Parfit believes in intrinsic values, in such cases someone must be wrong.  It's not a matter of, "well, for person A's community it's ok and for person B's community it's not".  Nope.  Someone is wrong.  And it ain't me!


Lets suppose Parfit is right and there are objective moral values.  What do we do in cases of disagreement, especially when er'body has all the same facts?  It seems that the only way to choose between the two positions, given equal epistemic positions, is to presuppose a meta-theory of value.  In other words, suppose I give the reason "dignity is da best" for my position and you give yours "suicide is the da worst".    Now we need a theory of value to determine which values to value more.  But then someone comes along and gives a contrary theory of how we should weigh values.  Now we need a meta-meta theory to adjudicate between those two theories.  


The bottom line is this: once we say there is objective normative value, in a moral dispute given epistemic parity, there is no way to decide which reason for action we should prefer unless we further presuppose a meta-theory of values.  


I didn't really explain that too well but I hope you get the point...


Wacky Mackie and Wile E. Coyote 
Ok, one last thing.  What's the solution to this?  I think Mackie's error theory is the solution.  Here's what he says.  When I say this is good or this is bad, I mean what I say but my statements are false.  There is no such thing as good and bad.  Oh! Snap! The world is going to end! Er'body hide your wife, hide your kids, hide your husband cuz they b rapin' er'body up here!  


Hold on.  Ain't nobody gong b climbin' in ur windows.  Here's Mackie's idea.  Just because moral statements are all false doesn't mean that we need to throw away morality.  Morality and moral concepts serve a very useful purpose.  Just cuz there's no such thing as objective good or bad is no reason to go rapin' er'body in here.  Think of it like this.  (Some people might disgree with this example but I'll try to come up with others later).  Numbers.  What are they?  Can you touch them?  Do they exist?  No.  They are concepts.  Very useful ones at that.  We don't stop using them just because they don't exist in any real sense.  We can do the same with moral concepts like "good", "right", "bad", and "wrong".  Nothing is really intrinsically good or bad, but these are certainly useful concepts.


One interesting consequence of this view is that we are a little like Wile E. Coyote before he realized he's run off a cliff.  We act as if these concepts are real and so long as we don't look down, we should be fine!


Any and all criticisms are welcome as it will give me content for my paper.  Thank you for reading.