Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma (Video)

Hey guys,

Here's a video I made to help my students understand Divine Command theory and the Euthyphro dilemma:

https://plotagon.com/12834

The Moral Problem: Michael Smith

Introduction and Context
So far it looks like if we're moral realists (i.e., we believe there are objective moral facts) we are in deep doo-doo.  In Why Be Moral, Glaucon and Adeimantus compellingly argue that it's better to appear moral than to actually be moral.  The Euthyphro dilemma shows that appealing to God can't, on its own, give us an account of objective moral truth--if anything it points to a naturalist account.  And if that isn't bad enough, Mackie's arguments from disagreement and queerness undercut the likelihood of a naturalistic account objective moral truth.  

Before you go around raping and pillaging, lets take a look at what a naturalistic account of objective morality has to offer in terms of a response to the various problems that have emerged. 


Started from the Bottom, Now We're Here
Contemporary naturalistic theories of objective morality (moral realism) pretty much all start from the same place:  Moral obligation is justified in terms of reasons.  There is some reason for which it's wrong to poke babies in the eyes for fun.  There is some reason for which you shouldn't steal.  There's some reason for which should help to feed a starving child.  Reasons for and against an action are at the bottom of all naturalistic moral realist theories...and now we're here.

So far so good...except what happens if we don't share or we disagree about what the relevant reasons are in respect to what we should do?  How do you decide whose reasons are the true indicator of moral facts?  Maybe I have what I think is a good reason to steal Bob's money but you tell me that the reason I shouldn't steal Bob's money is because it harms Bob's interests.  I respond, well, that it will hurt Bob isn't a reason for me not to take Bob's money--I couldn't give two hoots about Bob's interests.  I only care about mine.

Ok, you reply, but suppose someone were to do the same to you, would that bother you?  Of course it would.  It would bother me because my interests are at least as important as the interests as the next person, and stealing from me would cause me to my interests to subverted by the interests of another. 

Enter the principle of impartiality:  Stealing from me isn't wrong because there's something special about stealing from me or that there's something special about my interests.  Stealing from anyone is wrong.  From the point of the view of the universe, ceteris paribus, all of our interests have equal weight/are worthy of equal consideration and so any act that unjustifiably preferences one set of interests over another is wrong.  

This principle sounds good in theory but there are also good reasons to think we needn't alway act impartially nor that morality demands it.  If I can only save one life: the life of a close family member or a stranger I've never met, it doesn't seem wrong for me to prefer the interests of my family member.  What about spending money to extend my life 1 year or spending that same money to extend the life of a stranger for 5 years?  What about my personal interest in going to a concert and the interests of a starving child who could eat for 3 months off the ticket price?  Is it morally wrong for me to preference my own (possibly trivial) interests in such a situation?  The point is, reasons as a ground for naturalistic moral realism seem to only get us so far.  As it stands, we have no clear account of how to weigh them against each other or how to reconcile competing reasons. 

Another Big Problem
So far we've said that appeals to reasons ground an account of objective morality.  But where do reasons come from?  (On some accounts) reasons are a reflection of our motivations.  We all have different motives for action but different motives will generate different reasons for action. If I'm motivated to X then I have reason to X.  But what if I'm not motivated to X (i.e. I have no desire to X), does it mean that I have no reason to X?  

Since reasons underpin naturalistic morality, people having different reasons will imply different standards of wrong and right.  This will undercut any hope at objectivity in morality.

What constitutes a good reason for action for you might not be a good reason for me, so I will use my reason to justify my action and you'll use your reason to justify your different action and we'll both be right.  The only way out of this mess is to come up with a way to mediate between competing reasons...

Enter Smith's moral realism

Smith's Rationalist and Internalist Moral Realism 
Smith has two main issues to deal with:  (1)  Explain how there can be objective morality despite the fact that we all can have different reasons for action and (2) explain his answer to (1) in a way that also addresses Mackie's argument from moral disagreement and argument from queerness. 

Before proceeding, lets get one conceptual distinction out of the way:  explanatory reasons vs justifying reasons.   If I keep a lost wallet we can ask "why did you keep the wallet?"  I can respond "because I like money and there was money in it."  This would be an explanatory reason.  The reason I give doesn't justify my behavior but it explains it.  It is often said that explanatory reasons are agent-relative reasons.   A subclass of explanatory reasons are motivational reasons.  These are the specific sub-class of reasons which explain an agent's actions in terms of their particular motivations, desires, and means-end beliefs (i.e., beliefs about how to best realize what they are motivated to do).

A justifying reason, on the other hand, would be something like this:  "I kept the wallet because I couldn't afford food for my children and it's true that if you are given a choice between letting your children go hungry and returning a wallet, you should not return the wallet."  Justifying reasons are generally considered to be reasons we'd appeal to for or against acting in a certain way.  Justifying reasons are sometimes called normative reasons. 

How to Get Moral Objectivity from Reasons

Solution summary: Rationality is a universal quality and humans all possess it (to varying degrees).  The desires you'd rationally have about a situation are the desires that we'd share universally about that situation.  Since, under ideal conditions of rationality, we'd all have the same desires (and motivations), we'd also all have the same reasons for action (in a given moral situation).  Therefore, we could, if acting rationally, all share the same reasons for action thereby giving rise to objective morality.

So, to repeat, the first main problem for Smith is this: Objective moral facts can be known by appealing to reasons.   However, if not everyone thinks that the same reasons are good reasons for an action, then people will have different ideas about what is right and wrong, and objective morality doesn't get off the ground.  

There's a side-issue that need resolving too.  What kind of reasons are we talking about to ground moral judgment?  Motivational or justifying reasons?  If it's only agent-relative motivational reasons then it doesn't seem like the project will get very far.  Clearly, we all have different motivations for doing things.  On the other hand, if we're talking only about justifying/normative reasons then it doesn't seem that reasons have any power.  

What I mean is, if knowledge of right and wrong doesn't motivate action, what use is it?  If mere awareness of a normative reason doesn't motivate action, there doesn't seem to be any practical value in figuring out what's right and wrong.  If, upon discovering a (normative) reason for acting morally, people who were going to act immorally aren't motivated to do act otherwise, what practical value is there to figuring out and explaining moral truths?  

Because of this problem, Smith defends a position called "reasons internalism".  Reasons internalism attempts to connect justifying reasons to agent-relative motivational reasons.  In other words, reasons internalism tries to show that knowing a moral fact (justifying reason) will necessarily play a role in motivating the right actions.

Ok, now that we've got most of the terminology and context out of the way, lets take a look at how Smith attempts to deal with the problem of moral objectivity.  

What is (naturalistic) moral rightness?  Moral rightness is what we'd desire ourselves to do in a certain circumstance if we were fully rational.   So, if you want to know what 'right' is, (a) imagine that you are perfectly rational and (b) imagine what you'd want done in that particular situation.  

Consider an example:  You find a wallet on the ground and want to know what to do.  First imagine that you are perfectly rational and then imagine what you would want done in that particular circumstance.   Under these conditions you have a good chance (not a guarantee) to know what the right thing to do is. 

So, where does the objectivity come from?  Ah! Ha!  I'm glad you asked.  Lets work backwards for a second.  How do we determine what to do?  We appeal to reasons.  But of course, if we all have different reasons then we'll come up with different answers about what to do.  But where do reasons come from?  Reasons come from agent-specific desires, beliefs, and motivations.  Obviously, we differ enormously in these agent-specific respects...so appealing to them will not get us commonly-held reasons.  

The trick is to find a way to make everyone recognize and be motivated by the same reasons.  The only way to do this is to find something that generates the same desires.  We need something that is grounded in something universal: i.e., something we all share that is homogenous.  Rationality. Ta! Da!  Since rationality is universal, if in any particular situation we imagine ourselves as purely rational we will share the same motivations and desires (because they arise from the same source).  Those same motivations and desires (across individuals) will in turn generate the same reasons for action (across individuals), which in turn will generate the same moral judgments about a particular moral situation. 

Now, how does this connect to the agent-relative vs justifying reasons issue? Knowing what a (hypothetical) fully rational agent would want to do creates in (actual) you a desire to do that thing. Added to our pre-reflective set of desires, we now have a new desire to do what a purely rational agent would do.  This new desire will play a motivational role in how we act (because we want to actualize desires).  But since this new desire is something that would be universally shared (because it's what all purely rational being would want), it is not merely an explanatory reason (i.e., "because I wanted to do x") but a justifying reason (i.e., "because it's what all fully rational agents would want").

Issues:
1.  Why should we suppose that there is an overlap between what is rational and what is moral?
2.  Would our desires really be the same if we were all fully rational?
3.  Can desires be rational or is reason content-free?
4.  Is it true that knowing what a fully rational agent would want to do cause me to want to do that too?

Reply to Mackie's Argument from Queerness
Mackie says that moral properties can't be a feature of the world be cause they'd be metaphysically and epistemologically queer.  I can come to know and study all the properties of matter and energy but how come no one has ever scientifically identified the property of 'rightness' in something?  I know how my sense of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing work.  But how come no one's ever discovered a moral sense organ?  If we can sense these properties, surely there must be an organ or faculty for it.

Smith's reply is this:  Rightness is simply the qualities or properties we would want acts to have in circumstance C if we were fully rational.   There's nothing magical going on here.  If you want to know what rightness is, think about what a fully rational being would want in a particular moral situation. The features that we'd want the acts to have in those situations is 'rightness'.  

One might object that we've defined 'rightness' in terms of rationality, and maybe we can't give a naturalistic account of rationality.  Ok, maybe so, but rationality is naturally realized; that is, it emerges from the natural world.  A rational creature is simply one with a certain psychology-type.  And psychology is something that can be studied scientifically, so it is therefore, a natural quality. 

Reply to Mackie's Argument from Moral Disagreement
Recall that the argument from moral disagreement goes something like this:  It's an empirical fact that there is and has been a lot of substantive moral disagreement between cultures, over history, within cultures, and between individuals of the same culture.  Rather than saying this moral disagreement is a consequence of people misperceiving objective moral truth, it make more sense to say moral rules are socially constructed and reflect cultural ways of life.  

In Smith's reply, notice how he employs a very similar strategy to Mackie's but starts with different evidence arguing for the opposite conclusion.  

Convergence Claim: 
Smith's basic reply is the convergence claim:  If you removed all the distorting factors in people ethical reasoning (cognitive biases, cultural prejudices, uncritically accepted beliefs, dogma, ideology, religion, disagreement over non-moral facts) and engaged in rational discourse, everyone would eventually end up with the same moral conclusions.

Mackie is cherry-picking:  He's only looking at instances of moral disagreement but there is and continues to be lots of important moral agreement in the world--across cultures and individuals.  The empirical fact that moral arguments tend to illicit the agreement of our fellows gives us reason to believe that there will be a convergence in our desires under conditions of full rationality.

Abduction: The best explanation of moral agreement in the world is our convergence upon a set of extremely unobvious a priori moral truths. And convergence on these truths requires convergence in the desires that fully rational creatures would have.

Counter: But what about all the moral disagreement?

Replies:
1. : Alongside massive disagreement we find entrenched agreement.   For example, there is widespread agreement on thick moral concepts (descriptive concepts that are also value-laden): courage, brutality, kindness, meanness, honesty.  Moral agreement is so extensive that normativity has been incorporated into naturalistic descriptive concepts.  If we look at how these concepts are used across cultures we will find significant overlap not only in the behaviors they describe but also in the moral evaluation of those behaviors.

2:  Past moral disagreement was removed, inter alia, by a process of moral argument.   The fact that rational argument can lead to changes in culture's and individual's moral evaluations of cultural practices and behaviors is strong evidence for the positive role of rationality in accessing moral truth. Consider, for example, slavery, women's rights.  Essentially, there is moral progress across and within cultures, and one reason for this is rational discourse.

3: Current intractable disagreements can be explained away by absence of ideal conditions of reflection and discussion; i.e., if we removed the elements that distort or impede rational discourse, we'd have substantive moral agreement.

Issues:  

1.  Is it rational arguments that bring about change in moral attitudes or is it something else like emotions and the ability to empathize?
2. If we did remove all the distorting influences, would there be a convergence of desires of fully rational people?
3.  Is the convergence claim falsifiable? If it isn't, it doesn't mean it's false, only that as an empirical claim it will lose some strength.

Replies to Foot
Foot's main criticism is that logical consistency doesn't necessarily imply moral behaviour.  Eg. A criminal can have logically consistent premises about what to do yet not arrive at the correct moral conclusion.

Reply
The criminal's flaw is his premises. He has a normative reason to gain wealth no matter what the cost to others. But a fully rational creature would not want this.  His desire isn't what a fully rational creature would desire.

Counter:  The problem of conflicting intuitions about what a fully rational creature would want

What if the criminal says that he did rationally reflect on what a fully rational creature would want in his circumstance and he came up with a normative reason to gain wealth no matter what the cost to others.  He comes to this conclusion even thought the vast majority of others conclude the contrary.

Reply: Intellectual Arrogance

Just because his intuition differs from the vast majority doesn't mean, ipso facto, he is wrong.  But the criminal is demonstrating intellectual arrogance.  The criminal sticks to his opinion that he has reason to gain wealth no matter what the cost to other.   He sticks to his view without good reason. He doesn't weigh his position "in light of the folk...the only court of appeal there is for claims about what we have normative reason to do."  

Reflecting on what a perfectly rational individual will do doesn't guarantee the correct answer, it's a starting place.  From there we engage in rational dialogue and check our intuitions and arguments against those of others.  If they differ, they we need to find some reason for which we should prefer ours...especially if we are in the minority.  It doesn't mean we're wrong, only that we shouldn't be so arrogant to suppose we have stumbled upon the truth while the majority (of epistemic peers) has erred.

Issue:  Is this a satisfying reply?

Why Be Moral? Plato, The Republic Book II

Plato: Introduction to Why Be Moral (aka Glaucon's Challenge)

The first question of philosophy is "how should I live?" Implicit in this question is a similar question: "what does living a good life entail?"  Amongst other things, over the course of The Republic, Plato tries to answer this question. One of the central issues to be resolved in answering the above questions is whether being moral is required for the good life.  If it is, then presumably moral person will live a "more good" life than an amoral person.  The further implication is that there is some value in living a moral life that living an amoral life doesn't have.  

In this passage from Book II of the Republic, Plato attempts to defend the view that we should behave morally/justly for its own sake rather than for the potential beneficial consequences.    In philoso-talk we'd say acting morally is also a good "in itself" and not just an instrumental good.

An instrumental good is something that is good because of some consequence it brings about.  For instance, money is an instrumental good because it is a means to obtaining some other goods like paying for our university education or going on vacation. The "good" that money possess is to allow us to get the things that are more gooder than money.  If money didn't allow us to get good things, it would cease to have any value.  It'd just be colored paper.

An intrinsic good is a good that has value not because it allows us to get other things but because it just fundamentally is good.  Things that are intrinsic goods might include happiness and pleasure.

Anyhow, in this passage, Glaucon and Adeimantus argue that people only behave justly because (a) they are afraid of the consequences of getting caught acting unjustly or (b) they are too weak or cowardly to do what they really want to do or (c) they pursue the instrumental value of being perceived as just.  People don't act justly because they see some intrinsic value in behaving justly.

Note:  Although they aren't completely equivalent, for our purposes we can use the word "moral" interchangeably with how Plato uses "just".

Setting the Scene:  Justice Is Only an Instrumental Good, It Has No Intrinsic Value
Glaucon identifies 3 categories of goods:  (1)  purely intrinsic, (2) intrinsic but also having good consequences, (3) purely instrumental goods.  In the first category we can put things like (harmless) pleasures and happiness.  We don't want them because of any additional consequence they might bring us.  We don't seek happiness in order to obtain some other thing.  We just want happiness as an end in itself.  Same goes for pleasure. 

In the second category are things that are ends in themselves but also bring about further good consequences.  Health is something we desire for itself but also for its consequences:  being healthy "just is" good but it allows us to enjoy aspects of life we can't enjoy without it.

In the third category are things like money.  If money didn't allow us to get the things we really wanted, it would have no value--we wouldn't try to get it.  Since money is an instrumental good, it has no value of its own.  It's value is only in the other things it allows us to get.

The Main Issue:  Glaucon says justice (or behaving morally) belongs to the third category.  Justice is an instrumental good.  People only behave morally because of what it gets them (or what being perceived as failing to behave morally will get them): acting morally gets you a good reputation and status--the real goods we're after.  Like money, behaving morally isn't desirable in itself.  Doing so is a burden without the consequent benefits.

Socrates on the other hand says justice belongs in the second category.  It is good in itself and it has good consequences.  

In this passage, Glaucon presents his argument for why justice is a purely instrumental good rather than a good that also has intrinsic value.  Part of his argument is also to show why acting morally isn't an intrinsic good. 

Argument 1:  What Justice Is and Where it Comes From
Justice is the result of a compromise against having to suffer injustice and the benefits of being able to act unjustly.  Consider a pre-legal group of individuals living in the same area;  i.e., people in the "state of nature."  If there are no laws and you are stronger than others you can take and do what you want. This is good (for you).  However, in such a state you're also vulnerable to people or groups of people doing the same to you...which would really suck.  Justice is a way of reconciling this situation: in order to protect themselves from being at the receiving end of unjust acts, people enter into a contract of laws.

The down side is people no longer get to take and harm whomever they want whenever they want.  In short, people enter into a society of laws, not because they think justice is intrinsically good, but because they don't want to be at the receiving end of injustice.  What most people actually desire is be able to do whatever they want.  If you suspended all laws, this is exactly how people would behave.  In short, this proves that people don't act justly because they see it as some intrinsic good, rather, they do it for other reason. They do it as a means to avoid harm done by others:  just behavior is an instrumental good.  Boom! Goes the dynamite. 

Issue:  Is Glaucon correct that people only enter into social contracts to avoid harm?

Issue:  Is Glaucon giving a purely descriptive account of people's behavior or is he putting forward a meta-ethical position?  What might his meta-ethical position be?

Issue:  Glaucon implies that the law is a perversion of our natural desires: it is the middle road between what is good (acting on our natural desires without consequence) and what is bad (suffering injustice without being able to avenge one's self).  This implies that the true good life would be act on our natural desires without their being impinged upon.  Is he right?


The Ring Thought Experiment
Glaucon then proposes a thought experiment that has an eerie resemblance to Lord of the Rings (plagiarism alert!). Suppose someone we considered to be just found a ring that could make herself invisible.  It's inconceivable that this person wouldn't take advantage of this in someway to advance her position in a way that she wouldn't without the ring.  Eg.  eavesdropping on conversations, stealing expensive things, free friends and family from prison (I'd love to get my family out of prison), etc... Even if she didn't advance her own position, maybe she'd do things to help her loved ones (that she couldn't do otherwise).  This again goes to show that we don't value justice in itself because given the chance to do injustice, we will do it.  Given the opportunity, we will act according to what benefits us and/or our loved ones.

But what if the honest person with the ring didn't take advantage of the rings powers to benefit themselves or loved-ones?  If we found out, we might publicly praise them as to preserve our public image as just individuals, however in private we'd say this person is a fool!

Issue:  Is the fact that everyone else might think this person a fool an argument against the intrinsic value of acting morally?  

Issue: “We would catch the just man red-handed going the same way as the unjust man out of a desire to get the better [...]."  Is this true?

Uber-Just Man vs Uber-Unjust Man
If being just has value in itself, then that value should be visible to even the unjust.  But consider the following:  there a person who only does things for justice-sake.  He doesn't care about the reputation or praise he acquires for his acts.  In fact, lets suppose that he gets none of these benefits.  Not only that but the just man is perceived to be the exact opposite!  For every just act, he gets accused of being unjust and is punished accordingly.  Yet, he continues to act this way.  In other words, lets strip away from acting justly all the instrumental goods and see if there is any good left over.  If there is, then Socrates might have a case.  If not, then he doesn't.

On the other hand, consider the most unjust man of diabolical cleverness.  He does everything for personal gain no matter what the consequences to others.  No only that, but because he is so clever, he is perceived to be and praised as just!  This is true injustice!  He can harm his enemies, help his friends, he wins all contests.  He has power, wealth, and reputation to bring about or rectify whatever he wants.  If he gets caught or is accused of injustice he can uses his resources to coerce or persuade his detractors.  In short, this person gets all the instrumental goods associated with being perceived to be just but doesn't get any of the yet-to-be established intrinsic goods for actually being just.  

Lets consider how we might perceive the life of each.  The just man lives and dies despised by all because they all perceive him as unjust.  The maximally unjust man lives a life of happiness and is perceived to be honorable and just by all.  He has wealth, friends, power, status, and his own realty tv show.  Who would you say had the better life?  If justice is an intrinsic good then we must answer it was the just man.  But this is contrary to what most consider to be a good life.

Issue:  What is the measure of a good life?  Glaucon seems to imply it is measured by happiness.  Is he right?  

Issue: Is Glaucon right that a good life being able to do whatever you please while maintaining reputation for being just?

Issue:  Could any good come out of the uber just man's life?

Issue:  Glaucon's initial line of argument was to show that there in no intrinsic good in being just.  To illustrate his point he compares the life of the uber just and uber unjust man in terms of happiness.  Is this an effective line of argument?

If that doesn't convince you that justice is merely an instrumental good, then Adeimantus has a different argument...

Justice Vs Appearance of Justice
When we teach our children to be moral why do we do it?  Is it simply because we want for them to be just; full stop?  Or is it because we want our children to have the things that perceived just behavior attracts such as respect and a good reputation?  It seems like it's the latter.

Issue:  Is this why we teach our children to be moral?  Is it so they can function in society or is it because we believe there is some intrinsic good that comes out of being just apart from the desirable social consequences?

Reward and Punishment
Also, consider another reason for which parents implore their children to be just.  If they aren't just, they are told they will be punished in the afterlife but if they are just they will be rewarded.  Again, this is not an argument for the intrinsic good of being just, but one more example of why acting morally is an instrumental good.  If you act morally YOU will be rewarded, if not YOU will be punished.  As one of my favorite professors (Dr. G. Brown) called it, this is "'lolly-pop' morality."  If you're good, you get a lolly pop.  If you're bad, you get punished.  This has everything to do with personal interest and nothing to do with intrinsic good.

Justice is Difficult and Unprofitable and Injustice is Sweet, Easy, and Shameful only by Opinion and Law
Acting unjustly is sweet and easy.  Also, many unjust people are happy and looked up to (often because of their gains--not from the gym, tho).  On the other hand, justice is difficult and often runs counter to personal interest.  To make matters worse, those that live justly and in poverty are often looked down on while those who got rich off of unjust actions are looked up to (see: contemporary American culture).

The Unjust Can Escape Divine Justice
God/gods can be bought off or can grant forgiveness (often hand in hand).  The rich man with his ill-gotten gains can make a sizable donation to whatever religious organization he belongs to and be forgiven.  Or after a lifetime of ill-gotten gains and immoral behavior, he can ask for forgiveness.  God/gods can be persuaded. Instead of struggling through life, why not live the fun life then pay off the gods/ask for forgiveness at the end?

The very gods can be moved by prayer too.
With sacrifices and gentle vows and
The odor of burnt and drink offerings,
human beings turn them aside with
their prayers,
When someone has transgressed and
made a mistake
--Homer

All the sources we have to know about God/gods tell us this is true.  The evil can be forgiven on their death bed even.  

The Seeming Overpowers the Truth
Given the difficulty and lack of any guarantee of happiness or reward for being good and all the benefits that come with being perceived as just, why would anyone choose to be just?  What value is there?  It seems clear:  it makes way more sense to seem just than to be just.  This way you get all the instrumental benefits and none of the self-sacrifice.

Sure, it's not always easy to get away with things, but this is why you need to cultivate your skills of persuasion (i.e., take phil 102) and organize into secret societies to impose force and coerce when necessary.

Issue:  Is it true that "Seeming just is what leads to a happy life, there is no intrinsic value in being just" and “the seeming overpowers even the truth.”

But what about God/gods?  If there are none or they don't care about human affairs, then it makes no difference.  If there are God(s), the books through which we know them tell us they can be "persuaded and perverted by sacrifices, soothing vows, and votive offerings".

Sympathy for the Wicked
If someone can show these arguments to be false and has an argument for why we should be just (rather than appear to be just), he must have great sympathy for those who do injustice.  The arguments in favor of seeming to be just are very compelling and so it should be understandable to someone who comprehends them, yet opposes them, why people adhere to them.

Haters Gonna Hate
Also, it seems that the only reason people are willingly just is because they lack the power, courage, or strength to act as they truly would if they could.  (See:  Nietzsche) 

Why Be Moral?
Can you think of any reasons for being just other than the instrumental benefits?  What good does the unjust man who appears just miss out on that just man who appears unjust gains?  And even if we can show some good that the just man gains, does it outweigh all the instrumental goods the clever unjust man gains?

Boom! Goes the Dynamite.

Issue: Is this true? "In all history there is not one who praised justice for something other than its consequences: reputation, honors, and gifts that come from it."

Intro to Meta-Ethics

Introduction
Welcome to one of my favorite topics:  meta-ethics.  Rather than describe what meta-ethics is, it might be easier understood by listing some of the questions it tries to answer:

(a)  What does it mean for something to be morally "good" or what is it that makes something "good" or "bad"?
(b)  What does it mean for something to be morally "right" or what is it that makes something "right" or "wrong"?
(c)  Are there objective moral facts or are they subjective?
(d)  How can we know if a moral statement is true or false?  What constitutes evidence for truth in morality?
(e)  Are there objective moral values?  What are they?  How can we know?  What sorts of things count as evidence?

There are 3 major meta-ethical views:  (1) Error theory/moral skepticism, (2)  Moral Realism, (3) Emotivism/Non-cognitivism.   Lets take a (very) quick look at each in turn.

Error theory/Moral Skepticism:  This is the idea that (a) there are no objective moral values, however, (b) when people make moral statements (e.g., "doing x is morally right/wrong") they think they are making statements about what is objectively true.  Unfortunately, since there is no real objective moral truth, these people are making errors...hence, error theory.

Most moral skeptics say that moral values are socially constructed and their existence is best explained by considering the culture and ways of life of a particular community.  Moral skepticism doesn't necessarily entail that it's ok to rape and pillage at will.  Moral skeptics can be deeply committed to certain moral values.  The key point is only that they don't believe the moral values are an objective feature/property of the universe.

Moral Realism:  Moral realism is the view the (a)  there are objective moral values and facts that are a feature of the universe and (b) moral assertions can be objectively true or false and are objective statements about what one should or should not do.

Noncognitivism/Emotivism:  Emotivists say that (a) there are no objective moral values or facts in the universe and (b) moral assertions aren't meant to be assertions about what's true.  Moral assertion can be distilled to emotional expressions of personal assent or dissent for an act.  This is sometimes known as the "hooray-boo" theory.  When someone says "you shouldn't lie", what they really mean is "Lying, Boo!".  Or if someone says "you should help old ladies across the street" they really just mean "helping old ladies across the street, Hooray!".

Random Notes On Moral Reasons (Parfit)

Ok, it's term paper season.  This means my posts will become infrequent and the posts that I do make will be mostly me trying to figure stuff out for papers.  Without further ado, lets get into my ramblings on Parfit's notion of normative reasons.


Background on Parfit's Normative Reasons


In contemporary meta-ethics people talk about "reasons for action" as normative concepts.  Don't be scurd by the fancy words.  Normative just means "to do with values" or "what is correct or incorrect".  Examples of normative words are things like: good, bad, beautiful, virtuous, wrong, etc... So, for a lot of moral philosophers reasons for action can be normative.  It may sound like common sense that there can be "good" or "bad" reasons for action but that's philosophy for you.


Now, here comes the tricky part (who needs the Quickee Mart?).  Some philosophers say that normative reasons by definition motivate action.  This is the idea that if (a sane person) become aware of a good (in the moral sense) reason for action then just the mere fact that the person recognizes this as a good reason is sufficient to motivate them to act that way.  Otherwise stated, knowing that something is good should move us to act in accordance with it.


For example, I see an old lady about to cross the street and it comes to my mind that me helping her would be the right thing to do because it would make her day better.  The mere fact that I recognize that making her day better is a right reason to act, I will also feel some sort of motivation to act.


Parfit disagrees.  He says that it is possible to recognize something as being a good reason for action and still not be motivated to do it.  It is true, he says, that certain facts (e.g. old ladies are better off when they are helped across the street) can give us reasons for acting and if we are rational they will motivate us to act for these reasons.  However, this does not imply that something being a good reason necessarily "consists in actual or possible motivating force".


This to me sounds strange.  It's like he wants to have his cake and eat it too.  Let me break it down this way:  First he says that reason are a subspecies of facts.  Well not really, but that's how I'm going to read it.  He says "if we are aware of facts that give us certain reasons for action..." What is the difference between a fact and a reason for action?  How do we distinguish the two?  Is the distinction that a reason is a type of fact (i.e. one that we are aware of) that if we are rational it motivates us to act?  But the very next line he tells us that something being a good reason does not necessarily consist in actual or possible motivating force.


Or does he?  He actually says that just because reasons can motivate rational people to act doesn't imply  that normativity in part consists in actual or possible motivation.  Does this mean that reasons motivate but their normative status (if they're good or bad) has no bearing on our motivation?  That doesn't seem right.  And how do I distinguish a good reason from a bad reason?  It seems Parfit wants to say that it's got something to do with rationality.  But suppose what would be a rational reason for me isn't a rational reason for you.  For real world examples of people differing on what a rational reason is all you have to do is observe political debates.  Er'body thinks their reasons for policies are the rational reasons.  What the crap?


Anyway, I hope I can sort some of this shit out.  If you have any suggestion, I'll all ears...

The Arguments from Queerness and Relativity (Mackie Part 2)

Other Mackie Articles
Mackie on Subjectivity vs Objectivity
Mackie Intro and Second vs First Order Ethics 

Overview
Do objective moral values or principles exist?  Or are we dancer?  When someone says, "it's wrong to do x" or "you ought not to do x" it seems as though they are referring to something objective about or in the act.  That is, we are referring to some real quality or property in the act.  Mackie says this is a quirk of language and that moral properties and values don't exist in any real sense (i.e., the way we use language makes it seem like we are referring to something but actually we aren't).   He gives two arguments for his position: the argument from relativity and the argument from queerness.

Argument from Relativity
This argument is fairly straight forward:
P1. It's an empirical fact (that's science!) that many cultures around the world both historically--and now--have very different moral concepts, many of them in genuine opposition to each other.

[P1*  However, disagreement alone isn't enough to prove there are no objective moral values, so I'll offer a further argument.]

P2.  (Argument from Arrow of causation and constructivist account of morality) One way to explain the difference in moral judgments is that a culture's moral values arise out of how they live their lives.  The ways of living comes first, the moral judgments come after, not the other way around. For example, if a culture finds polygamy morally acceptable, it's because that's how they live.  A community doesn't first decide what types of marriage are appropriate, then modify its behavior.  If we accept this interpretation, then moral values aren't objective; instead they are a consequence of social structures. 

P3.  The moral realist has another way to explain moral differences which is to assume that there are objective moral facts.  The difference between moral values in cultures/moments in history arises because some cultures are (somehow) more aware of the true moral values than others.  Some cultures just have better perception of moral qualities than do others.

P4.  (Abductive Argument) However, if moral values are objective, giving an account of how entire cultures can fail to perceive them is not going to be easy (or plausible).  Instead we should adopt the constructivist explanation: i.e., we construct our values based on the normal behaviours and arrangements in our particular culture--rather than there being objective moral values that people somehow (mis)perceive.

Conclusion:  Because the constructivist account is a more plausible explanation for the wide variety of often conflicting moral positions we observe, we should say that there are no objective moral values.

Possible Objection 1: Moral Reformers Exist 
Moral judgments aren't merely a matter of conforming to a social standard. There are cases of moral change and reform throughout history. For example, the abolition of slavery, the civil rights act, advance of women's and, recently, gay etc...

Reply 1: Move Toward Consistency
There's aren't changes in the moral code, rather, they are moves toward consistency in the moral code. For example, the moral argument for the abolition of slavery was that slavery was inconsistent with the pre-existing ideals of all people being born free and equal before the law. 

Possible Objection 2: Instances of Universal Principles
The specific rules vary across cultures however they are instances of a more general universal rules. E.g., do whatever will bring about the greatest amount of good. So, of course what brings about the greatest amount of good will vary across different living circumstances. But this doesn't undermine the fact that the general rule is universally true. And so, morality does have objectively true principles.

Mackie's Reply: It's Only a Partial Counter
Accepting the above line of argument means that the specific laws are only derivatively and contingently objectively true. That is, their objectivity relies on their being instances of universal laws. Since the specific laws are dependent on local circumstances that means that if the local circumstances change, the objective truth of the specific laws will change. But this doesn't reflect what people think about their local moral rules. They think that their specific rules are objectively true and not merely derivative of universal rules or contingent on circumstance. 

For example, in some cultures they believe it's wrong to eat pork. They don't think this is wrong because it's an instance or derivation of a more general universal rule. They just think it's wrong to eat pork "period". Also, they don't think that if circumstances changed, it would be OK to eat pork. In other words, the specific rather than a general rule is considered to be objectively true. And it's objective truth isn't derivative of a more general rule, nor is it contingent on circumstance. 

Argument from Queerness
This argument has two parts, one metaphysical (to do with the nature of something's existence) and one epistemological (how we come to know something).

Metaphysical Argument: Suppose there were objective moral values: real qualities that were part of the world--in short, they exist.  What would they be made of?  Do they inhere in matter?  Can I taste them?  Touch them?  What colour are they?  How is it that we can sense them but not explain their properties?  It seems they would be queer entities or properties indeed! (Not that there's anything wrong with that--some of my best friends have queer properties).  

Epistemological Argument: Setting the metaphysical issue aside and continuing with our supposition, by what faculty might we come to know these queer qualities?  If I can't see, touch, taste, smell, or hear them, by what sense faculty do I come to know them?

It seems any theory that says moral values are objective must give us some sort of account of how it is we come to know them.  And to reply that ethical thinking occurs simply by sitting down and having an 'intuition' turns ethical thought into a travesty of a mockery of a sham.  What about application of reason?  conceptual analysis?  deliberation? 

The only possible good defense to this argument a realist can offer is to somehow show that these supposed moral qualities/properties can be known empirically.  

So, what might these real moral properties be like? According to Mackie, they'd have to be something like Plato's Forms.  A quick and dirty explanation of Plato's forms is that they are the perfect abstract notion of all qualities and things.  Well, not only are they abstract notions but they actually exist somewhere, in some sense.   Consider the Form of the Good.  This is the ideal goodness to which we all ought to strive; and although it is an ideal, it also somehow exists.  In what way do ideals objectively exist? 

The Problem of Motivating Force (Another metaphysical argument)
Anyhow, Mackie's argument isn't specific to Plato's forms. He argues that any moral realist position would be susceptible to the following argument:  According to Mackie, for a moral realist the properties of the "goodness" or "badness" of an act must not only be sensible but must also motivate action. 

For example, recognizing an act as "good" is not simply a matter of perceiving that property in something and thinking, "huh, that thing has 'goodness' in it--cool," it also necessarily provides the knower with a direction and motive for action.   So, when we recognize something as good, it should also incite us to action.  That is, knowing something is good should also motive us to pursue it.  And the same will apply for all moral values (if we perceive the property of 'badness' in something, it must also motivate us to avoid it).This meta-ethical position is called "existence internalism" (not to be confused with and not related to internalism in epistemology).  

But why should the realist accept this condition imposed by Mackie?  Why can't the realist say that it is possible to recognize 'goodness' in something and not have it motivate action?  I suppose the realist could do that, but then the realist has to give up the claim that moral values/properties of an situation or act do motivate action toward the good, which is a move they probably don't want to make.  It relegates moral properties to the same status as 'red' and 'heavy'.

More Queerness... 
In a particular action/situation, what would be the relationship between an objective moral quality and the act's/situation's natural features?  

Take the example of an act of cruelty.  Why do cruel acts also have the property of 'wrongness'?  The typical answer is that the act's wrongness is a consequence of its cruelness: it is wrong because it's cruel.  But the realist can't use this explanation because their argument is that moral values are in the act as natural properties, so appealing to a causal relation (x is wrong because it's cruel)  is off limits. Cruelness and wrongness have to exist independently of one another.

Furthermore, how do we rule out that judging a particular cruel act as wrong isn't simply a consequence of our culture?  There is a wide range of cultural opinions on what constitutes, for example, 'wrongness' in regards to treatment of animals.  Isn't an account of differing cultural values a better explanation for the diversity of views (rather than some groups' moral faculty being more accurate than others')?

The realist might reply the wrongness supervenes on the cruelty of an action; that is, the property of wrongness is a property that comes about wherever there is the property of cruelty.   But how do we explain the notion of properties having properties?  It seems a little...mmmm...queer!  Is it not a more likely account that our application of the term 'wrong' to cruel acts is a consequence of our subjective response to cruel acts--not that we are perceiving some additional natural property in the act.

The realist's position in regards to supervenience of properties is actually quite defensible. In contemporary philosophy (especially of mind) the notion of supervening properties is almost unanimously accepted.  For example, the property of consciousness supervenes on the physical properties of the brain.  This notion can plausibly be extended to acts.

So, there you have it, the arguments from relativity and from queerness, both against moral realism.  Whaduyuthink?  Are you ready to give up the chimera of objective moral qualities?  I should add that giving up objective moral values doesn't mean giving up morality, just objective morality.

Want to Discover Moral Truth? Part 3 How to Be a Moral Realist by Richard Boyd

Holy Crap! It's 4:10am and I'm going to start this now?  Am I insane?  Yup.  Actually, I have to do a presentation on this articles in 2 days so I'm forcing myself to get through the entire article tonight so tomorrow I can pick and choose the parts I'll use for my presentation.


I should add, as I've mentioned before, I am extremely grateful to those of you who take the time to read my blog.  I know that some of this stuff may not be the most exciting content.  But how can I be expected to compete with cute lol catz?  But seriously, knowing there is a small, yet, loyal audience inspires me to learn and write more and betterly...and be further indoctrinated by those "snobish professors with a liberal agenda".  So, thank you.


Notes and Thoughts on "How to Be a Moral Realist" by Richard Boyd


Recap


Read Parts 1 and 2.


Two Epistemological Challenges to Moral Realism


Both of these challenges fall out of the claim that moral realism is conflating our construction of moral value with its discovery.  Lets flesh this out a bit.  Recall back in part 1 when we were talking about realist epistemology, there was this idea that there is a positive feedback loop between our moral intuitions and our moral reasoning...


This idea comes from the close analogy Boyd proposes between how we acquire scientific knowledge and how we acquire moral knowledge.  The basic idea is that improvements in theory will improve our methods of inference, and those improved methods of inference will improve our theories.  Note that methods of inference can include both explicit (like deduction and statistical methods) and implicit methods (like the the types of intuitions a good scientist develops with experience and deep theoretical knowledge).


Two important issues arise when we apply this model to moral thinking.  First of all, the positive dialectic between method and theory only works if we've started with an approximately good (i.e., true) theory and method, although with some failings. The second issue is to give a plausible account of what the moral analogue to scientific observation will be.  Scientists have lab coats, test tubes, and bunsen burners; that shit's 'fficial and objective.  What does moral observation gots?


Observation


Lets deal with observation first.  Boyd's answer to moral realism's analogue to scientific observation is: "observation".  Wut you talkin' 'bout Boyiiiiiiiiiiiiiiid?  You try'na get crazy with us ese?


Ok, lets give him a chance.  He reasons that since goodness is a natural property then, just like any other natural property, observation is how we'z gonna come to know 'bout it.  Consider the properties studied by psychologists, historians, sociologists and such.  The properties these fields study are non-physical yet are all studied empirically.  Some of these types of observations will involve introspection, some will involve observation of oneself.  And some will require trained observation by experts (read: snobbish liberal indoctrinators).  Ahh, I really can't let that Santorum remark go.  I should.  But it's difficult.  Sooo difficult.


Of course our moral observations will be influenced by the moral framework within which we see the world, but this is no objection since all sciences--hard or soft--operate the same way.  Baaaaat there is a difference!  Our scientific theories are constrained by the hard facts of reality to make them approximately true.  I can believe that mind can overcome matter all I want but reality will constrain this theory when I try to walk through a wall.  Which brings us to the next challenge moral realism has to overcome--that reality will constrain its theories sufficiently to make them approximately true.


Approximate Truth of the Starting Point


The quextion we need to answer is whether we are correct to suppose that "we have had background moral beliefs sufficiently near the truth that they could form the basis for subsequent improvement of moral knowledge in the light of further experience and further historical development".  Otherwise stated: Is what we know about human goods and the mechanisms by which we realize them sufficient to act as a guide to gradual progress and expansion of these goods?


Boyd thinks that the answer is yes.  We do know enough about human goods, mechanisms of their fulfillment, and observation for there to be gradual progressive development of moral theory through reflective equilibrium.


My non-skeptic, non-philosopher self agrees with him if we limit the claim to certain cultures.  But that tom-foolery aside, I don't think this argument does anything to temper my intuition that moral progress is not so much a matter of discovering natural properties but of our after-the-fact ascription of moral notions to things that agree with us and/or become cultural norms.


But enough about me, lets talk about Boyd.  For Boyd, once we grant that indeed we do know enough about human goods and mechanisms for their augmentation that there can be a positive feedback loop, then "we may now treat moral intuitions exactly on par with scientific intuitions".  He acknowledges that moral intuitions needn't have a foundational role in moral understanding nor be a substitute for observation.  However, just as good scientists develop legitimate intuitions that are embedded in fruitful theories, we can say the same of moral intuitions: if they are embedded in "approximately true" moral theories, they are a legitimate means of acquiring knowledge.


Ok, even though I put that above quote in italics, it's still a bold statement.  I think it's a bit of stretch to say the two kinds of intuition are on par.  Given the constraints on scientific inferences are much greater than those on moral inferences and I don't think the methodologies come close in level or objective rigour.  Also, the mechanisms by which moral observations can be distorted are much more difficult to control for than for scientific observation (hard sciences, anyway).  


Boyd will probably counter that that isn't the point.  All he needs to get moral realism going is that we accept that our moral theory is approximately true enough for there to be reflective equilibrium.  I don't have a clear argument for why I disagree, probably cuz it's 530 in the morning, but something's gone awry with his reasoning.  For now I'm just going to say that I refudiate his conclusion.  I don't think moral intuitions are on par with scientific intuitions because they are respectively constrained to different degrees.


The God Objection


Another possible argument against the naturalist moral realist is that for most of human history people have believed that some sort of supernatural entity grounded moral law.  If moral values are natural properties, then, most people been (and continue to be) wrong about the source of morality.  This is contradicts what the realist just said, that our moral theory is currently at a place where it is approximately true.


Boyd replies that, while they were wrong about the source of morality, this did not prevent them from making correct moral judgments about fundamental human goods.  The judgments about fundamental human goods were correct enough for their moral theory to be approximately true, and allow for progressive reflective development.


He draws an analogy to biology.  Pre-darwinian biologists (and unfortunately, many present-day Americans) attributed all order and organization of life to sweet baby jesus.  But the fact that they mis-attributed the source of the order did not prevent them from developing important knowledge in biology.  What's important is they got enough of it right to allow for progressive reflective development to get started.


Note: I never managed to finish this last night, so, picking up from last night....


Moral Knowledge Is Easier to Explain than Scientific Knowledge


I'm just gonna warn you right now, shit's about to get loco up in herr.  So, check it aus.  In the 17th Century, modern chemistry was born but it was based on the incorrect idea that all matter was made of corpuscules. It a lot of ways it was kind of a lucky guess but the idea that all matter had micro-structure, despite getting the details wrong, was sufficient to get modern chemistry off the ground.  But how did they arrive at this idea?  In many ways it a lucky guess.  It was more or less accidental.  It was not a belief that was produced by particularly reliable mechanisms of belief production.


Now, this here's going to blow your mind.  The mechanisms by which we have come to our homeostatic-cluster-o'-human-goods idea are much more reliable than the ones that produced the ideas of corpuscular theory.  Recall that our beliefs about what constitute the homeostatic cluster o' human goods is arrived at through our understanding of human needs.  Who better to understand human needs (our own and of others) than humans?  It is entirely plausible that the evolutionary and psychological mechanisms for understanding these needs is reliable where as the we know that the belief producing mechanism for early chemistry were not.  Boyd summarizes that it is "easier, not harder, to explain how moral knowledge is possible than it is to explain how scientific knowledge [is possible]".


Wrap your big head around that!  Again, I think there's something to his idea that the belief producing mechanisms for beliefs about human goods is more reliable than they are for science.  However, there is a prollem.  Suppose he's right.  It's going to be hard to account for the fact that in just under 400 years of modern science and only a teeny tiny fraction of the population working as scientists, scientific knowledge has exploded and progressed; whereas, after 2300 years (if we use Ancient Greek philosophy as a starting point) and the entire population thinking about morality, we haven't made close to the amount of progress we see in science.  If I could make that sentence shorter I would. Sorry.


How do we explain non-western cultures that have been around for 1000s of years that still mutilate women's genitals  and treat them as barely better than livestock?  Where is the progress we should see if we are starting on even better footing than science did?


Semantics


What are the big bugaboos for moral realism?  (1) How to explain the wide variation in moral concepts between cultures, individuals, and groups which is purportedly best explained by a constructivist framework; (2) how to explain the wacky idea that moral terms refer to properties that can be explained in the language of natural science.


How can the moral realist meet these 2 challenges?  the general approach will be to shew that moral terms are naturalistic but not reducible to specific natural definitions.  This is the whole concept of homeostatic definitions.  For this line of response to work the moral realist needs to further shew that (A) there are good reasons to see moral definitions as grounded in natural phenomena rather than being stipulative; (B)  there are good reasons to think that our every day use of moral terms reference real moral properties; that is, our use of moral terms like 'good' are constrained by reality.


Ok, Mr. moral realist, convince me of (A).  I don't fancy Boyd's reason for (A) to be too convincing.  He offers a couple of arguments.  The first sounds a little like fancy footwork.  He says that it is the homeostatic cluster-o'-properties nature of moral terms that explains why there is variation.


That is, some people's conception of the good might have a little more concern for a particular set of human needs, while others might give a little more preference to another set.  Think of the 'cozy' example.  One house might be have a nice warm fire place and the other some quaint wood furniture covered in large fluffy pillows.  That the two houses aren't identical is no reason not to call them both cozy.  The same applies to 'good', that's why we can have different conceptions of it.


As I've said elsewhere, a constructivist story also explains varying uses of the same moral terms.  So far, Boyd hasn't given me a compelling reason to pick the realist story, unless that's the position I already started with.  Lets check out his next argument.


His second argument is that the progressively changing nature of our conception of the good, in light of new evidence about human needs and potential, is best explained by moral realism.  The idea is as we discover more about human needs we are discovering more about the property of 'goodness'.


But, again, I don't see why we should prefer this to a constructivist account.  It seems equally likely that after discovering new human needs we later come to describe their fulfillment as good.  But this happens after the fact.  We aren't discovering an aspect of something that was heretofore hidden from us.  Think of the expansion of suffrage to women.  After observing that it is a human need to have equal gender participation in the political process were we discovering an already existant aspect of goodness?  Or did we merely expand our notion of good to include women's suffrage because we observed it fulfilled a human need?


Ok, I'm just going to admit right here that I've kind of lost my line of thought and may have gone off track in terms of structuring this entry, so bare with me as I try to get it back on track...


I think I'm supposed to talk about bugaboo #(2), that moral terms refer to properties that can be explained in the language of natural science.  To support this Boyd has to appeal to (B) and shew that our use of moral terms is constrained by objective reality.  In other words, I can't just use the word 'good' to refer to anything (if I want its use to be intelligible).


I'm going to agree that it would be unintelligible for me to use the term 'good' to describe murder of innocents but does it necessarily follow that this is because the word's usage is constrained by reference to natural properties?  Maybe.  But might it not also be just as likely that we can explain away this constraint by appeal to convention?  Isn't it just the convention of a language community that constrains how I use words?  I don't see why we should accept one explanation over the other.


Hard Cases and Divergent Views
Supposing that moral realism is true, there are two other objections they have to handle: hard cases and divergent view.  'Hard cases' refers to hollow reinforced objects used to transport other objects.  Another definition is that hard cases are moral dilemmas for which there is no obvious solution, even between people who share a moral culture.  The difficulty is magnified when we consider how people of different moral cultures would approach a hard case.
The non-realist can avoid this difficulty because they are making no claims about objective moral values.  But of course, this is not true of the realist.  


What's a realist to do?  Well, clever Boyd has already laid the groundwork for an esplanation.   Recall his homeostatic property-cluster definitions.  Recall also that due to their homeostatic nature they are not always bivalent (that is, they are not always, necessarily either true or false).  


It's kind of like the notion of species.  At what point do we say a particular group of a species has evolved to the point that we should call them a new species?  There's no clear line.  Of instances on the extreme ends of the spectrum between two species that share the same genus we can say of a specimen whether it is or isn't a member of one of the species.  But a specimen somewhere in the midway point of evolving from into another species, there's no true of false answer to the question.  


Ok, I can dig that the whole homeostatic property-cluster non-bivalence thing.  Most social sciences have such terms and biology does too.  The next confounding factor for why there can be diverging moral views--even though there are real moral values--is that class interests and other cultural factors can distort analysis.  


Now things are starting to sound just a little too convient for the moral realist.  His problem is to account for how there can be such divergent views on moral good.   He's so far given us one account, which is that 'good' isn't always true of false of something.  Now he's saying that also, analysis of these differences can be clouded by social distortion and bias.  Next he says that another confounding factor is that moral issue are incredibly complex and controversial.  


All of what he is saying is true but here's my problem with it: how can we distinguish between a legitimate case where, on a moral judgment, one group "gets it right" (and the other wrong), and a case where the disagreement is only apparent because of all the confounding factors?  Especially if both groups have moral frameworks that are approximately true enough were recursive progress occurs.
I don't see how this can be done (unless we presuppose a prior objective standard).  Not so say this proves realism is false, but I think it tilts plausibility in favour of constructionists.

An interesting tangential suggestion Boyd makes is that most moral disagreements could be resolved if there were total agreement on non-moral facts.  For instance, if there were unanimous agreement on exactly what human needs ought to be satisfied to what respective degrees, moral realism predicts most moral disagreements would dissipate.  That koo.  But, assuming rational actors that are concerned about morality, I don't see why this doesn't preclude a constructivist interpretation. 


Well, tangents aside, does Boyd succeed in giving a realist account of moral disagreement and hard cases?  I think he give a decent defense but I'm not convinced he's made a convincing positive case. 


Morality, Motivation, and Rationality


The final objection typically aimed at moral realism is that it does not give a good account of (what people think should be) a logical connection between moral judgments and reason for action.   Otherwise stated, if we come to judge/know that something is morally good then this should necessarily provide a reason to act in accordance with that judgment.  Facts on their own, especially natural facts, don't provide this logical connection to rational choice or reasons for action.  The argument concludes that since natural facts can't motivate action, they must not exist.  So, moral realism is false.  


In all honesty I think this is a crap argument against realism but lets look at it for fun...yay!  The moral realist can simply deny that knowledge of moral facts necessitates it motivating action.  People can come to know what is morally right, yet not have that knowledge motivate them to act.  I think people like this exist.  I don't think there has to be a necessary link between moral knowledge and motive for action.  Some people be wack.

That's possible.  Know what else it possible?  I'll tell you....that psychologically normal humans will act in accordance with what they believe to be morally good.  It's not the facts that do the motivating, it's just part of our psychology because the homeostatic definition of 'good' is tied to human needs.  Because we, as fellow humans, can understand and thus sympathize with the needs of others, we will tend to act in such a way that will anticipate correctly the probable effect of our actions on others.  I can dig that.  


Conversely, if we say that it is moral facts that must motivate, then in cases where people don't act in a way we'd expect, we have to say that they just didn't perceive the right moral facts.  That doesn't sound right.  We do have clear examples of people do who know intellectually what the correct moral facts are, yet don't act in accordance with them.  So, I'm with the realists on this one. 


It is the psychological capacity for sympathy and compassion that motivate action, not moral facts.  People who don't have these psychological capacities are not motivated by moral facts.  This is actually in line with modern psychology and neuroscience.  It is not logic that motives us to moral action but our psychology.  


Got damn! That was a long article.  Of course the article I'm doing my presentation on just happens to be the longest we've done in class so far...Anyway, you win 10 internets if you read all 3 and made it to the end.