Berkeley: The Argument for Idealism and the Argument Against Skepticism

Introduction and Context:  Locke and Primary and Secondary Properties
To really understand Berkeley's arguments, you have to understand what issues and positions he was responding to. Descartes left us with a problem:  Since we can never "get out of our own heads," how do we know that our ideas and perceptions of the external world of objects resemble what those external objects that cause our perceptions are actually like.   Locke calls our inability to directly perceive the external world the problem of the veil of perception (we only have direct access to our perceptions, not the external objects that cause those perceptions).  This general model of perception is called representationalism.

We're going to take a quick look at Locke because Berkeley is in large part responding to Locke's solution to this problem.  Locke's solution has both a metaphysical component (having to do with the nature of reality) and an epistemological component (how we can know about that reality). Beginning with the metaphysical, it goes something like this (condensed from 500 pages):

Locke's Metaphysical Argument First of all, our perceptions have to be of something. Something has to cause them.  The most likely candidate is "stuff out there" in the world (he calls it "substance"). Substances have properties like color, shape, taste, smell, spacio-temporal location, solidity, etc...  These properties can be divided into 2 categories:  primary and secondary. We can look at these two types properties as inherent and dependent properties (from the metaphysical point of view). I'll elaborate all little more after this example:

Consider the properites of color, extension, and shape to illustrate the difference.  Color is a secondary property (i.e., dependent) because it depends for its existence on the primary properties.  That is, you cannot have color just randomly floating around in the air.  If must exist in something extended and with shape (not to mention spacio-temporal location).  This is one argument for the dependence of color.

The other is that color is actually the result of the object's surface properties.  The object's surface itself doesn't have a color.  When light (full spectrum) hits an object's surface, the particular shape (at the atomic level) of the object's surface (i.e., extension) absorbs some light wavelengths and reflects others.  The wavelengths that are reflected are the ones that enter our retina and initiate a causal chain terminating with our perception of a color "in the theatre of our mind."  Recall, however, that the lightwave frequency that enters our retina isn't itself colored, it merely has a wavelength that activates certain receptors (e.g., ones that cause "yellow") rather than others (e.g., ones that cause "red").

So, lets quickly recap the metaphysical argument.
(P1)  Something outside of us must be causing our perceptions.
(P2)  It's most likely external objects which are made of or are substances (Locke isn't clear here).
(P3)  The qualities like extension, shape, quantity, etc...are necessary for the object to exist as a physical entity.  Lets call them primary qualities.
(P4)  The qualities like color, texture, taste, and sound depend for their existence on the primary qualities.  Lets call them secondary qualities.
(P5)  It's not possible for a secondary property to exist on its own, whereas primary properties can. These names are a good description of the qualities.
(C)   Substances have 2 classes of properties: Primary and Secondary.

The external objects that cause our perceptions have primary and secondary properties. Primary properties are objective and will be perceived regardless the nature of a perceiver's perceptual system or point of view because they inhere in the objects.

Now, lets put on our epistemologist hats.

How can we know about the external world based on our perceptions of it since all we have access to are the ideas inside our heads?  (I.e., how can we know that the properties that an external object have "match up" with the image we have of it projected in our heads)

Recall that the primary qualities include extension, solidity, motion, quantity, spacio-temporal location, and shape. All external objects, when they are perceived, must have these properties in order to be perceived.  For instance, could you perceive an object that isn't extended? (i.e., that doesn't occupy space?)  Could you perceive an object that has no shape?  Locke says "no," and this is evidence of the fact that primary qualities are necessarily in the objects we perceive rather than simply in our pointy little heads.  

We can therefore know that our perceptions of external objects and those external objects themselves "match up" in terms of primary qualities.  It follows that, we can know stuff about the primary qualities of objects in the world as well as about the relations between those primary qualities in objects.

Secondary qualities are subjective: that is, the way each individual perceives them is a product of how our particular perceptual system works.  It might very well be that my purple is your red and vice versa.  There is no way to ever know.  For this reason, our perceptions of secondary qualities don't give us any information about how the "real" world is outside of our perceptions.

Ok, I think that should be (more than) enough to get us started...

Berkeley's Idealism and Its Motivations
Key Idea:  "[. . .] the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived."

We can summarize Berkeley's position like this:  The only thing we have direct access to with our minds is ideas (i.e., images, memories, perceptions).  This means that we can only know that 2 types of things are real and exist: ideas and the minds that perceive them.  Knowledge consists in the apprehension of the contents of our minds (ideas) and the regular relations between them.  Furthermore, the notion of "matter" or "material substance" is incoherent and therefore cannot exist.

Epistemological Motivation:
I'll get to it a bit later, but he further argues that we don't need to posit physical objects to explain how ideas get into our minds.  In fact, by not positing physical objects we completely avoid the epistemological problem of the veil of perception; i.e., trying to figure out if our perceptions of external objects match up with up with external objects themselves.  Also, we sidestep the veil of perception problem, we also avoid the problem of skepticism.

Metaphysical Motivation:
With idealism, we also avoid a metaphysical problem: supposing the there are only 2 types of things in the universe, matter and minds, how is it possible for these things to interact causally?  Consider the following:  matter has the properties of extension, shape, solidity, and most importantly a spacial location.   Minds on the other hand don't have any of these properties (extension, shape, solidity, nor do they exist in any spacial location), their only properties are ideas.  So how the crap can a physical object (i.e., matter) cause something to happen in a mind (which doesn't have any of the properties of matter)?  This problem is further exacerbated when we consider that matter can't have mental properties (ideas).

Destructive Arguments:  Why Positing Matter as the Cause of Ideas Is Incoherent
The first part of Berkeley's project is to show that the materialist conception of the world is incoherent.

Groundwork:  The Argument Against "Resemblance"
Before going directly after the materialist  conception  of the world (i.e., the position that there are physical substances), Berkeley lays down the groundwork with the following argument against the notion of resemblance between ideas and material objects:

Materialist say that our ideas of physical objects resemble the physical objects themselves.  For example, when I look at a cat, the idea (i.e., perception) which the actual cat causes me to have in my mind resembles the actual cat outside my mind.

Berkeley says this notion of resemblance is a mistake: the only thing that can resemble an idea is other idea.  Recall that ideas are something that minds have--physical objects can't have ideas.  That is, ideas have very different properties from physical things--ideas, unlike physical objects, don't have a spacial location, for example.  Because the properties possessed by physical things and the properties of ideas are so completely different, it is not possible for ideas to resemble physical things.

To repeat: the only thing that can resemble an idea is another idea.  From this it follows that extension can only resemble extension, solidity can only resemble solidity, color can only resemble color, and so on...  Ideas cannot resemble objects that have the properties of matter because ideas can only resemble ideas (and ideas don't have the properties of matter).

Collapse of Primary and Secondary Qualities Distinction
Recall that materialists (like Descartes and Locke) hold that not all properties have the same metaphysical and epistemological status.  Secondary properties only exist as a consequence of primary qualities.  Also secondary properties are a consequence of how our perceptual system works and are therefore subjective, while primary qualities are objective because we perceive shape, extension, quantity the same regardless of our perceptual system or point of view.

For example, you can't experience a circular object as triangular no matter how your perceptual system is configured because the circular shape inheres in the physical object whereas something like color isn't and is added by our minds.

Ok, so in this part of the argument (9-15 PHK) Berkeley wants to further show that the mere concept of a hierarchy of properties is incoherent:  All properties are metaphysically and epistemically equal.  And, contrary to the materialist hypothesis, all properties inhere in mind.

The argument goes something like this:  Try to imagine a physical object that possesses the "primary" properties of extension and motion.  Go ahead, do it.  Now, is it possible for you to do it without also imagining the object with some color, no matter how faint?  I don't know about you, but I can't do it.  Even if I just imagine the outline of a figure, that outline still has a color.

So, what does this mean?  What Berkeley does next is very clever.  He says, look youz guys (referring to materialists): You say that secondary properties only exist as ideas in the mind, but we have just shown that you cannot imagine a material object's primary qualities without its secondary properties (like color).  It follows that what you call primary (objective) properties require for their perception that there be secondary properties.  

The dependance relation between primary and secondary is mutual rather than only secondary depending on primary properties.  You cannot "abstract away" primary qualities from secondary qualities, both are required for perception of objects.  And since, as you say, "secondary" properties are mental, both primary and secondary properties must be mental because how could a physical property depend on for its existence a mental property?

Anti-Abstraction Argument
If that isn't clear, he gives another formulation of the argument which emphasizes the role of abstraction in Berkeley destruction of the primary/secondary distinction.   It goes like this:

The only way to conceive of the properties of pure extension or shape is to abstract them from a compound idea of an object (i.e. one with both primary and secondary qualities). Objects don't have "pure" extension or shape without color. We have to abstract those to properties out.  And when we engage in the act of abstraction, where do those "primary" qualities exist?  They exist only in the mind.  That is, since abstraction is a mental activity, pure extension and shape can exist only as ideas, and therefore those properties must be mental properties (i.e., ideas).

More Examples:
Quantity:  The materialists argue that quantity is an objective property of objects.  However, Berkeley argues it is clearly a subjective mental quality because something's quantity will depend on how we want to "chop it up."  For example, I might say my chair is 2ft high or 24" high or 60cm high.  The number I use to measure distance is totally subjective.

Likewise I might say there is one book, or 350 pages, or 345,660 words.  It's entirely up to me how I want to conceive an object of perception and what units I'd like to use to describe it.

The Master Argument for Idealism
In 22-23 (PHK), Berkeley gives what is called "the master argument" because he seems to think that even if you reject all the other arguments, this argument shows that the only place anything can exist is in the mind.  (And since anything that exists in the mind is an idea, the only things that exist are ideas and minds).  He begins: 

I am content to put the whole issue upon this issue; if you an but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the causes.

So what does all this mean?  Essentially, he is arguing that the only place anything can exist in is the mind as an idea. 

For example, can you imagine a color that is unperceived? Ah ha! No, you can't because in order to do so, you have to imagine it, and thereby perceive it in your mind.  Can you imagine an extended object that is unperceived?  Ah ha!  No you can't!  To do so requires that you imagine that object, thereby proving it exists in the mind, not "out there"!  It is impossible to think of a physical property or object that exists unperceived (outside the mind) because anytime you think do, ta da! you're perceiving it (as an idea).  

As Berkeley says, [you cannot conceive of anything existing outside the mind because doing so] only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy (i.e., absurdity).  

Implications of Idealism:  Minds and Ideas
If we agree with Berkeley's reasoning up to this point it seems we have to reject the notion of mind-independent objects.  What follows from this is that the only things that exist are minds (aka spirits, souls) and ideas (aka perceptions, conceptions, memories).  Minds are "active, indivisible substances" and ideas are "inert, fleeting, dependent beings."  Therefore, objects only exist as ideas in minds.  ([. . .] the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived.) 

We know that we exist through internal reflection and introspection; we can know other minds exist through reason.  (This will present problems as we will see in the next post on Russell and the problem of solipsism.)

Possible Objection and Reply
One possible objection to the view revolves around how we explain where ideas of external objects come from.  If there are no external physical objects, what are causing my perceptions?  Berkeley replies that we can call the things which we perceive via our senses "external" in terms of their origin, but they needn't be composed of matter.  They exist and come from other minds.  In particular, from God's mind. So, if I close my eyes, the object I was looking at doesn't cease to exist, but continues to exist in God's mind. 

Why Do People Pray? (Just to Make It Today?)

Random Thoughts On Prayer


I don't know why it popped into my head, but while I was making a snack I had this thought that prayer makes even less sense than I previously thought.  Maybe someone out there can explain things to me.


Lets suppose for a moment that there is indeed a god, and (lucky you) you magically picked the One True god to pray to (more than likely it's a consequence of geography-but I digress).  In most monotheistic religions the god is omniscient.  So, why should a theist pray to their god if their god already knows what they need/want?  Wouldn't the god be like "Dude, shut up! I already know!  Stop nagging me!  Oh, my God, won't you people shut up!  I ALREADY KNOW!!!!"


Is it because their god has some sort of pray-o-meter which determines whether the prayer is granted?  If so what are the units that a prayer-o-meter measures?  How many prayer units do you need before a prayer is granted?  Is the pray-o-meter sensitive to intensity of prayer or volume?  Do prayers have to come from various sources to move the pray-o-meter or can the same person pray for the same thing over and over again?


If someone's god is benevolent, and they're asking for something "good", like saving their mother from cancer, why should they need to ask?  Supposedly the god already knows what's going on, and that having someone's mother die from cancer is not a particularly good thing, why does the god need to be prompted by prayer to do anything?  Does a person really have to demonstrate to the god how badly they want their mother to live?  That would be kind of wack.


Of course not all prayers are about asking for things.  Maybe some people pray to tell their god how great he/she/it is.  But doesn't it already know?  It's true that it's pretty hard to get too many compliments--I love it when people tell me I'm awesome all day long, every day--but don't you think after several millennia it would get old and you'd just want some peace and quiet? 


Not that I understood prayer in the first place, but now that I think about it, it makes even less sense than I thought.  If anyone has any explanations (and "God acts in mysterious ways" is not an explanation) or hypotheses, I'm curious.


Thanks. 

The Vaccine Debate Part 1: The Legal Aspect of the Feb. 22 Ruling

Preamble  
    Because this blog post is likely to attract new readers to my blog, before I get into the meat of the debate I feel some preamble is in order.  Facebook is a wonderful thing.  It allows us to reconnect and stay in contact with friends to a degree that old skool letter writing simply wouldn't allow.  One interesting derivative of facebook is that we can learn how our own views differ from those of our friends and our friends' friends.  As we progress though life we tend to surround ourselves most closely with people who share our own point of view.  Facebook allows us to observe in real time how our views have changed or are diverging from past peer groups.
     So what's my point?  I guess what I'm getting at is that I think having friends/friends of friends who have divergent views from my own allows me to examine my own beliefs more critically.  For example, politically I have what Americans call a "liberal" bias (in Canada I'd be much closer to the centre) but thanks to facebook I can read articles that my more right leaning friends post.  Having access to these articles allows me to see things from a perspective that I probably might not have otherwise.  Sometimes I discount these countervailing views as malarky but occasionally I will agree with some of the points and modify my position.  The most fruitful reaction is when I respond to the article.  Doing so allows me to clarify my own position to myself and determine whether my position is simply an opinion or whether there are strong arguments and/or evidence which support my position.  Sometimes things get heated but as long as my friends and I stay within boundaries appropriate to our friendship/character the outcome is usually fruitful for the both of us.  Basically, this blog entry the the result of one of those interactions.
       As a caveat, I loves me some sarcasm, it's built into my DNA so I urge you not to take too much offence if I am dismissive of any of your cherished beliefs.  I'll do my best to temper it (Ha!) On the bright side I can take just as well as I can dish it...so give me your best!
     Although I'm but a babe in the woods in academia and I have no specialized knowledge, I would argue that training in philosophy qualifies one quite well in the evaluation of arguments.  The subsequent blog post is about several issues in the vaccine debate.  So, what are my medical credentials you ask?  Well, I'm not a doctor, but I did play one for over 2 years with Chippendales.  If that doesn't convince you of my bonifides, I don't know what will.  Without further ado...


Issue 1:  Government "Protection" of Vaccine Producers


    My good friend Nima posted the following article on his facebook page with a subject line that he knew would bate me (we do this to each other....it's fun!)
http://www.nvic.org/NVIC-Vaccine-News/March-2011/No-Pharma-Liability--No-Vaccine-Mandates-.aspx
 Besides the fact that this article is poorly written with grammatical errors and missing words (see ad hominem attack)  there are so many factual fabrications it reads like fox news (see "ad hominem" again!).  Basically I'm having a hard time deciding where to begin.  Lets try this.  I'll summarize the article, point out the main errors, then give some examples of dishonesty in the article.
    The main points of the articles are as follows:  1. Vaccine producers are protected from civil liability should a vaccine cause injury, 2. a)  'mericans are legally compelled to be vaccinated by government b) and that's a violation of FREEDOM! (chant USA! USA! USA!) 3. Vaccines are baaaaad.


Vaccine Producers are Protected from Civil Liability
      First of all the way this claim is made is disingenuous.  Thoughout the article the claim is made that there is "no liability" and "no accountability" for vaccine producers.  The tacit implication that it is very difficult if not impossible for victims of vaccine side effects to receive compensation.  I commend the writer for not outright lying but his account is misleading.  Here are the actual facts:
1.  In 1986 the US government set up the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVI) to provide no-fault compensation to those claiming to be victims of vaccines.  So, children suffering from what may be side effects of vaccines have an avenue by which they can receive compensation.  The threshold for a successful claim to demonstrate a causal link is very weak and the effects need only manifest themselves within a reasonable time frame after the injection.  It is important to note that the causal link between most vaccines and the purported side effects is weak at best.
     In many cases, for compensation to be awarded there need only be a temporal causal link between symptoms and vaccination, not physiological or biochemical.  Basically just because event B occurred after event A does not mean that event A caused event B.  I will get into the science of that later.  With the NCVI Children are provided medical, rehabilitation, counselling, and educational expenses in the case of a successful claim.  
Assessment:  While it is true that vaccine producers are protected from civil liability, it is not true that victims have no recourse for compensation.  In defence of the article writer, they never outright say this but any uninformed person reading the article could easily draw this conclusion.


     So how did this whole ruling come about?  Well, basically there was a case in which a family from Pennsylvania went to the NCVI claims committee looking for compensation and didn't get it.  The condition--residual seizure disorder--which afflicted the daughter had been removed from the schedule of approved reactions that qualify for compensation .  In other words,  there was no evidence indicating or plausible mechanism for a causal link between the vaccine and that particular condition.  Despite this, the plaintiff argued that the vaccine company had knowledge of a safer vaccine and if they had distributed the newer vaccine their daughter would not have had the reaction.  The family did not accept the ruling of the NCVI and eventually their case made it to the supreme court.
     In order to understand the supreme court ruling we need to look at the wording of the key passage in the 1986 NCVI law:
     No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.
The two keys to the case are the phrase "side effects that were unavoidable" and "the vaccine...was accompanied by proper directions and warnings".  Lets look first at the later.  Before a child gets any vaccine it is the law that the parents read and sign a vaccine information statement (VIS):

A VIS must be given with every vaccination, including each dose in a multi-dose series. Each VIS contains a brief description of the disease, as well as the risks and benefits of the vaccine. Each VIS is developed by the CDC and distributed to state and local health departments as well as individual providers.(my italics, thank you wikipedia)

     Basically this amounts to informed consent. The plaintiff wanted to argue that despite the informed consent the vaccine manufacturer knew about a more attenuated vaccine and should have offered it.
The judges ruled that despite this, the informed consent that was for the vaccine at hand, not another version of the vaccine.  Also, despite what the National Vaccine Information Centre NVIC article states, there are state laws that allow for abstention from taking vaccines.  

    So, the family could have refused that vaccine if the known risks which were on the VIS had been unacceptable to them.  That is to say, the family could have declined having the vaccine administered to their daughter if they were concerned about the "side effects that were unavoidable".  (Actually, in the article the NVIC contradicts themselves because in the first part of the article they say that Americans are legally required to get vaccinated, but at the end of the article they ask for donations to continue their support of existing state laws that allow for exemption--go figure).  

    The supreme court noted that if the law were otherwise interpreted it would open the door for very difficult cases.  Here are a couple of analogies I came up with as thought experiments to illustrate the point:  Let say you buy a car the year before they install airbag technology into the model.  You get into an accident and the injuries you sustained could have been prevented if there had been an airbag in the car.  The car company knew about airbag technology and maybe even sold some of your model with airbags in another country (with less stringent testing regulations, for example).  Can you sue the car company?  They knew about a safer modification to the vehicle.   Or lets say that midway production they started adding airbags.  You bought a car from an early production run that didn't have one.  Does the car company now need to pull all non-airbag (safer) cars from the market and junk them?  

    Here's another that maybe isn't so much of an analogy but a similar case.  Lets say you have a headache and decide to take your usual ibuprofen (NSAID) which can cause stomach ulcers with prolonged frequent use.  Meanwhile just 2 days ago that same drug company just concluded a 5 year FDA trial and received FDA approval for a similar drug but the new one is less likely to cause stomach ulcers.  Is the drug company expected to recall all existing stock of ibuprofen and destroy it just because it has produced on innovation that is slightly safer?  I'm not so sure it has this obligation.  

     If we consider these imperfect analogies we can see how it would be difficult for the court to rule in favour of the plaintiff and the difficulties that would arise out of setting such a legal precedent.  The bottom line however is that all this legal stuff is secondary to the science.  The science does not support any causal link between the DTP vaccine and many of the claimed side effects. (Again, I will discuss the science in part 2 which I hope to write over the weekend)

     Anyway, hopefully this fosters some perspicuity on how the ruling came about and why the supreme court ruled the way it did.  One final note.  At this point any careful reader should notice what seems to be a logical inconsistency in my position.  On the one hand I am implying that vaccines are safe but on the other I am saying that there is the NCVI which provides compensation for those experiencing side effects.  If vaccines are so safe why should there be a body which decides on compensation for side effects?  Ah! ha! good question.  I will elaborate on this when I discuss the science of vaccines.

Why Protect Vaccination Producers?

     Although the issues surrounding this particular case are interesting, the more important issue is why the US enacted the NCVI law in 1986 in the first place.  Why should government (once again) protect big bad pharma?  Before I continue I'd like to clarify that I do not think that pharmaceutical companies are particularly ethical actors.  In fact, there are many instances where they have proven to be quite the opposite.  Despite this there are important reasons for which the NCVI law was enacted.

A little background which I have stolen from this article 

http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/?p=11127#more-11127

I'll summarize for those of you who are already bored with the topic and don't wish to do any further reading:
In 1982 NBC produced an "expose" of alleged DTP vaccine related injuries.  This began the first major anti-vaccination movement and proliferation of misinformation.  
While in 1979 there was only 1 DTP-related lawsuit, by 1986 there were 255, with a total of over $3 billion sought by claimants. This clearly was not sustainable for the vaccine industry, and in fact manufacturers went out of business. In 1967 there were 26 US manufacturers of vaccines. By 1980 this number had dropped to 15, and by 1986 there were only 3 companies still making vaccines in this country. Vaccine prices skyrocketed, and manufacturers found it difficult to obtain liability insurance.


Basically, the sheer legal costs of defending claims made doing business prohibitive. The alternative was for pharmaceutical companies to stop producing vaccines. I know if I were selling vaccines in that environment I'd close my doors too and stick to selling aspirin.  What rational business person wouldn't?  So, it seems that the CDC and related government agencies were faced with a decision:  offer some protection to vaccine producers, or eliminate the vaccine program all together.  

     Now I know what your thinking.  They should have eliminated the vaccine program.  If people would just think more positive thoughts they wouldn't get sick.  All sickness comes from either negative (quantum?) energy, stress, and poor access to triple rainbows.  I know! But you're preaching to the choir.  All this crap about genetic predispositions, viruses, bacterial infection, different diseases having different aetiologies and pathologies... can all be avoided by simply tapping into the universe's positive energy.  And if you should accidentally unplug yourself from the positive waves of quantum energy, easy solutions are just around the corner.  Got mumps?  Laugh away those bumps....homeopathy will fix it!  Got polio? Just look at my portfolio...super doses of vitamins will have you healthy in no time!  Problem with your spleen?  Easiest thing I've ever seen...Reflexology will do the trick, just massage your foot where it's thick!  I've got hundreds of these folks, but I'll spare you--you get my point.

      I know it sucks to give legal protection to big corporations (and I'm actually being serious here) but I think in this particular instance it is warranted.  

OK folks, what was supposed to be a quick overview of the vaccine issues sprinkled with witty remarks has turned into a full-blown research project.  I have to work over the next few days but over the weekend I'll try to produce a part 2 focusing on the research/science.  Please post your comments and hate mail!