Mill's Utilitarianism Part 2: Mill's Argument for the Ultimate Sanction (What Can Compel Us to Consider General Happiness when We Act? )

Yo check it.  Weez about to learn about why (Mill thinks) we should be compelled to adopt and adhere to utilitarianism as the ultimate moral standard.  That is, why does a utilitarian ethic have binding force?

Overview and RecapOk, so...like...'member utilitarianism?  It's the idear that the moral goodness of an action is proportional to the total amount of happiness (or pleasure) it produces (for the agent as well as--and especially--other people).  So, an action that produces more pleasure/happiness for 5 people is more gooder than an action that produces pleasure/happiness for only 1.  Simple enough so far, right?  (We'll table some of the problems to get to the point of this post.)

Next step--Definition:  Happiness and pleasure are one and the same for utilitarians so I'll just say happiness to mean both; happiness also includes avoidance of pain.  But Mill makes a distinction between types of pleasure: higher (intellectual) and lower (sensual).  We know some pleasures to have more worth than others because the majority of peeps who experience and have the capacity for both will choose the higher over the lower.

Ok, supposing we accept everything so far, there's still a prollem--why should I be motivated to obey this standard of morality?  What's stopping me from being a selfish egotistical misanthrope and stepping on others to feed my own ravenous appetite for pleasure?  That's the problem Mill tackles in this section...

Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility
People Will Act on Utilitarian Principles Because They Already Are UtilitariansThe general gist of Mill's argument for why we should be motivated to obey the utilitarian maxim and whence it derives its motivating force is that we are already utilitarians and this is the natural moral position!  Of course he has some more specific arguments to support this assertion which we will look at...

Mill sets things up for his we're-utilitarian-even-if-we-don't-know-it view like this:  Many people recognize a moral duty not to murder, steal, and deceive yet might question the utilitarian maxim to act according to what will promote the general happiness.  How do we explain the feeling of moral duty toward abstaining from these specific acts while there is no corresponding feeling to act on the utilitarian maxim?

Mill suggests that we have accepted the specific consequences of utilitarianism but not the general maxim.  But this failure is simply a consequence of poor education and lack of influences which form moral character.  If people got their learn on, the 1st principle of utilitarianism "shall be as deeply rooted in our character, and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-bought up young person."

Basically, people who accept the consequences of the utilitarian ethic but not its principle do so because it falls outside of their particular custom and education--and so they question it.  But this is nothin' a little learnin' can't fix.

The obvious problem with this argument is that it can be made by any ethical system.  Hey, if you raise everyone as Kantians and teach them to see the moral truth in Kantianism, chances are, the majority will think the categorical imperative (one should only act according to principles that you'd want everyone to act on) is the one true moral principle.

Actually, if you ax most 'mericans (Republicans, anyway) they'll probably advocate an egoist morality; that is, since people are rational and self-interested, actions that are in line with the principle of rational self-interest are 'right'--provided another's rights aren't infringed upon.   If only they knew they are really just misguided utilitarians...

Anyhow, what really jumps out at me is how Aristotelian Mill sounds wilt all this moral education stuff.  Aristotle basically said (super condensed version), an action is good if it is by a virtuous person and a virtuous person is one who has had a correct moral education.  In a way, Mills just adding on that someone with the correct moral education would act according to the utilitarian principle.

Sanctions
Recall that the whole point of this section of the utilitarian argument is to defend utilitarianism from critics who charge that utilitarianism can't work because there's no reason for people to go along with it.  In this context, Mill discusses external and internal sanctions that may or may not compel someone to act according to the utilitarian ethic.  Regarding external sanctions he says they are the same for any possible moral system: desire to be praised and avoid punishment (earthly or cosmic).  Lets move on to internal sanctions...

Internal SanctionsSo, what is it that might compel us to consider our action's effect on the general good above all other considerations?   What is it that makes us feel as though we have a duty to consider the general good? It is "a feeling in the mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from its impossibility."  In other words, our conscience.

Lets call it a special feeling; lets call the feeling of moral duty "the essence of conscience".  There we have it--the thing that compels us to act according to utilitarian ethic is our conscience.  Admittedly, we rarely feel pure duty because we often have competing feelings, interests, and social conditioning running around in our heads that distort this sense of moral duty.

But how does pure conscience bind us to a particular course of action (i.e., the 1st principle of utilitarianism)?  It binds us because it is "a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse."  In other words, our conscience binds us because we cannot escape it.

The obvious objection is that there are people who don't have strong feelings of conscience or are able to ignore their conscience, so how can we say that utilitarianism binds people to action?  Mill's (reoccurring) reply is that this is a problem for any ethical system--it is not particular to utilitarianism.  Such people can only be compelled to act through external sanctions regardless of what moral system you support.   So, I guess this is meant to diffuse the argument that utilitarian ethics should be rejected because it can't bind people to follow it, but neither is it a point in favour of utilitarianism.

On the Origins of the Feeling of Duty
Mill begins that the origins of the feelings of duty, be they innate or acquired, are unimportant because the net result is the same.  Supposing they are innate (here he's implying Kantian ethics), then the feeling of duty would attach to moral principles.  But there is no argument to suggest that the innate feeling of duty wouldn't attach to the utilitarian principle rather then, lets say, the categorical imperative.  Furthermore, if morality itself is intuitive, it seems that accounting for the effect of our actions on the happiness of others is "intuitively obligatory".  So, even if our sense of moral duty is innate (which Mill denies) this is no objection to utilitarianism.

Suppose instead, as Mill does, that moral feelings are learned rather than innate.  They are something we (hopefully) develop over time with experience and education just as we do with things like the ability to reason, to use language, to play an instrument... Just like any capacity we have, our moral feelings can develop to varying degrees, both positively and negatively.  So, even if our moral conscience is acquired rather than innate, there is no reason to suppose it couldn't develop to follow utilitarian principles (amongst all the other possibilities).

Then Why Utilitarianism? Finally we learn why our conscience will be receptive to utilitarian principles rather than others.  Given that, regardless of the origins of our sense of duty and moral conscience, what arguments are there to suppose the utilitarian ethics is the one true standard?  So far we've said that human can be conditioned to attach a sense of moral duty to just about moral principle.

Ah! Ha!  But you see, the utilitarian principle is special! The is a "powerful natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality".  You see, once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard it will be the basis of this powerful natural sentiment.  And that natural oh-so-good feeling is the social feeling of mankind--"the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures..."; that is, our natural tendency to live as social creatures.  It is unnatural for us to live outside of a social context.

It's hard to dispute that we are social creatures but some people might reply that our natural tendency toward social living doesn't necessarily entail utilitarianism.  An egoist or social contract theorist might say, for example, that social living just means that I have to abide by certain conventions if I want to get out of life what I want but still avoid (external) sanctions.

Mill further argues that social living is impossible unless the members regard everyone's interests to be equal.  People grow up with the understanding that they have to include the interests of others when/before they act.  They learn not to injure others.  In instances of cooperation they learn that interests can be mutual and that our own well being is often bound up in that of others.  He goes on to paint a very pretty picture:

Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others, it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it.

Under these conditions he will, as a matter of habit, consider the good of others in his actions.  Once he has this feeling he will want to demonstrate it, and encourage it in others.  And even if he doesn't have utilitarian sentiments, for his own self-interest he will want others to be utilitarians because he will benefit.  Before long and by this process the utilitarian meme takes over the society, removing sources of opposition and "leveling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes".

Here's the really interesting thing.  In a way Mill was right.  Empirical evidence suggests that most people think like utilitarians (however, it varies between cultures and contexts).  Also, that in groups where there are strong social ties members do tend to consider the happiness of the other members in their moral calculus.  As the intellectual underpinnings and the utilitarian feelings of the individual grow, he will oppose socio-economic and socio-political structures that prevent others from having the benefits he has.  Through this mechanism the moral community grows in number.

Basically, once you go utilitarian you never go back cuz it just feels sooooo natural.  When you accept utilitarianism into your heart it is not as "a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which is would not be well for them to be without".  Utilitarianism, once embraced, works in harmony with external or internal motives to care for others.  When external sanctions fail to motivate, the utilitarian ethic will provide internal motivation (sense of duty) to consider the happiness of others (in proportion to the extent to which to agent is utilitarian).

Sounds nice, doesn't it?

Do I Have to Do What I Know Is Right? (Part 1)

Intro Ramble: The Purpose of Philosophy in Morality

     It's funny how things work sometimes.  After making my last post--"What Philosophy Is and Isn't"--I encountered the following passage in Kant regarding the role of philosophy (in ethics, anyway):

    

It is here that she [i.e., philosophy] has to show her purity as the authoress of her own laws--not

as the mouthpiece of laws whispered to her by some implanted sense [i.e., intuition] or by who      knows what tutelary nature [divine inspiration], all of which laws together, though they may          always be better than nothing, can never furnish us with principles dictated by reason.

     Now it is quite obvious that everything happens for a reason and god made Kant insert this passage back in the Enlightenment so that one day I would read it at just the right time.  There are no coincidences people!  Ok, all metaphysics aside, lets take a quick lookie-loo at what this passage is talking about.  Hopefully my use of the handy dandy parentheses have already made the meaning clear.  Basically, Kant wants to show that morality stems from reason, and reason alone.  Morality cannot come from some person claiming to have intuition about what is right.  If this were the case we'd quickly descend into a moral relativism of the worst kind.  Nor can morality come from someone claiming divine inspiration.  If this were the case we would have no rational reason to follow the laws, we'd only follow them out of fear of sanction.  Moral laws must come from reason because the fact that they come from reason gives them authority.

     Think about it for a second.  Suppose you are not sure how you should act in a particular situation.  Your faculty of reason--that is, rationality--tells you to act one way but you have inclinations toward a different course of action.  Suppose you choose to act on your inclinations: does it make any sense to say you acted in a morally correct way because "it felt right" even though you have a perfectly rational reason to act the other way?  Basically you are admitting that, in this case, acting irrationally is the moral thing to do.  This is a very tough case to make!

     Now if we take your method as a general principle for er'body to make moral decisions willy nilly (this is a technical term) based on how they feel, we're going to get into some trouble.  Now decisions are based on feeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeelings but feelings aren't consistent but ephemeral; no universal laws could ever be derived from this method.  This method of making moral decisions and rules cannot work...nope.  (But I just feel it in my bones, I know I'm right!...I have a really good sense for these things!) Shut up.  (No, but my psychic told me I have a gift!  I'm speeeeeeeeeeecial!)

      I can't help it.  I have to share what Kant says about what happens when we appeal to intuition and such, it's way too good not to share:

     [...]for human reason in its weariness is fain to rest upon this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions (which lead it to embrace a cloud in mistake of Juno) to foist into the place of morality some misbegotten mongrel patched up from limbs of very varied ancestry and looking like anything you please, only not like virtue, to him who has once beheld her in her true shape.

Oh! Snap! Wicka! Wicka! Wicka! Wut?  I'd give my left testicle to write half as well as that! (Ok, you could argue his sentences are a little long...)

The Relationship Between Duty, Morality, and Reason

     So, up until now Kant has focused on showing that we can determine the universal principle of morality by asking whether a particular action we will is universalizable.  Whatever passes this test qualifies as a universal moral maxim according to which we ought to act.  Now that we know what we ought to do, the next question is, it is a necessary law for all rational beings to act on what we ought to do?  In other words if we know what the morally correct action is, are we, as rational agents, obligated to act on it?

      Before we answer this problem it might be helpful to quickly review, by example, how we can determine the moral law.  Suppose I'm in a tough financial situation and I want to borrow some money.  I know that I'm not going to be able to repay the money, but the only way I'm going to get a loan is if I say (falsely) that I will repay the loan.  How do I determine if this is morally permissible? Well, we run our maxim (not the magazine!) through the universalization test (AKA the Categorical Imperative).  I ask, what would happen if I willed my behaviour to be a universal law for all?  If I make it a universal rule that everybody who needs to borrow money can lie about repaying the money what will happen?

     What will happen is that people who lend money will cease to lend money based on promises to repay.  The notion of a promise will have no meaning.  People making promises in this situation will receive only laughter in response to their request.  For people to lend money there has to be a norm (standard behaviour) or truth telling in the culture.  If you universalized your particular behaviour, no one would be able to borrow money with just a promise to repay.  Your behaviour is not universalizable and so we must universalize the opposite maxim, that people who borrow money must keep their promises to repay.

The Will...Vas is Das?

     Ok, so now we know what the moral thing to do is.  As rational creatures, do we have to do it?  Kant says yes, and here's his argument:  First we begin with a definition of will.  A will is the power/faculty by which we self-determine our actions according to notions of laws.  In plain English I think this means the will is my motivation for action; however it should be viewed as distinct from inclinations, instinct, and physiological urges.  The will is somehow above all that, not to say it can't sometimes be inline with those other elements that bring about appetite-driven behaviour.  The key notion it seems is that through the will we can "self-will" behaviour and overcome instincts, character, etc....  For example, take someone who really wants to eat ice cream.  Their inclination is to eat it, but they are not captive to this impulse; they can exercise their will to not eat the ice cream.

     Our will is always directed at some end.  Our will is not necessarily good, it can be directed at both good and bad actions.  However, when the end at which our will is directed comes about through reason, it must be equally valid for all rational things, viz, it has equal moral merit.  Hold on a second!  Couldn't we argue that I could use my reason to direct my will toward nefarious ends?  Would these wicked ends have equal validity too?  Kant would say that any nefarious ends did not come about through reason, but inclination and/or self-interest.  Of course we can use our reason to achieve evil ends but reason cannot choose evil ends.  Reason operates according to the categorical imperative, and evil ends are not universalizable.

      Where are we so far?  We know that the will gives us the power of self-determination; the will is always directed at some end; and when the will is directed at an end which came about through reason, that end is equally valid for all rational beings.  This last point is central to Kant's ethics.  We must give equal weight to the rational ends of any rational creature.  Simply put, er'body on this planet has an equal right to pursue their personal ends so long as they are universalizable.  As we have seen, an end is not universalizable if it prevents others from pursuing their ends.

     To illustrate lets quickly revisit the money borrowing scenario.  If you lie and say that you will pay the money back but don't and then will this norm to be universalized, nobody else will be able to borrow money (because lenders no longer take people at their word).  Your action has interfered with other people whose end might require they borrow money based on a promise, but now they can't.  Why do you have to be so selfish? Sheesh! Now look what you've done!

     Of course some actions won't have an effect either way on interfering with other people attaining their ends.  In cases such as these all we can say is that they are not the subject matter of morality.  So, if you're struggling to determine whether you should watch Jersey Shore or Big Brother, this has no bearing on somebody else attaining their ends;  you can do whatever you want--Kant doesn't care.   The moral content of these actions is as vacuous as the intellectual content of the shows I mentioned.

  

Humans as Ends in Themselves

     The next step in Kants argument is to (pretty much) assert that if we suppose there is an entity whose existence has intrinsic absolute value then from this entity, which is an end in itself we can derive determinate laws.  This is a little tricky so let me restate it.  Take for example "compassion".  Compassion has value in itself.  We don't display compassion as means to an end; we don't seek to be compassionate to achieve any further goal.  Compassion is an end in itself.  Because it is an end itself it has value "built into" it.

     From the idea of something having intrinsic value (i.e., it is an end in itself) Kant argues that it can be the ground of a possible categorical imperative--something like, "we should endeavor to be compassionate".  We don't endeavor to be compassionate to fulfill some other end, we simply ought to pursue being compassionate because it is a (good) end in itself.

     Humans are also ends in themselves.  They have intrinsic value.  They ought not be used for arbitrary means to achieving someone else's ends (without consent).  Anytime my actions affect another person I have to consider them as ends in themselves.  This doesn't mean that another person can never help another attain some goal, only that the helper has to have full information and grant consent to helping.  I can't use power to force people to do things that I want (my ends) because I am not treating them as ends in themselves but as means to my ends.   A significant part of our modern ethical ideas comes from this Kantian notion of treating all people equally as ends in themselves.

Up to hear we've talked about the relationship between morality and reason.  We still haven't finished talking about how Kant moves from saying morality springs from reason to it is our duty to do what reason dictates.  This seems as good a place as any to take a break.  I'll address the other part tomorrow.  It's 4am and I should get some rest.  Stop using me as a means to your end of philosophical knowledge!  Oh, wait.  Knowledge is a good in itself and I have a duty to make it available...

Good night!