Conflict Between the Ten Commandments and the Constitution and the People who Think the Two Can Be Appealed to for Public Policy
I'm supposed to be working on a paper but what I heard got me so worked up, I had to write something about it. NPR was broadcasting a debate between contestants in the Texas senatorial election. Every idiot ended their speech with the same idiotic claim, that they promise to uphold the Constitution and the 10 Commandments as the guiding documents for their policies. If these morons want to follow the 10 Commandments in their personal life, fine. But don't get up on the pulpit and say you're going to use it as guidance for your public policy decisions.
Reason #1 why they are idiots: If they actually read the gotdam Constitution they'd see right there in the 1st Amendment there is a prohibition against government enacting any law regarding the establishment of religion. By the rules of the Constitution they are prohibited from enacting many parts of the 10 Commandments.
Reason #2 why they are idiots: Just like 90% of "Christians" I've met, I'll bet they can't even name the 10 Commandments or even know that there were TWO lists of 10 Commandments given to Moses. So, lets look at some of the things they will appeal to for their policies:
1st Commandment: Thou shalt have no gods before me. You're going to make this public policy? How the fuck does this fit with the establishment clause? What about freedom to worship as people please? Idiots.
2nd Commandment: Thou shalt not make thee any graven images...blah blah blah. What the fuck. So are they going to make policies that ban art? What about freedom of expression? And if someone wants to worship a statue, that's protected by freedom of religious expression. Idiots.
3rd Commandment: Thou shalt not take the Lord's name in vain. Hello? Freedom of speech? Idiots.
4th Commandment: Keep the Sabbath--even your manservant and maid. Oh, so now all businesses have to shut down on Sunday? I'd like to see a Republican put forward an anti-commerce law. Idiots.
5th Commandment: Honor they father and mother. What the fuck are you going to do to people who don't? Send them to jail? What about people whose parents are cretins? Are people obligated to honor those who don't deserve it? Idiots.
6th Commandment: Thou shalt not kill. Oh! This one's good. Such wisdom does the bible have! No other society could ever have or ever has figured out this is a good rule. Idiots. Oh, and by the by, in the bible this statement is left unqualified. So, I guess that means you Texas Republicans will be repealing capital punishment. I look forward to seeing that legislation. Idiots.
7th Commandment: Thou shalt not commit adultery. Or what? What happened to your ideas of curtailing the powers of government. So, now government's going to get involved when people cheat on their partners? Is that what you're saying? Idiots. Oh, and what's the punishment going to be? Public stoning? Idiots.
8th Commandment: Thou shalt not steal. Once again, the wisdom of the bible overwhelms me. How deep and profound is this rule! Surely, no other tradition or society could have come up with a rule so sublime! There's already a rule against stealing, we don't need the bible for that. Idiots.
9th Commandment: Thou shalt not bear false witness. (See 6 and 8). Idiots.
10th Commandment: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, wife, ox, etc... I see, so you're going to be introducing thought crime. How? Make it a law that when I have thoughts about wanting my neighbor's ox, I go to jail? I'd like to see you enforce it. Idiots.
So, would someone please tell me how it is possible to simultaneously uphold both documents when creating public policy? Answer: you can't. So all you idiot politicians stop pandering to the Christian right. If you think the 10 Commandments are the more important, that's fine, go run for a committee at a church, but keep that crap out government if you value the Constitution (as you say you do).
What the conclusion? When these idiots say that their policies will be guided by the ten Commandments, they mean "I will violate the establishment clause and legislate my particular version of Christianity as the State religion". When they say their policies will be guided by the Constitution, they mean, "I will interpret the 2nd Amendment out of its context to allow easy access to guns". It's clear that's the only part they're ever read. Idiots.
Ok, I feel a bit better now.
Saturday, April 14, 2012
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Critique of Kuhn: Scientific Revolutions and Semantic Incommensurability
Preamble and Notes to the Reader
People is always axin' me (jk, lol, #thatneverhappens), why don't you post your papers? The answer is that while, for the most part, I enjoy writing in my blog, for some reason I don't like how my philosophy papers turn out. They seem sterile. Anyway, I'm posting this paper because it's the first paper I've written since undergrad that I feel ok about. I don't think its content is genius or anything, but it is in the style and tone that I've been aiming for. Also, lucky for you all, it's a short paper (by grad paper standards, anyway).
For my non-philosopher friends, before you read, don't be scur'd of the technical term "semantic incommensurability" in the title. It just means that if two people hold different theories that share words, they cannot have meaningful debate over theory choice because the words they use refer to different things or are conceptually different.
To use a very simple example, suppose there is a debate between a prescientific person and a Newtonian. They might both use the word "weight". Kuhn says they can't engage in any meaningful debate because "weight" for the prescientific refers to an object's intrinsic "nature" to fall toward the earth. For the Newtonian, "weight" is a technical term which refers to an object's mass times its rate of acceleration. Because their terms refer to different concepts, Kuhn argues they are talking past each other (unbeknownst to them). I explain it more in the essay, but that's the main idea.
For my philosopher friends, you are probably already familiar with Kuhn's arguments so you can skip to mine, starting with the section entitled "Case Study: Paradigm Shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics and Semantic Incommensurability".
Anyway, I hope you guys enjoy and/or learn something...
Zombie Newton is Havin' a Crisis: A Critique of Kuhn's Account of Science and Semantic Incommensurability
Introduction
At the heart of Kuhn's view of revolutionary science is that paradigm shifts arise out of crises: A growing group within a community of experts will call for the overthrow of a theory because of its inability to satisfactorily account for observations. In such situations--when one paradigm is adopted over another--the choice is not one that can be made by appeal to logic or evidence: it is made by social persuasion. A consequence of this view is that science is not a cumulative enterprise, rather it is a series of extrarational choices of one paradigm over another. The purpose of this paper is to put pressure on Kuhn's argument that scientific revolutions necessarily involve a choice between logically mutually exclusive theories. Specifically, I will seek to undermine one of his central claims that supports his non-cumulative view: that theoretical terms have fundamentally different meanings between theories.
A central supporting argument to Kuhn's main thesis is that the theoretical terms of one theory cannot be understood in a rival theory because of the theory-dependence of meaning, or “semantic incommensurability”. The implication is that, although two paradigms can share a theoretical term nominally, the term has fundamentally different meanings since the terms derive their meaning from within a theory-specific paradigm. For example, 'mass' in Newtonian physics refers to force divided by acceleration, while 'mass' in Einsteinian physics refers to energy divided by the speed of light squared.
Case Study: Paradigm Shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics and Semantic Incommensurability
Kuhn appeals to the historical example of physicists' adoption of the Einsteinian over the Newtonian paradigm as support for his science-as-revolution hypothesis. Within this paradigm shift, he argues for the semantic incommensurability of Newtonian and Einsteinian concepts. The basic argument is that Newtonian concepts cannot be derived from Einsteinian concepts because they refer to fundamentally different things. (E.g. Each theory's concept of mass refers to different things, as mentioned in the previous section.) In response I will give three counter-arguments.
Argument From Zombie Newton and Inter-theory Communication
Is this idea of semantic incommensurability right? Suppose Newton himself came back from the dead and walked into Einstein's physics lab just after Einstein had figured out his new physics. Upon hearing it, poor zombie Newton goes into crisis. Is the Newtonian concept of mass so different from Einstein's that any discussion of mass between the two would entail that they talk past each other? Would not zombie Newton be able to understand when Einstein speaks of mass? I think that in a limited way he would. He would at least have a general notion of mass no different from the lay general public of today: laypeople can talk to their physicist friends about mass without too much head-scratching. We might argue that although the notions of mass are measured differently, they are not so different that zombie Newton and Einstein wouldn't find each other's use of 'mass' unintelligible.
We can look to other fields of study and see that intra-theoretic communication is quite common. Suppose there's a room with cognitive scientists, psychologists, behaviourists, cognitivist, and AI theorists. Although all of these people work within different but related theories, it seems odd to say they wouldn't understand each other if they were speaking about 'beliefs'. Concepts which are shared between different theories don't seem to be so radically different such that (necessarily) there is no overlap in meaning to the point where meaningful dialogue is impossible. It seems as though there are plenty of examples of people holding different theories with common terms who can engage in meaningful dialogue without speaking past each other.
Kuhn's Possible Reply
Kuhn might reply that the similarities between their concepts are are trivial. In the case of zombie Newton, he doesn't have sufficient knowledge of Einsteinian concepts to be able to understand important things that are implicit whenever Einstein refers to mass. The issue is not whether a 17th Century physicist shares a concept with the contemporary general population, rather we want to know if his concepts would allow him to engage in important scientific discussions with his Einsteinian peers. Once discussion turns to measuring the mass of bodies at high relative velocities, the important fundamental differences between the two concepts of mass will come into stark relief.
Perhaps Kuhn is right here. While it is true that Newton's notion of mass would yield similar measurements where slow moving objects are concerned, the fact that their respective theories produce similar measurements would mask the fact that their respective notions of mass measure fundamentally different things. And because they measure fundamentally different things, meaningful debate isn't possible because their terms refer to different things.
Despite this possible Kuhnian response, there are two more inter-related replies to Kuhn's response to show that meaningful dialogue is possible between competing theories at a time of crises. The first is to try to show that the similarities between the nominally identical concepts are more fundamental than the differences; and second, is to propose that rational meaningful debate is possible so long as it is between epistemic peers.
Argument from Fundamentally Similar Meaning
Before arguing that intra-theoretic meanings are commensurable in important ways, I need to lay some ground work2. First, I want to put forward a very basic picture of what science does: Science attempts to measure fundamental aspects of the natural world3. I do not mean to say this is all science does, but I think it fairly uncontroversial that this is a fundamental aspect of the activity of science. Now, for whatever reason, humans--and particularly scientists--have adopted certain conventions about how we “chop up” the natural world. Among some of these aspects, we measure space, time, energy, and mass.
There are several ways we go about measuring these qualities. Take 'space' as an example. Space is comprised of notions of length, width, and depth. To measure space we first had simple notions of “long” and “short”. Then we had comparative notions like “longer”,“shorter”, or “equal”. An incremental step above that is to employ an instrument, such as a string, to measure the differences. In the final step of measurement, we quantify. I might start out by choosing a piece of string and subsequently measure everything in terms of that string. I'd say, “this wall is 5 strings long”. Perhaps I go around measuring things for a year, then come back to the wall and find out that the wall now measures 5 ½ stings. Now, obviously the wall didn't grow; over the course of the year there was wear and tear on the ends of my string which caused it to shorten. The standard by which I chose to make measurements, in this case, didn't yield consistent measurements over time. So, later, I might choose a metal rod as my standard.
We can observe a similar progression in the measurement of time. Early humans quantified time according to the movement of a shadow on a sundial, or relative movement of the sun to the earth. Under this standard, time seemed to pass more quickly in winter than in summer. Eventually, other standards were adopted, such as the swings of Foucault's pendulum, the piezo-electric effect of quartz, all the way up to today's measurement of decay rates of radioactive elements.
Behind this simple explanation there is something very important going on. The first is that how I choose to quantify a particular aspect of the natural world is in part conventional. I could have chosen a string of any length and I could have chosen a measuring instrument of any material. I could also have chosen to measure everything in terms of my foot or thumb length. In the case of time, I could have quantified time according to any of the above standards and I could have divided up their cyclical rhythms an infinite number of ways.
But there is also an aspect of quantifying that isn't conventional—these are facts about the natural world and logical laws. No matter how I choose to measure length (and by extension, space) it is a fact of nature that certain materials will make better measuring instruments than others. In the case of time, I can compare two cyclical phenomena to determine which cycle is more regular relative to the other. It is by appealing to these facts of nature that I choose my convention. A logical law will make so if I add two lengths together, their sum will not be greater or less than the total of the two lengths.
Now lets relate this information about conventionality, facts of nature, and logical laws back to Kuhn's notions of semantic incommensurability. Suppose there are two populations that use different conventions for measuring time: One uses Foucault's pendulum swings and the other uses the piezo-electric effect of quartz. Would it make sense for the latter group to say to the former: “No, no, no! You've got it all wrong! You're measuring the wrong way! Time isn't measured by swings of a pendulum, time is measured by quartz' piezo-electric effect.” This type of claim seems no more odd than a modern physicist telling the quartz proponents that the proper way the measure time is according to atomic half-lives. Furthermore, it would be equally curious if one group were to claim that the other group was measuring the wrong thing. Time itself isn't pendulum swings or atomic decay rates any more than length is pieces of string.
How can we describe our intuitions that debates between these groups are kind of silly? It is because the different groups are disputing the conventional part of the concept of time—how it is measured. There is no objectively right answer, nevertheless, it is true that choosing the convention of quantifying time according to the intervals of radio-active decay will yield more consistent measurements. But it certainly seems that all groups are intending to measure the same fundamental aspect of nature.
This brings us back to Kuhn. When I say that a Newtonian can meaningfully talk about mass with an Einsteinian what do I mean? I mean that, although there is a dispute between the pendulum people and the quartz people over what measurement convention should be adopted, they are both referring to the same fundamental aspect and facts of the world. It might be true that the Einsteinian convention of measuring mass as equal to E/c2 yields more consistent results, but both theories aim to quantify the same fundamental aspect of the natural world.
In this paper, in the context of Newtonian vs Einsteinian physics, I have argued against there being semantic incommensurability to a degree such that important scientific debate isn't possible between proponents of competing paradigms. In the argument from zombie Newton I suggested it is an empirical fact that meaningful communication does occur between proponents of different paradigms. In the argument from fundamentally similar meaning I showed that the essential meaning of basic terms like time, space, energy, and mass are preserved in significant ways across theories. Finally, I advanced the idea that, in a community of epistemic peers, rational appeal to concepts and principles outside of a paradigm make possible meaningful intra-paradigm discussion.
If, as I suggest, meaningful debate is possible and there is sufficient shared relevant background knowledge, then we should acknowledge that there are bridge concepts and principles. If there are bridge concepts and principles linking an older theory to a new, then there is a case to be made for the evolutionary and cumulative view of science.
Endnotes
1By “normal science” Kuhn means the scientific activity of answering questions and solving problems within a particular paradigm, not resolving disputes between competing paradigms.
2The information on measurements is from my lecture notes from Dr. Richard Creath's class on Quine and Carnap.
3At this point I'm being intentionally vague by employing the term “aspect”. Depending on your metaphysics this could refer to properties, kinds, laws—fill in the blank as you wish. At this point, it is unimportant. I only seek to make the point that measurement is a key activity of science.
4My claim is not that every paradigm shift is evolutionary rather than revolutionary; only that, it is not as improbable as Kuhn makes it out to be. And the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics might be one such instance.
People is always axin' me (jk, lol, #thatneverhappens), why don't you post your papers? The answer is that while, for the most part, I enjoy writing in my blog, for some reason I don't like how my philosophy papers turn out. They seem sterile. Anyway, I'm posting this paper because it's the first paper I've written since undergrad that I feel ok about. I don't think its content is genius or anything, but it is in the style and tone that I've been aiming for. Also, lucky for you all, it's a short paper (by grad paper standards, anyway).
For my non-philosopher friends, before you read, don't be scur'd of the technical term "semantic incommensurability" in the title. It just means that if two people hold different theories that share words, they cannot have meaningful debate over theory choice because the words they use refer to different things or are conceptually different.
To use a very simple example, suppose there is a debate between a prescientific person and a Newtonian. They might both use the word "weight". Kuhn says they can't engage in any meaningful debate because "weight" for the prescientific refers to an object's intrinsic "nature" to fall toward the earth. For the Newtonian, "weight" is a technical term which refers to an object's mass times its rate of acceleration. Because their terms refer to different concepts, Kuhn argues they are talking past each other (unbeknownst to them). I explain it more in the essay, but that's the main idea.
For my philosopher friends, you are probably already familiar with Kuhn's arguments so you can skip to mine, starting with the section entitled "Case Study: Paradigm Shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics and Semantic Incommensurability".
Anyway, I hope you guys enjoy and/or learn something...
Zombie Newton is Havin' a Crisis: A Critique of Kuhn's Account of Science and Semantic Incommensurability
Introduction
At the heart of Kuhn's view of revolutionary science is that paradigm shifts arise out of crises: A growing group within a community of experts will call for the overthrow of a theory because of its inability to satisfactorily account for observations. In such situations--when one paradigm is adopted over another--the choice is not one that can be made by appeal to logic or evidence: it is made by social persuasion. A consequence of this view is that science is not a cumulative enterprise, rather it is a series of extrarational choices of one paradigm over another. The purpose of this paper is to put pressure on Kuhn's argument that scientific revolutions necessarily involve a choice between logically mutually exclusive theories. Specifically, I will seek to undermine one of his central claims that supports his non-cumulative view: that theoretical terms have fundamentally different meanings between theories.
Instead, I will propose that often enough meaning is sufficiently preserved in intra-theoretical terms to create a bridge between the old and new paradigm, thereby lending support to the “science-as-cumulative” hypothesis. Given the constraints on this paper's length, I will limit my investigation to Kuhn's example of the incommensurability of terms between the Newtonian and the Einsteinian paradigm. In the first section, I will give a general overview of Kuhn's argument for a revolutionary view of scientific paradigm shifts. Second, I will briefly outline Kuhn's argument for semantic incommensurability. Third, I will propose three counter-arguments. Finally, I will conclude that given the weakness of the incommensurability argument, the cumulative view is a plausible alternative account of scientific shifts between paradigms, including the move from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.
Overview of Kuhn
Thomas Kuhn argues that when an area of science adopts one scientific theory over another, the process mirrors that of political revolution rather than that of evolution. Political and scientific revolution is a choice between two incompatible modes of thought--where adoption of the new “demands the destruction” of the old (Kuhn, p. 89). He relies on his politics/science analogy to more carefully spell out the criteria for what is constitutive of revolutionary change and the crises that precipitate it.
The first criteria is that a portion of the scientific community will be increasingly doubtful of the prevailing paradigm's ability to adequately explain the natural phenomena it is purported to explain. The inability of a theory to explain a type or types of phenomena will lead to “scientific unrest”--the precondition to revolutionary change and the breaking of test tubes. The second characteristic is that since competing camps reject the other's paradigm, any resolution
is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. (Kuhn, p.89)
In short, disputes can only be settled by appeal elements that are external to both competing paradigm.
Kuhn's view is in direct opposition to the “science-as-a-cumulative-enterpise” view. Unlike proponents of this view, it is Kuhn's contention that adoption of new paradigms very rarely occurs through discovery of unanticipated novelties. It is only “normal science” that is cumulative1. When scientists run up against a growing amount phenomena that cannot be explained by or be made to conform to an existing theory, then a new incompatible theory can arise. Adopting this new theory entails the rejection of the previous theory and its concepts because paradigms can only be rejected or accepted as wholes.
Overview of Kuhn
Thomas Kuhn argues that when an area of science adopts one scientific theory over another, the process mirrors that of political revolution rather than that of evolution. Political and scientific revolution is a choice between two incompatible modes of thought--where adoption of the new “demands the destruction” of the old (Kuhn, p. 89). He relies on his politics/science analogy to more carefully spell out the criteria for what is constitutive of revolutionary change and the crises that precipitate it.
The first criteria is that a portion of the scientific community will be increasingly doubtful of the prevailing paradigm's ability to adequately explain the natural phenomena it is purported to explain. The inability of a theory to explain a type or types of phenomena will lead to “scientific unrest”--the precondition to revolutionary change and the breaking of test tubes. The second characteristic is that since competing camps reject the other's paradigm, any resolution
is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. (Kuhn, p.89)
In short, disputes can only be settled by appeal elements that are external to both competing paradigm.
Kuhn's view is in direct opposition to the “science-as-a-cumulative-enterpise” view. Unlike proponents of this view, it is Kuhn's contention that adoption of new paradigms very rarely occurs through discovery of unanticipated novelties. It is only “normal science” that is cumulative1. When scientists run up against a growing amount phenomena that cannot be explained by or be made to conform to an existing theory, then a new incompatible theory can arise. Adopting this new theory entails the rejection of the previous theory and its concepts because paradigms can only be rejected or accepted as wholes.
A central supporting argument to Kuhn's main thesis is that the theoretical terms of one theory cannot be understood in a rival theory because of the theory-dependence of meaning, or “semantic incommensurability”. The implication is that, although two paradigms can share a theoretical term nominally, the term has fundamentally different meanings since the terms derive their meaning from within a theory-specific paradigm. For example, 'mass' in Newtonian physics refers to force divided by acceleration, while 'mass' in Einsteinian physics refers to energy divided by the speed of light squared.
Case Study: Paradigm Shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics and Semantic Incommensurability
Kuhn appeals to the historical example of physicists' adoption of the Einsteinian over the Newtonian paradigm as support for his science-as-revolution hypothesis. Within this paradigm shift, he argues for the semantic incommensurability of Newtonian and Einsteinian concepts. The basic argument is that Newtonian concepts cannot be derived from Einsteinian concepts because they refer to fundamentally different things. (E.g. Each theory's concept of mass refers to different things, as mentioned in the previous section.) In response I will give three counter-arguments.
Argument From Zombie Newton and Inter-theory Communication
Is this idea of semantic incommensurability right? Suppose Newton himself came back from the dead and walked into Einstein's physics lab just after Einstein had figured out his new physics. Upon hearing it, poor zombie Newton goes into crisis. Is the Newtonian concept of mass so different from Einstein's that any discussion of mass between the two would entail that they talk past each other? Would not zombie Newton be able to understand when Einstein speaks of mass? I think that in a limited way he would. He would at least have a general notion of mass no different from the lay general public of today: laypeople can talk to their physicist friends about mass without too much head-scratching. We might argue that although the notions of mass are measured differently, they are not so different that zombie Newton and Einstein wouldn't find each other's use of 'mass' unintelligible.
We can look to other fields of study and see that intra-theoretic communication is quite common. Suppose there's a room with cognitive scientists, psychologists, behaviourists, cognitivist, and AI theorists. Although all of these people work within different but related theories, it seems odd to say they wouldn't understand each other if they were speaking about 'beliefs'. Concepts which are shared between different theories don't seem to be so radically different such that (necessarily) there is no overlap in meaning to the point where meaningful dialogue is impossible. It seems as though there are plenty of examples of people holding different theories with common terms who can engage in meaningful dialogue without speaking past each other.
Kuhn's Possible Reply
Kuhn might reply that the similarities between their concepts are are trivial. In the case of zombie Newton, he doesn't have sufficient knowledge of Einsteinian concepts to be able to understand important things that are implicit whenever Einstein refers to mass. The issue is not whether a 17th Century physicist shares a concept with the contemporary general population, rather we want to know if his concepts would allow him to engage in important scientific discussions with his Einsteinian peers. Once discussion turns to measuring the mass of bodies at high relative velocities, the important fundamental differences between the two concepts of mass will come into stark relief.
Perhaps Kuhn is right here. While it is true that Newton's notion of mass would yield similar measurements where slow moving objects are concerned, the fact that their respective theories produce similar measurements would mask the fact that their respective notions of mass measure fundamentally different things. And because they measure fundamentally different things, meaningful debate isn't possible because their terms refer to different things.
Despite this possible Kuhnian response, there are two more inter-related replies to Kuhn's response to show that meaningful dialogue is possible between competing theories at a time of crises. The first is to try to show that the similarities between the nominally identical concepts are more fundamental than the differences; and second, is to propose that rational meaningful debate is possible so long as it is between epistemic peers.
Argument from Fundamentally Similar Meaning
Before arguing that intra-theoretic meanings are commensurable in important ways, I need to lay some ground work2. First, I want to put forward a very basic picture of what science does: Science attempts to measure fundamental aspects of the natural world3. I do not mean to say this is all science does, but I think it fairly uncontroversial that this is a fundamental aspect of the activity of science. Now, for whatever reason, humans--and particularly scientists--have adopted certain conventions about how we “chop up” the natural world. Among some of these aspects, we measure space, time, energy, and mass.
There are several ways we go about measuring these qualities. Take 'space' as an example. Space is comprised of notions of length, width, and depth. To measure space we first had simple notions of “long” and “short”. Then we had comparative notions like “longer”,“shorter”, or “equal”. An incremental step above that is to employ an instrument, such as a string, to measure the differences. In the final step of measurement, we quantify. I might start out by choosing a piece of string and subsequently measure everything in terms of that string. I'd say, “this wall is 5 strings long”. Perhaps I go around measuring things for a year, then come back to the wall and find out that the wall now measures 5 ½ stings. Now, obviously the wall didn't grow; over the course of the year there was wear and tear on the ends of my string which caused it to shorten. The standard by which I chose to make measurements, in this case, didn't yield consistent measurements over time. So, later, I might choose a metal rod as my standard.
We can observe a similar progression in the measurement of time. Early humans quantified time according to the movement of a shadow on a sundial, or relative movement of the sun to the earth. Under this standard, time seemed to pass more quickly in winter than in summer. Eventually, other standards were adopted, such as the swings of Foucault's pendulum, the piezo-electric effect of quartz, all the way up to today's measurement of decay rates of radioactive elements.
Behind this simple explanation there is something very important going on. The first is that how I choose to quantify a particular aspect of the natural world is in part conventional. I could have chosen a string of any length and I could have chosen a measuring instrument of any material. I could also have chosen to measure everything in terms of my foot or thumb length. In the case of time, I could have quantified time according to any of the above standards and I could have divided up their cyclical rhythms an infinite number of ways.
But there is also an aspect of quantifying that isn't conventional—these are facts about the natural world and logical laws. No matter how I choose to measure length (and by extension, space) it is a fact of nature that certain materials will make better measuring instruments than others. In the case of time, I can compare two cyclical phenomena to determine which cycle is more regular relative to the other. It is by appealing to these facts of nature that I choose my convention. A logical law will make so if I add two lengths together, their sum will not be greater or less than the total of the two lengths.
Now lets relate this information about conventionality, facts of nature, and logical laws back to Kuhn's notions of semantic incommensurability. Suppose there are two populations that use different conventions for measuring time: One uses Foucault's pendulum swings and the other uses the piezo-electric effect of quartz. Would it make sense for the latter group to say to the former: “No, no, no! You've got it all wrong! You're measuring the wrong way! Time isn't measured by swings of a pendulum, time is measured by quartz' piezo-electric effect.” This type of claim seems no more odd than a modern physicist telling the quartz proponents that the proper way the measure time is according to atomic half-lives. Furthermore, it would be equally curious if one group were to claim that the other group was measuring the wrong thing. Time itself isn't pendulum swings or atomic decay rates any more than length is pieces of string.
How can we describe our intuitions that debates between these groups are kind of silly? It is because the different groups are disputing the conventional part of the concept of time—how it is measured. There is no objectively right answer, nevertheless, it is true that choosing the convention of quantifying time according to the intervals of radio-active decay will yield more consistent measurements. But it certainly seems that all groups are intending to measure the same fundamental aspect of nature.
This brings us back to Kuhn. When I say that a Newtonian can meaningfully talk about mass with an Einsteinian what do I mean? I mean that, although there is a dispute between the pendulum people and the quartz people over what measurement convention should be adopted, they are both referring to the same fundamental aspect and facts of the world. It might be true that the Einsteinian convention of measuring mass as equal to E/c2 yields more consistent results, but both theories aim to quantify the same fundamental aspect of the natural world.
So, contra Kuhn, I argue that semantic incommensurability between Newtonian and Einsteinians is not so great that no meaningful debate can occur between between then. Despite important theoretical differences, the fundamental meaning of their terms, which corresponds to how we fundamentally “chop up” the universe, allows for important mutual understanding.
I'd like to qualify my claim and acknowledge that the different ways in which Einsteinians and Newtonians measure mass arise out of very important theoretical differences, however, I still think that the fundamental notions of mass are sufficient for some meaningful debate to be possible. Furthermore, I will show Kuhn's incommensurability claim is further undermined when the argument from fundamentally similar meaning is coupled with the subsequent argument:
Argument from Epistemic Peers
Lets return the argument from zombie Newton. I suggested that Kuhn might reply that while zombie Newton might nominally share Einstein's notion of mass, his understanding wouldn't be sufficient to engage in important scientific debate. Such debate wouldn't be possible because zombie Newton's epistemic position would lack all the empirical and theoretic scientific advances since he last dawned his lab coat. Specifically, Einstein was only able to develop his theory because he had a sophisticated particle theory and non-Euclidian geometry, among other concepts foreign to zombie Newton. So, given the paucity of zombie Newton's current background knowledge, it is quite plain that he would not be able to understand everything that Einsteinian mass entails. Consequentially, Kuhn would be right to say they would be speaking past each other.
While semantic incommensurability may be true of zombie Newton, I don't think it would be true of Einstein's contemporaries; that is, his epistemic peers. When Kuhn argues that paradigm shifts are revolutionary, they only appear so because he is narrowly focussing his proverbial microscope on the theories and principles of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. But in engaging in this narrow approach his is excluding from his account the important developments outside of and adjacent to Newtonian physics proper that allowed Einstein to develop his theory. After all, Einstein did not develop his theory ex nihilo. Quite certainly, Einstein's peers would also have been familiar with non-Euclidian geometry and have shared knowledge of the advanced particle theory.
From this fact we make several points against Kuhn. The first is that these adjacent fields of development could act as bridges for Einstein to explain to his Newtonian contemporaries how to derive his theory in terms of theirs. Presumably, these new developments are what allowed him to make his own leap from Newtonian physics; if Einstein used those concepts to move from Newton's model to his own, it seems reasonable that by sharing his reasoning with epistemic peers, others could too. Or at least they could intelligently debate it.
Second, that Einstein's epistemic peers had access to the same relevant advances weakens Kuhn's claim that choice between paradigms cannot be decided by rational debate. Einsteinian physics appeals to non-Euclidian geometry and advanced particle models which, although not part of Newtonian physics, are epistemic considerations from which one can make rational arguments.
I'd like to qualify my claim and acknowledge that the different ways in which Einsteinians and Newtonians measure mass arise out of very important theoretical differences, however, I still think that the fundamental notions of mass are sufficient for some meaningful debate to be possible. Furthermore, I will show Kuhn's incommensurability claim is further undermined when the argument from fundamentally similar meaning is coupled with the subsequent argument:
Argument from Epistemic Peers
Lets return the argument from zombie Newton. I suggested that Kuhn might reply that while zombie Newton might nominally share Einstein's notion of mass, his understanding wouldn't be sufficient to engage in important scientific debate. Such debate wouldn't be possible because zombie Newton's epistemic position would lack all the empirical and theoretic scientific advances since he last dawned his lab coat. Specifically, Einstein was only able to develop his theory because he had a sophisticated particle theory and non-Euclidian geometry, among other concepts foreign to zombie Newton. So, given the paucity of zombie Newton's current background knowledge, it is quite plain that he would not be able to understand everything that Einsteinian mass entails. Consequentially, Kuhn would be right to say they would be speaking past each other.
While semantic incommensurability may be true of zombie Newton, I don't think it would be true of Einstein's contemporaries; that is, his epistemic peers. When Kuhn argues that paradigm shifts are revolutionary, they only appear so because he is narrowly focussing his proverbial microscope on the theories and principles of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. But in engaging in this narrow approach his is excluding from his account the important developments outside of and adjacent to Newtonian physics proper that allowed Einstein to develop his theory. After all, Einstein did not develop his theory ex nihilo. Quite certainly, Einstein's peers would also have been familiar with non-Euclidian geometry and have shared knowledge of the advanced particle theory.
From this fact we make several points against Kuhn. The first is that these adjacent fields of development could act as bridges for Einstein to explain to his Newtonian contemporaries how to derive his theory in terms of theirs. Presumably, these new developments are what allowed him to make his own leap from Newtonian physics; if Einstein used those concepts to move from Newton's model to his own, it seems reasonable that by sharing his reasoning with epistemic peers, others could too. Or at least they could intelligently debate it.
Second, that Einstein's epistemic peers had access to the same relevant advances weakens Kuhn's claim that choice between paradigms cannot be decided by rational debate. Einsteinian physics appeals to non-Euclidian geometry and advanced particle models which, although not part of Newtonian physics, are epistemic considerations from which one can make rational arguments.
Finally, if we acknowledge that Einstein's theory was possible because of important relevant advances in adjacent fields, there is support for the idea that changes new paradigms can be described as cumulative4. While it is true that there was no direct leap from traditional Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, such a move was only possible because of advances in other scientific areas. So, the argument is that since there was a kind of synthesis between Newtonian physics and other areas of science, when viewed through a wide-angle lens, the picture of change looks evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Conclusion
Kuhn proposes that revolutionary science necessarily entails a non-rational choice between two mutually incompatible theories. Furthermore, because paradigms are mutually exclusive and the decision to adopt one over the other isn't rational, science isn't necessarily cumulative and/or progressive. One specific argument he makes for his view is that of semantic incommensurability whereby proponents of competing theories cannot engage in meaningful debate because the theory-ladenness of their respective terms implies they refer to fundamentally different things. They end up speaking past each other.
Conclusion
Kuhn proposes that revolutionary science necessarily entails a non-rational choice between two mutually incompatible theories. Furthermore, because paradigms are mutually exclusive and the decision to adopt one over the other isn't rational, science isn't necessarily cumulative and/or progressive. One specific argument he makes for his view is that of semantic incommensurability whereby proponents of competing theories cannot engage in meaningful debate because the theory-ladenness of their respective terms implies they refer to fundamentally different things. They end up speaking past each other.
In this paper, in the context of Newtonian vs Einsteinian physics, I have argued against there being semantic incommensurability to a degree such that important scientific debate isn't possible between proponents of competing paradigms. In the argument from zombie Newton I suggested it is an empirical fact that meaningful communication does occur between proponents of different paradigms. In the argument from fundamentally similar meaning I showed that the essential meaning of basic terms like time, space, energy, and mass are preserved in significant ways across theories. Finally, I advanced the idea that, in a community of epistemic peers, rational appeal to concepts and principles outside of a paradigm make possible meaningful intra-paradigm discussion.
If, as I suggest, meaningful debate is possible and there is sufficient shared relevant background knowledge, then we should acknowledge that there are bridge concepts and principles. If there are bridge concepts and principles linking an older theory to a new, then there is a case to be made for the evolutionary and cumulative view of science.
Endnotes
1By “normal science” Kuhn means the scientific activity of answering questions and solving problems within a particular paradigm, not resolving disputes between competing paradigms.
2The information on measurements is from my lecture notes from Dr. Richard Creath's class on Quine and Carnap.
3At this point I'm being intentionally vague by employing the term “aspect”. Depending on your metaphysics this could refer to properties, kinds, laws—fill in the blank as you wish. At this point, it is unimportant. I only seek to make the point that measurement is a key activity of science.
4My claim is not that every paradigm shift is evolutionary rather than revolutionary; only that, it is not as improbable as Kuhn makes it out to be. And the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics might be one such instance.
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
Separation of Church and State Part 2: The Establishment Clause and Accommodationist Position
Notes and Thoughts on the Legal Issues Surrounding the Separation of Church and State in the Context of the Establishment Clause
Overview
So, what's the establishment clause? It's the part of the first part of the first amendment that says "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion". The free exercise clause follows it is, "[...] shall make no law impeding the free exercise of religion". The first clause is a guard against there being a state religions and the second forbids the gov't from obstructing people's ability to worship however and whomever they please. So, if someone wants to worship me the gov't can't stop them. Now I just need disciples. I'll be accepting applications.
History
Historically there are two basic reasons for the inclusion of the establishment clause: the first is political, the second is philosophical. Obviously, in reality the latter never would have been considered if not for the former. Enough jibber-jabber. Lets talk about the political reasons.
Prior to the 'mercan revolution the Church of England had been the national state religion. After the 'mercan revolution it was not. Pretty simple so far. But now in Virginia the Baptists held most of the political power. They realized that there were no protections in the Constitution against there being a national religion which they di'int want. Other religious groups realized this too, so basically as a safeguard against one religion taking over, the establishment clause was included.
Here comes the tricky part! Who needs the Quikee Mart? A couple of background points. First, is that up until the 14th Amendment was passed (extending the Bill of Rights, including 1st Amendment, to state laws), the Bill of Rights only applied to Federal laws. But part of the reason why the states had originally ratified the agreement in 178-whatever is because they didn't want federal interference in their state in the religious sphere.
So, it sounds like the signatories were against gov't intervention in religion. Not so. The reality was 6 of the states had official state religions. Ah! Now we see why they really signed. They di'int want their particular state religion to be banned or subjugated by a national religion.
In 1940 when the Supreme Court ruled that the 1st Amendment was included state-level laws, no one really had any issues with the "free exercise clause"--but the establishment clause was going to be a problem. Anytime people have to give up power and privilege there will always be resistance.
Two Arguments Against Extending the Establishment Clause to State Law
There are 2 main arguments against extending the scope of the establishment clause to state law. The first regards original intent. Recall that when the states originally ratified the constitution it was to protect their state religions and religious laws from federal interference. Apparently, in 1947 the Supreme Court acknowledges this fact (I need to read the opinions). Despite this acknowledgment, the court still ruled that the establishment clause extends to the state level (interesting).
The other argument involves individual rights. The argument is that the 14th amendment is only intended to extend the Bill of Rights to prohibitions on government interference with individual rights; that is, what were previously only restrictions on federal gov't laws vis a vis individual rights were now being extended to state laws. However, accommodationists contend that the establishment clause doesn't violate anyone's individual rights. It is not in the domain of individual rights, so it should be exempt from the extension of the Bill of Rights. Extending the establishment clause to state laws is an "unconstitutional" intrusion of the federal gov't into state sovereignty. And we all know how whipped up 'mericans can get when the big bad gov't extends it's powers in any way, shape, or form, including triangles. In 'merica, gov't is always baaaaaaaaaaaaad; especially the federal gov't (except when it provides the services that are required for a modern civilized nation...but lets ignore that).
Interesting. So, it looks like the accommodationists have some technical arguments...but do they have philosophical arguments? I'll keep looking...it'll make a better paper when I crush them!
Overview
So, what's the establishment clause? It's the part of the first part of the first amendment that says "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion". The free exercise clause follows it is, "[...] shall make no law impeding the free exercise of religion". The first clause is a guard against there being a state religions and the second forbids the gov't from obstructing people's ability to worship however and whomever they please. So, if someone wants to worship me the gov't can't stop them. Now I just need disciples. I'll be accepting applications.
History
Historically there are two basic reasons for the inclusion of the establishment clause: the first is political, the second is philosophical. Obviously, in reality the latter never would have been considered if not for the former. Enough jibber-jabber. Lets talk about the political reasons.
Prior to the 'mercan revolution the Church of England had been the national state religion. After the 'mercan revolution it was not. Pretty simple so far. But now in Virginia the Baptists held most of the political power. They realized that there were no protections in the Constitution against there being a national religion which they di'int want. Other religious groups realized this too, so basically as a safeguard against one religion taking over, the establishment clause was included.
Here comes the tricky part! Who needs the Quikee Mart? A couple of background points. First, is that up until the 14th Amendment was passed (extending the Bill of Rights, including 1st Amendment, to state laws), the Bill of Rights only applied to Federal laws. But part of the reason why the states had originally ratified the agreement in 178-whatever is because they didn't want federal interference in their state in the religious sphere.
So, it sounds like the signatories were against gov't intervention in religion. Not so. The reality was 6 of the states had official state religions. Ah! Now we see why they really signed. They di'int want their particular state religion to be banned or subjugated by a national religion.
In 1940 when the Supreme Court ruled that the 1st Amendment was included state-level laws, no one really had any issues with the "free exercise clause"--but the establishment clause was going to be a problem. Anytime people have to give up power and privilege there will always be resistance.
Two Arguments Against Extending the Establishment Clause to State Law
There are 2 main arguments against extending the scope of the establishment clause to state law. The first regards original intent. Recall that when the states originally ratified the constitution it was to protect their state religions and religious laws from federal interference. Apparently, in 1947 the Supreme Court acknowledges this fact (I need to read the opinions). Despite this acknowledgment, the court still ruled that the establishment clause extends to the state level (interesting).
The other argument involves individual rights. The argument is that the 14th amendment is only intended to extend the Bill of Rights to prohibitions on government interference with individual rights; that is, what were previously only restrictions on federal gov't laws vis a vis individual rights were now being extended to state laws. However, accommodationists contend that the establishment clause doesn't violate anyone's individual rights. It is not in the domain of individual rights, so it should be exempt from the extension of the Bill of Rights. Extending the establishment clause to state laws is an "unconstitutional" intrusion of the federal gov't into state sovereignty. And we all know how whipped up 'mericans can get when the big bad gov't extends it's powers in any way, shape, or form, including triangles. In 'merica, gov't is always baaaaaaaaaaaaad; especially the federal gov't (except when it provides the services that are required for a modern civilized nation...but lets ignore that).
Interesting. So, it looks like the accommodationists have some technical arguments...but do they have philosophical arguments? I'll keep looking...it'll make a better paper when I crush them!
Monday, April 2, 2012
Normativity and Misunderstandings: Parfit
Notes and Thoughts on Parfit's "On What Matters", Vol. 2, Chapter on Normativity
Oh! Before we start...Welcome my 100th published post! That's a lot of rambling...Thank you for reading my stuff. Here are a couple of fun facts about my blog:
Total number of visits 6787
Most visits in a month 548 in Feb 2012
Strangest Stat: I've had 250 visits from Russia and 132 from Slovenia (shout out to my readers in Russia and Slovenia!)
Strangest keyword search that directed someone to my blog: "Can virtuous people do Zumba" (directed to my post on Aquinas' "Summa Theologica" which I titled "Zumba Theologica"
Ok, back to philosophy...
Overview
In the last post we talked about the disagreement between Parfit and Williams on whether there is such a thing as intrinsic good. The debate continues but in the context of reasons for action. For Williams having a reason to act means that you have some desire that you act to fulfill. For Parfit reasons are facts that count in favour of (or against) a certain act. You can have a reason to act without having some corresponding desire you seek to fulfill.
Parfit uses an example to illustrate his point. It's called the Early Death example:
Suppose that you know that unless you take a certain medicine, you will die much younger, losing many years of happy life. Though you know this and you have deliberated in a procedurally rational way on this and all of the other relevant fact, you are not motivated to take this medicine.
On Williams view you have no reason to take the medicine because there is nothing in your motivational set (the set of desires, dispositions, tendencies, etc that motivate your actions). On Parfit there are facts that give you good reasons that count in favour of you taking the medicine. The split between the two, in the simplest terms is that for Williams reasons for action must by definition motivate action. For Parfit reasons needn't in themselves motivate actions, but they can count in favour of certain actions when considered by a rational agent.
Ok, I've already jumped into the arguments and we're not even out of the intro yet! I know you're anxious for more, so lets enjoy philosophy! Yay!
[Note: If you get tired of reading what Parfit and Williams say you can skip to the bottom section entitled "My Thoughts"! Regarding my thoughts on the issues, I appreciate any feedback 'cuz it'll help me identify weakness in my future paper on the topic. Thanks!]
Misunderstandings
So, check it. Parfit is all "the problem is that Williams doesn't understand what reasons are". Again, for Williams reasons can only be things that motivate action, and the only things that can motivate action are internal to us (the things in our motivational set). The extension of Williams' position is that it is unintelligible to conceive of an "external" reason; that is, a reason for action that is not part of our pre-existing motivational set (i.e. desires). Now that I think of it, we can say this about Williams' concept of a reason for action:
1. A reason must have motivational force on the agent
2. Since the only things that have motivational force on an agent are elements of his motivational set, all reasons are internal to the agent.
3. Since all reasons are internal, any talk of external reasons for action is stark nonsense.
Case 1
Parfit's all, "dude, you sooooo don't understand what I mean by external reasons". Lets go back to the early deph example. Williams says that when we say that Sick Sam has a reason to take the medicine, it's true that we might mean that it would be better for him to take the medicine. But Williams doesn't think that taking the medicine would be a reason for Sam. The distinction is that other people might perceive the facts of the situation and say that they are reasons for taking the medicine but it doesn't mean that the same facts would be reasons for Sam.
Case 2
Lets use a different example to bring out the distinction. Suppose an unfortunate young girl is raped and gets pregnant as a consequence. For some people all the facts of the situation would be reasons for her to get an abortion. For others, the same facts would not be reasons for an abortion. Suppose the young girl has a motivational set that disposes her toward wanting an abortion. The anti-abortion group can rant and rave about the facts that are reasons for them for why she shouldn't have an abortion.
But Williams would argue that unless the girl has some sort of desire (after rational deliberation) to have a child, these facts won't constitute reasons for her. They don't constitute reasons for her because they don't have any "grip" on her; they can't motivate her to act. They have about as much motivational force on her decision as do the facts about her perpetrators favorite sports team.
Again, Parfit wants to deny that reasons need to have motivational force. He says that reasons are simply facts that count in favour (or against) some action. But it seems we need to ax, reasons for whom? in favour of what? Regarding the latter, ultimately in explaining our actions we will say something like "because doing x is right or good". But good for whom? How do you know?
I think Parit's position seems most plausible when we give uncontroversial examples. Examples where "common sense" would tell us what is good. But Parfit's claim is that there are objective values. There are things that are objectively good. When we give examples where people's intuitions or "common sense" differs, his position becomes less plausible.
I feel like in making this post, I'm repeating myself a lot. Maybe that's because that's what Parfit's doing in this section.
Case 3
I don't know why but I'm going to give one more example to contrast the two positions...Suppose Bob the Bully enjoys hurting others; it gives him more pleasure than anything. It's just the way he's wired. He also believes that he is more important than any other person. His motivational set is such that he doesn't care about the suffering of others at all. There are certain facts that most of us (I hope) could point to that give reasons against acting like Bob. The question is whether Bob would see these facts as reasons against him acting how he does. He might agree that certain things are facts, but, given his psychological make up he probably wouldn't see them as reasons that count against his behaviour.
Of course, Williams position is unappetizing for people who really want to believe in objective right and wrong. We want to say something like, "look, bullying causes suffering and suffering is bad. These facts are reasons against bullying-type behaviour." The problem is that while Bob might agree that bullying causes suffering (i.e., the facts), for him it's not a reason that counts against doing it. Causing suffering makes him happy. Bob has no reason to stop bullying although most people will think that he does. The problem with Bob is that, despite being presented with all the facts, he has no reason to stop bullying.
I just noticed something. When I'm writing Williams' arguments I agree with him, but when I write Parfit's I want to agree with Parfit. Moving on...
Normativity and Why Does It Matter?
So how does this all relate to normativity? In short, normativity for Williams is particular to the agent's psychology. Facts can only be reasons in favour/against something in relation to a particular agent's values and desires. What will constitute a 'reason in favour' for a particular agent is a "psychological prediction" based on their desires and psychological make up. For Parfit reasons are facts in favour/against actions that bring about objectively good/bad things/states.
Resolving this question is important to Parfit because he believes that certain ways of living are intrinsically better than others. How are we supposed to decide how to live our lives if we can't appeal to reasons that are for or against one way or another?
My Thoughts
I partly agree with Parfit that some ways of living are better than others. I'm just not sure that we can say that this is an objective fact. But suppose for a moment that Parfit's right, that there are intrinsically better ways of living than others and that we can appeal to reasons for or against certain ways of living. The problem is that how we respond to facts and states of affairs is a consequence of our evolutionary, biological, psychological, historical, and cultural history. How could we possibly hope to disentangle the facts that we consider to be good reasons from our historical, individuals, cultural, and biological biases? Parfit could reply that that's no reason not to try.
Ok, lets continue with the supposition. How could we possibly adjudicate between differing opinions. I think that part of what makes things 'right' hangs on certain biological facts about humans. For instance, we are social animals thus require some sort of sanction on violence if we are to survive as a species. I'll admit right now I have some Hobbesian tendencies. Now, does the fact that a requirement for sanctions on violence is necessary (which arises out of our biology) make sanctions on violence intrinsically good?
What if the facts of our biology were different. Suppose we were like some strange insect species where the female rips the head of the male in order to procreate. Then would decapitation be an intrinsic good because it arose out of our nature and was necessary for the survival of the species?
Lets set that worry aside. There's another worry I have. There is an assumption in Parfit that all rational individuals would respond the same way to facts that count as reasons in favour of something. This arises out of his assertion that there are intrinsic goods. The idea, I think, is that facts that give us reasons to act in ways that aligne with these intrinsic goods (happiness, compassion, knowledge, etc...) will be reasons for all of us.
Think of it this way. Fact A counts as a reason for an action because the action alignes the individual with some intrinsic good. Every rational person who becomes aware of fact A can acknowledge that fact A is a reason in favour of acting a certain way. But this can only be true if both people recognize the aim of the action as an intrinsic good. I have trouble accepting the idea that there can be such consensus. I think there is something to Williams here in that what we consider 'good' has much to do with our psychological make up.
Consider this example. Suppose I'm walkin' down the street and I see some guy playing an instrument I've never seen before: a kazuba. I think it sounds amazing--a cross between a kazoo and a tuba. I'm totally inspired. I go on the intertubes and look up what it is and order one with an handy instructional DVD. Here's the thing. A hundred other people walk by and none of them think the instrument sounds any good. Non of them order themselves one.
Pafit's reasons story goes something like this. The facts about the sounds of the instrument were reasons in favour me learning to play. But why didn't the others respond to those same facts? Just as I did, they all heard the sweet soothing sounds of the kazuba. The plausible story is something like what Williams says: the facts of that sweet kazuba sound gave me reasons in favour of learning to play because there was something in my psychological make up that made me perceive the kazuba sounds good. If there weren't that particular fact about me, no amount of kazuba sonatas could ever give me reasons in favour of playing the kazuba. The upshot is that what we value is deeply intertwined with who we are as individuals.
Given the wide variety of individuals, it's not unreasonable to suggest that there is a corresponding variety of ways to ascribe values to things and concepts. If it's true that there are differences in how value ascribed to concepts and things, then some facts will count as reasons for for some people, and those same facts might be irrelevant or against an action for other people.
The problem for Parfit is this: It only makes sense to talk about reasons for or against something if that thing has some kind of normative value. But, as Mackie pointed out long ago, there is ample empirical evidence to suggest that there are important normative disagreements between people and cultures. Unless Parfit can give us some guidance and to what these objective normative values are, he going to have a difficult time making his case that there are such things.
Even if he can point to instances of agreement, the fact that there is agreement is not evidence of objectivity. It is only evidence of agreement. Parfit for his part can turn things around and say that the burden of proof lies on the skeptic: that there are moral disagreements is only evidence of disagreement, not that one side isn't right.
Sunday, April 1, 2012
Normative Truth: Good and Bad Reasons. (Parfit)
(apology--I haven't proof read this yet)
Yo, check it. I think I might actually have my paper topic for metaFX. Stop. That would be the best DJ name for a philosopher ever, DJ metaFX. Anyway, I is going to talk about whever der is such ting as normativity in reasons--that is, whether there's such a ting as a good, bad, right, or wrong reason for axion.
Parfit's Preamble on Disagreements
This is an intensely personal section where Parit shares his personal reasons for his quest to determine what matters in life. The main point, however, is that if we find ourselves in disagreement with someone over a moral issue, the standard assumption is that there is some sort of asymmetry. Maybe the person with whom we disagree doesn't have sufficient cognitive capacity to see the correct answer, or maybe they just don't have all the right facts. But, those types of disagreements can be explained away.
The difficult disagreements are with those that we consider our epistemic peers. The people who are also on a whole. nuva. level. wif us. Aaaand they have all same facts as us. In cases of epistemic symmetry there is no rational reason to suppose our belief is any more correct than our friend's. What do? The only thing we can do is to assume that there is an asymmetry in knowledge or capacity somewhere. But how do we know it's not us that is in the weaker position? Answer: we don't. Oh! Snap!
An example of one of these beliefs is retributive justice. Parfit doesn't think anyone deserves to suffer ever. To support his view he has to find the asymmetry responsible for his epistemic peers' views to the contrary. To support his position Parfit suggests that belief in retributive justice may be a case "in which an evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains".
His argument goes that evolution explains why people have reactive attitudes and the desire to inflict harm. But the fact that these emotions and reaction arise out of the evolutionary process demonstrates that such attitudes are not responses to reasons. They are simply reactions. In other words, just because we have an impulse, doesn't mean the action for which we have the impulse is a right action, or that an emotional reaction isn't justification for an action's being right. Something akin the naturalistic fallacy is going on up in hur.
The upshot of the section is that he has deep disagreements with some of his epistemic peers so in order to determine whether his view is correct, rather than his peers, he needs to discover the asymmetries between them.
Parfit on Williams
Parfit has great reverence for Williams and it disturbs him that their moral views are so divergent. A central issue between them is whether there is such a thing as an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good is something that isn't good because of any consequences derived from its acquisition rather it is good in itself. A standard example would be happiness. We don't pursue happiness for any other reason than happiness itself is good. Contrast that with money. We don't pursue money just to have it, but because it allows us to obtain other things we might value like Ed Hardy shirts--which are intrinsically ugly.
So, why is Parfit so pre-occupied by Williams' rejection of the notion of intrinsic good? Because, without this notion Parit doesn't think we can answer the first question of philosophy: Are we human or are we dancer? Not only that, but we also can't answer the "other" first question of philosophy, "how ought we to live our lives/which kind of life do I have the most reason to live?"
You see, if we have nothing with absolute value to pursue, then not only can we not know at what we should aim our own actions but there will be no grounds by which we might judge the actions/life choices of others. If all values are relative, then the person who pursues a life of causing suffering for others is on equal normative footing as someone who spends their life pursuing justice, happiness, knowledge, and love. For Parfit we need some objective normative truths in order to know what reasons should count in favour or against engaging in an action.
For Williams the notion of an intrinsic good is inexplicable. If something were to be intrinsically good-- that is, its essence was goodness--then its goodness should be explainable in advance of human valuation. This is close to my position. I don't understand how something is intrinsically good, devoid of any context. I understand the notion if we say something like "justice and happiness are intrinsically good for humans". Without humans would justice and happiness be good? Are justice and happiness also good for ants and bacteria? It seems that these values are only positive in relation to the benefits they bring to humans (in a community).
Someone like Parfit might reply that bacteria and ants don't have the capacity for happiness and goodness, so my counter-example is irrelevant. That's an objection I'll have to reply to.
But enough about me, lets go back to Williams' argument which is very similar to my own thought, but obviously more sophisticated! He says that if something has intrinsic goodness then we should not be able to explain its goodness by saying we value it. So, I can't say that love is good because I value it. It has to be the other way around; I must say of something that has intrinsic value that I value it because of its intrinsic goodness. In the case of love, I need to say that I value love because it is good. In essence we are saying that something (e.g. love) is good because it is good. This seems a little tautologous.
The suggestion might be that we should value things such as virtue, justice, and happiness because of the other properties that make them good. Plato says justice is good because it creates harmony. But just like Palin, Williams refudiates this view too.
Before we get into Williams' argument there, lets return to Parfit's view of reasons. He says:
When we call something intrinsically good in the reason-implying sense, we mean that this thing has intrinsic properties that would or might give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, or trying achieve this thing.
The basic idea is that certain facts about the world will give us reasons to act in a certain way. For example, it is a fact that helping an old lady across the street will make her happy and will be kind. Both of those things are intrinsically good--those are facts! Those facts give me reasons to act. If there were no facts about the intrinsic goodness of happiness and kindness, I'd have no reason to act one way or the other. A central idea is that facts create reasons for a determinate action.
Reasons Internalism Vs. Reason Externalism
Williams thinks this is all claptrap. He adopts the "Humean" model of action. The basic idea is that I have a predetermined set of desires, dispositions, character traits, etc called the motivational set...the only way we can explain action is by reference to my motivational set. If I say I want to study, but I procrastinate on facebook instead, then my dominant desire was to make witty comments on facebook. Every time I ask "why did I do x" the answer will be "to satisfy some desire in my motivational set". A consequence of this view is that, logically, we can't act in a way that isn't in accordance with something our pre-existing motivational set.
Parfit sees things differently. He says that facts about the world give us reasons to have new desires (if we are sufficiently rational and reflexive). For example, maybe I see an old lady trying to cross the street on my way to work. For whatever reason Zeus (the one TRUE god) gave me a motivational set that lacks the desire to help her across the street. My friend sees that I didn't help her then explains to me why it's good to help old ladies across the street. He states facts about kindness and compassion that give me reasons to include the desire to help many old ladies across many streets. And I dedicate the rest of my life to helping old ladies across streets. The end.
From Parfit's position Williams' view is tragic for humanity. If all that can motivate action are pre-existing desires, then it is pointless to ask what kind of life we ought to live. All we can do is internally reflect on our motivational set and decide which desires we weigh more than others. There is no point in asking what things are important or what we should care about. It is a sad state of affairs indeed.
I have to say that while my philosophical sympathies are with Williams, Parfit paints a much nicer picture. Those in the Williams camp can claim that they are simply doing psychology. It doesn't make sense to say that someone acted in a way that didn't accord with one of their desires. Note that Williams' view doesn't necessarily imply profligate behaviour. Most people have in their motivational set the desire to act in accordance with whatever they consider to be moral.
Moral Disagreement
But I want to set that debate aside and turn to another issue. This notion of normatively--of intrinsic value. It's all fine and dandy to say that this and that are intrinsically good or bad, but what do we do in cases of disagreement? Certainly there are cases where people disagree. Some people think allowing individuals to end their own lives is a good thing, others think it's baaaaaaad. Because Parfit believes in intrinsic values, in such cases someone must be wrong. It's not a matter of, "well, for person A's community it's ok and for person B's community it's not". Nope. Someone is wrong. And it ain't me!
Lets suppose Parfit is right and there are objective moral values. What do we do in cases of disagreement, especially when er'body has all the same facts? It seems that the only way to choose between the two positions, given equal epistemic positions, is to presuppose a meta-theory of value. In other words, suppose I give the reason "dignity is da best" for my position and you give yours "suicide is the da worst". Now we need a theory of value to determine which values to value more. But then someone comes along and gives a contrary theory of how we should weigh values. Now we need a meta-meta theory to adjudicate between those two theories.
The bottom line is this: once we say there is objective normative value, in a moral dispute given epistemic parity, there is no way to decide which reason for action we should prefer unless we further presuppose a meta-theory of values.
I didn't really explain that too well but I hope you get the point...
Wacky Mackie and Wile E. Coyote
Ok, one last thing. What's the solution to this? I think Mackie's error theory is the solution. Here's what he says. When I say this is good or this is bad, I mean what I say but my statements are false. There is no such thing as good and bad. Oh! Snap! The world is going to end! Er'body hide your wife, hide your kids, hide your husband cuz they b rapin' er'body up here!
Hold on. Ain't nobody gong b climbin' in ur windows. Here's Mackie's idea. Just because moral statements are all false doesn't mean that we need to throw away morality. Morality and moral concepts serve a very useful purpose. Just cuz there's no such thing as objective good or bad is no reason to go rapin' er'body in here. Think of it like this. (Some people might disgree with this example but I'll try to come up with others later). Numbers. What are they? Can you touch them? Do they exist? No. They are concepts. Very useful ones at that. We don't stop using them just because they don't exist in any real sense. We can do the same with moral concepts like "good", "right", "bad", and "wrong". Nothing is really intrinsically good or bad, but these are certainly useful concepts.
One interesting consequence of this view is that we are a little like Wile E. Coyote before he realized he's run off a cliff. We act as if these concepts are real and so long as we don't look down, we should be fine!
Any and all criticisms are welcome as it will give me content for my paper. Thank you for reading.
Yo, check it. I think I might actually have my paper topic for metaFX. Stop. That would be the best DJ name for a philosopher ever, DJ metaFX. Anyway, I is going to talk about whever der is such ting as normativity in reasons--that is, whether there's such a ting as a good, bad, right, or wrong reason for axion.
Parfit's Preamble on Disagreements
This is an intensely personal section where Parit shares his personal reasons for his quest to determine what matters in life. The main point, however, is that if we find ourselves in disagreement with someone over a moral issue, the standard assumption is that there is some sort of asymmetry. Maybe the person with whom we disagree doesn't have sufficient cognitive capacity to see the correct answer, or maybe they just don't have all the right facts. But, those types of disagreements can be explained away.
The difficult disagreements are with those that we consider our epistemic peers. The people who are also on a whole. nuva. level. wif us. Aaaand they have all same facts as us. In cases of epistemic symmetry there is no rational reason to suppose our belief is any more correct than our friend's. What do? The only thing we can do is to assume that there is an asymmetry in knowledge or capacity somewhere. But how do we know it's not us that is in the weaker position? Answer: we don't. Oh! Snap!
An example of one of these beliefs is retributive justice. Parfit doesn't think anyone deserves to suffer ever. To support his view he has to find the asymmetry responsible for his epistemic peers' views to the contrary. To support his position Parfit suggests that belief in retributive justice may be a case "in which an evolutionary explanation helps to undermine what it explains".
His argument goes that evolution explains why people have reactive attitudes and the desire to inflict harm. But the fact that these emotions and reaction arise out of the evolutionary process demonstrates that such attitudes are not responses to reasons. They are simply reactions. In other words, just because we have an impulse, doesn't mean the action for which we have the impulse is a right action, or that an emotional reaction isn't justification for an action's being right. Something akin the naturalistic fallacy is going on up in hur.
The upshot of the section is that he has deep disagreements with some of his epistemic peers so in order to determine whether his view is correct, rather than his peers, he needs to discover the asymmetries between them.
Parfit on Williams
Parfit has great reverence for Williams and it disturbs him that their moral views are so divergent. A central issue between them is whether there is such a thing as an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good is something that isn't good because of any consequences derived from its acquisition rather it is good in itself. A standard example would be happiness. We don't pursue happiness for any other reason than happiness itself is good. Contrast that with money. We don't pursue money just to have it, but because it allows us to obtain other things we might value like Ed Hardy shirts--which are intrinsically ugly.
So, why is Parfit so pre-occupied by Williams' rejection of the notion of intrinsic good? Because, without this notion Parit doesn't think we can answer the first question of philosophy: Are we human or are we dancer? Not only that, but we also can't answer the "other" first question of philosophy, "how ought we to live our lives/which kind of life do I have the most reason to live?"
You see, if we have nothing with absolute value to pursue, then not only can we not know at what we should aim our own actions but there will be no grounds by which we might judge the actions/life choices of others. If all values are relative, then the person who pursues a life of causing suffering for others is on equal normative footing as someone who spends their life pursuing justice, happiness, knowledge, and love. For Parfit we need some objective normative truths in order to know what reasons should count in favour or against engaging in an action.
For Williams the notion of an intrinsic good is inexplicable. If something were to be intrinsically good-- that is, its essence was goodness--then its goodness should be explainable in advance of human valuation. This is close to my position. I don't understand how something is intrinsically good, devoid of any context. I understand the notion if we say something like "justice and happiness are intrinsically good for humans". Without humans would justice and happiness be good? Are justice and happiness also good for ants and bacteria? It seems that these values are only positive in relation to the benefits they bring to humans (in a community).
Someone like Parfit might reply that bacteria and ants don't have the capacity for happiness and goodness, so my counter-example is irrelevant. That's an objection I'll have to reply to.
But enough about me, lets go back to Williams' argument which is very similar to my own thought, but obviously more sophisticated! He says that if something has intrinsic goodness then we should not be able to explain its goodness by saying we value it. So, I can't say that love is good because I value it. It has to be the other way around; I must say of something that has intrinsic value that I value it because of its intrinsic goodness. In the case of love, I need to say that I value love because it is good. In essence we are saying that something (e.g. love) is good because it is good. This seems a little tautologous.
The suggestion might be that we should value things such as virtue, justice, and happiness because of the other properties that make them good. Plato says justice is good because it creates harmony. But just like Palin, Williams refudiates this view too.
Before we get into Williams' argument there, lets return to Parfit's view of reasons. He says:
When we call something intrinsically good in the reason-implying sense, we mean that this thing has intrinsic properties that would or might give us or others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive way, such as wanting, choosing, or trying achieve this thing.
The basic idea is that certain facts about the world will give us reasons to act in a certain way. For example, it is a fact that helping an old lady across the street will make her happy and will be kind. Both of those things are intrinsically good--those are facts! Those facts give me reasons to act. If there were no facts about the intrinsic goodness of happiness and kindness, I'd have no reason to act one way or the other. A central idea is that facts create reasons for a determinate action.
Reasons Internalism Vs. Reason Externalism
Williams thinks this is all claptrap. He adopts the "Humean" model of action. The basic idea is that I have a predetermined set of desires, dispositions, character traits, etc called the motivational set...the only way we can explain action is by reference to my motivational set. If I say I want to study, but I procrastinate on facebook instead, then my dominant desire was to make witty comments on facebook. Every time I ask "why did I do x" the answer will be "to satisfy some desire in my motivational set". A consequence of this view is that, logically, we can't act in a way that isn't in accordance with something our pre-existing motivational set.
Parfit sees things differently. He says that facts about the world give us reasons to have new desires (if we are sufficiently rational and reflexive). For example, maybe I see an old lady trying to cross the street on my way to work. For whatever reason Zeus (the one TRUE god) gave me a motivational set that lacks the desire to help her across the street. My friend sees that I didn't help her then explains to me why it's good to help old ladies across the street. He states facts about kindness and compassion that give me reasons to include the desire to help many old ladies across many streets. And I dedicate the rest of my life to helping old ladies across streets. The end.
From Parfit's position Williams' view is tragic for humanity. If all that can motivate action are pre-existing desires, then it is pointless to ask what kind of life we ought to live. All we can do is internally reflect on our motivational set and decide which desires we weigh more than others. There is no point in asking what things are important or what we should care about. It is a sad state of affairs indeed.
I have to say that while my philosophical sympathies are with Williams, Parfit paints a much nicer picture. Those in the Williams camp can claim that they are simply doing psychology. It doesn't make sense to say that someone acted in a way that didn't accord with one of their desires. Note that Williams' view doesn't necessarily imply profligate behaviour. Most people have in their motivational set the desire to act in accordance with whatever they consider to be moral.
Moral Disagreement
But I want to set that debate aside and turn to another issue. This notion of normatively--of intrinsic value. It's all fine and dandy to say that this and that are intrinsically good or bad, but what do we do in cases of disagreement? Certainly there are cases where people disagree. Some people think allowing individuals to end their own lives is a good thing, others think it's baaaaaaad. Because Parfit believes in intrinsic values, in such cases someone must be wrong. It's not a matter of, "well, for person A's community it's ok and for person B's community it's not". Nope. Someone is wrong. And it ain't me!
Lets suppose Parfit is right and there are objective moral values. What do we do in cases of disagreement, especially when er'body has all the same facts? It seems that the only way to choose between the two positions, given equal epistemic positions, is to presuppose a meta-theory of value. In other words, suppose I give the reason "dignity is da best" for my position and you give yours "suicide is the da worst". Now we need a theory of value to determine which values to value more. But then someone comes along and gives a contrary theory of how we should weigh values. Now we need a meta-meta theory to adjudicate between those two theories.
The bottom line is this: once we say there is objective normative value, in a moral dispute given epistemic parity, there is no way to decide which reason for action we should prefer unless we further presuppose a meta-theory of values.
I didn't really explain that too well but I hope you get the point...
Wacky Mackie and Wile E. Coyote
Ok, one last thing. What's the solution to this? I think Mackie's error theory is the solution. Here's what he says. When I say this is good or this is bad, I mean what I say but my statements are false. There is no such thing as good and bad. Oh! Snap! The world is going to end! Er'body hide your wife, hide your kids, hide your husband cuz they b rapin' er'body up here!
Hold on. Ain't nobody gong b climbin' in ur windows. Here's Mackie's idea. Just because moral statements are all false doesn't mean that we need to throw away morality. Morality and moral concepts serve a very useful purpose. Just cuz there's no such thing as objective good or bad is no reason to go rapin' er'body in here. Think of it like this. (Some people might disgree with this example but I'll try to come up with others later). Numbers. What are they? Can you touch them? Do they exist? No. They are concepts. Very useful ones at that. We don't stop using them just because they don't exist in any real sense. We can do the same with moral concepts like "good", "right", "bad", and "wrong". Nothing is really intrinsically good or bad, but these are certainly useful concepts.
One interesting consequence of this view is that we are a little like Wile E. Coyote before he realized he's run off a cliff. We act as if these concepts are real and so long as we don't look down, we should be fine!
Any and all criticisms are welcome as it will give me content for my paper. Thank you for reading.
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Separation of Church and State: The Lemon Test
Pre-amble
As I mentioned in my previous entry, most of my posts from now until the end of the semester will be me (who else?) contemplating and trying out ideas for essays. Basically, I'm apologizing in advance for what might end up as "rambling". For my philosophy of law paper I'm thinking of doing something about interpretation of the 1st Amendment clause concerning establishment of religion. Originally, I thought I'd focus on this issue in relation to attempts to get creationism into the science curriculum but I fear that the content will be too heavily weighted towards legal interpretation rather than philosophical analysis. Anyhow, I'm thinking about looking at the philosophical issues surrounding why the establishment clause was originally written into the Bill of Rights, the different ways it is interpreted, and the philosophical implications of each interpretation, and which interpretation best accomplishes the philosophical aims of the clause.
Also something went crazy with the layout so I apologize for that.
Intro the First Amendment Regarding Establishment of Religion
The First Amendment (in the context of religion) is often referred to as the establishment clause because it prohibits Congress congress from making any law respecting the establishment of any religion and impeding free exercise of religion. (Note, it has been extended to laws at the state level since 1925).
Before we put on our philosopher beards, lets look at the actual law:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (then some
shit about free speech, freedom of the press, assembly,
blah, blah, blah).
So, what's the point of the law? It seems it's to make it so
government neither promotes one religion over another or
interferes in anyone's ability to practix their religion of choice, and
maybe to secure freedom from being coerced into a particular
religion.
The clauses work together in that if government were to enact
policy that gave preference to one religion (or branch of a
religion), it would be a hop, skip, and a jump away from
interfering others' ability to practix their own religion.
Conversely, by interfering in someone's/some group's ability to
practix religion, they'd be tacitly endorsing others.
There are lots of instances where the manner in which this law
should be applied is pretty clear, and we never hear about those
because they never make it to court. There are however other
instances where it's not so clear how or if the establishment clause
applies.
Two Interpretations
There are 2 basic interpretations of the law: the separationist and
the accommodationist. Obviously, the separationist view is that
there should be a strict separation of Church and State. The
modern separationist interpretation (the standard one) was first
invoked in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman. In this case private
religious-based schools were axing for money to supplement
teachers' salaries who taught secular content. Out of this case
arose what is called the Lemon test. The purpose of the test is to
determine whether a proposed piece of legislation constitutes the
establishment of religion, thereby violating the establishment
clause.
The Lemon Test
Here it is--check it!
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; third, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Regarding the first section, it is noted that a law can also have
religious motivations and still be constitutional, but it's primary
purpose must be secular. The second section is self-explanatory.
The third has faced the most criticism and has been interpreted
various ways.
One interpretation of the third part is that it is only the effects of
the proposed law that cannot bring about Church-State
entanglement. For example, most "Church" charities are actually
largely funded by the government. Because government doesn't
administrate or regulate the charities (possible problem?) these
types of policies have not been interpreted as "excessively"
entangling gov't with religion.
Another consideration in interpreting the third section of the
Lemon test is the purpose of the law. Hospitals and universities
are institutions considered to have secular purposes, for this
reason, a law which approves funding to such institutions even if
they have religious affiliations can be (and has been) considered
permissible.
Accommodationists
One can make the argument that accommodationists are "less
concerned about the dangers of establishment and less concerned
to protect free exercise rights, particularly of religious minorities."
Basically, as I mentioned before, if you give an advantage to one
religious group it is very easy for smaller groups to be prejudiced
against and not be able to compete for souls on a level playing
field. Er'body knows that whatever religion ends up with the most
souls wins. It's unfair for gov't to help one team while not helping
others.
The accommodationist position is best summarized by the opinion
of Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson: "Accommodationists read
the establishment clause as prohibiting Congress from declaring a
national religion or preferring one to another, but laws do not have
to be shorn of morality and history to be declared constitutional".
They apply Lemon only selectively because "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being".
Oy! Where to begin! For my paper I'm going to attack the clause
"do not have to be shorn of morality and history" because a) the
(absurd) implication is that the is no morality without religion (or
that our moral values are derived from religion) and b) that this is
what the writers of the constitution intended and/or that this
interpretation is implied by the historical circumstances at the time
of the writing. It seems Justice Douglas is taking liberties with his
psycho-analysis of James Madison.
Obviously, the claim that the US gov't institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being is also pretty loony. Suppose it is true. What does
that tell us about our sexual preference? Exactly, it's irrelevant.
Someone please tell me how the existence or non-existence of a
Supreme being is relevant to EPA legislation.
Arguments for Interpretation
I should add that the separationists, to support their position,
appeal to one of Jefferson's letters in which he uses the phrase and
advocates the view of "separation of church and state". Also in
1879 Chief Justice Waite consulted with historian G. Bancroft to
discuss Madison's (author of the 1st Amendment) "Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments". In that petition
Madison proposes there should be "a great barrier" between
Church and State.
This brings up the issue of how interpretation is done in
constitutional law: do you strictly interpret the letter of the law in
the way it would have been understood in its era? Or do you make
allowances with the understanding that what made sense in one era
might not now, and that law-makers can't foresee all future
circumstances.
Maybe you argue for interpretation based on intent, but how do
you know the authors intent? Do you have a time-travel machine
and a mind reading machine? It is almost certain that our own
biases will be read into how we "interpret" the intent of a
lawmaker.
Anyway, I think this is a productive start. I think I'll go though
some of the major trials and read judges opinions and go from
there. I welcome any comments or suggestions. Thanks for
putting up for the scattered writing...
G'nite!
By the by, if you're interested in reading G. Madison's "Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments" here's the link
(it's not very long):
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html
As I mentioned in my previous entry, most of my posts from now until the end of the semester will be me (who else?) contemplating and trying out ideas for essays. Basically, I'm apologizing in advance for what might end up as "rambling". For my philosophy of law paper I'm thinking of doing something about interpretation of the 1st Amendment clause concerning establishment of religion. Originally, I thought I'd focus on this issue in relation to attempts to get creationism into the science curriculum but I fear that the content will be too heavily weighted towards legal interpretation rather than philosophical analysis. Anyhow, I'm thinking about looking at the philosophical issues surrounding why the establishment clause was originally written into the Bill of Rights, the different ways it is interpreted, and the philosophical implications of each interpretation, and which interpretation best accomplishes the philosophical aims of the clause.
Also something went crazy with the layout so I apologize for that.
Intro the First Amendment Regarding Establishment of Religion
The First Amendment (in the context of religion) is often referred to as the establishment clause because it prohibits Congress congress from making any law respecting the establishment of any religion and impeding free exercise of religion. (Note, it has been extended to laws at the state level since 1925).
Before we put on our philosopher beards, lets look at the actual law:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (then some
shit about free speech, freedom of the press, assembly,
blah, blah, blah).
So, what's the point of the law? It seems it's to make it so
government neither promotes one religion over another or
interferes in anyone's ability to practix their religion of choice, and
maybe to secure freedom from being coerced into a particular
religion.
The clauses work together in that if government were to enact
policy that gave preference to one religion (or branch of a
religion), it would be a hop, skip, and a jump away from
interfering others' ability to practix their own religion.
Conversely, by interfering in someone's/some group's ability to
practix religion, they'd be tacitly endorsing others.
There are lots of instances where the manner in which this law
should be applied is pretty clear, and we never hear about those
because they never make it to court. There are however other
instances where it's not so clear how or if the establishment clause
applies.
Two Interpretations
There are 2 basic interpretations of the law: the separationist and
the accommodationist. Obviously, the separationist view is that
there should be a strict separation of Church and State. The
modern separationist interpretation (the standard one) was first
invoked in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman. In this case private
religious-based schools were axing for money to supplement
teachers' salaries who taught secular content. Out of this case
arose what is called the Lemon test. The purpose of the test is to
determine whether a proposed piece of legislation constitutes the
establishment of religion, thereby violating the establishment
clause.
The Lemon Test
Here it is--check it!
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; third, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Regarding the first section, it is noted that a law can also have
religious motivations and still be constitutional, but it's primary
purpose must be secular. The second section is self-explanatory.
The third has faced the most criticism and has been interpreted
various ways.
One interpretation of the third part is that it is only the effects of
the proposed law that cannot bring about Church-State
entanglement. For example, most "Church" charities are actually
largely funded by the government. Because government doesn't
administrate or regulate the charities (possible problem?) these
types of policies have not been interpreted as "excessively"
entangling gov't with religion.
Another consideration in interpreting the third section of the
Lemon test is the purpose of the law. Hospitals and universities
are institutions considered to have secular purposes, for this
reason, a law which approves funding to such institutions even if
they have religious affiliations can be (and has been) considered
permissible.
Accommodationists
One can make the argument that accommodationists are "less
concerned about the dangers of establishment and less concerned
to protect free exercise rights, particularly of religious minorities."
Basically, as I mentioned before, if you give an advantage to one
religious group it is very easy for smaller groups to be prejudiced
against and not be able to compete for souls on a level playing
field. Er'body knows that whatever religion ends up with the most
souls wins. It's unfair for gov't to help one team while not helping
others.
The accommodationist position is best summarized by the opinion
of Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson: "Accommodationists read
the establishment clause as prohibiting Congress from declaring a
national religion or preferring one to another, but laws do not have
to be shorn of morality and history to be declared constitutional".
They apply Lemon only selectively because "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being".
Oy! Where to begin! For my paper I'm going to attack the clause
"do not have to be shorn of morality and history" because a) the
(absurd) implication is that the is no morality without religion (or
that our moral values are derived from religion) and b) that this is
what the writers of the constitution intended and/or that this
interpretation is implied by the historical circumstances at the time
of the writing. It seems Justice Douglas is taking liberties with his
psycho-analysis of James Madison.
Obviously, the claim that the US gov't institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being is also pretty loony. Suppose it is true. What does
that tell us about our sexual preference? Exactly, it's irrelevant.
Someone please tell me how the existence or non-existence of a
Supreme being is relevant to EPA legislation.
Arguments for Interpretation
I should add that the separationists, to support their position,
appeal to one of Jefferson's letters in which he uses the phrase and
advocates the view of "separation of church and state". Also in
1879 Chief Justice Waite consulted with historian G. Bancroft to
discuss Madison's (author of the 1st Amendment) "Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments". In that petition
Madison proposes there should be "a great barrier" between
Church and State.
This brings up the issue of how interpretation is done in
constitutional law: do you strictly interpret the letter of the law in
the way it would have been understood in its era? Or do you make
allowances with the understanding that what made sense in one era
might not now, and that law-makers can't foresee all future
circumstances.
Maybe you argue for interpretation based on intent, but how do
you know the authors intent? Do you have a time-travel machine
and a mind reading machine? It is almost certain that our own
biases will be read into how we "interpret" the intent of a
lawmaker.
Anyway, I think this is a productive start. I think I'll go though
some of the major trials and read judges opinions and go from
there. I welcome any comments or suggestions. Thanks for
putting up for the scattered writing...
G'nite!
By the by, if you're interested in reading G. Madison's "Memorial
and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments" here's the link
(it's not very long):
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html
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