I been having this weird experience of questioning the value of studying philosophy. Well, not so much for me personally, but for people who are not already interested. Here's the thing: I, like pretty much anyone who teaches and studies philosophy, am passionate about it. There's clearly no need to sell me on it. The problem is that I realized that the things I find interesting and important about philosophy might not be interesting and important to those on the outside. It's kind of like your favorite food or TV show: It's hard to conceive of why anyone wouldn't find them to be great or at least see the value in them.
Over the summer semester I'm teaching a 101 class. As with most 101 classes, I begin with epistemology. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Two of the traditional main questions are (1) what is knowledge? (E.g., what's the difference between simply believing something and knowing something) and (2) what can we know? (E.g., it seems that many beliefs that were previously held to be true can end up being false, so is there a way to systematically decide before hand which are likely to be true or false). A third issue I include in my class is the issue of justification: What conditions have to be met before we can say someone's belief is justified.
As I was preparing my lectures I started to ask myself why should Joe-Shmo care about what knowledge is? Or what we truly can or can't know? Or what counts as a justified belief? I was actually in the middle of my lecture today when these doubts came to a head, in my head.
We were discussing whether a person who holds a belief has to have conscious access to the reason why his belief is justified in order for the belief to be justified. Let's back up a step. Intuitively, or at least historically, we think that in order for someone to hold a justified belief they have to be able to provide some sort of argument for why they hold the belief. That is, they have to be able to provide the justification. If you asked someone "why do you believe X?" and they answered "I don't know but it's justified" most of us would think that this person's belief couldn't possible by justified. They have no reason supporting why they believe what they believe. This, by the way, is called "internalism" (the reason why a belief is justified to the believer must be consciously accessible to the believer at the time he is asked to justify the belief).
But hold on a tick. Suppose you do a logic puzzle and the answer turns out to be "yes". Your belief that the answer is "yes" is justified by the logical proof that you performed. The process of following the rules of logic yielded the answer. 10 years later someone gives you the same logic puzzle but you don't remember how to do the logic part to get the answer. You do however remember that the answer is "yes" although you have no idea how you got that answer: in fact, you don't even remember if you even did the proof or if someone else had just told you the answer. Are you justified in believing that the answer is "yes"? Most of us would say "yes". So, it seems that you can have a justified belief that the believer can't in the moment provide a justification for. This is called "externalism" (the justification for a belief can be external to the believer's consciousness).
Anyhow, as you can see, it all gets very abstract very fast. As we got bogged down in this I noticed some of the students tuning out. It was it this point I had my little internal panic attack. Does what I have devoted my life to have value to anyone outside of the profession? Why should these people care about this?
Answer 1
One common response (aside from "who cares) to these seemingly esoteric debates is subjectivism: Whatever counts as justification for you is fine and whatever counts as justification for me is fine. There are a couple of problems with this: First of all it's not a solution: it's surrender. The second is that no one seriously believes this.
Everyday we are bombarded with information. Why do we choose to believe some of that information reject other parts of it? We don't randomly decide what to belief and what not to (well....actually, most of the time we just go with whatever confirms our biases but lets restrict this to deliberative inquiry). If someone came to us for advice on what they should and should not believe, no one would think it's good advice to say "it doesn't matter why you believe something--just believe whatever you like."
Here is why epistemology matters: Ultimately we have to figure out how we are going to live our lives. The decisions we make will directly influence the quality of our lives. But the decisions we make are a direct result of what we [choose to] believe and don't [choose to] believe. If we have no principled way to distinguish between something we have good reason to believe and something for which we don't, we will very easily make poorly informed decisions about how to live our lives and how to treat others which will in turn directly impact the quality of our life.
In short, your beliefs are more likely to be true if they have good justifying reasons supporting them. But if you have no principles or rules for what distinguish a good justification for a bad one (or none at all) you'll be in for a rough ride. Before you can act you must have beliefs and the "truthiness" of your beliefs will determine the quality of your action and its likelihood of producing the desired result. For this reason, it's important for everyone to study the properties of good and bad justification.
If you don't at least spend some time thinking about what you can and cannot know and to what degree of certainty before entering other domains of knowledge, you might be on a fools errand. If you seek knowledge about something which is impossible know, yet you failed to reflect on this beforehand, you just wasted (part of) your life.
Answer 2:
Beyond the general answer to why epistemology matters let's return to why we should care about the abstract and esoteric issue of internalist justification vs externalist justification.
Click on the link and watch the video:
Ok, so if you didn't have a chance to watch the entire video here is the most relevant point:
72% of wrongful convictions that are later overturned by DNA evidence are a result of eyewitness testimony.
Consider Jennifer Thompson's testimony. Pretty convincing right? She has access to all the justifications for her belief about who raped her. From the point of view of internalism, she is justified in her belief. Now, lets consider the same situation from the point of view of an externalist. We know that the process of eye-witness memory and testimony is unreliable, in fact, it's very unreliable. So, if we adopt an externalist model of justification, we ought to reject Jennifer's testimony. It isn't a justified belief.
Our preferred philosophical theory of epistemic justification has huge practical implications in many domains, and it is made most readily apparent in the court of law. As a thought experiment, think about the practical consequences to your area of expertise of applying one theory of justification vs another. You'll likely find there are important consequences.
Epistemology matters.
Ok, I feel a bit better now. Back to grading reflections.
Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
Sunday, September 8, 2013
What is a Justified Belief? Goldman and Reliablism
Introduction and Context
"A topic that ain't given no 'spect"
---Renowned Philosopher D. Gurney
Introduction and Context
So far we've been looking at Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley's account of what is possible for us to know. Common to all their accounts is that in order for our beliefs to be justified, we have to be able to offer some sort of argument. You just can't go running around saying you believe there are tables and chairs without any supporting argument!
In other words, traditionally, justification for a belief entails that the believer
(1) has an argument/reason (i.e., justification) for why they hold their belief,
(2) has conscious access to the justification for their belief,
(3) can present that justification when asked for it.
Goldman disagrees.
He denies 1, 2, and 3!
"A process reliable,
makes justification undeniable,
That defines it for me!"
If you aren't a master at poetic interpretation, Goldman's reliablism is that justification for a belief is a function of the reliability of the process that created the belief. That is, if a belief is acquired through a process that reliably produces more true beliefs than false beliefs, then the believer has a justified belief.
Now here's the crazy part. It doesn't matter if a particular belief produced from a reliable process is false. Reliable processes can sometimes produce false beliefs. To qualify as a reliable process, the process needn't produce true beliefs 100% of the time. This standard is too high. All that is needed is that, in the long run, the process produces more true beliefs than false ones.
To many who see rationality as central to justification, this is a philosophical outrage! To make matters worse, Goldman's going to agree with Gettier in that justification and knowledge are not one and the same: You can have a belief that is justified but that is not knowledge! Before we go on a rampage, leaving behind us a smoldering trail of broken collections of sense-data, let's hear Goldman out...
Vocabulary:
Ok, I lied. We're not going to look at Goldman right away because we first need to cover some vocabulary and explain the alphabet soup of some technical philosophical writing.
Lets get the vocabulary out of the way first:
Explanans vs explanadum (explanada for plural): This is really just a fancy way of referring to the explanation and the-thing-you-are-trying-to-explain. So, explanandum is the thing we're trying to explain; in this case, we're trying to explain what it means for a belief to be justified. The explanans is the explanation that we use to to give an account of the thing we're trying to explain (i.e., the explanandum). Anyhow, these words pop up sometimes in academic philosophy so they're good to know...and now you can impress your friends! (E.g., "What do you suppose the explanans is for why so-and-so broke up?")
Philosophy Alphabet Soup
In contemporary philosophy there can be a lot of "alphabet soup" depending on the philosopher. Variables are used to stand in for classes of things. It's actually no different from using variables in math, except in philosophy there are some conventions regarding which variables represent which types of things--most of which are intuitively obvious. Here are a couple standard ones:
S: This stands for "subject" as in "some person" who is (usually) doing or believing something. For example: Suppose S is walking down the street...or S believes that cats like milk.
p: This stands for "proposition" as in "some assertion" that is either true or false but not both. For example: S believes p. We could substitute any person for 'S' and we could insert any assertion for 'p'.
t: This one's pretty easy. "t" stands for "at some point in time." So, me might say, S believes p at t1.
C: This stands for "some cognitive state". For example, S's belief in p at t1 is a result of C1.
There are others but this should be enough for now... OK, let's check out Goldman's reliablism.
Defining a Reliable Process:
For our purposes, I'm not too concerned about the details of how Goldman eventually arrives at his definition of a reliable process, but I'd like to point out a few important points:
The Project: An Explanation of our Intuitive Sense of Justified Belief
Goldman's project is not to tell us which processes are reliable or even how we can verify if a process is reliable (although this is arguably a problem); what he's trying to do is to give an account of what we mean when we say someone is justified in holding a certain belief. Although it's not made explicit, it's important to notice that his method is to give an account of justification that aligns with our intuitions. In short, his project is descriptive, not prescriptive.
Two Definitions of Reliable Processes
Fairly early in the article, Goldman proposes a definition of a reliable process for forming true beliefs:
(5) If S's believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive process (or set of process), then S's belief in p at t is justified.
Basically he's saying that a justified belief is one which you acquired through a reliable cognitive process (where "reliable" is any process that produces more true beliefs than false ones over the long run).
He then goes on to make a further distinction between the two types of belief-forming processes: belief-dependent and belief-independent. He wants to distinguish these two types because some belief-forming processes (i.e., belief-dependent ones) use beliefs as input, and if the input is false, then the output will also be false. But this shouldn't count as strike against the process.
Consider an example of a belief-dependent process. Suppose you have to do some basic arithmetic for your taxes. If you begin with the wrong numbers (i.e., inputs) then you'll likely come up with wrong totals at the end (i.e., outputs), but this doesn't mean that the rules or processes of arithmetic aren't reliable. It only means that you began with "false beliefs" (i.e., the wrong numbers). If you'd begun with the correct numbers, the rules of arithmetic would have reliably yielded true answers.
Examples of belief-dependent processes might be reasoning and inferences made from memories (if you have a false memory, the inference will also likely be false).
A belief-independent process would be something like beliefs formed from sensory perception. I believe there's a wall in front of me because I see it, not because I'm inputing a prior belief into some cognitive process. I see. I believe. There's no manipulation of an input belief to yield an output belief.
Anyhow, because of these two classes of processes he divides his original formulation in (5) into 2 sub-formulations
(6A) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a belief-independent process that is (unconditionally) reliable, the S's belief in p at t is justified.
(6B) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a belief-dependent process that is (at least) conditionally reliable, and if the beliefs (if any) on which this process operates in producing S's belief in p at t are themselves justified, then S's belief in p at t is justified.
Reliablism vs Other Accounts of Justification
Now that we have definitions for reliable processes, we can compare Goldman's theory with other theories we've encountered thus far. Before doing that, let's just quickly recap what Goldman's theory is.
Reliablism is the idea that a belief is justified if and only if it is the product of a reliable cognitive process. The belief could be true or false; it doesn't matter for justification. The only thing that matters for justification is how the belief was formed. For this reason Goldman calls reliablism an historical or genetic theory. Within epistemology, reliablism is considered an externalist theory because what justifies a belief can be external to the agent's consciousness.
We can compare historical theories with "current time-slice" theories. Current time-slice theories tie a belief's justification to what is true of the believer at the time of the belief: for example, can he give a good argument for his belief? Or is it coherent with his other beliefs? Current-time-slice theories are more generally called internalist theories of justification because what justifies a belief is internal to the agent's conscious awareness.
Let's look at the two current time-slice theories we've encountered so far: First we encountered foundationalism with Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley. Their account of justification is that a belief is justified if and only if the believer can, at that moment, give a sound argument for the belief.
We've also encountered a coherence theory with Russell. Under this theory, a belief is justified if and only if it doesn't conflict with any of the believer's other current beliefs.
Justified Belief without Knowing You're Justified
Unlike those other two theories, reliablism says we can be justified in holding a belief even though we don't know we're justified! How the crap does that work, you ask? Suppose a long time ago you acquired a belief through a reliable cognitive process and have since forgotten why you hold that belief, yet you still hold the belief. That is, if asked, you cannot give a justification for it. However, under reliablism, the mere fact that the belief was acquired via a reliable process means you are justified in holding it despite the fact that you can't give any reasons or arguments for it now.
Objection 1: The Definition Is Too Narrow, It Doesn't Capture All Possible Types of Justification
Goldman anticipates two possible objections to his theory. The first is that his definition of a reliable process excludes justifications for some types of beliefs that we would agree are justified. That is, there are some beliefs that are justified but are not justified because of the process by which they were formed.
These types of beliefs include: beliefs about our current psychological state, intuitive beliefs about elementary logic (e.g., that something cannot both be and not be at the same time), and beliefs about conceptual relationships (all cats are mammals).
His reply to the first type is that we obtain our beliefs about our current psychological state through introspection, which, he argues, is also a type of retrospection and therefore doesn't only rely on a current time-slice of my mental states. Basically, even though it occurs in a very short period of time, a belief (about my own psychological state) is derived from a (reliable) cognitive process that had a (short) causally connected chain of events over time, and so it is captured by his definition of justification.
The second and third types of beliefs are also the result of cognitive processes that, although very quick, involve a chain of beliefs and/or mental states that reach back in time, as opposed to depending only on a set of beliefs and/or mental states that exist at the present time-slice. Therefore, contrary to his critics, they are also captured by his definition.
Objection 2: Is Reliability Sufficient for Justification?
The next objection puts pressure on the notion of reliability as being enough, on its own, for justification. Essentially, Goldman's position is that so long as a process produces more true beliefs than false beliefs, then we can call the process "reliable" and in turn say that the beliefs it produces are justified. In short, if the process is reliable, then the belief is justified.
But there's an easy counter-example: Typically, we think that wishful thinking is not a reliable process for producing true beliefs and therefore justifiable beliefs. However, suppose there's a world in which a benevolent demon (Descartes' evil demon's good little brother) makes everyone's wishes come true. For example, if you believe that pigs fly, then pigs will fly.
In such a world we are forced to say that beliefs derived from wishful thinking are justified (because they produce more true ones than false ones). In this world, wishful thinking is a reliable process. But even though the process is reliable in this case, it seems odd to say the believer is justified in holding the beliefs. We don't want a theory that says wishful thinking is a reliable process.
Reply 1: Accept
One possible reply is to bite the bullet and say, "well, I guess in that world, the process is reliable and so the consequent beliefs are justified". However, some people might resist this because we "know" that wishful thinking isn't normally a reliable process for producing true beliefs and any theory that says wishful thinking is a reliable process for true beliefs is not very good. Let's try a different reply...
Reply 2: Non-manipulated Environments
Another possible reply would be to add a further qualification to the definition that stipulates that a belief is justified if it comes from a process that is reliable in non-manipulated environments. That is, a process is reliable if it functions in "natural" situations, not implausible demon-haunted worlds where the environment is "messed with" in order to mislead us regarding a processes reliability.
Reply 3: Here on Earth
A further possible reply is to add different qualification. We can say that a belief is justified if and only if it results from a process that is reliable here on earth as we know it. Forget about the fantastical on other possible planets where a process that doesn't work here works over there. The only beliefs that we will call justified are the ones that are formed by process that we know to be reliable here on earth, not on crazy philosopher-imagined worlds.
Things to Think About:
Goldman's explanation of what we mean by a justified belief relies heavily on our intuitions on the matter. What role do you think our intuitions play and should play in discerning truth? What should we do if we have internally conflicting intuitions? What if two people or two groups have conflicting intuitions? What is the relationship between intuitions and truth, especially in non-empirical matters such as epistemology and, perhaps, morality?
A Few Possible Problems for Reliablism
The Cartesian Demon:
Suppose there's a Cartesian demon or you're in the matrix (and you haven't taken the blue pill yet). Typically we think of perception as a reliable process thereby creating justified beliefs. So, perception =a reliable process. But in these hypothetical cases, the resulting perceptual beliefs will not be reliably producing true beliefs. So, which is it? Is perception a reliable process or not?
Someone who's a current-time slice theorist (especially Berkeley) doesn't have this problem. He's going to say, "look, all I can know is what I directly perceive, so whether I'm in the matrix or I'm a brian in a vat, I can know what I directly perceive (the clusters of sense data in my conscious experience)".
Mr. Truetemp (Lehere 1990):
Mr. Truetemp, unbeknownst to him, has a thermometer in his head that produces accurate beliefs about the ambient temperature. He walks into a room and says "it's 71 degrees." He has no knowledge about the process by which he acquires the beliefs. Intuitively, it doesn't seem that these beliefs are justified.
Bootstrapping/Circularity (Vogel):
Arguably, reliablism requires that we know that a process is reliable. But how do we independently verify that a process is reliable without appealing to that very same process? For example, consider visual perception: without using your perceptual system, how can you verify that your perceptual system reliably picks out the color red whenever it is present? All you can do is to refer back to past instances, but this involves appealing to your perceptual system and presupposes that it was already reliable previously.
"A topic that ain't given no 'spect"
---Renowned Philosopher D. Gurney
Introduction and Context
So far we've been looking at Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley's account of what is possible for us to know. Common to all their accounts is that in order for our beliefs to be justified, we have to be able to offer some sort of argument. You just can't go running around saying you believe there are tables and chairs without any supporting argument!
In other words, traditionally, justification for a belief entails that the believer
(1) has an argument/reason (i.e., justification) for why they hold their belief,
(2) has conscious access to the justification for their belief,
(3) can present that justification when asked for it.
Goldman disagrees.
He denies 1, 2, and 3!
"A process reliable,
makes justification undeniable,
That defines it for me!"
If you aren't a master at poetic interpretation, Goldman's reliablism is that justification for a belief is a function of the reliability of the process that created the belief. That is, if a belief is acquired through a process that reliably produces more true beliefs than false beliefs, then the believer has a justified belief.
Now here's the crazy part. It doesn't matter if a particular belief produced from a reliable process is false. Reliable processes can sometimes produce false beliefs. To qualify as a reliable process, the process needn't produce true beliefs 100% of the time. This standard is too high. All that is needed is that, in the long run, the process produces more true beliefs than false ones.
To many who see rationality as central to justification, this is a philosophical outrage! To make matters worse, Goldman's going to agree with Gettier in that justification and knowledge are not one and the same: You can have a belief that is justified but that is not knowledge! Before we go on a rampage, leaving behind us a smoldering trail of broken collections of sense-data, let's hear Goldman out...
Vocabulary:
Ok, I lied. We're not going to look at Goldman right away because we first need to cover some vocabulary and explain the alphabet soup of some technical philosophical writing.
Lets get the vocabulary out of the way first:
Explanans vs explanadum (explanada for plural): This is really just a fancy way of referring to the explanation and the-thing-you-are-trying-to-explain. So, explanandum is the thing we're trying to explain; in this case, we're trying to explain what it means for a belief to be justified. The explanans is the explanation that we use to to give an account of the thing we're trying to explain (i.e., the explanandum). Anyhow, these words pop up sometimes in academic philosophy so they're good to know...and now you can impress your friends! (E.g., "What do you suppose the explanans is for why so-and-so broke up?")
Philosophy Alphabet Soup
In contemporary philosophy there can be a lot of "alphabet soup" depending on the philosopher. Variables are used to stand in for classes of things. It's actually no different from using variables in math, except in philosophy there are some conventions regarding which variables represent which types of things--most of which are intuitively obvious. Here are a couple standard ones:
S: This stands for "subject" as in "some person" who is (usually) doing or believing something. For example: Suppose S is walking down the street...or S believes that cats like milk.
p: This stands for "proposition" as in "some assertion" that is either true or false but not both. For example: S believes p. We could substitute any person for 'S' and we could insert any assertion for 'p'.
t: This one's pretty easy. "t" stands for "at some point in time." So, me might say, S believes p at t1.
C: This stands for "some cognitive state". For example, S's belief in p at t1 is a result of C1.
There are others but this should be enough for now... OK, let's check out Goldman's reliablism.
Defining a Reliable Process:
For our purposes, I'm not too concerned about the details of how Goldman eventually arrives at his definition of a reliable process, but I'd like to point out a few important points:
The Project: An Explanation of our Intuitive Sense of Justified Belief
Goldman's project is not to tell us which processes are reliable or even how we can verify if a process is reliable (although this is arguably a problem); what he's trying to do is to give an account of what we mean when we say someone is justified in holding a certain belief. Although it's not made explicit, it's important to notice that his method is to give an account of justification that aligns with our intuitions. In short, his project is descriptive, not prescriptive.
Two Definitions of Reliable Processes
Fairly early in the article, Goldman proposes a definition of a reliable process for forming true beliefs:
(5) If S's believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive process (or set of process), then S's belief in p at t is justified.
Basically he's saying that a justified belief is one which you acquired through a reliable cognitive process (where "reliable" is any process that produces more true beliefs than false ones over the long run).
He then goes on to make a further distinction between the two types of belief-forming processes: belief-dependent and belief-independent. He wants to distinguish these two types because some belief-forming processes (i.e., belief-dependent ones) use beliefs as input, and if the input is false, then the output will also be false. But this shouldn't count as strike against the process.
Consider an example of a belief-dependent process. Suppose you have to do some basic arithmetic for your taxes. If you begin with the wrong numbers (i.e., inputs) then you'll likely come up with wrong totals at the end (i.e., outputs), but this doesn't mean that the rules or processes of arithmetic aren't reliable. It only means that you began with "false beliefs" (i.e., the wrong numbers). If you'd begun with the correct numbers, the rules of arithmetic would have reliably yielded true answers.
Examples of belief-dependent processes might be reasoning and inferences made from memories (if you have a false memory, the inference will also likely be false).
A belief-independent process would be something like beliefs formed from sensory perception. I believe there's a wall in front of me because I see it, not because I'm inputing a prior belief into some cognitive process. I see. I believe. There's no manipulation of an input belief to yield an output belief.
Anyhow, because of these two classes of processes he divides his original formulation in (5) into 2 sub-formulations
(6A) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a belief-independent process that is (unconditionally) reliable, the S's belief in p at t is justified.
(6B) If S's belief in p at t results ("immediately") from a belief-dependent process that is (at least) conditionally reliable, and if the beliefs (if any) on which this process operates in producing S's belief in p at t are themselves justified, then S's belief in p at t is justified.
Reliablism vs Other Accounts of Justification
Now that we have definitions for reliable processes, we can compare Goldman's theory with other theories we've encountered thus far. Before doing that, let's just quickly recap what Goldman's theory is.
Reliablism is the idea that a belief is justified if and only if it is the product of a reliable cognitive process. The belief could be true or false; it doesn't matter for justification. The only thing that matters for justification is how the belief was formed. For this reason Goldman calls reliablism an historical or genetic theory. Within epistemology, reliablism is considered an externalist theory because what justifies a belief can be external to the agent's consciousness.
We can compare historical theories with "current time-slice" theories. Current time-slice theories tie a belief's justification to what is true of the believer at the time of the belief: for example, can he give a good argument for his belief? Or is it coherent with his other beliefs? Current-time-slice theories are more generally called internalist theories of justification because what justifies a belief is internal to the agent's conscious awareness.
Let's look at the two current time-slice theories we've encountered so far: First we encountered foundationalism with Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley. Their account of justification is that a belief is justified if and only if the believer can, at that moment, give a sound argument for the belief.
We've also encountered a coherence theory with Russell. Under this theory, a belief is justified if and only if it doesn't conflict with any of the believer's other current beliefs.
Justified Belief without Knowing You're Justified
Unlike those other two theories, reliablism says we can be justified in holding a belief even though we don't know we're justified! How the crap does that work, you ask? Suppose a long time ago you acquired a belief through a reliable cognitive process and have since forgotten why you hold that belief, yet you still hold the belief. That is, if asked, you cannot give a justification for it. However, under reliablism, the mere fact that the belief was acquired via a reliable process means you are justified in holding it despite the fact that you can't give any reasons or arguments for it now.
Objection 1: The Definition Is Too Narrow, It Doesn't Capture All Possible Types of Justification
Goldman anticipates two possible objections to his theory. The first is that his definition of a reliable process excludes justifications for some types of beliefs that we would agree are justified. That is, there are some beliefs that are justified but are not justified because of the process by which they were formed.
These types of beliefs include: beliefs about our current psychological state, intuitive beliefs about elementary logic (e.g., that something cannot both be and not be at the same time), and beliefs about conceptual relationships (all cats are mammals).
His reply to the first type is that we obtain our beliefs about our current psychological state through introspection, which, he argues, is also a type of retrospection and therefore doesn't only rely on a current time-slice of my mental states. Basically, even though it occurs in a very short period of time, a belief (about my own psychological state) is derived from a (reliable) cognitive process that had a (short) causally connected chain of events over time, and so it is captured by his definition of justification.
The second and third types of beliefs are also the result of cognitive processes that, although very quick, involve a chain of beliefs and/or mental states that reach back in time, as opposed to depending only on a set of beliefs and/or mental states that exist at the present time-slice. Therefore, contrary to his critics, they are also captured by his definition.
Objection 2: Is Reliability Sufficient for Justification?
The next objection puts pressure on the notion of reliability as being enough, on its own, for justification. Essentially, Goldman's position is that so long as a process produces more true beliefs than false beliefs, then we can call the process "reliable" and in turn say that the beliefs it produces are justified. In short, if the process is reliable, then the belief is justified.
But there's an easy counter-example: Typically, we think that wishful thinking is not a reliable process for producing true beliefs and therefore justifiable beliefs. However, suppose there's a world in which a benevolent demon (Descartes' evil demon's good little brother) makes everyone's wishes come true. For example, if you believe that pigs fly, then pigs will fly.
In such a world we are forced to say that beliefs derived from wishful thinking are justified (because they produce more true ones than false ones). In this world, wishful thinking is a reliable process. But even though the process is reliable in this case, it seems odd to say the believer is justified in holding the beliefs. We don't want a theory that says wishful thinking is a reliable process.
Reply 1: Accept
One possible reply is to bite the bullet and say, "well, I guess in that world, the process is reliable and so the consequent beliefs are justified". However, some people might resist this because we "know" that wishful thinking isn't normally a reliable process for producing true beliefs and any theory that says wishful thinking is a reliable process for true beliefs is not very good. Let's try a different reply...
Reply 2: Non-manipulated Environments
Another possible reply would be to add a further qualification to the definition that stipulates that a belief is justified if it comes from a process that is reliable in non-manipulated environments. That is, a process is reliable if it functions in "natural" situations, not implausible demon-haunted worlds where the environment is "messed with" in order to mislead us regarding a processes reliability.
Reply 3: Here on Earth
A further possible reply is to add different qualification. We can say that a belief is justified if and only if it results from a process that is reliable here on earth as we know it. Forget about the fantastical on other possible planets where a process that doesn't work here works over there. The only beliefs that we will call justified are the ones that are formed by process that we know to be reliable here on earth, not on crazy philosopher-imagined worlds.
Things to Think About:
Goldman's explanation of what we mean by a justified belief relies heavily on our intuitions on the matter. What role do you think our intuitions play and should play in discerning truth? What should we do if we have internally conflicting intuitions? What if two people or two groups have conflicting intuitions? What is the relationship between intuitions and truth, especially in non-empirical matters such as epistemology and, perhaps, morality?
A Few Possible Problems for Reliablism
The Cartesian Demon:
Suppose there's a Cartesian demon or you're in the matrix (and you haven't taken the blue pill yet). Typically we think of perception as a reliable process thereby creating justified beliefs. So, perception =a reliable process. But in these hypothetical cases, the resulting perceptual beliefs will not be reliably producing true beliefs. So, which is it? Is perception a reliable process or not?
Someone who's a current-time slice theorist (especially Berkeley) doesn't have this problem. He's going to say, "look, all I can know is what I directly perceive, so whether I'm in the matrix or I'm a brian in a vat, I can know what I directly perceive (the clusters of sense data in my conscious experience)".
Mr. Truetemp (Lehere 1990):
Mr. Truetemp, unbeknownst to him, has a thermometer in his head that produces accurate beliefs about the ambient temperature. He walks into a room and says "it's 71 degrees." He has no knowledge about the process by which he acquires the beliefs. Intuitively, it doesn't seem that these beliefs are justified.
Bootstrapping/Circularity (Vogel):
Arguably, reliablism requires that we know that a process is reliable. But how do we independently verify that a process is reliable without appealing to that very same process? For example, consider visual perception: without using your perceptual system, how can you verify that your perceptual system reliably picks out the color red whenever it is present? All you can do is to refer back to past instances, but this involves appealing to your perceptual system and presupposes that it was already reliable previously.
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Ramblings From "Texas, Yeah Texas" to Carnap
Texas. When this state is mentioned few people have neutral impressions. For people that were born here I'm sure they imagine positive things like friendly people, bbq's, wholesome farm living, and sweet, sweet baby Jesus. For those of us that grew up far from this mystical land we generally imagine negative things such as rednecks, over-consumption (of both food and petroleum products), religious fundamentalism, chewing tobacco, racism, and bigotry. In my short time here (4 days) since Friday I have already experienced most items from both lists. This isn't particularly surprising because like most places, Texas has both the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Rather than focus on the negative I'd like to share a positive experience I had at a mega-walmart--everything IS bigger in Texas--from which I gained the insight that maybe I can be somewhat of a bigot too (gasp!)
After an exasperating encounter with the student housing office of U of H which made Japanese bureaucracy seem intelligible, I resigned myself to the fact that I will not be able to move into my residence until Wednesday. Of course the apt. was empty but don't get me started! My plan was to go camping in Sam Houston National Forest until Wednesday. The forest is only about 1.5 hours outside of Houston and I could spend some quality time alone in the wilderness before the madness of studying and TAing started.
I had my camping gear with me as I had camped on the drive from Vegas to Houston but I needed to pick up some food and more propane and propane accessories. I also thought that since I'd be camping near a lake I might buy an inflatable kayak if I could find one for a reasonable price. When driving from Houston to the campground there is a town called Conroe through which you must pass. I figured I'd stop at the Walmart there, since it was just off the freeway (I'd seen it on the way in) to pick up food and see if Walmart had a boat.
Walmart had the paddles but had sold out of the boat. As I was contemplating what I might do instead I noticed the fishing poles one row over. I have a vague recollection of having fished when I was ten or something but I am by no means a seasoned fisherman. "Hmmm..." I thought, "well, I'll be there for 5 days, if I can catch my own dinner it'll save me from having to make food runs and what's better that fresh fish? How hard can fishing be?"
The guy working the sports and outdoors section was a big ol' Texas country boy. I told him I was going camping for a few days and wanted to fish, could he advise me on what gear I should buy. Well, let me tell you, if you think fishing is a simple matter of attaching a hook to a line on a pole you are wrong! Depending where you are fishing and what you are fishing for you need to select the correct weights, lures, bait, floats, line, pole, cleaning kit, and net.
Stop for a moment. I am about to have my moment of insight. I realize now that I was feeling pretty smug about myself ever since I got accepted into several schools with scholarship. I don't think that smugness ever reached the point of arrogance but it was smugness nonetheless. It wouldn't surprise me if most college grads feel a slight superiority over those who never finished, just as I'm sure many who finished high school might feel the same toward those who never finished. Perhaps it's a normal feeling--those with a higher level of formal education feel, to varying degrees, superior to those below them. Or maybe I'm just an asshole.
Anyway, I asked this Texas country boy to help me "gear up" for fishing. I explained to him that I was a total beginner and didn't have any idea what I was doing. He was so excited to show me and explain to me all the intricacies of fishing. He asked me my budget, what type of fish I wanted to catch, gave me technical advice, demonstrated how to tie the knots. It was plainly obvious that if there were a graduate degree in fishing, this guy would have one. But he did not take his position of superior knowledge to talk over my head, to condescend, or to show off his encyclopedic knowledge of fishing. He answered my questions with kindness and with enthusiasm. He never made me feel small for not knowing what is practically innate to him. Particularly endearing was after completing every explanation he'd interject, "I love fishing....I really love fishing".
I drew two main lessons from this exchange. The first is obvious, that it is much more pleasant to learn from someone who doesn't speak down to you. The second is that I should be more humble. Perhaps I have more formal education than some but it does not mean I have more knowledge. Perhaps the guy at Walmart's depth and breadth of knowledge of fishing far outstrips mine in philosophy--actually, I'm quite sure it does. The knowledge I pursue just happens to be disseminated primarily in formal institutions. His--not so much. It is doubtful that where knowledge is obtained is relevant in ascribing value to it, provided we are defining knowledge as "true justified belief".
This brings up a philosophical issue: Can we ascribe different values to different types of knowledge? Is my knowledge of philosophy more valuable than his knowledge of fishing, or vice versa? Is an MBA more valuable than an MA? That is to say, is practical knowledge more valuable that theoretical knowledge?
I'm not sure what the answer is but I think it might have something to do with the type of life one wants to lead and the degree to which that knowledge helps you pursue that life. He enjoys a life of fishing and knowledge of fishing helps him successfully pursue this life. I'm trying to pursue a life of a philosophy instructor, obviously studying philosophy helps me achieve success in this aim.
But are there areas of knowledge that are universally beneficial, and if so, should we not ascribe more value to knowledge that has universal benefit? I'd like to think that studying some philosophy can enrich everyone's life. It is not domain specific. Learning to think critically is an asset no matter what our specific field of interest. On the other hand, I'm not sure everyone's life will be enriched if they learn the fundamentals of fishing.
So where does this leave us? It seems that there certainly are knowledge domains that universally improve our life quality, some practical, some theoretical. For example, the practical knowledge of how to manage one's money will universally improve the quality of anyone's life. Turning to theoretical knowledge, understanding something about ethics and concepts of justice, for example, can also universally improve people's lives. Finally, there is the more specific type of knowledge, such as that which applies to fishing. It is doubtful that this knowledge will universally enrich people's lives and so in a sense, is not equal to the aforementioned types of knowledge.
Doh! This is the problem with philosophy is no matter what I say, there is usually a counter-arguent. So if I may play devil's advocate to my incoherent ramblings...: "So, what you're saying is we should ascribe value to types of knowledge based on the degree to which they have universal utility. Can you provide an argument for this naked assumption? What's wrong with knowledge for knowledge sake? Why does it have to be useful? Why not measure instead how much pleasure the knowledge brings?"
My reply: "Don't make me go all Carnap on your ass, cuz you know I will...Let us ascribe value to knowledge based on its fruitfulness in achieving the purpose for which it is intended; that is to say, if a particular area of knowledge is meant to bring about universal pleasure, we should value it to the degree to which it does so. Conversely, if a branch of knowledge is meant to have utility, e.g. how to maintain basic hygiene, then let us measure it on those terms."
Carnap, I love you!
Ok, I'm rambling too much. Time for bed. Thanks for reading guys and lemmi know what you think about how we should ascribe value to different types of knowledge.
Rather than focus on the negative I'd like to share a positive experience I had at a mega-walmart--everything IS bigger in Texas--from which I gained the insight that maybe I can be somewhat of a bigot too (gasp!)
After an exasperating encounter with the student housing office of U of H which made Japanese bureaucracy seem intelligible, I resigned myself to the fact that I will not be able to move into my residence until Wednesday. Of course the apt. was empty but don't get me started! My plan was to go camping in Sam Houston National Forest until Wednesday. The forest is only about 1.5 hours outside of Houston and I could spend some quality time alone in the wilderness before the madness of studying and TAing started.
I had my camping gear with me as I had camped on the drive from Vegas to Houston but I needed to pick up some food and more propane and propane accessories. I also thought that since I'd be camping near a lake I might buy an inflatable kayak if I could find one for a reasonable price. When driving from Houston to the campground there is a town called Conroe through which you must pass. I figured I'd stop at the Walmart there, since it was just off the freeway (I'd seen it on the way in) to pick up food and see if Walmart had a boat.
 |
| The parking lot is ONLY for Walmart |
 |
| Walmart in Conroe, TX |
The guy working the sports and outdoors section was a big ol' Texas country boy. I told him I was going camping for a few days and wanted to fish, could he advise me on what gear I should buy. Well, let me tell you, if you think fishing is a simple matter of attaching a hook to a line on a pole you are wrong! Depending where you are fishing and what you are fishing for you need to select the correct weights, lures, bait, floats, line, pole, cleaning kit, and net.
Stop for a moment. I am about to have my moment of insight. I realize now that I was feeling pretty smug about myself ever since I got accepted into several schools with scholarship. I don't think that smugness ever reached the point of arrogance but it was smugness nonetheless. It wouldn't surprise me if most college grads feel a slight superiority over those who never finished, just as I'm sure many who finished high school might feel the same toward those who never finished. Perhaps it's a normal feeling--those with a higher level of formal education feel, to varying degrees, superior to those below them. Or maybe I'm just an asshole.
Anyway, I asked this Texas country boy to help me "gear up" for fishing. I explained to him that I was a total beginner and didn't have any idea what I was doing. He was so excited to show me and explain to me all the intricacies of fishing. He asked me my budget, what type of fish I wanted to catch, gave me technical advice, demonstrated how to tie the knots. It was plainly obvious that if there were a graduate degree in fishing, this guy would have one. But he did not take his position of superior knowledge to talk over my head, to condescend, or to show off his encyclopedic knowledge of fishing. He answered my questions with kindness and with enthusiasm. He never made me feel small for not knowing what is practically innate to him. Particularly endearing was after completing every explanation he'd interject, "I love fishing....I really love fishing".
I drew two main lessons from this exchange. The first is obvious, that it is much more pleasant to learn from someone who doesn't speak down to you. The second is that I should be more humble. Perhaps I have more formal education than some but it does not mean I have more knowledge. Perhaps the guy at Walmart's depth and breadth of knowledge of fishing far outstrips mine in philosophy--actually, I'm quite sure it does. The knowledge I pursue just happens to be disseminated primarily in formal institutions. His--not so much. It is doubtful that where knowledge is obtained is relevant in ascribing value to it, provided we are defining knowledge as "true justified belief".
This brings up a philosophical issue: Can we ascribe different values to different types of knowledge? Is my knowledge of philosophy more valuable than his knowledge of fishing, or vice versa? Is an MBA more valuable than an MA? That is to say, is practical knowledge more valuable that theoretical knowledge?
I'm not sure what the answer is but I think it might have something to do with the type of life one wants to lead and the degree to which that knowledge helps you pursue that life. He enjoys a life of fishing and knowledge of fishing helps him successfully pursue this life. I'm trying to pursue a life of a philosophy instructor, obviously studying philosophy helps me achieve success in this aim.
But are there areas of knowledge that are universally beneficial, and if so, should we not ascribe more value to knowledge that has universal benefit? I'd like to think that studying some philosophy can enrich everyone's life. It is not domain specific. Learning to think critically is an asset no matter what our specific field of interest. On the other hand, I'm not sure everyone's life will be enriched if they learn the fundamentals of fishing.
So where does this leave us? It seems that there certainly are knowledge domains that universally improve our life quality, some practical, some theoretical. For example, the practical knowledge of how to manage one's money will universally improve the quality of anyone's life. Turning to theoretical knowledge, understanding something about ethics and concepts of justice, for example, can also universally improve people's lives. Finally, there is the more specific type of knowledge, such as that which applies to fishing. It is doubtful that this knowledge will universally enrich people's lives and so in a sense, is not equal to the aforementioned types of knowledge.
Doh! This is the problem with philosophy is no matter what I say, there is usually a counter-arguent. So if I may play devil's advocate to my incoherent ramblings...: "So, what you're saying is we should ascribe value to types of knowledge based on the degree to which they have universal utility. Can you provide an argument for this naked assumption? What's wrong with knowledge for knowledge sake? Why does it have to be useful? Why not measure instead how much pleasure the knowledge brings?"
My reply: "Don't make me go all Carnap on your ass, cuz you know I will...Let us ascribe value to knowledge based on its fruitfulness in achieving the purpose for which it is intended; that is to say, if a particular area of knowledge is meant to bring about universal pleasure, we should value it to the degree to which it does so. Conversely, if a branch of knowledge is meant to have utility, e.g. how to maintain basic hygiene, then let us measure it on those terms."
Carnap, I love you!
Ok, I'm rambling too much. Time for bed. Thanks for reading guys and lemmi know what you think about how we should ascribe value to different types of knowledge.
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