Notes and Thoughts on Kuhn's The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions: Part 2
Overview
Kuhn argues that scientific progress comes about when one paradigm is replaced by other. This is in contrast to the view that scientific progress is cumulative, and new theories simply modify existing theoretical structures.
Application of The Revolutionary Model to Contemporary Science
So, the Kuhn model of scientific progress fits pretty well when we apply it to changes in early science from the 16th, 17th, 18th, and some of the 19th Centuries. Clearly, some of those early scientific theories were completely wrong. So much so that if they had been around, even the Insane Clown Posse would have looked, well...sane. Back then, they didn't even know how magnets worked! But what about now? I mean, clearly we've got it right, now; we know how magnets work. So, scientific progress from this point on will be cumulative...or will it? Oh! Snap!
Counter-Example to Kuhn (?)
Clearly, when the Copernican model of the solar system totally annihilated the Ptolemaic model, we are looking at an instance that supports Kuhn's thesis that scientific change is revolutionary. It is not possible to simultaneously hold both theories. One theory--in this case--Ptolemaic astronomy, was relegated to the dust bin of history (I invented that phrase) as per Kuhn's theory. But what about contemporary physics?
In the early 20th Century, Einsteinian physics showed that Newtonian physics was wrong. So, if Kuhn is right, no scientists should be using Newtonian physics. But wait! I know I'm getting on in my years but I'm pretty sure that it was Newtonian physics I was taught in high school (shout out to Mr. Kelly) and I went to high school after the great Einsteinian revolution! Did Mr. Kelly not get the memo? Was he a staunch physics conservative? Was I instead in a history of science class? My head is spinning now! So, many possibilities!
What makes matters worse is that still today, working engineers and physicists use Newtonian physics. Aaaand they even appeal to Einsteinian physics to prove that Newtonian physics works! Appeal to Einstein's theory shows that in limited circumstances, Newtonian physics gives us the right answers. It seems that we can derive Newton's theory from Einstein's. What the crap is going on?
One might reply that, unlike Einstein's theory, Newton's physics only works within a certain domain-- when the relative velocities of bodies being considered are small compared to the speed of light.
But the Newtonians can counter by saying that their theory isn't wrong, it's just that the early proponents applied it to cases for which it does not apply. They over-extended the domain of the theory; they didn't have any evidence to support their claims that Newtonian physics applied to such high relative velocity bodies. When you apply it to its correct domain, it is unproblematic. So, there! Newton rules! Kuhn's wrong.
Kuhn Kounter Attack (*laser sound effects)
Trivial Science
First of all, if we say that theories are immune from criticism provided we ignore all the things they can't explain, and only judge them within the confines of what we already know they explain, then almost every past theory can be protected. This is just stark nonsense!
Also, it makes the use of the theory very restrictive and further scientific development is almost ruled out by definition because, again, the theory can only be used in areas that are already well-known. Research is always conducted within the framework of a theory, and if we already know the areas to which a theory can be applied or not, "progress" will be trivial.
Can Newtonian Physics Really Be Derived from Einsteinian Physics?
K. Shit's about to get a bit technical but don't be scurd. We gong do dis t'getha.
So, we have a set of statements from Einsteinian physics which are the axioms and definitions of the theory; that is the laws and terms. Call them E1, E2, E3...Also we have the axioms of Newtonian physics: N1, N2, N2... The suggestion from the science as evolution camp is that we can derive the N statements from the E statements. In other words, the N statements can be shown to be a sub-set of the E statements; Newtonian physics is a part of the larger Einsteinian physics.
The E statements represent spacial position, time, mass, (and the laws and other definitions in E) and the N statements also include most of these notions. So, it seems like we're talkin' 'bout the same things in both theories; so, maybe we can derive (or translate terms into) the Newtonian statements from the E statements and shew that Newton's laws (the N statements) are just a subsection of a greater whole (the E statements).
But wait! 'member how I said way back in the prollem of cirkilairity that all scientific statements presuppose a background theory? (the technical term is that they are "theory-laden"). Why is this relevant? Because if we look closely, the E terms don't correspond directly with the N terms. E mass refers to something different than N mass--they have different properties. N mass is always conserved but E mass is convertible to energy. So, we can't do a direct translation of E terms to N terms because they refer to fundamentally different things.
The only way to do it would be to import the E concepts into the corresponding N terms, but then the N terms wouldn't be N terms any more, they'd be E terms. So, the N statements cannot be derived from the E statements, so, Newtonian physics cannot be derived as a subset of Einsteinian physics.
The disanalogy of N-mass, N-spacial location, N-time, etc and E-mass, E-spacial location, E-time, etc, might not be as dramatic as other historical examples. (Phlogiston to oxygen [how things burn], corpuscules to waves [how light travels].) However, the fundamental point is that, despite the eeeeeery resemblance of the names of the terms, they do not refer to the same things.
Conclusions
Finally, while it is true that an old theory can be considered a special case of the prevailing theory it must be retrofitted for the purpose with the full benefit of hindsight. Understanding the specific parameters within which Newtonian physics works and why, requires the prior acceptance of Einsteinian physics as the correct model.
Furthermore, while it may be possible to work within Newtonian physics, the prospects for actual scientific progress are very small because it can only be applied to areas where we know it works already--so, no new significant discoveries can be made. In other words, Newtonian physics is good for applied sciences and engineering, but not so much for research that might lead to important advances in new understandings of our universe.
The last point (I promise) is that the prevailing scientific paradigm is the one that defines the research problems and projects. So, by adopting a new paradigm, new research problems emerge and, perhaps, the old one's--now, explained away by the new paradigm--dissolve.
As an example, we can point to the annihilation of the evolutionary model in biology by the intelligent design model of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster. To take one example, previously, evolutionary biologists occupied their time trying to figure out how light sensitive patches on simple organisms evolved into the modern complex eye. Now, under the new correct paradigm they realized this was a false problem and are instead focusing their research energy on trying to figure out how eyeballs evolved from meatballs.
To learn about this new paradigm here's the link...http://www.venganza.org/2011/07/meatball-eyes/
Monday, February 13, 2012
Sunday, February 12, 2012
Is Scientific Progress Cumulative or Revolutionary? Kuhn Part 1
Notes and Thoughts on Thomas Kuhn's The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions
Favourite Quote: "...whatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle."
Overview
Kuhn's view of how science works is that in order for there to be scientific development, one scientific paradigm must be "overthrown" by a new mutually exclusive paradigm. His position is in contrast to the view that science develops incrementally and cumulatively. In short this is about whether scientific progress is best described as evolution or revolution.
The Nature of a Scientific Revolution
Scientific revolution? Vas ist das? Obviously, it's a revolution in which everyone wears lab coats. Oddly, Kuhn has a different idea of what it means. I want to skip though this part fairly quickly soz we can get to the meat of the issue. Basically, Kuhn wants to drahr an analogy between political and scientific revolutions.
Quick definition of terms: by scientific paradigm, I mean an overarching theory upon which other sub-theories depend/are embedded. Examples of paradigm theories are Newtonian physics, phlogiston theory, kinetic molecular theory, and, since it's Darwin day today (yay!) we should, of course, include evolution.
The first parallel is that political revolutions are brought about by a growing belief by a portion of the population that the institutions don't adequately solve the problems that those institutions are designed to solve, and that often the institutions themselves partly contribute to the problem. In short, substitute "paradigm" for every instance of "institution" and you have Kuhn's view of how scientific revolutions come about.
The second parallel is that political revolutions are partly about changing institutions in ways that those institutions, by definition, prohibit. So, for a revolution to be successful, the initial institutions must fundamentally change. This implies (as we are seeing in Egypt, for example) that there will be a transition periode where it's not clear what institutions are doing the governing. Will the pharaohs maintain power and continue to build pyramids or will the Muslims take over and build mosques?
Uncertainty will prevail for a while but eventually, individuals will have to choose one set of institutions over another; and one set of institutions will become de facto. During this period of uncertainty there will be mass campaigns of persuasion--often violent. Again, substitue "paradigm" for every instance of "institution" and you get Kuhn's view of scientific revolutions.
One last note is that, when we are talking about competing sets of institutions there is no objective standard to which we can appeal to choose one over the other. The same goes for scientific paradigms. Kuhn' s not talking about cases where there's overwhelming evidence in favour of one theory, but cases where both paradigms can explain most of the phenomena it aims to describe. The contention of one group is that the way that one paradigm explains things is be preferred.
To summarize, except for the fact that scientific revolutions are often more violent and bloody than political revolutions, Kuhn's basic analogy is that there are significant parallels between the two types. The analogy will allow us to conceptualize in a more familiar way how scientific revolutions occur. Also, these similarities will support his thesis that scientific process requires the destruction of existing theories by new theories; as opposed to the idea that scientific progress is cumulative--i.e., the old is simply modified by the new.
Lets move on...
Changes in Scientific Paradigms that Support the Revolution Hypothesis
So, the general situation we are discussing will look something like this: there are 2 competing paradigms that are both capable of explaining most empirical observations. We can't point to any particular evidence that favours a paradigm because the evidence is only intelligible within a given paradigm; for instance when I talk about electrons, I'm necessarily invoking the atomic model of matter (i.e., paradigm).
The Problem of Circularity
So, check it. Suppose we lived in a pre-quantum mechanics era. The standard atomic model is king of the wooooooooorld. There's no quantum touch healing and no quantum energy healing. People are dying everywhere. In short, it's a horrible place. Now, along come these crazy people that say that understanding matter within the standard atomic model is wrong. We should consider electrons not to be particles but waves.
Notice that we can't talk about electrons without pulling in all the rest of the stuff that goes along with the standard atomic model, and we can't talk about quantum energy waves without bringing in the rest of quantum theory.
The prollem of cirkalairity arises because there isn't a one to one correspondence of terms when discussing competing paradigms. The consequence is that any argument for a paradigm will necessarily presuppose that paradigm. As Kuhn says
"...whatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle."
I'll esplain this in more concrete terms in a bit, but for now, it will suffice to say that cirkalairity is going to be a prollem when a proponent of one paradigm argues with a proponent of a paradigm from another mother.
I lied. One more thing about cirkalairity: A further prollem that derives from the cirkalairity is that logic and empirical evidence alone will not be sufficient to persuade the relevant community toward a particular paradigm. The obvious question then is, how is it decided when one paradigm gets replaced by another? Do scientists arm wrestle over it? Do the cleanest lab coats win? How?
What About New Discoveries?
It's possible that a new discovery could push opinion one way or another but it's going to depend on the nature of the discovery. Consider our paradigm about what is required in an environment for life to exist. If life were discovered on the moon--an environment our current paradigm holds as hostile to (native) life--we'd have to change our paradigm. But if life were discovered in the unknown reaches of the universe, we'd have to know more about that environment before our paradigm changed.
Similarly, sometimes new discoveries connect previously unconnected theories. This is the case with the theory of energy conservation which links dynamics, chemistry, alectricity, optics, and thermal energy.
In short, new discoveries do not guarantee support for one paradigm over another. Sometimes they are compatible with both, inconclusive, or connect the previously unconnected.
Importantly, new discoveries reveal something new about the natural order of the world, but do nothing to influence our decision regarding the preferred theoretical framework within which to describe the discovery.
What About Science as a Cumulative Enterprise?
Why all this crazy talk about revolutionary overthrow of paradigms? Kuhn's obviously just read too much Marx and Hegel. Why can't we just say science is cumulative? You know...we have a theory about something and then we discover something that doesn't fit our theory so we adjust the theory. This happens over and over. There are no crazy revolutions going on. We just take new information in the context of what we know. When we have to, we adjust our theory so it best fits empirical observation.
Ok, says Kuhn, I'll grant this is true in normal research. Scientists wearing lab coats choose for their research projects problems that can be solved with the concepts and instrumental techniques already and close to those already existence. The direction of their research will be influenced by the phenomena their existing working model predicts or areas of the model that need to be filled in. This is obvious enough. Scientists don't just do random research. There's always some expectation of result which is defined by the paradigm within which they work.
The consequence of this is that anomalies will be rare to the degree that the working theory incorrectly predicts and/or the scientist incorrectly deduces and/or incorrectly uses his test tubes and bunsen burner. Otherwise stated, it will be the amount of different types of anomalies and their inability to be assimilated into the prevailing paradigm that give rise to (hehe, I said "give rise") the issue of competing paradigms. For the existing paradigm, the anomaly will be just that--an anomaly; but a new paradigm might redender the anomaly law-like.
At some point, given enough or recalcitrant enough anomalies, a new paradigm will be proposed and the people in lab coats will have to decide to choose one or the other. If they choose the new one, by definition they must reject the other. Since the rejection of paradigms is what marks revolution, it is Kuhn's model that best describes how scientific progress is made, not the cumulative model.
A further point for Kuhn is that since two paradigms will have, by definition, different logical consequences, they will predict different things. If the cumulative model is correct and we hold on to our old theory after we have accepted the new one, then we will have differing predictions from within the same scientific field. But this isn't what happens (when there is consensus), the predictions derived from the new theory will crush the heads of the beliefs of the first, and so, the old theory is necessarily displaced by the new. This is as opposed the the old theory assimilating the new, and science proceeding in a cumulative fashion.
So, where we at? Basically, Kuhn's argument is that scientific progress isn't cumulative but revolutionary. It requires the rejection of previous theories by new ones, rather than the assimilation of the new by the old. Part 2 coming up!
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Objective Moral Values Don't Exist: J. L. Mackie Part 2
Notes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong; The Subjectivity of Values
Recap
So, what were we talkin' 'bout? Ah! yes, that there are no objective moral values. Let's look a little more closely at what that might mean...
Standards of Evaluation
What might it mean to say there are no objective moral values? One possible interpretation is that value statements can't be true or false. For example, the statement "helping little old ladies across the street" isn't true or false. It has no truth value because, as we learned with Ayer, moral statements refer to emotional attitudes--not states of affairs or things--so can't be true or false.
Despite this, Mackie--contrary to Ayer--says value statements can be true or false even if there are no objective values! I know what you're thinking...how does that work? And how do magnets work? To support his position he says evaluations are made all the time in relation to agreed and assumed standards.
For instance, consider a beauty competition or figure skating competition: judges make evaluations based on standards or qualities that are particular to the contest. The judges evaluate each competitor in relation to the predetermined standards of the competition. The degree to which a competitor meets the standards will be an objective matter. That is, "contestant x meets the criteria of gracefulness" can be subject to evaluation in terms of truth or falsity. Comparative evaluations like "competitor x was more graceful than competitor y" will also be subject to truth/falsity considerations.
The main point here is that you can have objective judgements even when those judgment are in respect to subjective standards. Of course, there is also subjective interpretation of what the standards mean, but it is still possible to make objective judgments based on subjective standards. If your head is spinning, here's an example to illustrate.
Consider the value judgments of 'just' and 'unjust'. If someone is convicted of a crime even though the court knows he is innocent, we make the objective statement that such an event would be unjust. Our standard of what constitutes injustice is subjective--we define it into existence; it is a case like the one in the example. But our judgment about whether our subjectively defined standard has been obtained in a particular instance (like in the example) is objective.
Aarg! I don't like that example, let me try another to make it clearer. Suppose you enter a 100 meter race. You finish the race 1st but the judges award the prize to the 3rd place finisher. Now, the standard to determine what constitutes winning was set prior to the race; but it was subjective. It could have been whoever runs 101 meters fastest, 102 meters fastest, 103 meters; or who finishes 2nd, whoever finishes 3rd...you get the point. The race could have been judged by many standards. There is nothing objective/special about about the standards.
The standard by which the contestants would be judged was totally subjective. But, determining whether a contestant meets that predetermined subjective standard is objective. So, because you met the predetermined subjective standard of judgement but were denied your just deserts, we can objectively call this situation 'unjust. Whew! That was complicated. I should have just started with that example.
So, what's Mackie's next move? He says something to the effect that, sure, we can make objective statements about whether something is just, but simply saying something is just or unjust still leaves open the question whether there is an objective requirement to do what is just and refrain from what is unjust." All we have learned is that we can say something is just or unjust. But this has nothing to do with whether there is an objective obligation to do one or the other. All we've accomplished is to say that a given act or event is just/unjust.
We could reply to Mackie that what compels us to prefer what is just over what is unjust is that justice is desirable. The problem with this answer is that while it may be true that justice is desirable, the fact that we desire something has no relation to its objective existence. If I could desire things into existence, it would be a wonderful world indeed! A herd of unicorns for me!
Recap
So, what were we talkin' 'bout? Ah! yes, that there are no objective moral values. Let's look a little more closely at what that might mean...
Standards of Evaluation
What might it mean to say there are no objective moral values? One possible interpretation is that value statements can't be true or false. For example, the statement "helping little old ladies across the street" isn't true or false. It has no truth value because, as we learned with Ayer, moral statements refer to emotional attitudes--not states of affairs or things--so can't be true or false.
Despite this, Mackie--contrary to Ayer--says value statements can be true or false even if there are no objective values! I know what you're thinking...how does that work? And how do magnets work? To support his position he says evaluations are made all the time in relation to agreed and assumed standards.
For instance, consider a beauty competition or figure skating competition: judges make evaluations based on standards or qualities that are particular to the contest. The judges evaluate each competitor in relation to the predetermined standards of the competition. The degree to which a competitor meets the standards will be an objective matter. That is, "contestant x meets the criteria of gracefulness" can be subject to evaluation in terms of truth or falsity. Comparative evaluations like "competitor x was more graceful than competitor y" will also be subject to truth/falsity considerations.
The main point here is that you can have objective judgements even when those judgment are in respect to subjective standards. Of course, there is also subjective interpretation of what the standards mean, but it is still possible to make objective judgments based on subjective standards. If your head is spinning, here's an example to illustrate.
Consider the value judgments of 'just' and 'unjust'. If someone is convicted of a crime even though the court knows he is innocent, we make the objective statement that such an event would be unjust. Our standard of what constitutes injustice is subjective--we define it into existence; it is a case like the one in the example. But our judgment about whether our subjectively defined standard has been obtained in a particular instance (like in the example) is objective.
Aarg! I don't like that example, let me try another to make it clearer. Suppose you enter a 100 meter race. You finish the race 1st but the judges award the prize to the 3rd place finisher. Now, the standard to determine what constitutes winning was set prior to the race; but it was subjective. It could have been whoever runs 101 meters fastest, 102 meters fastest, 103 meters; or who finishes 2nd, whoever finishes 3rd...you get the point. The race could have been judged by many standards. There is nothing objective/special about about the standards.
The standard by which the contestants would be judged was totally subjective. But, determining whether a contestant meets that predetermined subjective standard is objective. So, because you met the predetermined subjective standard of judgement but were denied your just deserts, we can objectively call this situation 'unjust. Whew! That was complicated. I should have just started with that example.
So, what's Mackie's next move? He says something to the effect that, sure, we can make objective statements about whether something is just, but simply saying something is just or unjust still leaves open the question whether there is an objective requirement to do what is just and refrain from what is unjust." All we have learned is that we can say something is just or unjust. But this has nothing to do with whether there is an objective obligation to do one or the other. All we've accomplished is to say that a given act or event is just/unjust.
We could reply to Mackie that what compels us to prefer what is just over what is unjust is that justice is desirable. The problem with this answer is that while it may be true that justice is desirable, the fact that we desire something has no relation to its objective existence. If I could desire things into existence, it would be a wonderful world indeed! A herd of unicorns for me!
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Objective Moral Values Don't Exist: Mackie Part 1
Mackie on Objectivity/Subjectivity
Mackie's Arguments from Relativity and Queerness
Notes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Part 1
Intro
Mackie represents the position in meta-ethics known a moral skepticism. As you may have guessed, his position is typified by a strong belief in a god and objective moral values. Jk. lol. Actually, moral skepticism can be interpreted in two ways: (1) the belief there there is no such thing as morality; (2) there is no way to objectively define moral values. Mackie is of the second kind.
Moral Skepticism
The first sentence in his book reads: "There are no objective moral values". Many philosophers have fretted over how to interpret this cryptic statement. Does he mean that there are no objective moral values or does he mean there are no objective moral values? It's pretty ambiguous, but for now we'll interpret him as saying that there are no objective moral values.
OK, but lets get a little more specific about what this means. Moral values include concepts like good, evil, wrong, duty, and obligation. More generally, we can also include in his position any value statement, including those of aesthetics. Objective means there is some absolute standard for these terms because they are real qualities. So, 'good' will apply to the same things everywhere in the universe, in every situation--as will the other value statements like 'ugly', 'beautiful', and 'wrong'.
Well, lets examine a possible philosophical objection to Mackie's claim that there are no objective moral values. (1) Oh! Yeah!? On second thought, perhaps this objection is too tough to deal with right away. Lets deal with something a little easier.
(2) "Well, Mr. Smarty pants, if you don't think there's any real difference between a 'good' and 'bad' action then you are saying punching you right in the nose ("POW") and giving you a lollipop are of equal merit." Mackie's response is that we are confusing the issue: we need to distinguish between an act, how we describe the act, and how we ascribe value to the act. These distinctions and their relevance in determining the existence of objective moral values can be better understood when we consider first and second order questions in ethics...
First and Second Order Questions
So, within ethics we have first and second order questions. First order questions deal with questions like "how ought we to act?" "what are my duties to myself and what are my duties to my community". In first order ethical questions, values (whatever they may be) are usually presupposed. Second order questions involve issues in the realm of meta-ethics. These are questions like what "what is a value?"; "what does 'good' or 'bad' mean?"; "in cases of moral disagreement, what is at issue?".
Some suggest we do linguistic analysis to figure out what people are referring to when they use moral concepts--maybe this will tell us what moral values are. But, perhaps all this really tells is the conventional usage for the value term in question. Consider an analogy with our perceiving the colour red. We could do a linguistic analysis of what people are referring to when they say "I see 'red' people". They can describe the experience of seeing 'red' and what it's like.
But what is the act of perceiving red? Red is when a light at a certain frequency comes through the retina...something something...then stimulates the optical nerve (hehe...I said "stimulates")...something something...then stimulates visual cortex...etc. What I refer to when I use the word 'red' and what perception of red entails are two completely different things. For this reason, Mackie doesn't think linguistic analysis will help us solve our problem of understanding what a value is.
Hume made a similar argument that went a little somethin' like this: what does the concept 'bad' refer to? If I observe a bad act and examine it under a microscope, will I observe the property of badness? Nope. But notice we are now asking another class of question: Does badness exist and if so, in what sense?
These questions of existence also second order questions but concern ontology (having to do with existence). So, people can argue all day about what the concept of 'good' or 'bad' means and maybe I can give a complete definition; but in what sense can we say that 'good' and 'bad' exist in any intelligible way? Is badness something that I can touch? taste? feel? smell? how many quarks does it have? etc...if not, in what sense is it real?
Just because I can define something doesn't make it real: I can define unicorns but it doesn't make them real...or does it? (jk, lol) So, finding out what a word means does little work in helping us discover whether it exists or not.
Is Objectivity a Real Issue?
Some people might respond to Mackie by saying it's poppycock. The ontological status of values is irrelevant (i.e., it doesn't matter that we can't figure out in what sense they exist). Consider two basic positions on morality: the subjectivist (thinks moral values are subjective) and the objectivist (there is only one True moral code and they are the objective moral values).
Regardless of your position, we all have some idea as to what it means to think or say something is 'wrong'. Some people (subjectivists) say it expresses an attitude of disproval; others (objectivists) say it's a moral intuition, but the outcome will be the same; the two camps will understand each other. So what's the dealy-yo? It seems that whether one is a subjectivist or an objectivist, people are still concerned about the same things and the subjectivist world is indistinguishable from an objectivist world...or is it! Oh! Snap! Here comes Mackie!
How does an objectivist come to know values? Well, for the objectivist, values are real and exist in "the fabric of the world"; so, objectivists have some spider sense that can detect the values. (When two objectivist disagree, obviously someone's spider senses aren't working properly--usually the other person's.)
But we can see how the two views will differ when we consider how a subjectivist moral concerns are acquired or changed. When a subjectivist acquires or changes a value it's because something new has developed on their emotive side. In the case of an act they consider 'wrong', they develop an repugnance and they express the repugnance with the word or thought 'wrong'.
But what about if we found that there were certain things that were universally condemned or valued? Wouldn't that shew the existence of objective moral values? Nope. In the unlikely case of this happening it would only shew that all people share some values, not that those values exist. If our beliefs caused things to exist, our universe would be a truly remarkable place, indeed! (I love it when I can end a sentence with "indeed!"; I do indeed!)
Suppose an objectivist, after deep quantum spiritual contemplation of the universe, realizes that doing x is wrong (maaaaan!). Does his proclamation that x is wrong make it so? Is a person or group's proclamation enough to make something really exist? Nope. But what if they really know, I mean like, they can just feel they're right. Nope. No, man, you don't understand because you're not in tune with the universe/god/nature like I am...blah! blah! blah!
So, to quickly summarize, some sort of statement of the ontological status of values is going to matter if our ethical theories are going to be able to give (or not give) a coherent account of how we come to know values; and in the case of subjectivists, how we come to change values.
Part 2 tomorrow, if you can stand the suspense!
Mackie on Objectivity/Subjectivity
Mackie's Arguments from Relativity and Queerness
Mackie's Arguments from Relativity and Queerness
Notes and Thoughts on J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Part 1
Intro
Mackie represents the position in meta-ethics known a moral skepticism. As you may have guessed, his position is typified by a strong belief in a god and objective moral values. Jk. lol. Actually, moral skepticism can be interpreted in two ways: (1) the belief there there is no such thing as morality; (2) there is no way to objectively define moral values. Mackie is of the second kind.
Moral Skepticism
The first sentence in his book reads: "There are no objective moral values". Many philosophers have fretted over how to interpret this cryptic statement. Does he mean that there are no objective moral values or does he mean there are no objective moral values? It's pretty ambiguous, but for now we'll interpret him as saying that there are no objective moral values.
OK, but lets get a little more specific about what this means. Moral values include concepts like good, evil, wrong, duty, and obligation. More generally, we can also include in his position any value statement, including those of aesthetics. Objective means there is some absolute standard for these terms because they are real qualities. So, 'good' will apply to the same things everywhere in the universe, in every situation--as will the other value statements like 'ugly', 'beautiful', and 'wrong'.
Well, lets examine a possible philosophical objection to Mackie's claim that there are no objective moral values. (1) Oh! Yeah!? On second thought, perhaps this objection is too tough to deal with right away. Lets deal with something a little easier.
(2) "Well, Mr. Smarty pants, if you don't think there's any real difference between a 'good' and 'bad' action then you are saying punching you right in the nose ("POW") and giving you a lollipop are of equal merit." Mackie's response is that we are confusing the issue: we need to distinguish between an act, how we describe the act, and how we ascribe value to the act. These distinctions and their relevance in determining the existence of objective moral values can be better understood when we consider first and second order questions in ethics...
First and Second Order Questions
So, within ethics we have first and second order questions. First order questions deal with questions like "how ought we to act?" "what are my duties to myself and what are my duties to my community". In first order ethical questions, values (whatever they may be) are usually presupposed. Second order questions involve issues in the realm of meta-ethics. These are questions like what "what is a value?"; "what does 'good' or 'bad' mean?"; "in cases of moral disagreement, what is at issue?".
Some suggest we do linguistic analysis to figure out what people are referring to when they use moral concepts--maybe this will tell us what moral values are. But, perhaps all this really tells is the conventional usage for the value term in question. Consider an analogy with our perceiving the colour red. We could do a linguistic analysis of what people are referring to when they say "I see 'red' people". They can describe the experience of seeing 'red' and what it's like.
But what is the act of perceiving red? Red is when a light at a certain frequency comes through the retina...something something...then stimulates the optical nerve (hehe...I said "stimulates")...something something...then stimulates visual cortex...etc. What I refer to when I use the word 'red' and what perception of red entails are two completely different things. For this reason, Mackie doesn't think linguistic analysis will help us solve our problem of understanding what a value is.
Hume made a similar argument that went a little somethin' like this: what does the concept 'bad' refer to? If I observe a bad act and examine it under a microscope, will I observe the property of badness? Nope. But notice we are now asking another class of question: Does badness exist and if so, in what sense?
These questions of existence also second order questions but concern ontology (having to do with existence). So, people can argue all day about what the concept of 'good' or 'bad' means and maybe I can give a complete definition; but in what sense can we say that 'good' and 'bad' exist in any intelligible way? Is badness something that I can touch? taste? feel? smell? how many quarks does it have? etc...if not, in what sense is it real?
Just because I can define something doesn't make it real: I can define unicorns but it doesn't make them real...or does it? (jk, lol) So, finding out what a word means does little work in helping us discover whether it exists or not.
Is Objectivity a Real Issue?
Some people might respond to Mackie by saying it's poppycock. The ontological status of values is irrelevant (i.e., it doesn't matter that we can't figure out in what sense they exist). Consider two basic positions on morality: the subjectivist (thinks moral values are subjective) and the objectivist (there is only one True moral code and they are the objective moral values).
Regardless of your position, we all have some idea as to what it means to think or say something is 'wrong'. Some people (subjectivists) say it expresses an attitude of disproval; others (objectivists) say it's a moral intuition, but the outcome will be the same; the two camps will understand each other. So what's the dealy-yo? It seems that whether one is a subjectivist or an objectivist, people are still concerned about the same things and the subjectivist world is indistinguishable from an objectivist world...or is it! Oh! Snap! Here comes Mackie!
How does an objectivist come to know values? Well, for the objectivist, values are real and exist in "the fabric of the world"; so, objectivists have some spider sense that can detect the values. (When two objectivist disagree, obviously someone's spider senses aren't working properly--usually the other person's.)
But we can see how the two views will differ when we consider how a subjectivist moral concerns are acquired or changed. When a subjectivist acquires or changes a value it's because something new has developed on their emotive side. In the case of an act they consider 'wrong', they develop an repugnance and they express the repugnance with the word or thought 'wrong'.
But what about if we found that there were certain things that were universally condemned or valued? Wouldn't that shew the existence of objective moral values? Nope. In the unlikely case of this happening it would only shew that all people share some values, not that those values exist. If our beliefs caused things to exist, our universe would be a truly remarkable place, indeed! (I love it when I can end a sentence with "indeed!"; I do indeed!)
Suppose an objectivist, after deep quantum spiritual contemplation of the universe, realizes that doing x is wrong (maaaaan!). Does his proclamation that x is wrong make it so? Is a person or group's proclamation enough to make something really exist? Nope. But what if they really know, I mean like, they can just feel they're right. Nope. No, man, you don't understand because you're not in tune with the universe/god/nature like I am...blah! blah! blah!
So, to quickly summarize, some sort of statement of the ontological status of values is going to matter if our ethical theories are going to be able to give (or not give) a coherent account of how we come to know values; and in the case of subjectivists, how we come to change values.
Part 2 tomorrow, if you can stand the suspense!
Mackie on Objectivity/Subjectivity
Mackie's Arguments from Relativity and Queerness
Sunday, February 5, 2012
What is Law? Baby Don't Hurt Me, Don't Hurt Me, No More...
Ok, before I start I just want to note that there are clearly different ideas of social conventions. Take for example the person who is sitting across the room from me blabbing on her phone. The parameters: It's Saturday night, I'm in my favourite study place (the laundry room) which is, I acknowledge, a public space. It is however Saturday night and with the exception of a couple fools with no life like myself, the building is empty. She can see I'm studying. My books are open. They're not comic books. It's not like there's nowhere else to go in the building. There's a lounge around the corner. Oh, well...
Notes and Thoughts on H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law: Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules
Overview
I know what you're thinking: this is going to be the most exciting thing to read--ever! Well, I can't promise you that, but I'll do my best to make it into your top 3. From the point of view of philosophy of law, H. L. A. Hart is pretty exciting. Lemmi 'splain why. So, in my last entry on philosophy of law we looked at Aquinas' naturalistic conception of the law, which expresses one of the poles on the continuum of answers to the question of "what is law". On the other pole is Austin and "positive law". I didn't write anything about his position but basically the central debate in philosophy of law (in modern secular terms) is over the role of morality in law.
To recap both positions, Augustine thinks that human law (what we now generically refer to as "law") is only legitimate to the extent that it expresses divine law (i.e. morality). A strong interpretation of Augustine's position is that if a law is unjust (i.e., inconsistent with divine law/morality) then one is not compelled to obey it. This interpretation raises some interesting issues that I might discuss later.
Austin, on the other hand, is all "dude! if it's a law in the books, then it's a law. Sayin' a law is immoral is one thing, but saying it's not a law, and you don't need to obey it is another." For Austin, a law must be obeyed to the extent that it emanates from a legitimate political entity; its content is irrelevant. Actually, he has a pretty awesome quote to summerize his position:
Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God...the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up...An exception, demurrer, or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the present moment. (my italics)
Regardless of where you stand on the continuum, the main issues arise out of your answer to what you think is the relationship between morality and law. Does law have to reflect morality? Does law arise out of morality? Does the legitimacy of law arise out of its relationship to morality or the political institutions from which it was promulgated? What is our obligation, as citizens, to obey laws? And out of what does that obligation arise? Under what conditions should we disobey the law?
Of course there are more questions, but you get the picture: our answer to how law and morality are related is going to heavily influence how we answer the above questions. Ultimately, by trying to understand the relationship between law and morality we also approach an answer to the question, "what is law?" (baby don't hurt me, baby don't hurt me, no more)
So, anyway, around the middle of the 20th Century, H. L. A. Heart comes along and is all, like, "guys, check it out, I've got an idea that everyone can enjoy..." Yay!
HOLY CRAP, THAT CHICK IS STILL TALKING!
Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules
Primary Rules
Yo, check it. Imagine you is in a jungle tribe (because all tribes lives in jungles). There's no formal government or legal system--i.e., courts, legislature, etc...So, what would allow these tribespeople that hunt with spears and play drums all time (all tribes hunt with spears and play drums all the time) to co-exist with each other? Well, it would be the general attitude of the tribe towards its own standard behavioural norms--i.e., the degree to which they adhere to their social conventions and customs. Hart calls these customs the primary rules.
All systems of primary rules, in order for people to co-exist along side each other, must contain (1) some form of restriction on the free use of violence, theft, and deception. Such rules are found in every primitive society along with various positive obligations toward contributing to the society (unless it's a libertarian society, in which case everyone else can go screw themselves).
(2) The second set of conditions required in a society having only primary rules is that the number of people who support a given rule must be in the majority, otherwise there would not be sufficient social pressure to ensure conformity. So, in any primitive society there will be individuals who try to or do break the rules or object to the rules, but the majority will always live by the prevailing rules/customs.
Problems With Having Only Primary Rules
Consider the following situation: I am a world famous DJ (call me DJ QWanTum NRG) living in a primitive pre-legal society and I want to remake the early 90s classic hit "What is Love". It is custom in our tribe to ask permission from the original artist to remake a song, especially if it's going to be a techno-trance remix, which happens to be my speciality. (Every detail in this hypothetical situation is of vital importance). Unfortunately, Haddaway (the original artist who also lives in my tribe) went-a-way for a hol-i-day. Well, I've got a rave to DJ tonight and I can't wait for him to come back this-a-way. I need to know now.
Anyway, to make a long story short, I play my awesome remix and er'body loves it so much they say I should change my name to DJ Jesus. The following Saturday, I run into Haddaway. He says I broke one of the customs and now should be sentenced to hang by my thumbs. I say, "well, I didn't know I have to ask about doing a remix, I just thought we do that to be polite." And Haddaway is all, "no, for this custom you are obliged to follow it, otherwise you will be punished". And I'm all, "well, if I had-a-way of knowing things were that-a-way, I wouldn't have played my remix; it's not clear what customs are suggested practice and which are rules must be followed."
This totally plausible example summarizes would happen in hypothetical society with only primary rules (customs) where there was a disagreement on whether a rule applied to a situation or not; or that there was even a rule that applied. In a system of only customs, how is it to be determined if a custom is a rule of etiquette that is polite and optional (e.g., table manners, RSVPing, social conventions) but not obligatory, or a rule to which adherence is obligatory.
In a society with no legal system, there would be no procedure or criteria for differentiating: they won't have any official book or authority that can resolve the dispute because this would imply a secondary set of rules: rules concerning how to resolve disputes about the degree of adherence required for a given primary rule. A primitive system of only primary rules will have a problem with uncertainty, because of an absence of rules prescribing how to resolve such situations.
A second problem with such a primitive system is that its rules will be static. Since there are no rules about how to change rules, a society will not be able to adapt where and when appropriate. The only way primary rules can be introduced is if they, by random happenstance, move from being optional, to habitual, to obligatory. For rules to be eliminated, deviations that were previously punished will start to go unpunished, until such infractions go unnoticed.
The third problem with our hypothetical primitive society's system is that of inefficiency. Rules are only enforced by social pressure, but what happens in borderline cases where it isn't clear if a custom was broken or not? Some might think a custom was violated, others not. With no rules for resolving such situations, our tribe's system is very inefficient.
The Solutions: Secondary Rules
You guessed it: we need secondary rules--rules that outline how to deal with problems of uncertainty, staticity, and inefficiency in a system of primary rules. Also, it is interesting to note that it is the introduction of secondary rules that brings about what we recognize as a legal system. So, what are secondary rules? They are the rules about the primary rules. They concern how primary rules can be ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.
Secondary Rules for Uncertainty: The Rule of Recognition
The first and most important of the the secondary rules is "the rule of recognition" which addresses the problem of uncertainty. How do we know what rules are socially polite to follow (e.g., table manners) but not obligatory, and what rules are obligatory and whose transgression are followed by sanction? The rule of recognition tells us! The rule of recognition might be something as simple as "whatever Bob says is law" or "look at the tablets God gave to Moses'" to something as sophisticated as, "if it passes votes in both legislative houses by a 2/3rd majority and isn't vetoed by el presidente". The point is, when there is a rule of recognition, there is some way for individuals to know what customs are obligatory to follow and which aren't.
Secondary Rules for Overcoming "Staticness": Rules of Change
If we want our society to have a way to change rules we need rules on how to change those rules, which are called the rules of change. These rules can be simple or complex. A simple rule of change would be that a certain individual (the head DJ of the tribe) gets to decide whether a primary rule can be introduced, eliminated, or modified.
There will be a close relationship between the rules of change and the rules of recognition because introducing a new rule or repealing an old rule will also require the rule of recognition to tell us what is and/or isn't a rule. The simpler the legal system, the closer the rule of recognition will resemble the rules of change.
A contemporary instance of a primary rule changing can be observed in US states where there are attempts to extend marriage laws to include gay couples. The procedures the advocates are going through are the rules of change for the respective state legal systems.
Secondary Rules for Overcoming Inefficiency: Rules of Adjudication
Under a system of only primary rules, compliance is brought about purely through social pressure. How do we decide in ambiguous cases if someone has broken a primary rule? This is where rules of adjudication come in: these are rules about what individuals get to decide if a primary rule was broken and how (i.e., judges, courts, lawyers, jurisdiction, and judgement). Rules of adjudication will also include what sort of penalties are are acceptable for different classes of transgressions of the primary rules.
Conclusion
Returning to the original issue of the relationship between morality and law, we are in a better position to evaluate the matter now that we have a clearer picture of what law is. Within Hart's framework, we can ask internal and external questions about law. Internal questions are about whether a certain law applies to a given situation--that is, is a given law valid? Does it meet the criteria of the rule of recognition? Answers to questions of validity will involve analysis of the secondary rules: Is the primary rule (i.e., law) legitimate in regards the rule of recognition?
External questions are about the secondary rules that confer legitimacy on a particular law. Such questions might include: is it good that the only thing that makes a law valid is that DJ Jesus said it's valid? Maybe there should be other criteria for validity...
Notice two things. In Hart's model we aren't questioning the moral worth of particular laws, we can only question whether they are valid and whether they apply to a particular situation. However, as we enter the realm of external questions, we enter the realm of values, but not about particular primary laws...
So, I ask you: What is law? Baby don't hurt me, baby don't hurt me, no more...
Notes and Thoughts on H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law: Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules
Overview
I know what you're thinking: this is going to be the most exciting thing to read--ever! Well, I can't promise you that, but I'll do my best to make it into your top 3. From the point of view of philosophy of law, H. L. A. Hart is pretty exciting. Lemmi 'splain why. So, in my last entry on philosophy of law we looked at Aquinas' naturalistic conception of the law, which expresses one of the poles on the continuum of answers to the question of "what is law". On the other pole is Austin and "positive law". I didn't write anything about his position but basically the central debate in philosophy of law (in modern secular terms) is over the role of morality in law.
To recap both positions, Augustine thinks that human law (what we now generically refer to as "law") is only legitimate to the extent that it expresses divine law (i.e. morality). A strong interpretation of Augustine's position is that if a law is unjust (i.e., inconsistent with divine law/morality) then one is not compelled to obey it. This interpretation raises some interesting issues that I might discuss later.
Austin, on the other hand, is all "dude! if it's a law in the books, then it's a law. Sayin' a law is immoral is one thing, but saying it's not a law, and you don't need to obey it is another." For Austin, a law must be obeyed to the extent that it emanates from a legitimate political entity; its content is irrelevant. Actually, he has a pretty awesome quote to summerize his position:
Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God...the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up...An exception, demurrer, or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the present moment. (my italics)
Regardless of where you stand on the continuum, the main issues arise out of your answer to what you think is the relationship between morality and law. Does law have to reflect morality? Does law arise out of morality? Does the legitimacy of law arise out of its relationship to morality or the political institutions from which it was promulgated? What is our obligation, as citizens, to obey laws? And out of what does that obligation arise? Under what conditions should we disobey the law?
Of course there are more questions, but you get the picture: our answer to how law and morality are related is going to heavily influence how we answer the above questions. Ultimately, by trying to understand the relationship between law and morality we also approach an answer to the question, "what is law?" (baby don't hurt me, baby don't hurt me, no more)
So, anyway, around the middle of the 20th Century, H. L. A. Heart comes along and is all, like, "guys, check it out, I've got an idea that everyone can enjoy..." Yay!
HOLY CRAP, THAT CHICK IS STILL TALKING!
Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules
Primary Rules
Yo, check it. Imagine you is in a jungle tribe (because all tribes lives in jungles). There's no formal government or legal system--i.e., courts, legislature, etc...So, what would allow these tribespeople that hunt with spears and play drums all time (all tribes hunt with spears and play drums all the time) to co-exist with each other? Well, it would be the general attitude of the tribe towards its own standard behavioural norms--i.e., the degree to which they adhere to their social conventions and customs. Hart calls these customs the primary rules.
All systems of primary rules, in order for people to co-exist along side each other, must contain (1) some form of restriction on the free use of violence, theft, and deception. Such rules are found in every primitive society along with various positive obligations toward contributing to the society (unless it's a libertarian society, in which case everyone else can go screw themselves).
(2) The second set of conditions required in a society having only primary rules is that the number of people who support a given rule must be in the majority, otherwise there would not be sufficient social pressure to ensure conformity. So, in any primitive society there will be individuals who try to or do break the rules or object to the rules, but the majority will always live by the prevailing rules/customs.
Problems With Having Only Primary Rules
Consider the following situation: I am a world famous DJ (call me DJ QWanTum NRG) living in a primitive pre-legal society and I want to remake the early 90s classic hit "What is Love". It is custom in our tribe to ask permission from the original artist to remake a song, especially if it's going to be a techno-trance remix, which happens to be my speciality. (Every detail in this hypothetical situation is of vital importance). Unfortunately, Haddaway (the original artist who also lives in my tribe) went-a-way for a hol-i-day. Well, I've got a rave to DJ tonight and I can't wait for him to come back this-a-way. I need to know now.
Anyway, to make a long story short, I play my awesome remix and er'body loves it so much they say I should change my name to DJ Jesus. The following Saturday, I run into Haddaway. He says I broke one of the customs and now should be sentenced to hang by my thumbs. I say, "well, I didn't know I have to ask about doing a remix, I just thought we do that to be polite." And Haddaway is all, "no, for this custom you are obliged to follow it, otherwise you will be punished". And I'm all, "well, if I had-a-way of knowing things were that-a-way, I wouldn't have played my remix; it's not clear what customs are suggested practice and which are rules must be followed."
This totally plausible example summarizes would happen in hypothetical society with only primary rules (customs) where there was a disagreement on whether a rule applied to a situation or not; or that there was even a rule that applied. In a system of only customs, how is it to be determined if a custom is a rule of etiquette that is polite and optional (e.g., table manners, RSVPing, social conventions) but not obligatory, or a rule to which adherence is obligatory.
In a society with no legal system, there would be no procedure or criteria for differentiating: they won't have any official book or authority that can resolve the dispute because this would imply a secondary set of rules: rules concerning how to resolve disputes about the degree of adherence required for a given primary rule. A primitive system of only primary rules will have a problem with uncertainty, because of an absence of rules prescribing how to resolve such situations.
A second problem with such a primitive system is that its rules will be static. Since there are no rules about how to change rules, a society will not be able to adapt where and when appropriate. The only way primary rules can be introduced is if they, by random happenstance, move from being optional, to habitual, to obligatory. For rules to be eliminated, deviations that were previously punished will start to go unpunished, until such infractions go unnoticed.
The third problem with our hypothetical primitive society's system is that of inefficiency. Rules are only enforced by social pressure, but what happens in borderline cases where it isn't clear if a custom was broken or not? Some might think a custom was violated, others not. With no rules for resolving such situations, our tribe's system is very inefficient.
The Solutions: Secondary Rules
You guessed it: we need secondary rules--rules that outline how to deal with problems of uncertainty, staticity, and inefficiency in a system of primary rules. Also, it is interesting to note that it is the introduction of secondary rules that brings about what we recognize as a legal system. So, what are secondary rules? They are the rules about the primary rules. They concern how primary rules can be ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.
Secondary Rules for Uncertainty: The Rule of Recognition
The first and most important of the the secondary rules is "the rule of recognition" which addresses the problem of uncertainty. How do we know what rules are socially polite to follow (e.g., table manners) but not obligatory, and what rules are obligatory and whose transgression are followed by sanction? The rule of recognition tells us! The rule of recognition might be something as simple as "whatever Bob says is law" or "look at the tablets God gave to Moses'" to something as sophisticated as, "if it passes votes in both legislative houses by a 2/3rd majority and isn't vetoed by el presidente". The point is, when there is a rule of recognition, there is some way for individuals to know what customs are obligatory to follow and which aren't.
Secondary Rules for Overcoming "Staticness": Rules of Change
If we want our society to have a way to change rules we need rules on how to change those rules, which are called the rules of change. These rules can be simple or complex. A simple rule of change would be that a certain individual (the head DJ of the tribe) gets to decide whether a primary rule can be introduced, eliminated, or modified.
There will be a close relationship between the rules of change and the rules of recognition because introducing a new rule or repealing an old rule will also require the rule of recognition to tell us what is and/or isn't a rule. The simpler the legal system, the closer the rule of recognition will resemble the rules of change.
A contemporary instance of a primary rule changing can be observed in US states where there are attempts to extend marriage laws to include gay couples. The procedures the advocates are going through are the rules of change for the respective state legal systems.
Secondary Rules for Overcoming Inefficiency: Rules of Adjudication
Under a system of only primary rules, compliance is brought about purely through social pressure. How do we decide in ambiguous cases if someone has broken a primary rule? This is where rules of adjudication come in: these are rules about what individuals get to decide if a primary rule was broken and how (i.e., judges, courts, lawyers, jurisdiction, and judgement). Rules of adjudication will also include what sort of penalties are are acceptable for different classes of transgressions of the primary rules.
Conclusion
Returning to the original issue of the relationship between morality and law, we are in a better position to evaluate the matter now that we have a clearer picture of what law is. Within Hart's framework, we can ask internal and external questions about law. Internal questions are about whether a certain law applies to a given situation--that is, is a given law valid? Does it meet the criteria of the rule of recognition? Answers to questions of validity will involve analysis of the secondary rules: Is the primary rule (i.e., law) legitimate in regards the rule of recognition?
External questions are about the secondary rules that confer legitimacy on a particular law. Such questions might include: is it good that the only thing that makes a law valid is that DJ Jesus said it's valid? Maybe there should be other criteria for validity...
Notice two things. In Hart's model we aren't questioning the moral worth of particular laws, we can only question whether they are valid and whether they apply to a particular situation. However, as we enter the realm of external questions, we enter the realm of values, but not about particular primary laws...
So, I ask you: What is law? Baby don't hurt me, baby don't hurt me, no more...
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Hurrah/Boo Theory of Ethics: A. J. Ayer Part 2
The Case for Emotivism
Recap
In part 1 we looked at Ayer's arguments against the idea that any value assertion (e.g. "x is good/right/bad") by subjectivism, utilitarianism, or absolutism is not reducible to any testable claim, and is therefore meaningless, except as expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval. So, for example, if I say "premarital sex is baaaaaaaaaaaad" there is nothing that I can measure this claim against to test whether it's true except the attitude of disapproval.
Coincidentally, my friend, Dr. Nima just made a video that (unintentionally, I'm sure) closely demonstrates Ayer's idea of what moral assertions reduce to. Watch this video before proceeding so we can use it as a paradigm. The emotivism starts at 1:20.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Jt6hN6QQ6wo#!
Ok, now keep that video in mind as we explore Ayer's theory...
Emotivism
As we saw in part 1, ethical concepts are unanalysable because there is no criterion by which we can test their validity. So, value/moral words like "right/good/bad/evil" add nothing to the content of a sentence. For instance, if I say "Dude! you're hurting me and that's baaaaad", the content of that sentence is really just "Dude! you're hurting me!" because that's the only verifiable part of the sentence (i.e., I can check to see if I'm hurting you). The "that's baaaaad" part is simply the speaker indicating that they disapprove; it's like saying "you're hurting me!" with extra emphasis or, if I wrote it, with extra exclamation marks--or in caps lock if I'm really upset! The value language doesn't add any meaning to the sentence--it only displays approval or disapproval about the verifiable part of the sentence. It's just like the snowboarder and the spine's various iterations of "dude!"
Lets take Ayer's example of someone who says "stealing money is wrong". Since the "is wrong" part has no content I'm really just saying "stealing money!!!!!" in a certain tone and expressing moral disapproval. What is important is the "is wrong" portion cannot be shown to be true or false; it is unverifiable. Maybe someone disagrees with me and has different feeling about stealing. But there is no way for either of us to prove the other wrong--no matter how many exclamation points I put at the end of the sentence, and no matter how much he shrugs his shoulders when he says "stealing money". In sum, no one can say they are right because there is no way to verify the proposition. Simply put, there is nothing objective against which we can verify value claims.
How Is It Different from Subjectivism?
Ayer is saying that moral claims express emotional attitudes--i.e., hurray! or boo!-- toward acts or things. How is this different from the subjectivist? Subjectivism, as you surely recall, is the idea that values arise out of a person's or culture's attitudes toward acts and/or things. For instance, a subjectivist might argue that slavery is bad because it elicits feelings of moral repugnance in our society.
The distinction is this, the subjectivists say that our emotional attitude toward slavery is the very thing that makes it "bad", whereas Ayer says that our emotional attitudes don't ascribe value. He is merely giving a description of a person's attitude toward something. Think of it this way, is the fact that I feel that eating rabbits is evil sufficient to make it evil? Nope. What if our whole society thought eating rabbits was evil? Still, probably not.
Ayer's point is that our emotional attitude toward things has no bearing on their moral value (in fact, there are no moral values, only moral attitudes), whereas the subjectivist says that moral value arises out of individual or collective emotional values. So, Ayer would say that someone or a culture asserting "eating rabbits is wrong" is simply someone saying "eating rabbits!!!" with a certain tone and the "is wrong part" just refers to a particular attitude (boo!) expressed in the tone of voice. The subjectivist thinks that "eating rabbit!!!" with the same negative tone and attitude is what makes feeding rabbits wrong.
Also, as we have seen, moral declarations aren't translatable into anything that can be verified--only attitudes, and so have no content. The subjectivist thinks moral assertions have content.
But Don't People Actually Dispute Value Claims?
Ok, I need to do more reading on other things tonight so I'm going to go through this pretty quickly, my apologies if my explanations aren't explicit enough.
Anyone who has come into contact with another human being can attest to having what seem like genuine disputes about values. But if Ayer is right, and value statements aren't really about values but just expressions of "hooray" or "boo", what's happening in these situations? Are we having a competition to see who can say "hooray" or "boo" the strongest? Admittedly, it sometimes seems that way...Consider Dr. Nima's video, for example.
Ayer's reply to this objection is that, if we look at our disputes more carefully, we are actually disputing facts. So--at least until they totally disintegrate into verifiable "hooray/boo--offs"--people usually use arguments to support their positions. What are the arguments usually about? Maybe a misperceived motive of action? (e.g., I didn't mean to cut you off) or misjudged effects of an action? (e.g., "now, you've ruined everything!" "no, look, we can do x, y, z and everything will be fine"). Maybe it's about incomplete knowledge ("you don't care about me cuz you didn't call me last night" "My phone fell in the toilet..."). Anyhow, generally in arguments we are arguing about an interpretation of empirical facts, not over values.
It's plausible that most of the time we are arguing over facts, when it's with someone who grew up in the same social environment. But there are times where both parties agree on the facts but still disagree on the moral value of an action. In such cases, we throw up our hands and say it's impossible to argue with them because the person has a distorted (from our perspective) sense of values. We, invariably consider our set of moral values to be superior. But, once we've agree on the empirical facts of a dispute, there are no arguments we can make for why our particular set of values is better than another's, so we resort to verbal abuse. Constructive argument stops because there is nothing factual (i.e. empirically verifiable) that we can refer to make our case.
We can only resolve moral arguments if we presuppose an already present system of values. E.g., "Killing your enemy is good" "No, it's not". "Yes it is, it says so right here verse 22 of the Upanishad--the one True book (i.e., presupposed shared system of values). If the two parties have agreed on the facts but disagree on the values, there's nothing they can reference to resolve the dispute.
That's what Ayer says anyway. Most people think there is some sort of universal morality. That's fine. But what about cases where reasonable people disagree on what the right thing to do is? Is one person just wrong? Does historical and cultural context matter? Can we resolve it by saying "dude!" with different emphasis and tones? It's situations like these where Ayer's emotivism comes crashing in.
Recap
In part 1 we looked at Ayer's arguments against the idea that any value assertion (e.g. "x is good/right/bad") by subjectivism, utilitarianism, or absolutism is not reducible to any testable claim, and is therefore meaningless, except as expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval. So, for example, if I say "premarital sex is baaaaaaaaaaaad" there is nothing that I can measure this claim against to test whether it's true except the attitude of disapproval.
Coincidentally, my friend, Dr. Nima just made a video that (unintentionally, I'm sure) closely demonstrates Ayer's idea of what moral assertions reduce to. Watch this video before proceeding so we can use it as a paradigm. The emotivism starts at 1:20.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Jt6hN6QQ6wo#!
Ok, now keep that video in mind as we explore Ayer's theory...
Emotivism
As we saw in part 1, ethical concepts are unanalysable because there is no criterion by which we can test their validity. So, value/moral words like "right/good/bad/evil" add nothing to the content of a sentence. For instance, if I say "Dude! you're hurting me and that's baaaaad", the content of that sentence is really just "Dude! you're hurting me!" because that's the only verifiable part of the sentence (i.e., I can check to see if I'm hurting you). The "that's baaaaad" part is simply the speaker indicating that they disapprove; it's like saying "you're hurting me!" with extra emphasis or, if I wrote it, with extra exclamation marks--or in caps lock if I'm really upset! The value language doesn't add any meaning to the sentence--it only displays approval or disapproval about the verifiable part of the sentence. It's just like the snowboarder and the spine's various iterations of "dude!"
Lets take Ayer's example of someone who says "stealing money is wrong". Since the "is wrong" part has no content I'm really just saying "stealing money!!!!!" in a certain tone and expressing moral disapproval. What is important is the "is wrong" portion cannot be shown to be true or false; it is unverifiable. Maybe someone disagrees with me and has different feeling about stealing. But there is no way for either of us to prove the other wrong--no matter how many exclamation points I put at the end of the sentence, and no matter how much he shrugs his shoulders when he says "stealing money". In sum, no one can say they are right because there is no way to verify the proposition. Simply put, there is nothing objective against which we can verify value claims.
How Is It Different from Subjectivism?
Ayer is saying that moral claims express emotional attitudes--i.e., hurray! or boo!-- toward acts or things. How is this different from the subjectivist? Subjectivism, as you surely recall, is the idea that values arise out of a person's or culture's attitudes toward acts and/or things. For instance, a subjectivist might argue that slavery is bad because it elicits feelings of moral repugnance in our society.
The distinction is this, the subjectivists say that our emotional attitude toward slavery is the very thing that makes it "bad", whereas Ayer says that our emotional attitudes don't ascribe value. He is merely giving a description of a person's attitude toward something. Think of it this way, is the fact that I feel that eating rabbits is evil sufficient to make it evil? Nope. What if our whole society thought eating rabbits was evil? Still, probably not.
Ayer's point is that our emotional attitude toward things has no bearing on their moral value (in fact, there are no moral values, only moral attitudes), whereas the subjectivist says that moral value arises out of individual or collective emotional values. So, Ayer would say that someone or a culture asserting "eating rabbits is wrong" is simply someone saying "eating rabbits!!!" with a certain tone and the "is wrong part" just refers to a particular attitude (boo!) expressed in the tone of voice. The subjectivist thinks that "eating rabbit!!!" with the same negative tone and attitude is what makes feeding rabbits wrong.
Also, as we have seen, moral declarations aren't translatable into anything that can be verified--only attitudes, and so have no content. The subjectivist thinks moral assertions have content.
But Don't People Actually Dispute Value Claims?
Ok, I need to do more reading on other things tonight so I'm going to go through this pretty quickly, my apologies if my explanations aren't explicit enough.
Anyone who has come into contact with another human being can attest to having what seem like genuine disputes about values. But if Ayer is right, and value statements aren't really about values but just expressions of "hooray" or "boo", what's happening in these situations? Are we having a competition to see who can say "hooray" or "boo" the strongest? Admittedly, it sometimes seems that way...Consider Dr. Nima's video, for example.
Ayer's reply to this objection is that, if we look at our disputes more carefully, we are actually disputing facts. So--at least until they totally disintegrate into verifiable "hooray/boo--offs"--people usually use arguments to support their positions. What are the arguments usually about? Maybe a misperceived motive of action? (e.g., I didn't mean to cut you off) or misjudged effects of an action? (e.g., "now, you've ruined everything!" "no, look, we can do x, y, z and everything will be fine"). Maybe it's about incomplete knowledge ("you don't care about me cuz you didn't call me last night" "My phone fell in the toilet..."). Anyhow, generally in arguments we are arguing about an interpretation of empirical facts, not over values.
It's plausible that most of the time we are arguing over facts, when it's with someone who grew up in the same social environment. But there are times where both parties agree on the facts but still disagree on the moral value of an action. In such cases, we throw up our hands and say it's impossible to argue with them because the person has a distorted (from our perspective) sense of values. We, invariably consider our set of moral values to be superior. But, once we've agree on the empirical facts of a dispute, there are no arguments we can make for why our particular set of values is better than another's, so we resort to verbal abuse. Constructive argument stops because there is nothing factual (i.e. empirically verifiable) that we can refer to make our case.
We can only resolve moral arguments if we presuppose an already present system of values. E.g., "Killing your enemy is good" "No, it's not". "Yes it is, it says so right here verse 22 of the Upanishad--the one True book (i.e., presupposed shared system of values). If the two parties have agreed on the facts but disagree on the values, there's nothing they can reference to resolve the dispute.
That's what Ayer says anyway. Most people think there is some sort of universal morality. That's fine. But what about cases where reasonable people disagree on what the right thing to do is? Is one person just wrong? Does historical and cultural context matter? Can we resolve it by saying "dude!" with different emphasis and tones? It's situations like these where Ayer's emotivism comes crashing in.
The Hoorah/Boo Theory of Ethics: A. J. Ayer Part 1
Notes and Thoughts on A. J. Ayer's Critique of Ethics and Theology
Favourite Quote: "The propositions which describe the phenomena of moral experience must be assigned to psychology or sociology. The exhortations to moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provoke the reader to action of a certain sort...A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements. But it should, by giving an analysis of ethical terms, show what is the category to which all such pronouncements belong."
Overview
A. J. Ayer's ethical philosophy is known as emotivism, which is sometimes known as hoorah/boo theory. Basically, he argues that our moral inclinations and expressions are only reducible to emotional attitudes of approval or disapproval, hence hoorah/boo theory. Moral statements and judgments have no meaning beyond that.
Emotivism is grounded in the epistemology of verificationism, which is idea that if the contents of a statement about the world don't correspond to something in the world (that can be empirically verified) then it is a meaningless statement (i.e. it has not content). We should be able to verify all statements for truth or falsity, if they are to have any meaning. For example, if I say "my car has four wheels", that is a meaningful statement because it is saying something about the world that can be empirically verified--you can look at my car and count the wheels and test if the statement is true of false.
Ayer wants to argue that value statements are empirical but their content doesn't correspond to what most people think it does. For example, if I said, "you ought to help old ladies across the street", we must ask, what does "ought" correspond to in the empirical world? What could I check this against in the real world to verify whether the statement is true?
One possible answer is that these statements correspond to moral facts. But how do I measure a moral fact? Where are they? Can I touch them? Feel them? Taste them? See them? Hear them? This is a problem.
Another possible answer is that value statements like "x is good" or "one ought to x" correspond to empirical statements like "x produces happiness" or "doing x produces happiness". As we will see this solution has problems too. Ayer's answer is that value statements/judgments only reduce to the attitudes of "hooray" or "boo", not empirical statements.
One possible answer is that these statements correspond to moral facts. But how do I measure a moral fact? Where are they? Can I touch them? Feel them? Taste them? See them? Hear them? This is a problem.
Another possible answer is that value statements like "x is good" or "one ought to x" correspond to empirical statements like "x produces happiness" or "doing x produces happiness". As we will see this solution has problems too. Ayer's answer is that value statements/judgments only reduce to the attitudes of "hooray" or "boo", not empirical statements.
Argument Against Judgments of Value
Ayer begins by considering a possible argument against his verificationist, emotivist position. Lets define a few terms before we get into it. The first is speculative knowledge. Think of a philosopher sitting in his chair smoking a pipe thinking about how the world works (that's wut we duz). The product of this enterprise is speculative knowledge (he achieved the speculative knowledge through reasoning). It is the type of knowledge we acquire through reflection and application of principles of reason. Opponents of Ayer argue that from speculative knowledge we can identify two distinct kinds: (a) those which relate to empirical facts about the world, and (b) those that are statements of value. Ayer wants to say that speculative knowledge is of only one kind--(a)-type; there is no (b)-type.
Lets look at (a) statements first. Imagine you are a world famous detective and you are looking for an excaped (i.e., wearing a cape shaped like an 'x') criminal. The criminal cut himself on the barbed wire while jumping over the prison fence (he used to be an olympic high jumper). You notice there are droplets of blood every 10 feet or so. Using principles of reason you speculate that if you follow the trail of blood you'll find the criminal.
This scenario is an example of using speculative reason which relates to empirical facts about the world. If you are so inclined you can test your statement "following the trail of blood will lead to the criminal"; that is, you can test whether the content of the statement matches up with the real world. Also notice, that this type of speculative reason allows you to make predictions that can be verified, i.e., "if I follow the trail of blood, I'll find the criminal".
This scenario is an example of using speculative reason which relates to empirical facts about the world. If you are so inclined you can test your statement "following the trail of blood will lead to the criminal"; that is, you can test whether the content of the statement matches up with the real world. Also notice, that this type of speculative reason allows you to make predictions that can be verified, i.e., "if I follow the trail of blood, I'll find the criminal".
Consider (b) statements, that is, statements of value. Lets use the usual example, "one ought to help little old ladies across the street". Opponents of Ayer want to argue that these statements are empirical statements about the real world, but unlike the (a)-type statements, we can't use them to make predictions about the world. They are a special branch of empirical statement that, despite their inability to be used for predictions, nevertheless do express something about the world.
Ayer's Account of Judgments of Value: Can Ethical Statements Be Translated Into Statements of Empirical Fact?
As I mentioned briefly in the introduction, Ayer thinks value statements/judgements do correspond to something empirical, and that is the psychological states of "boo" or "hooray". He says
We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary "scientific" statements; and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true or false.
What does this mean? The short version is that value statement do reduce to something empirical (emotional states of hoorah/boo) but don't reduce to anything empirically verifiable any more significant than hoorah/boo. To examine his argument we need to look at how it applies to propositions that express definitions of ethical terms and determine whether statements of ethical value can be restated in terms that are empirically verifiable. Lets see if we can get value statements to translate into empirically verifiable statements...
Case 1: Vs. Subjectivist and Utilitarian Account of Ethics
Quick terminology lesson: Subjectivists think that statements about the rightness of an act can be translated in terms of statements about the feelings of approval which a particular person or group feels toward the action. So, for a subjectivist, if a person or community says "helping little old ladies across the street is good", it is equivalent to saying "I/we have feelings of approval toward helping little old ladies across the street".
Utilitarians think that statements about the rightness of an act can be translated into statements about the pleasure or happiness that arise from the act. For example, if a utilitarian says, "helping little old ladies across the street is good" it is equivalent to saying "helping little old ladies across the street increases happiness and/or pleasure".
As I have shewn, both subjectivists and utilitarians believe that ethical statements can be translated into empirical statements of fact about subjective feeling or happiness, respectively. Ayer sets out to prove this claim false. To do so he relies on something similar to the naturalistic fallacy that we saw in G. E. Moore. Lets deal with subjectivism first:
For a subjectivist saying something is good is equivalent to saying something is approved of by a person or community. I.e., that feeling of approval are what make the thing good. But there are plenty of example of things that are approved of but aren't good (many of these examples might depend on where you sit on the political spectrum). But, to use some historical examples, how about slavery and treating women as less than men? These were approved of, but maybe not so good...Because of these (and plenty of other) counter examples we see that statements about what's good cannot be reduced to statements about someone's feelings of approval.
The utilitarian will have a similar problem. Recall that he says that statements about good can be reduced to empirical statements about what produces the most happiness and/or pleasure. I.e., The capacity to produce happiness is what makes something/an action good. Well, heroin produces a lot of pleasure and happiness, does that mean passing out free heroin is good? (Only if it comes from Bangladesh, I hear). There is no shortage of examples of actions that produce happiness and/or pleasure that few in their right mind would equate with 'good'.
In sum, we can't say "x is good" is equivalent to "x brings about feelings of approval" or "x is good" is equivalent to "x brings about happiness". There are plenty of things we could plug in for 'x' that would show the sentences in each pair are not equivalent. Ayer concludes that, whatever 'good' is, it is not empirically calculable. In the man's own words "[o]ur contention is simply that, in our language, sentences which contain normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences which express psychological propositions, or indeed empirical propositions of any kind."
Well, if subjectivism is wrong, and utilitarianism is wrong, maybe moral absolutism is the way to go?
Case 2: Vs. Moral Absolutism
What's moral absolutism? Obviously, it's the moral theory that pretty much anything goes--whatever you feel like doing is fine. Ha! jk. lol. Ok, for realz, think religion (but not necessarily). There are whatever rules are written in a holy text, and those are the absolute moral rules. There's no room for leniency. The laws are constitutive of morality for all time. Acting against or changing the laws would be considered immoral. Usually, along with moral absolutism comes the idea that all humans have some special (we're special!) power to know what is right and wrong (this is the intuitionist branch). We don't need no fancy books, we can just feel what's right in our hearts.
Of course, absolutism makes its statements of value unverifiable because we can't look inside the heads, nay! the hearts! of others to determine if they're really feeling what's right or just walking through the motions. But wait, lets not be so dismissive. Lets suppose absolutism is true and people can just sense what's right and wrong. How then do we explain the wide variety of moral views in the world, or even within families? How do we explain people voting for George W. Bush 2x in a row? Oooh! ad hominem! How do we reconcile conflicting moral intuitions? Do we have a "feel off" to determine who feels they're right the strongest? That'd be cool to watch.
Conversely, when it comes to empirical statements we can objectively test the truth value of the statement. Ethical statements about what is good or right or evil from an absolutist or intuitionist have no empirical test to which they can appeal. So, we can conclude that ethical statements made by absolutists and their ilk (I just wanted to say that word) are unverifiable, although they may be saying something. But here's the dealee-yo: We want to say that synthetic statements (statements that require some sort of verification to determine truth value) are only significant (i.e., have meaning) if they are empirically verifiable. But under the absolutist model, moral propositions might be about something, but their truth value is not verifiable; so of what use are they?
I'll try to finish this up tomorrow with a part 2...g'nite
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